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Standardization of Some Names
Various sources quoted in the text have spelled names of some places and persons related to 
the eastern Iranian borderlands differently. To avoid conufusion, the following chart is 
designed in alphbetic order to show these variations in comparison to the standard spelling 
adapted by the author in accordance with the standard persian pronounciation of these names.
Standard Spelling Some variations of Spelling
Afghanistan Affghanistan
Amin as-Sultan Amin es-Sultan
Amir Mir, Meer, Ameer, Emir, Emeer
Asadollah Assadullah, Asadullah, Assadollah
Asef ad-Doleh Asif ul-DowIah, Ausef ad-Dowleh
Avaz Awaz, Ahwaz
Baluchistan Baloochistan, Boluchistan
Band Bond, Bund, Bandar
Dasht Dusht
Dizak Dizuk, Dizzuk
Doroh Doruh, Duroh
Dust Mohammad Dost Moh.,..
Esfandk Isfanduk, Ispandak, Esfanduk, Ispanduk
Esmail Ismael, Ismail
Fakhred-Din Fahrettin
Ferdosi Firdosi, Firdausi
God-e Zereh God-i-Zarih, Gud-i-Zirrah, God-i-Zirreh
Guater Gwuttar, Gwatter
Hesam ad-Doleh Hisam ud Dowleh, Hisam al-Dowlah, Hiss am
Heshmat al-Molk Hashmat-ul-Mulk, Hishamt ul Mulk
Hezb-e Tudeh Hizb-i Tudah, Hizb-i-Tudeh
Hirmand Helmand, Helmund,
Hozdar Hauzdar
Jahanabad Jehanabad, Jihanabad
Jalalabad Jelalabad, Jilalabad
Kabul Kabol, Cabul
Kalat Kelat,Khelat, Khalat
Kalateh Kelata, Kelateh, Kelatah
Kariz Karez
Khark Island Kharg, Kharaj
XIV
Khoajeh 
Khotbeh 
Kohandel Khan 
Kuhak
Kuh-e Gadayaneh
Kuh-e Khoajeh
Makran
Mashhad
Mehrdel Khan
Mirjaveh
Mirza
Moazez al-Molk 
Mohammad 
Moshir ad-Doleh 
Musa Abad 
Nader Shah 
Namakzar 
Naserabad 
Neizar 
No
Nosratabad
Parian
Pordel Kkan
Qadim
Qaen
Qaenat
Qajar
Qaleh
Qaleh Fath
Qanat
Qandehar
Qasre-qand
Qoran
Sadiq
Saduzaei
Safavid
Sanjideh
Seyyed
Sarbaz
Sardar
Khawajah, Khowajeh 
Khootbeh, Khatbah 
Kohandil Khan, Kuh indil Khan 
Kuhok
Kuh-i-Kadanna, Kadaoneh, Kadaona
Kuh-i-Khojah, Kuh-e Khoja
Mekran, Mukran
Mehed, Mashed, Meshad
Mehrdil Khan
Mirjawa, Mirjawah
Meerza
Muaziz ul-Mulk
Mahomad, Mahomed, Muhamad, Mehmet
Mushir ul-Dowleh, Mushir ad-Dowleh
Musabad, Musaabad
Nadir Shah
Namaksar
Nasirabad
Naizar
Nau
Nasratabad
Pariun
Pordil Khan, Purdil Khan 
Kadim
Kain, Qain, Kayen 
Kainat, Kayanat, Qayinat 
Kajar 
Kala
Kala-i-fath
Kanat
Kandahar, Candahar, Qandihar 
Kasrirkand, Kasserkund 
Koran
Sadik, Saddik 
Sudozye 
Safaveean 
Sanjitti
Saiyad, Sayud 
Sirbaz, Surdaz 
Sirdar, Surdar
XV
Sarhang
Sarkar
Sartip
Savar
Shir-Ali Khan 
Sistan
Shokat al-Molk 
Taher 
Tappeh 
Tehran
Torbat-e Heidariyeh
YaminNezam
Yaqub
Yavar
Zahedan
Zahir ad-Doleh
Zurabad
Surhang 
Sirkar, Surkar 
Surtip 
Sawar
Sher Ali Khan 
Seistan
Shaukat-ul-Mulk, Shaukat al-Molk 
Tahir
Tappa, Tapp-i 
Teheran
Turbat-i- Heidari
Yarain-e Nezam, Yamin-i-Nizam
Yakub
Yawar
Zahidan
Zahir ul-Dowlah, Zuheer-ool-Dwlah 
Zarabad, Zorabad
A B S T R A C T
This thesis is an historiographic examination of the 
emergence of Eastern Iranian boundaries. It examines the 
dual impact of Anglo-Russian geopolitics of the nineteenth 
century, and the nature of centre-periphery relationships 
within Iran's political system. Iran's political decisions 
in respect to her eastern flanks appear to have been mostly 
made in response to the impact of the so-called Great Game of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries played by 
Britain and Russia in the East. Meanwhile, the political 
centre in Iran appears to have revelled in the tradition of 
leaving political events on the geographical peripheries of 
the country to the provincial political actors without 
modifying and/or strengthening the ancient structure of 
centre-periphery relationships. These arguments bring the 
thesis to its central discussion.
It has continuously been argued that "monopolism" of 
political power throughout most of the history has meant that 
the centre was solely responsible for making and implementing 
all decisions in Iran. This argument neglects the fact that 
the provincial political units, especially the 
frontier-keeping states of Iran were more effective in 
shaping the political geography of Iran's borderlands. This 
notion constitutes the overall hypothesis of this work which 
will be partly examined in the general introduction, and in 
part, in the subsequent chapters.
The schematic model of Jean Gottmann's "Iconography" forms 
the basis for some theoretical frameworks within which the 
hypothesis will be examined. In this context, the 
frontier-keeping state "Amirdom" of Khozeimeh of Eastern 
Iranian borderlands provides the best example of Iran's 
traditional political system. The historical background, 
political structure and regional role of the Khozeimeh 
Amirdom is first examined, followed by an account of the 
Amirdom's foreign relations.
2A brief introduction to the historical background of the 
political process which led to the partitioning of Greater 
Khorasan and separation of Herat is given. The hypothesis 
here is that these political processes set the stage for the 
emergence of Eastern Iranian boundaries largely to suit the 
strategic needs of British India.
The actual delimitation and demarcation of the Khorasan and 
Baluchistan boundaries is examined. The hypothesis is 
proposed that the impact of the role of Khozeimeh Amirdom 
locally influenced the shape of these boundaries in favour of 
Iran. Evolution of the Sistan boundaries is discussed in 
which the impelling role of the Khozeimeh Amir of the time 
became more apparent. The second boundary arbitration of 
Sistan is reviewed which took place at the time when the role 
of the frontier-keeping Amirdom of Khozeimeh was largely 
undermined by the Iranian central authorities. The contrast 
between the role of the Khozeimeh Amirs in this period and 
that of the period of first boundary arbitration of Sistan 
demonstrates that whenever the interests of the central power 
coincided with those of the frontier-keeping states Iran 
benefited from it and whenever this coincidence of interests 
diminished, Iran suffered geographically.
Finally the evolution of Hirmand water disputes between Iran 
and Afghanistan is examined to show how ineffective was the 
policy of involvement of central government in border issues 
when the role of local influence was marginalised. A general 
conclusion gives a guideline for a fresh approach towards the 
settlement of the Hirmand water disputes satisfactory to both 
Iran and Afghanistan.
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has been particularly kind in preparing a number of maps 
appearing in this work.
Mrs Nayereh Said-Ansari (Fotouhi) has kindly shared with me 
all family information she has regarding the career of heir 
grandfather, Mirza Said Khan, Foreign Minister of Naser 
ad-Din Shah Qajar at the time of delimitation of most of the 
Eastern Iranian boundaries. I am most grateful to her and 
her husband, Mr. Nasrollah Fotouhi, who has never been short 
of patience in listening to my analysis of various aspects of 
the work, often long and tedious. My sincere thanks are due 
to him and to [in alphabetical order] Mr. Amir Khosro Afshar, 
Dr. Mostafa Alamuti who introduced me to Amir Hussein Khan 
Khozeime Alam in the first place, Mr. Farhud 
Berenjian, Dr. Hassan Kiyudeh, Dr. Jamshid Malek-Mohammadi
6Nouri, Mrs. Shokuh Mirzadegi, Mr. Arsalan Nayer-Nouri, 
Dr. Esmail Nouri-Ala (Payam), Dr. Naser Rahimi, Mr. Kambiz 
salarian. Dr. G. Sabri-Tabrizi, Mrs. Parvin Sufi-Siyavosh, 
and Dr. Hassan Yaseri for their assistance or 
encouragement.
Mr. Shahin Nasiri has kindly seen to the translation into 
English of the French text of the 19 39 Iran-Af ghanistan 
treaty of Hirmand Water Distribution. I owe him many thanks.
Of the institutes, the Document Centre of the Institute of 
Political and International Studies of Foreign Ministry of 
Islamic Republic of Iran has been very generous, as a result 
of the advice of His Excellency Abbas Maleki, Deputy Foreign 
Minister and Director of IPIS, in sending me copies of a
number of disclosed documents relating to Iran-Afghanistan 
border agreements. I owe them, especially Mr. Maleki,
an immense debt of gratitude. My thanks are also due to the 
controllers of the (British) Public Record Office, India 
Office Library and Records and the Librarians of the Library 
of the School of Oriental and African Studies, British 
Library, and to the controllers of the Document Centre of the 
(Iranian) Office of Prime Minister. Ms Norma Edwards has 
been most patient in organising this work in the form of
computer print. A valuable work which deserves my thanks and
acknowledgement. My thanks are also due to the controllers
of the Computer Help Line of the School of Oriental and
African Studies who on many occasions assisted Ms Edwards and 
myself.
Last, but by no means least, I am most grateful to my wife, 
Nahid Mojtahed-Zadeh for her outstanding display of patience 
and understanding of the unsociable hours I spent working at 
home, day in and day out for four years. She did all she
could do to help and encourage me to undertake and to see
through the project. Similarly, I am grateful to my little 
daughters; Tosca (Nayereh) and Elica (Najmi) who in their
small world made sure that I noticed their awareness of the 
"important work" their father was engaged in.
P R E F A C E
J  ^  J  ^  tfUjt y  ^J l_J  ^ .^J I
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The cloud, the wind, the moon, the sun and the galaxy 
are at work, for you to make your bread, but not to 
have it in ignorance.
(Sadi: Iranian poet 
born about 1190, died about 1292AD)
In my application for reading towards the Ph.D. degree at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, I indicated that I 
would work on the political geography of the Persian Gulf, 
the region of my life-time interest. I registered the 
subject and began organising the research plan in October 
1989 when I met Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime^ Alam. He 
knew of me as a writer, but was unaware of my special field 
of research interest being political geography. He wanted my 
advice on a project that he had in mind: writing his memoirs, 
a productive hobby taken up by most Iranian statesmen of the 
Pahalavi regime living in exile. As conversation developed, 
he began making references to his great-grandfather's role in 
the process of delineation of Sistan boundaries carried out 
by British officers in the nineteenth century. I, like most 
other educated Iranians, had heard of the "Khozeimehs", the 
"Alams", and the "Khozeime Alams", never knowing who was who 
and what was the connection between these names. I had also 
known that they were of one family background, with 
substantial influence in Iran's eastern provinces of Khorasan 
and Sistan and also in the Iranian Government of the Pahalavi 
era, without knowing that they themselves had ruled eastern
(1) Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam speLLs his surname “Khozeime" without "H" at the end.
8parts of Iran somewhat independently for a considerable 
length of time. I knew that Amir Asadollah Khan Alam was 
Mohammad Reza Shah's closest confidant of lifetime and his 
Prime Minister in early 1960s,and finally, the Shah's trusted 
and powerful Court Minister, 1966-1977, the period in which 
the second Pahalavi ruled Iran largely through his Court 
Minister with great determination.^1^
I also knew about Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam being a 
veteran parliamentarian both in the Majlis and the Senate. I 
even had heard of the term "Amir-e Qaen", but to me, like 
most other Iranians, it was an abstract term, used in 
colloquial Persian occasionally as a proverb or a by-word in 
reference to such expressions as "authority" and "splendour 
mixed with arrogance."
During the meeting with Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam, 
little did I know that I was talking to the last of the 
Khozeimeh Amirs whose forefathers were the Amirs of Qaenat 
and Sistan for centuries. In fact I was talking to a man who 
had seen the traditional way of his father's rule during the 
Qajars; a man who at the early age of 23, because of his 
ancestral influence in the region, was given the sensitive 
governorship of Sistan and Baluchistan by Reza Shah Pahalavi 
in the new centralised Iran, during World War II; the last 
Khozeimeh Amir who, during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, 
again represented the vast eastern borderlands of Iran in the 
Senate for 29 years up until the Pahalavi regime was brought 
down by the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
As conversation with Amir Hussein Khan progressed, he made 
further references to his family's role in the Eastern 
Iranian borderlands and this whole conversation opened up, 
for me, an entirely new horizon for the possibility of a 
thoroughly new subject for research. What I was confronted 
with in my mind at the end of the meeting was that, a new
(1) Alam, Asodollah, "The Shah and I", (The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969 - 
1977), introduced and edited by Alinaghi ALikhani, London 1991, the Introduction.
9challenge was before me to take on, an original subject for 
research, a difficult one, yet an opportunity for discovering 
new territories in which no one else had trodden on before.
Much work has been done on the political geography of the 
Persian Gulf, I thought, and my contribution to it can wait, 
but, no one had , thus far, paid any attention to the 
political geography of the Eastern Iranian borderlands, and I 
was almost sure that no one had studied the Khozeimeh family 
and their role in the political geography of these 
borderlands. This was a challenge well worth taking on, an 
opportunity not to be missed. Professor Keith McLachlan, 
designated as supervisor of the work, and himself a highly 
respected authority on Iranian geography including the 
Eastern Iranian provinces, welcomed the change of subject of 
research and the school authorities agreed with the proposed 
change to the new subject.
The preliminary investigation proved my assumptions to be 
correct. Published information on the Khozeimeh family was 
far more scanty than one would normally expect, yet, I had 
the family sources’ vast information available to me. 
Furthermore, the Foreign Office documents stored in the 
Public Record Office proved to be invaluable, a whole host of 
unexplored British diplomatic correspondence, with an amazing 
concentration on the role of the family in Eastern Iranian 
borderlands and in the process of delimitation of boundaries 
between Iran and Afghanistan, and between Iran and Kalat (now 
Pakistan) was there waiting to be discovered.
In the course of my research works, I discovered that the 
role of the frontier-keeping " A m i r d o m " o f  Khozeimeh in 
the border provinces of Khorasan, Sistan, and Baluchistan, 
and in the evolution of boundaries separating these provinces 
from Afghanistan and Pakistan was probably the most
(1) Because of the exceptional Length of the Khozeimeh Amirs* rule of this vast part of eastern 
borderlands of Iran, stretching from Khorasan to Sistan and Baluchistan, I propose to refer 
to their rule in that region as the “Khozeimeh Amirdom."
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interesting feature of political geography of the region. My 
second discovery was that this aspect of political geography 
of Eastern Iran had not been studied before, and that an 
attempt in that direction would amount to a notable 
contribution to the knowledge of political geography of the 
region. I also discovered that the background to, and the 
evolution of the Eastern Iranian boundary, which happens to 
be one of the earliest examples of modern boundaries created, 
had not been seriously studied. References to these
aspects of the Eastern Iranian boundaries, both in English 
and Persian publications would not exceed fifty pages of 
casual data. The natural conclusion could only be that a 
serious study of the evolution of these boundaries and the 
role of the Khozeimeh Amirs in it would be an addition, not 
only to the knowledge of the political geography of Eastern 
Iranian borderlands, but also to the knowledge of the 
politico- historical impact of Anglo-Russian rivalries on the 
state and boundary of Iran from an "Iranian" point of view. 
My educational background in Iranian studies (geographical 
and historical) proved to be an asset in this context, and 
access to unexplored Iranian documents, few of which that 
have survived, made it possible for me to see the way the 
Iranians had approached delimitation of their eastern 
boundaries.
Apart from the sources pointed out hitherto, I have been 
fortunate to gain access to the personal knowledge of a 
number of individuals who were, at some stages, directly or 
otherwise involved in the process of the evolution of these 
boundaries.
What can be described as the end result here, is not only a 
collection of relevant information on the evolution of 
Eastern Iranian boundaries and/or on the role of the 
Khozeimeh Amirdom in its process, but also an analysis of the 
said evolution based on the concepts of state and boundary in 
political Geography and on the background to the history of 
state and boundary in Iran. This, I hope, will prove to be 
an addition to the existing knowledge of political geography
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in general, and, on a more personal note, I hope that I have 
learnt something new of the work of geography (the cloud, the 
wind, the sun, and the galaxy), and will not have my bread in 
total ignorance of how this wonderful world of geography 
works for that bread to be made.
Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh
SOAS
January 1993
G E N E R A L  I N T R O D U C T I O N
"EVOLUTION OF STATE AND BOUNDARY IN IRAN"
Eastern Iranian boundaries are the spatial manifestation of a 
number of political factors of the nineteenth century. Chief 
among them were two: first, the role of the frontier-keeping 
Amirdom of Khozeimeh, an autonomous principality in Qaenat 
and Sistan which was brought to its end in 1937. Unlike most 
other frontier-keeping states of Iran, this Amirdom remained 
solidly loyal to Iran throughout its history and hence played 
a remarkably effective role in the evolution of the political 
geography of Eastern Iranian borderlands: the other
determining factor was the geographical dimension of 
Anglo-Russian rivalries in the nineteenth century which 
generated great pressure on Iran, both from north and east.
"At the same time that Britain had been extending its 
position in India, Russia had been expanding its land 
empire into Central Asia inevitably provoking a clash 
of interests between the two powers. The result was 
the Great Game of the nineteenth century, the intrigue 
and the threats between Russia and Britain in a zone 
extending from Turkey, through Iran to Afghanistan and 
the north-west frontier of India. This Victorian cold 
war, as Edwards (1975) has called it rarely erupted 
into "hot war", but it was an underlying concern of 
Britain's global imperial geopolitical code. It was
this Great Game that Makinder extended to become the
Heartland theory and which the United States finally
inherited in the 'real' cold war."(l)
The clash of interests of Britain and Russia in Afghanistan 
where Iran had substantial interests, especially in the 
countries of Herat and Qandehar, provoked Iranian reactions, 
albeit weak and unskilled. Iran was no match for the two 
giants on her northern and eastern neighbourhood and as a 
result suffered both politically, by submitting to 
'capitulation', and geographically, by loosing territories in 
the north and east.
(1) Taylor, Peter J. (1989), “PoLiticaL Geography11, Second ed. London, p. 117.
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Considering that the Eastern Iranian boundaries are mainly 
the outcome of Iranian reaction, whether from Tehran or from 
Qaenat, to the Anglo-Russian rivalries in the lands between 
Iran on the one side and India and Central Asia on the other, 
an analysis of the evolution of these boundaries needs to be 
supported by a study of the evolution of the state in Iran on 
the whole and Qaenat and Sistan in particular. Equally 
important is to define the concepts of frontiers and 
relationships between central government and peripheral 
autonomies in Iran.
The emergence, evolution and function of the Khozeimeh 
Amirdom will be discussed in Chapters II and III and a brief 
look at the emergence and evolution of state and boundary in 
Iran constitutes this general introduction,
THE ORIGIN OF "STATE" AND “BOUNDARY” IN IRAN
The term "Iran” means "the land of the Aryans". Politically, 
however, this term refers to the country situated in 
south-west Asia, that part of the globe generally known as 
the "Middle East". With a land area of 1,648,195 square 
kilometres. ^  ^ Iran is bounded on the north by the Caspian 
Sea and the republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
Turkmanistan: on the east by Afghanistan and Pakistan: on the 
west by Iraq and Turkey: and on the south by the Persian
Gulf, Gulf of Oman and the north-west corner of the Indian 
Ocean.
Geographically, the term covers an area much greater than the 
state of Iran. It includes the entire Iranian Plateau (see 
chapter I). Culturally, the term includes all people 
speaking Iranian languages - a subdivision of Indo-European 
family of languages; people who speak Persian, Kurdish, Luri, 
Mazandarani, Baluchi.....
(1) Mahmudi, Gudarzi, KhaliLifar, “Joghrafiay-e Iran = Iranian Geography", Tehran 1985, p. 1.
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The early Iranians themselves were thought to have been
nomadic groups of Indo-European origin, who, moving southward
from east and west of the Caspian Sea, gradually overwhelmed
and absorbed previous inhabitants and for the most part
adopted their sedentary civilisation. It is generally
believed that the Persian branch of Iranians took control of
Anshan, the location of which is now identified as having
been at Tappeh Malyan in the Pars (Persia) province, at the
start of the seventh century BC. Eruptions from the
north-east were to continue for many centuries by Iranian
nomads - Scythians ( Sakae ) and Hepthalites - down to the
(1)middle of the sixth century AD.V ' From the sixth century 
BC, when the Persian Empire emerged, to the seventh century 
AD when the country was overrun by the Arabs, Iran' s role in 
the making of man's civilisation is largely shrouded in 
obscurity. Iranian chronicles were largely destroyed by
various events, particularly the Arab invasion. Our 
knowledge of the pre-Islamic history of Iran is almost 
exclusively drawn from information provided by Hebrew, Greek, 
Roman and Arab historians.
Although there are mentions of Iran and her role in the old 
world in the said sources, it is noteworthy that most of
these writings speak of Iran as an enemy, not as a friendly
nation, or as a third party. As a result, it is not 
surprising how much our modern world is unaware of the 
significance of the role Iran played in the old world:
"Considering the tremendous role which Aryan man has 
played in world history, how unfamiliar to us (his 
descendants) are his origins and the lands that were 
the cradle of our race. Hebrew, Greek, and Roman 
civilisation is absorbed, more or less by western man 
with his mother's milk: the vast Iranian panorama in
which our ancestors arose and flourished seems as 
remote to the majority as the moon. For us its early 
history is restricted to those occasions when it 
formed part of that of Israel or Greece. Our interest 
and sympathies are enlisted on behalf of the Jewish
exiles, the drama of the Marathon and Termopylae, the 
march of the ten thousand, or Alexander's meteoric 
career: incidental in our minds to these events are
(1) Hurray, John, "Iran Today", Tehran - October 1950, Vol. I, p. 7,
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the extent of the realm of Aharuerus (Esther i. I, 
from India even unto Ethiopia.), the background to the 
decree of Cyrus, the king of Persia (Ezrai. I), the
initiative shown by Darius on his accession, or the 
rise of Zoroastrianism. In part the reason is no 
doubt that Persia has lacked a chronicle of its own.
No Heredotus or Xenephon has arisen (or survived) from 
amongst the Persians themselves.... Our information, 
all too scanty as it is, derived from foreigners, from 
Jews and Greeks, the national enemies of Persia.(1)
This is a powerful handicap".(^)
The Iranians themselves knew, until a century ago, of their 
ancient past only from the accounts of Arab and Moslem 
historians and from the epic account of Ferdosi (AD 1020) in 
his Shahnemeh which was based on a translated version of a 
lost Khodaynameh of the later part of the Sassanid period (AD 
224 - 651).
In their histories the Jews have taken a more favourable view 
of the Persians, but those writings speak of Persia only when 
and where Hebrew relations with Iran are concerned. Thus it 
is limited to the early Achaemenian in general, and Cyrus in 
particular for his humane treatment of the captive Jews of 
Babylonia:
"The tolerance and kindness displayed by Cyrus the 
Great and certain of his successors towards the Jews 
make it the less surprising that they should have 
spoken well of the Persians and have remained faithful 
to them for so long. Cyrus on conquering Babylonia in 
539 BC. found the Jews in captivity there. . . . the
Achaemenian king felt a natural sympathy  no
doubt that he was fulfilling the prophecy of Isiah 
(Chapter xliv)."(3)
The author of the above then quotes Isiah as follows:
(1) Inclusion among ancient Persia's nationaL enemies of the Jews is probably not a correct 
assumption.
(2) ILiff, J.H., 'Persia and the Ancient World", in A.J. Arberry's "The Legacy of Persia", 
Oxford 1953, pp. 1 - 39.
(3) Lockhart, L., "Persia as seen in the West", in A. J. Arberry's the “Legacy of Persia", op. 
cit., p, 326.
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"J am the lord...that saith of Cyrus, he is my 
shepherd, and shall perform my pleasure: even saying
to Jerusalem, thou shalt be built: and to the temple, 
thy foundation shall be laid."(l)
The first invasion resulting in a massive destruction and 
relocation of the Achaemenian chronicles was that of the 
Macedonians. Alexander, rather than destroying the library 
at Persepolis, as many historians have suggested, had these 
chronicles transported to Egypt where he founded the world 
famous library in the Egyptian city of Alexandria. This 
library was destroyed at a later date by the Arab invaders of 
the early Islamic era. The fact that Alexander's invasion of 
Iran was philosophically motivated, and Iran's advanced 
civilisation of the Achaemenian era was the main attraction 
for his invasion is confirmed by many historians and those 
closely concerned with historical studies. In reply to a 
letter by this author, Jean Gottmann, a highly respected 
political geographer of our time whose thesis on 
"iconography" and "circulation" are widely quoted in the 
works of political geography, wrote on 17 June 1987:
....Iran must have belonged to the 'Western' part of 
mankind, and I suspect that this was what Alexander
the Great of Macedonia, a pupil of Aristotle,
therefore, in the great western philosophical
tradition, found in Iran and that attracted him so 
much that he wanted to establish a harmonious,
multi-national cooperation between the Iranians and 
Greeks within the large empire he was building".(2)
If this was the main purpose of invading Iran, he certainly 
succeeded in achieving it in part. Translation into Greek of 
the Achaemenian chronicles at Alexandria and certainly what 
the Iranians had learnt from the Greeks, have shaped the 
foundation on which the universal civilisation of modern man 
has evolved.
(1) Ibid.
(2) Professor Jean Gottmann authorised this quotation from his said Letter, in a separate note 
dated 19th May 1992.
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"The heritage handed down by Iran to the West and 
still living in its ideological conceptions and 
cultural institutions is manifold. If its patterns 
are sometimes difficult to recognise and trace back to 
their origin, that is due to the fact that this legacy 
has been received through intermediate cultures and 
westernised models... the leading elements of what we 
could call the "vertical organisation" of the state 
are part of this age-old heritage. They were handed 
over to the modern world through the late roman 
imperial structure and its medieval renaissance: 
through the institutions of chivalry and knighthood 
that, obscurely transmitted to European society in a 
Celtic-Germanic garb, were later Christianized.(*)
However, the remaining of the Achaemenian chronicles and all
that had been left behind by the Parthians and Sassanids,
were completely done away with by the Arab invaders of
mid-seventh century AD. The Arabs, as many historians
have pointed out, when found themselves faced with a massive
collection of books in various libraries in Iran, asked their
commander and Caliph, Omar Bin Khattab, for instruction as to
what to do with them. Caliph Omar is said to have argued the
famous example of fallacy, that; these books cannot be either
in favour of the holy Qoran or against it; if they are in
favour of the Qoran, we do not need them because the Qoran is
available to us and that is enough; and if they are against
the teachings of the Qoran, their existence is harmful thus,
(2)in both cases they must be destroyed.v *
The destruction of libraries and burning of books in Iran by 
the Arabs are confirmed by all historians, but such a 
fallacious argument, if had indeed taken place, cannot be 
cited as a special Arab enmity against Iran and her people, 
for, the Arabs, in their invasions of other lands, dealt with 
people and their cultural heritage in much the same way. 
Arab strategy at the time was to create an empire within 
which there would be no room for indigenous non-Arab cultures 
and languages. In other words, Arab invasions of other lands 
were culturally motivated with the aim being establishment of
(1) Fillipani-Ronconi, Prof. Pio of Naples University, "The Tradition of Sacred Kingship in 
Iran", in George Lenczwski's publication on Iran, USA, 1978, pp. 51 - 2.
(2) Filician Chale, "Philosophy of Science", translated into Persian by Yahya Hahdavi, Tehran 
1965, p. 157.
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a culturally monotonous state under the empire of 
Caliphateship. An undertaking which could not gain success
without endeavouring to do away with the indigenous culture 
and languages of the subdued nations.
EVOLUTION OF STATE AND BOUNDARY IN IRAN
State is the vertical dimension of a legally organised
political structure based on common consent in a given human
group, the horizontal or spatial dimension of which is
territory. In other words, territory is the spatial
manifestation of the state, while the latter is the organiser
of the former. Politically organised units have, in the
past, been translated into a territorial state and later,
into a nation state, which is one of the units forming the
world political map. The basic elements of a geographical
/1 \
theory of the state, as we are reminded by Peter Taylor,v ; 
were developed in the early 1950s by Gottmann (1951-52), 
Hartshc?ne (1950) and Jones (1954).
Gottmann analysed the political partition of the world and 
concluded that it was based on two main factors - circulation 
which causes instability and iconography which causes
stability.
Moreover, Gottmann has, as yet, provided the most 
comprehensible account of the concept of territory in
relationship with the notion of state. In his "evolution of 
the concept of territory" while acknowledging that the 
concept of territory is undergoing a substantial modification 
in our time, Gottmann argues that:
"Territory is a political as well as geographical 
concept because geographical space is both partitioned 
and organised through^political p r o c e s s (2)
(1) Taylor, op. cit., 135.
(2) Gottmann, Jean, “Evolution of the Concept of Territory", Social Science Information, Paris 
1976, Vol. 14, Nos. 3/4, p.3.
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Having said this, he quotes Aristotle's remark in his 
"physics" that "what is nowhere does not exist", and for that 
reasort he submits that definition of territory offered by him 
to be accepted. He defined "territory" as:
"Territory is a portion of geographical space that 
coincides with the spatial extent of a government's 
jurisdiction. It is the physical container and 
support of the body politic organised under a 
governmental structure. It describes the spatial 
arena of the political system developed within a 
national state or part thereof endowed with some 
authority."(1)
This far more practical definition than others before, leaves 
little doubt about the inseparability of the concept of state 
with that of territory. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that 
while territory is more of a physical nature, state is more 
of a political one.
The term "state" assumes its meaning similar to the modern
concept of state at the time of the Achaemenian empire. No
evidence exists suggesting existence of "state" of this
description prior to the advent of the Achaemenians. The
Achaemenians (BC 559-330) in the beginning created an empire
of universal aspiration, extending from India to Egypt (see
figure 1). The founder of the dynasty, Cyrus the Great
(BC559-529) used to be the ruler of the vassal kingdom of
Persia (southern Iran) in the Median empire (BC 709-559). He
and his successors substantially expanded and developed the
new empire. They divided their realms into forty satrapies
£which included lands of Tans-Oxus, Sind, Trans-Caucasus as
far as what is now Moldavia, Trans-Jordan and Syria,
(2 )Mecedonia and Cyprus, Egypt and Libya,v } each governed by 
a vassal king, whereas the King of Kings had his capital in 
Persia. The King of Kings was not a law giver but the 
defender of the laws and religions of the empire:
(1) Gottmann, op. cit., p. 1.
(2) Vadiei, Prof. Kazem, (1974) *An Introduction to the Human Geography of Iran", Tehran
University Press, N. 1280, pp. 159 - 161 (text in Persian).
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"The 'law of Medes and Persians which changeth not' 
was a sacral law...which he upheld....Other people of 
the empire had their laws and customs, which the great 
king likewise upheld, and their own judges."(1)
To respect the independent cultural identities of the varying
peoples of the empire, the King of Kings did not adhere to
(2 )any specific religion.' ' When conquering new territories
the conquered people were allowed to keep their religions,
laws and traditions and the great King endeavoured to restore
their prosperity. Having conquered Babylonia Cyrus let the
Jews in captivity there return to Jerusalem, and while in
Babylonia, he issued a proclamation or charter of which the 
(3 ^text survives.' ; In it, he declared equality and justice 
for all in the empire and assumed the title of King of 
Babylonia, Sumer and Akkad, in addition to the titles of King
/ 4 \
of the Four Quarters' ' and King of Anshan. He does not 
mention a Persian God, but gives thanks to the Babylonian God 
Marduk. This broad-minded policy won the allegiance of many 
peoples including the Greek citizens of vassal cities in 
Ionia.^  ^
Darius organised twenty provinces (see figure I), each under 
an autonomous satrap, and fixed their tributes; appointed 
tribute-collecters and travelling inspectors called 'eyes and 
ears' of the great king, to watch over the satrap and 
commanders: introduced currencies of gold darics and silver
siglus facilitating trade exchange throughout the empire: 
built the Royal Road from Susa in Khuzestan to Sardis on the 
Aegean Sea, with branches to Persepolis and other major 
centres: ordered for the map of this road and civilised
(1) TempLeton, Peter Louis (1979), “The Persian Prince", London, p. 14.
(2) FiLlipani-Ronconi, op. cit., p. 51 - 83.
(3) The text is in cuneform Akkadian inscribed on a d a y  cylender now in British Museum, Persian
section.
(4) In reference to the grand political divisions of the empire which were organised in four 
main quarters.
(5) Templeton, op. cit., p. 15.
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countries alongside it to be engraved on a plate of 
bronze which must have been the first detailed
geographical map in history: established a postal service
with relays of men and horses at short intervals: and caused 
a canal to be dug in Egypt to link the Red Sea to the Nile 
and, thence to the Mediterranean Sea.^^
A stale (Hajar ar-Rashid) uncovered at Zaqaziq, near Suez,
with the following inscription, is a clear indication of the
actuality of the Achaemenians' great interests in commercial
/ 3 \
use of the sea routes.v 1
"Thus spake King Darius, I am a Persian, and by the 
help of the Persians, I captured Egypt. I ordered 
this canal to be dug from the river Nile (Pirava) 
which floweth in Egypt to the sea which goeth forth 
from Persia. This canal was dug as I ordered"(4)
These whole undertakings were aimed at promoting prosperity 
through greater interconnection of various peoples of the 
empire in a trade link worthy of a commonwealth of autonomous 
nations.
"The Persians opened up fresh possibilities of 
economic development by uniting the whole of Western 
Asia and Egypt in an enduring empire. Darius the 
Great (BC 521-485) appreciated the value of linking 
Persia with India and Egypt by sea as well by 
land."(5)
(1) A plate of bronze or other metals is caLled '‘Jam* in Persian. SimiLarLy a goblet of metal or
crystal is jam. On the other hand, Shahnameh of Ferdosi speaks of Legendary Jamshid Shah,
founder of Iran, who had a "jam showing the world*. From this concept comes the mystical 
“crystal balL". Yet this author believes Jamshid Shah was none other but Darius the Great who 
had the Jam showing the map of the civilised worLd. There are other reasons supporting this 
notion the discussion on which is beyond the scope of this work.
(2) For more details of these developments under the Achaemenians, see A.J. Arberry's "The Legacy
of Persia", Oxford Clarendon Press 1953.
(3) Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz, "Sheikh-Nashinhay-e Khalij-e Fars = The Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf,
Ataei Press Tehran, 1970, p.31.
(4) Walis, E.A. (1902), "A History of Egypt“, London, p. 64.
(5) Major, R.H. (1857), "India in the Fifteenth Century", p. 15.
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Figure I The Empire of Darius the Great
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Source: General Atlas, by El Ducio, 
Hachet Library Publications, Paris 1850
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The contribution to man's civilisation made by the Persian 
rulers of the Achaemenian empire, has been so tremendous that 
the world continued attributing to the Persians, throughout 
the ages, the great commonwealth of many nations which was 
founded by them, and similarly calling the whole countries of 
Iran as "Persia" until very recently. Frequently it is 
forgotten that this great empire was handed down by the 
Achaemenians to many dynasties originating from various 
corners of the commonwealth, the founder of most of which 
being a vassal king under the previous dynasty.
When it was the turn of the Sassanids (AD 224-651), the 
concept of state and the internal political organisation and 
peripheral frontiers of the empire gained a much clearer 
form. The Sassanids, not only revived the Achaemenian
political organisation of the empire which was divided into 
forty autonomous countries, ^  ^ but they gave a practical 
meaning to the Achaemenian concept of "four quarters" by
dividing the interior of the empire-areas now forming the 
modern state of Iran—-into four "Kusts" or countries, also 
autonomous but ruled by a noble or prince of the Sassanid 
dynasty. These were kusts of Khorasan, north, south and 
west. Arab Geographer-Historian of the fourth century AH,
Masudi states:
"Ardeshir (Artxeres, founder of Sassanid Empire) 
organised the classes of the people and created seven 
classes; ministers and then, the priesthood who
guarded religious affairs and supreme judges leading
(1) These were:
1-Medes (Greater and Lesser), 2-Persia (including Kerman), 3-Ilam or Elam (Lur and Khuz), 
4-Kadusian (Gilan), 5-Amard and Tapur (Mazandaran), 6-Vahragan (Gorgan), 7-Parth (Northern 
Khorasan), 8-Harau (Herat), 9-Margu (Marv), 10-Darangiana (Sistan), 11-Harkhavatish 
(Qandehar), 12-Thetegush (central Afghanistan), 13-Gandar (Eastern Afghanistan), 14-Sind, 
15-Bakterea, 16-Karazm (Khiveh), 17-Sogdea (Bokhara and Samarqand), 18-Sak Hurmevarak 
(Trans-Oxus), 19-Sak Tiger (Trans-Oxus), 20-Hatianiens and Saspieres (between Hede and 
Black Sea), 21-Mosches (Georgia), 22-Colches (east of Black Sea), 23-0rartu (Ararat), 
24-Tibaran on Thermoden, 25-Armenia, 26-Assyria, 27-Babylonia, 28-Anatolia, 29-Islands of 
Aegean Sea, 30-Syria, 31-Phenisia, 32-Palestine, 33-Cyprus, 34-Egypt, 35-Libya, 37-Borgia 
(Ben Ghazi), 38-Thiopia, 39-Trakia (Mecedonia and Danube), 40-Kartage (Tunisia)
(source: Vadiei, op. cit., pp. 159-160-161.)
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all priesthood....And appointed four Espahbads 
(Generals); one to Khorasan, the second to the Maghrib 
(west), the third to the southern provinces, and the 
fourth to the northern provinces. And these Espahbads 
were administrators of the affairs of their countries, 
each in charge of politics of one section of the 
empire, and each was a commander of a quarter, each of 
these had a Marzban (frontier-keeper) who was locum to 
the Espahbad, and the other four classes were people 
of initiative (knowledge and wisdom) and the affairs 
of the land and advice on sorting out problems were 
conducted before them. Then was the class of singers 
and musicians who organised the industry of 
music". (1)
Konstantin Inostranster, a Russian Iranologist of our time, 
gives a slightly different account of the division of the 
Sassanid Empire. He asserts:
"The post of commander-in-chief (of the armed forces) 
was abolished at the time of Khosro I, and four 
commanders were installed instead, each leading a 
quarter of the military of the Empire, In some 
instances, a person of close confidence of the king or 
of the royal family, would be appointed to a position 
higher than that of a c o m m a n d e r (2)
REVIVAL OF STATE IN IRAN
A nationalistically oriented movement emerged in Iran from
the early years of Iran's annexation into the Arab 
Caliphateship (mid-seventh century AD) of Damascus. Aimed at 
the preservation of Iranian culture and restoration of the 
country’s independent political life, this movement, appeared 
in every aspect of people's life - from their language to 
their art, literatures, science and technology, and from
their religion to their social viewpoints. It started from
the time when Iranians invited Imam Hussain (d 680 AD),
(1) Masudi, Abut-Hassan Ali e,bn Hussein, Arab Geographer-Historian of fourth century AH, 
"Morravej a2-Zahab", Persian translation, Tehran 1977, p. 240.
(2) Inostanstev, Konstantin, "Studies on the Sassandis", translated into Persian by Kazem 
Kazem-Zadeh, Bongah-e Tarjomeh va Nashr-e Ketab, Tehran 1969, pp. 63-4.
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grandson of the prophet of Islam and third Imam of Shiah
Moslems, to come and proceed with his campaign against the
Omayyad Caliphate of Damascus (AD661-749) in the countries of
Iran; from the time when Barmaki Vazirs^1  ^ (AD 781-835)
organised the Abbasid Caliphate's administration on the
Sassanid pattern; from the time when Abu Moslem
(2)Khorasaniv ; headed the military forces of the Omayyad
Empire and brought that Empire to its end and later revolted
against the Abbasids; from when Taher Zol-Yaminein (ruled AD
821-822) in Khorasan and Maziar (about the same time) in
Mazandaran hoisted flags of independence; and from the time
when Yaqub Leith Saffarid (AD 867-879) in Sistan defied the
rule of the Abbasid Caliph and told the poets of his royal
court not to recite poems in a language (Arabic) that he did 
(3 1not understand.' '
Historian Talbot Rice asserts:
the political field the victory was complete: 
in the cultural it was but short-lived, for the old 
culture of Persia was not to be destroyed in a day, 
especially when the Arabs had little of their own to 
offer in return....Persian art, Persian thought, 
Persian culture, all survived to flourish anew in the 
service of Islam, and impelled by a new and powerful 
driving force, their effect was felt in a widely 
extended field from the early eighth century 
onwards....when the caliphate was moved from Damascus 
to Baghdad with the establishment of the Abbasid 
Dynasty in 750 that Persian culture ascendancy was 
established".(4)
Against this comment, another historian, R. Levy, believes 
that the Iranian culture and traditions started to have a 
large impact on the Arab empire long before the capital was 
moved from Damascus to Baghdad. He writes:
(1) Ministers or chief administrators.
(2) Abu Moslem's original Persian name was Hormuzan.
(3) Safa, Zabihollah, (1984), "Tarikh-e Adabiyat-e Iran = History of Literatures in Iran",
Sixth ed., Tehran, Vol. 1, pp. 165-6.
(4) Rice, Prof. Talbot, "Persia and Bayzantium", in A.J. Arberry's "The Legacy of Persia", op.
cit., p. 41.
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"Within a comparatively few years of the invasion, 
young men attached to the court of the Omayyad caliph 
were discarding their homespun in favour of expensive 
cloths of brocaded silk cut in Persian style, eating 
Persian culinary delicacies, and displaying manners at 
tables that were themselves an importation from 
Persia. " )
Earlier in the same writings, he points out:
"...the Fakhri, an early - fourteenth century manual 
of politics and history, relates how the Caliph, Umar, 
when at his wits end to know how to distribute the 
spoils of war which were pouring in, sought the advice 
of a Persian who had once been employed in a 
government office (of the Sassanids time). His 
suggestion was that a divan, a register or bureau, 
should be instituted for controlling income and this 
became the germ out of which grew the government 
machine that served the caliphate some hundreds of 
years. «<2)
Omar Bin Khattab, second Caliph of the Rashedin (AD 634-644)
who claimed to have learnt justice from Kasra (Khosro)
(3 )Anushervan of the Sassanids,v J at the time when organising 
the political and administrative structure of the state of 
caliphate, provided for a sovereign ruler but retained the 
principle of electing the caliphs, for the duration of a 
life-time, exclusively from the Bani-Hashem clan of the 
Qoreish tribe.
The Caliphate was divided administratively on the basis of 
Sassanid administrative organisation. This organisation was 
completed by the Abbasid Caliph, almost in the same detailed 
form that existed at the time of the Sassanids. The Eastern 
Iranian borderlands were divided into three provinces of 
Khorasan, Sistan (Sajistan) and Makran (see figure II).
(1) Levy, R., "Persia and the Arabs", in A.J. Arberry's "The Legacy of Persia, op. cit., p. 74.
(2) Levy, R., op. cit., p. 61.
(3) Maqdasi al-Maruf be-al-Beshari, "Ahsan at-Taqasim fi-Marefat al-Aqalim", Second ed. Liden
1906, p. 8 (Text Arabic).
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Apart from the impact of Persian culture and administration 
system on the expanding Arab Caliphate, the Iranians started 
a movement from within the empire aimed at restoration of the 
country's cultural and political independence. This movement 
took many forms. On the one hand, several armed struggles 
begun in different parts of the country which resulted in the 
emergence of a number of vassal states such as: the Taherids 
(AD 821-873) in Khorasan; the Samanids (AD 819-1005), 
descendants of Sassanids from what is now Uzbakistan; the 
Saffarids (867-1495) in Sistan (see figure III); the Buyeds 
(932-1055) from southern Caspian littorals; the Seljuqs 
(1038-1194) from Central Asia; the Ghaznavids (998-1186) from 
what is now known as Afghanistan...
Whereas these are the more well known dynasties who created 
semi-independent states of varying size in various parts of 
the Iranian plateau, historians have often overlooked the 
fact that several branches of the Sassanid dynasty continued 
ruling some remote or geographically inaccessible parts of 
Iran, long after the inclusion of Iran in the Arab 
Caliphate. These were remnants of the frontier-keeping 
states of the Sassanid Empire which will be discussed later. 
One such Sassanid family ruled the district of Rostamdar (now 
Nour and Kojur), situated beyond the high mountains of Elborz 
in Mazandaran. They were known as the Padusbanan 
(frontier-keepers) of Rostamdar and their rule lasted for 
centuries.^1) Their kingdom was finally overthrown by Shah 
Tahmasb Safavid (1524-1576).
Another element of paramount significance in the revival of 
state in Iran was the growth of Shiism among the masses in 
the country. As the security organisation created by the 
Abbasid Caliphate tightened its pressure against Iranians and 
the general oppression of the population increased, Shiism
(1) Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz (1973), “Shahrestan-e Nour", section II Historical, Sobh-e Emrouz
Publications. This book is a geographical and historical study of the author's native town 
‘Nour‘, himself being the tenth generation from the Last of the Padusbanan of Rostamdar.
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Figure II
Abbasid Caliphate's Provinces
The Eastern Iranian border provinces of Khorasan, 
Sistan and Makran in the Abbasid Empire's 
administrative divisions
(Source; Bacharach/ Jere L " A  Middle East Studies 
Handbook", University of Washington Press, Seattle. London. 
1984, Chapter VIII, Historical Atlas, p.93)
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Figure III
The Saffarid Kingdom of Sistan
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became more popular among the masses of Iran. This growing 
popularity was the result of a combination of the following 
basic factors:
1 As the ruling groups of the Caliphate were of the main
sect of Islam - namely Sunniism - Shiism became popular
as the religion of the poor, the oppressed, and the
under-priviledged groups in Iran, because of its
protesting nature. Thus, Shiism became generally known
as the religion of the peasants in Iran who were
discontented with landlords and governors, the upper
class Sunnis protected and privileged by the Baghdad
(1)Sunni Caliphate.' '
2 The great emphasis, in Shiism, put on the state of the 
Imams, the grandchildren of the prophet of Islam, who 
were oppressed by and suffered from the atrocities of 
the Damascus and Baghdad caliphates, created a natural 
sympathy among the oppressed masses in Iran who found 
these Imams as symbols of their own sufferings.
3 The hereditary Imamate of Shiism, which was more 
identical with the Iranian culture and traditions, was 
particularly appealing to the Iranians.
4 The third Imam - Hussein Ibn Ali (680-712) - taking in
marriage the Iranian Princess Shahrbanu, daughter of 
Yazgerd III, the last of the Sassanid dynasty, and the 
fact that his son (Zein al-Abedin Ali Ibn Hussein) and 
his sons and grandsons (the subsequent Imams) were 
regarded as Iranians from their mother's side, had 
another natural appeal to the Iranians.
5 Last but perhaps the most important of all, was that the 
Iranians, by converting into Shiism, were able to
*
(1) Nour-ALa, Esmaiil (1980), “Evolution of Religious Organisation and Legal Theories in
Relation to Socio-Economic Conditions of Iran", Ph, D. thesis, University of London, p. 236.
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identify themselves as different from the Arabs even by 
virtue of their religion, while still being Moslems.
Therefore, Shiism formed an important part of the cultural
movement in Iran for independence and assisted the Iranians
in their cause of re-establishing their cultural, political
(2 \and national identity.v ; Centuries later, when the
Safavid Empire ( 1501- 1722) rose in power and came face to 
face with the expanding Sunni empire of the Ottoman Caliphate 
in their western flanks, it proclaimed Shiism - hitherto an 
underground movement - as the official religion of the state, 
and therefore, masses of Iranians converted into Shiism more 
rapidly than ever before.
GEOGRAPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MOVEMENT
A brief look at the map of the world of Islam brings to
attention that at the time when the Iranians were struggling 
for the restoration of their political independence and their 
independent national identity, other lands conquered by the 
Arabs, such as Egypt, Syria and the Maghrib, situated on the 
west and north-west of Arabia proper, and once cradles of 
their own civilisations, were being drawn deep into the 
Arabism of the Arab culture, so far as when one now thinks of 
the Arab world, these names are imprinted in one's mind 
probably before the names of the real Arab countries. One
reason for this could have been the fact that since Islam was
a montotheist religion, had strong appeal to the people whose 
religions of earthly gods were too decadent and too often 
used by tyrants as their main source of power, to assist them 
to develop or restore a non-Arabic national identity that 
would protect them from complete surrender to the Arabs.
(1) It is noteworthy that Shiism discussed here differs in its political function with that of
Islamic fundamentalism of our time which is principally based on the philosophy of 
universality of Islam with LittLe regard for political secteriansm.
(2) On various aspects of political role of Shiism in the restoration of Iranian identity see: 
Fillipani-Ronconi, op. cit.; A.J. Arberry op. cit.; Nouri-Ala, op. cit.
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Apart from Islam, the Arabs offered little more than nothing 
to convince the Iranians, whose culture had flourished on the 
basis of monotheism of Zoroastrianism, to replace their 
highly developed culture and civilisation and their distinct 
national identity with those of Arabic* On the other hand, 
all Islamic countries situated beyond Iran to the east and 
north-east, while being converted to Islam, were able to 
maintain their cultural and political independence and their 
independent identities. This could be interpreted that Iran, 
by the virtue of her struggles against Arab rule, played the 
role of a cultural barrier throughout the Islamic era, 
providing the people of the lands beyond its eastern and 
north-eastern borders with the possibility of enjoying Islam 
without being subdued by Arabism. It is worth mentioning 
that Islam expanded throughout the areas east of Iran, mainly 
by the Iranians themselves, especially under the rule of the 
Seljuqids and Ghaznavids who were of Sunni persuasion. 
Moslems of the lands beyond Iran's eastern flanks are of this 
sect. It is also noteworthy that the precise location of the 
line of this cultural barrier can be defined somewhere around 
the western peripheries of the Iranian plateau, in 
Mesopotamia which played the same role in the pre-Islamic era 
between Iran and the Roman Empire.
Here David Mitrany's theory of the "Middle Zone" - defined 
somewhere in Central Europe, around the Danube - can be 
applied to the role of this geographical location of Iran in 
the world of I s l a m . A  location which has, throughout
(1) In the introduction to his thesis on the “Evolution of the Middle Zone", David Mitrany says:
"There has always been a curtain somewhere along the line between the Baltic Sea and the 
Adriatic Sea. Sometimes it has been a curtain of politics or of creeds and ideas. A strange 
region, with something of political witchery in it, to judge from the many social and political 
movements which have been checked when they reached it. The Romans tried to get around it from 
the south, but after much trouble gave up the attempts. The Turks at the height of their power 
reached the Line, but could not cross it. The fiery stream of Western Protestanisra did not get 
beyond it and the Eastern church remained behind it. Nor in the more recent times of economic 
development did the industrial revolution pass the Line. Only with the Bolshevic revolution has 
a poLicy set in, though not unopposed, which seeks to end that long economic division of the 
continent into "two Europes...."(a)
(a) Mitrany, David, “Evolution of the Middle Zone, Annals of American Political and Social Science, 
September 1950.
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history prevented total cultural supremacy of other powers 
over the Iranian plateau.
The Iranians, however, embraced the Shiah sect of Islam which 
they found more in harmony with their cultural and 
traditional values, and under its protection, endeavoured to 
reinstate their cultural and political identity, and their 
independence from the Caliphate of Baghdad in the beginning, 
and to prevent domination of the Ottoman Caliphate later on. 
Hence, Shiism added a new force to the movements of the 
Iranians, and merged in their national impetus.
Here Jean Gottmann's iconography seems to be most applicable 
to the process of Iran's re-emergence as a separate political 
entity with a distinct national identity. In describing his 
iconography, Gottman says:
"... to be distinct from its surrounding, a region 
needs much more than a mountain or a valley, a given 
language or certain skills: it needs essentially a
strong belief based on some religious creed, some 
social viewpoint, or some pattern of political 
memories, and often a combination of all three. Thus, 
regionalism has some iconography as its 
foundation...the most stubborn facts are those of 
spirit, not those of physical world...And while 
history shows how stubborn are the facts of the 
spirit, geography demonstrates that the main 
partitions observed in the space accessible to man are 
not those in the topography or in the vegetation but 
those that are in the minds of the people".(1)
During their long lasting struggles against Arab domination , 
the Iranians were endeavouring to preserve their culture and 
to restore their cultural and political independence, 
motivated by a combination of beliefs such as: their social 
viewpoints strongly directed against Arab domination of their 
affairs; their Shi'ah creed by which they were acknowledged 
as Moslems, yet different from the Arabs who were 
overwhelmingly of the Sunni persuasion of Islam; and their 
political memories of the pre-Islamic role of their country 
in advancing man's civilisation.
<1) Gottmann, Jean (1964), “Geography and International Relations", in U.A.D. Jackson's
"Political and Geographic Relationships", Princeton Hall INC., Englewood-CLIFFS, N.J.
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These notions were the central impetus in the minds of the 
Iranians which explain the nature of centre-periphery 
relationships in the recent thirteen centuries of Iranian 
history, and in fact, a combination of these iconograpical 
factors has been and is Iran's 'reason d'etre' as a political 
entity and a different nation in the world of Islam and the 
wider world.
Different dynasties, emerging from different parts of the 
country, whether tribal or from urban communities, seldom 
attempted to move the political and administrative centre of 
the country to the districts of their own origin. Changes of 
the capital in Iran have always been for geographical, 
historical, strategic and economic reasons. In other words, 
the political impetus moved into the centre of Iranian 
thoughts and beliefs, created some kind of a firm spun which 
has so far held various ethnicities together as one nation. 
Whenever a dynasty ran into weakness, laxity and/or 
corruption and ignored these central impetus, a fresh force 
emerged from within the ordinary stratas of society and 
continued. The recorded history of Iran is the best 
testimonial to this little explored, yet unsophisticated 
nature of Iran's secret of continuity and change.
From the time when Buyeds and Samanids established their 
semi-independent states in the Iranian plateau until the 
emergence of the Safavid Empire, Iran was ruled by many 
dynasties from within and outside the country, with, at least 
nominal dependence on the Caliphate of Baghdad. When the 
Seljuqs of Central Asia ruled Iran, the great Iranian vazir, 
Khoajeh Nezam al-Molk (d.1092) who served under Sultans 
Alp-Arsalan and Jalal ad-Din Malek Shah, carried out tax 
reforms and wrote the most important of the post-Islamic 
Persian advice books, "the Syasatnameh" or the book of 
politics. Jalal ad-Din replaced the inaccurate old Arabic 
calendar in 1079, which the months had become displaced in 
relation to the seasons, by a new calendar called "Jalali" 
which was worked out on the basis of the Sassanid calendar 
"Yazdgerdi". This very accurate calendar was the work of a 
scientific committee of which the renowned poet/mathematician
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Omar Khayam was reputedly a m e m b e r , r e s t o r e d  the
festival of Norouz to its proper place at the vernal
equinox. Persian language had been revived through an
extensive cultural movement which reached its peak with the
creation of "Shahnameh" by Ferdosi (d 1020). Although Holaku
Khan the Mongol, grandson of Ghenghis Kahn, put an end, on
the advice of Khoajeh Nasir Tusi, another outstanding Iranian
(2)scholar of his time,v ' to the Caliphate of Baghdad by 
executing Caliph al-Mostasam Bellah in 1258, Iran's true and 
final cultural and political independence had to wait until 
1501 when the sixteen year old prodigy Ismail established the 
Safavid Empire and assumed the title "king of kings" for the 
first time since Arab invasion of Iran in the mid-seventh 
century.
Under the Safavids (1501-1722) Iran restored her full
cultural identity and true political independence. Shah
Ismail came to power at the head of a new Shi' ah movement
which began in Ardebil of Azerbaijan and proclaimed twelve
Imamate Shi'ah Islam as the official religion of the state.
This move disarmed the Ottoman's eastward expansionism which
was based on the argument that sons of Ottoman were the
caliphs of all Moslems. At the age of thirteen, this
philosopher genius headed an army of ten thousand, all men of
thought and belief/ which impressed the entire east of the 
(3 \Moslem world.v ’ This army, known as Qezelbash (red-hats) 
formed the core of the Iranian military forces. The Safavids 
revived the traditional political union approximately within 
the frontiers of the pre-Islamic empires. A hundred years 
later this empire shrank to a smaller size and remained so 
for the rest of the duration of the Safavid rule. In the 
second half of the Safavid government, the empire extended 
from Daghestan, now in southern Russia, to Mesopotamia, and 
from Kabul to Baghdad (See figure IV). Politically, the
(1) Templeton, op. cit., p. 23.
(2) Khoajeh Nasir Tusi, a politician and philosopher, tamed the rule of the Mongols in Iran, in 
his capacity as the Vazir of Molaku Khan the MongoL.
(3) FiLlipani-Ronconi, op. cit., p. 76.
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Safavids created three kinds of divisions in their
territorial state:
1 - The inner provinces which enjoyed no autonomy.
2 - The outer governorate generals (Biglar Beigi)
which paid tribute and enjoyed a considerable 
autonomy.
3 - The outer states (lalats) also paid tribute and
enjoyed autonomy. The main difference of status 
of the Biglar Beigi and Ialat was vaguely 
defined. Generally speaking, Biglar Beigi was a 
degree lower in status than the Ialat.
Nineteen provinces, Biglar Beigis and lalats existed at the 
time of Shah Abbas the Great (1568-1629). These were the 
following, with the name of their capitals in brackets if 
different from the name of the state:
1 - Shirvan (Shammakhi)
2 - Qarabagh - Karabakh (Ganjeh)
3 - Chekhur Sad = Armenia (Iravan = now pronounced
Yaravan)
4 - Azerbaijan (Tabriz)
5 - Dyar Beker = Syria-Lebanon (Qaramad)
6 - Arzanjan
7 - Ali Shokr (Hamadan)
8 - The rest of Iraq-e Ajam (Ray)
9 - Kermanshah and Kalhor
10 - Iraq- e Arab (Baghdad)
11 - Fars or Persia (Shiraz)
12 - Koh Kiluyeh (Behbahan)
13 - Kerman
14 - Qandehar
15 - Balkh
16 - Marv
17 - Mashhad
18 - Herat
(1 )19 - Astarabad.' '
(1) Rohrborn, KLaus-MichaeL, "Provinzen Und Zentralgewalt Persians im 16. Und 17. Jahrhundert" 
translated into Persian by Kaykavous Jahandari, Tehran 1978, p.2.
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Figure IV
(based on the map appearing in 
Rohrborn's book, Tehran 1978)
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Apart from these, Georgia proper, Khuzestan, Kurdistan,
Lorestan and Sistan and Qohestan were states of considerable
autonomy. The Khozeimeh Amir of Qohestan (Qaenat) at the
time of the emergence of Safavid Empire was Amir Sultan who
was given the official title of his country and the official
position as the Amir by Shah Ismail the founder of the
(1)Safavid dynasty.v '
It is noteworthy that those appointed to the governorship of 
the autonomous states by the imperial court had to have 
substantial local and/or tribal base, being Khans or Amirs.
Each state had a Safavid prince as "Laleh" or supervisor who, 
in most cases, never visited the country under his 
supervision.
Of the administrative divisions, Shiraz and Rasht, both inner 
provinces, were ruled by vazirs, and the following were 
Biglar Beigis:
1 - Azerbaijan (Tabriz)
2 - Armanestan (Armenia)
3 - Gorgestan - Georgia (Tiflis = Tblisi)
4 - Shirvan - (Shammakhi)
5 - Qarabagh (Ganjeh)
6 - Astarabad (Gorgan)
7 - Mashhad
8 - Marv
9 - Herat
10 - Qandehar
11 - Kerman
12 - Koh Kiluyeh
13 - Qazvin
14 - Hamadan.
(1) Tarikh-e Jahan Ara of Ghazi Ahmad Ghaffari Ghazvini, Tehran 1964, p. 278.
(2) Vadiei, Prof. Kazem, "Moghaddameh-i Bar Joghrafiay-e Ensani-e Iran = An Introduction to the 
Human Geography of Iran, Tehran University Press, No. 1280, 1974, p. 191.
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The outer states, however, exercised a considerable degree of 
independence which in no way contradicted the unity of the 
empire at the time. When rebellion erupted in Qandehar and 
southern Afghanistan, for example, Gorgin Khan (George XI) of 
the Biglar Beigi of Gorjestan (Georgia), an able warrior, was 
appointed by the king of kings in 1703 to Biglar Beigi of 
that principality and its dependencies in addition to his 
own,  ^^  ^
Following the assassination of Nader Shah Afshar (1736-1747) 
in June 1747, Iran lost parts of the Safavid states in India 
and Mesopotamia.
The traditional political and administrative organisation of 
the Safavid period, vague as it was, remained in force until 
the late eighteenth century. Relations between the political 
centre of the country and outer principalities and 
dependencies were not clearly defined, and this was a 
powerful handicap. This handicap began to show, especially 
with the emergence of new European systems of precise legal 
and political relations between the centre and peripheries 
within the precisely defined boundaries, one of the earliest 
examples of which happened to be implemented in the eastern 
and north-eastern neighbourhood of Iran.
The rise into global prominence of Russian and British powers 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and Iran's 
location on the south and west of these two powers 
respectively (west of the British Indian Empire) left an
immense impact on the Iranian political geography. The two
wars fought with the Russians which resulted in the
conclusion of Golestan and Turkmanchai treaties of 1813 and 
1828 respectively, triggered territorial disintegration of 
Iran. Article seven of Turkmanchai treaty provided for the 
protection and defence of Prince Abbas Mirza Qajar, Fath-Ali 
Shah's son's position as the Crown Prince whose position was
(1) Rohrborn, op. cit., p. 136.
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threatened in Tehran.^^ This article allowed, for the 
first time, foreign intervention in the internal affairs of 
Iran and signified Iran's rapid political decline. Statesmen 
and politicians could no longer survive in their positions 
without seeking foreign protection. This state of affairs 
inevitably led to foreign capitulations in Iran, and it was 
in this situation that territorial disintegration took place 
rapidly and easily.
The two treaties of Golestan and Turkmanchai with the 
Russians resulted in the loss of Iranian dependencies of 
Trans-Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Aran, later renamed
as "the Republic of Azerbaijan). Further treaties 
with the Russians resulted in the loss of Iranian possessions 
in Central Asia (Turkmanistan and parts of what are now 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan).
The British in India , much apprehensive of Russian designs 
on India via north-east Iran, decided to assist separation of 
the dependencies of Herat and Qandehar from Iran and 
delimitation of modern boundaries with Iran in Khorasan, 
Sistan and Baluchistan, resulted in the partitioning of all 
three provinces (chapters IV, V, VI).
Establishment of a powerful central government in Iran and 
rearrangement of her political and administrative 
organisation affecting clear and strong relationships between 
the political centre and the peripheries of the country had 
to wait until after the fall of the Qajar dynasty in 1926. 
The new political organisation introduced under Reza Shah 
Pahlavi in 1937, put an end to autonomy of what was left of 
principalities and other dependencies, including that of the 
Khozeimeh Amirdom of Qaenat and Sistan. Iran was politically 
and administratively divided in 1937 into ten "Ostans" or 
provinces. Each Ostan was subdivided into a number of 
"Shahrestans" (equivalent to counties in British and American
(1) Sheikh al-Eslami, Javad <1990), “Afzayesh-e Nofuz-e Syasi-e Russ va Englis dar Iran = The 
Increasing Influence of Russia and England in Iran“, Part II, Ettelaat Syasi va Eqtesadi 
monthly, Tehran, June 1990, Vol. 36, p.4.
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systems) . Each Shahrestan was subdivided into one or more 
"Bakhshs", each, in turn, subdivided into one or more 
"Dehestans", and each Dehestan included a number of small 
towns and villages. A more up-to-date version of the Safavid 
"Biglar Beigi" has been fashioned in recent decades in the 
form of "Farmandari Koll" which is a degree lower in status 
from that of "Ostan", (see the following graph):
Central Government
Ostan
(Province)
Sharestan (county)
Bakhshs (Rural District)
Dehestan (Rural district)
Deh (Village)
Farmandari Koll 
(Governorate General)
Shahrestan
Bakhshs
Dehestan
Deh
The 19 37 legislation divided Iran into ten Ostans and fifty 
Shahrestans,^^ which has changed several times ever 
since. The current political and administrative organisation 
is as follows: 24 Ostans and Farmandari Koll; 196 Shahrestans 
and 510 Bakhshs (see figure V).
(1) Vadiei, op. cit., p. 194
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Figure V
Current Administrative Divisions of Iran 
Ostan and Farmandari No. of Shahrestan No. of Bakhsh
Tehran 7 24
Markazi (Central) 8 13
Gilan 11 22
Mazandaran 15 36
Azerbaijan (east) 11 34
Azerbaijan (west) 9 19
Bakhtaran 8 17
Khuzestan 13 30
Fars (Persia) 14 37
Kerman 10 23
Khorasan 17 53
Isfahan 15 27
Sistan and Baluchistan 6 23
Kurdistan 6 16
Hamadan 4 12
Chahar Nahal Bakhtiari 4 8
Lorestan 3 16
H a m  (or Elam) 5 12
Koh Kiluyeh and Boir Ahmadi 3 8
Bushehr 7 16
Zanjan 5 14
Yazd 5 12
Semnan 4 10
Hormuzgan 6 18
Source: Markaz-e Amar-e Iran = Iran Statistical Centre,
General Census of Mehr 1365 (September - October 1986), Vol. 
I, p.5.
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BOUNDARIES IN IRAN
Whereas man was preoccupied, in the ancient world, with the 
idea of establishing the frontiers of his realm, the modern 
man's main concern regarding the peripheries of his dominion, 
is to define its "boundary". Boundaries in the modern sense 
of the word, did not exist until recently. Ancient man 
considered the end of his conquest as the frontier. Frontier 
is, therefore, ancient and boundary is new. Endeavouring to 
distinguish frontiers from boundaries, geographers have used 
various etymologies:
"Kristof (1959) uses the etymology of each term to 
derive their essential difference. Frontier comes 
from the notion of 'in front' as the 'spearhead of the 
civilisation'. Boundary comes from 'bounds' implying 
territorial limits,
''Frontier is therefore outward-oriented and boundary 
inward-oriented. Whereas a boundary is a definite 
line of separation, a frontier is a zone of 
contact."(1)
A frontier, therefore, functioned as a zone of contact 
between two socially and politically united entities on its 
two extremes and can safely be described as the embodiment of 
the outer limits of a state's power and influence, and/or it 
can be described as the embodiment of political push of one 
power against the other. The Eastern Iranian borderlands of 
the nineteenth century (Greater Khorasan, Greater Sistan and 
Greater Baluchistan) in which the two powers of British India 
and Iran pushed to and fro for little less than a century, is 
the best example of this description in the more modern world.
Best examples of frontier zones in the ancient world were 
those between Persian and Roman empires. Instances of 
frontiers, in the form of a line, are to be found in the 
ancient world such as the Wall of China, Hadrian's wall in 
Roman Britain and Sadd-e Secandar wall in north-west Iran. 
These walls, however, were built as barriers between
(1) Taylor, Peter J, (1989), "PoliticaL Geography", Second ed., London, p. 145,
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civilisation and barbarians, where contacts between the two 
became too close. In other words, these walls could be 
justified as being a small part of a much wider zone of 
frontiers. Yet, it is noteworthy that Ferdosi (d. 1020 AD),
the most famous Iranian epic poet, speaks in his "Shahnemeh = 
Book of Kings" of boundary pillars between Iran and Turan 
(now Turkmanistan) at the time of Bahram Gur (AD 420-438) the 
Sassanid king.
The concept of frontier, however, differed for different 
nations. Jean Gottman indicates:
"To some nations the frontier was a line in space to 
be secured and maintained; the French concept of 
'frontieres naturelles' is probably the best 
illustration of this attitude...To other nations the 
frontier was a peripheral area that generated social 
and economic change, shaping a nation and 
contributing to its political well-being..."(2)
With the emergence of the world-economy in the nineteenth 
century, which in turn was caused by the development of 
imperialism of global aspirations of the earlier periods, and 
with the inherent traits of the new world economic order; new 
trade and communication systems, the need for defining 
precise points of contacts between states through their 
political and commercial agents, and establishing customs 
houses gave birth to the idea of creating border lines, or 
"boundaries". The new borderlines were defined first in 
North America, Australia, South Africa and North-West India 
between British Indian Empire and Iran, the last of which is 
the subject of discussion in this work (see chapters IV, V, 
VI, VII).
Apart from what Ferdosi says of boundary pillars at the time 
of Bahram Gur, the Sassanids appear to have developed the
(1) Ferdosi (Hakim Abolqassem), "Shahnameh", English translation by Arthur G. Warner and Edward
Warner, London 1925, Vo. VIII, pp. 92, 160, 161, 164.
(2) Gottmann, Jean (1976), “Evolution of the Concept of Territory", Social Science Information,
Vol. 14, No. 3/4 Paris, p. 34.
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concept of frontiers in clear terms. They created two kinds 
of frontier-keeping states; the internal frontier-keeping 
sates within their four Kusts and the external 
frontier-keeping states, the most famous of which was the 
state of Hira in Mesopotamia.
On the north-western corner of the Persian Gulf, where 
Sassanid and Roman empires’ frontiers met, the vassal kingdom 
of Hira was created on the river Tigris not far from the 
Sassanid capital Ctisphun, in the seventh century. This 
frontier-keeping state, paid annually and defended by the 
Iranians, played the role of a buffer state for Iran defusing 
pressure from the Romans. In a similar move, the Romans 
created the vassal kingdom of Ghassan in the region now known 
as Syria, to play the same role for the Roman Empire. Arab 
Geographer, Masudi, says of Hira:
"When Islam came, Khosro Parvlz was Shah of Iran who 
made Ayas Bin Qabsia Taei king of the Arabs of Hira 
and his kingdom lasted for nine y e a r s , T h e n  a number 
of kings of Hira, both from Arab and Iranian stock, 
were twenty three who ruled for six hundred and eight 
years. . . 1 M )
Of the Ghassan vassal kingdom the same author says:
1 This is how the Ghassanis prevailed over the Arabs 
of Sham (Damascus) and the Romans gave them the 
kingship of the Arabs of that area. The first of the 
Ghassani kings of Sham was Harith Ibn Amr Ibn 
A m e r , (2)
This tradition and the tradition of internal frontier-keeping
states were maintained by the Abbasid Caliphate. Several of
these states were created, the longest surviving of them was
£
the Amirdom of Khozeimeh in Qohestan (Kuhstan), now known as 
Qaenat, Tabas and Birjand. This region was part of the
(1) Masudi, op. cit., pp. 464-5.
A kingdom created at the time of the advent of Islam could not have survived for six 
centuries on the same Location where Abbasid Caliphate ruLed Moslem world for a similar 
Length of time.
(2) Masudi, op. cit., p. 467.
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frontier-keeping state of Sistan in the Sassanid times.^^
In fact, this Amirdom was created at the time of Omayyad 
Caliph Yazid Bin Moaviya (AD 680-683) by an able commander of 
the Caliphate1s military known as Khazem Bin Salmi (see 
chapter II), and continued functioning until 1937 with an 
immense impact on the evolution of modern boundaries of 
Eastern Iranian borderlands (see chapters II, III, IV, V,VI, 
VII, and VIII).
The Safavids also revived the tradition of frontier-keeping 
states without endeavouring to modernise the idea by creating 
a clear and up-to-date system which would retain the 
traditional relationships between the centre of the state and 
the peripheral autonomies, This shortcoming began to show 
its impact at the time when the authority of the central 
government over the peripheries declined under the Qajars 
towards the mid-nineteenth century. This was the time when 
Anglo-Russian rivalries intensified in and around Iran. 
Russian and British strategic interests in Central Asia and 
west of Indian sub-continent necessitated the creation of 
buffer zones within clearly delimited boundaries of a modern 
kind. Delineation of these boundaries began in 1870 when not 
only was Iran totally unfamiliar with the legal implications 
and sophistications of delimitation of modern boundaries, but 
her traditionally ill-defined relations with the dependent 
principalities and dependencies of the east and north-east 
together with her general weakness resulted in the loss of 
territories in Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchistan. Whenever it 
was claimed that these principalities and dependencies were 
independent of Iran, Tehran failed legally and physically to 
prove the opposite. The Eastern Iranian boundaries thus, 
evolved in the middle of the said provinces, and their 
evolution is the subject of discussion in this work. 
Evolution of these boundaries meanwhile, was substantially 
affected by the role of Khozeimeh Amirdom of Qaenat and 
Sistan which also exercised a considerable degree of
(1) Commander of the frontier-keeping state of Sistan at the time of Bahram Gur was Sufrai
according to: Pour-Davoud, "Iran Bastan", Tehran University Press, No. 1542, Tehran 1977, p. 
10.
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influence in Western Baluchistan in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century. To examine 
the role of the Khozeimehs in the emergence and evolution of 
Eastern Iranian boundaries necessitates a study of the 
family's origin and its function as a "frontier-keeping" 
autonomy (chapters II and III). Most of Iran's boundaries 
with the neighbouring countries are demarcated in full and 
final settlement. These boundaries and the dates of their 
settlements are as follows:
1- Northern boundaries (with former Russian Empire):
A- Republics of Azerbaijan,
Nakhjavan and Armenia 
B- Republic of Turkmanistan
2 - Western Boundaries with:
A- Turkey
B- Iraq
3 - Eastern Boundaries with:
A- Afghanistan
B- Pakistan
4 - Southern (maritime) boundaries with:
A- Saudi Arabia
B- Qatar
C- Bahrain
D- Dubai
E- Oman
1968
1970
1972
1974
1975
1828-1962 
1881 & 1893
1639-1914-
1926-1937
1914-1937-
1975
1872-1895-
1905-1935
1870-1896-1905
C H A P T E R  I
GEOGRAPHY OF EASTERN IRANIAN BORDERLANDS 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE MIDDLE SECTION
INTRODUCTION = GENERAL GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND
The country of Iran, within its present boundaries (62 8,000
sq. miles), occupies most of the Iranian plateau. The country
is mainly plateau, except the plains of Khuzestan in the
south-west, at the head of the Persian Gulf; the lowlands of 
Gilan, Mazandaran and Grogan, south of the Caspian Sea, 
and the valleys of Hari Rud and Hirmand River on the Afghan 
border. This plateau is surrounded by Trans-Caucasus, 
Caspian Sea, and the western highlands; Lake Aral and the 
Pamir Plateau to the north; the plains of Punjab and Sind to 
the east; the Persian Gulf and Oman sea to the south; and 
Mesopotamia and Asia Minor to the West. Of the geological 
characteristics of this plateau, W.B. Fisher states:
"The greatly restricted degree of sedimentation 
during the Paleaozonic, Mesozoic, and Tertiary 
periods indicates a certain stability of the plateau: 
and the extent to which it would seem to have
transmitted pressure to the Zagros on the south, 
either from its own movement, or from that of 
Angaraland, make it appear that central Iran could be 
regarded as an ancient stable mass comparable, on a 
smaller scale, with the major continents of
Gondwanaland and Angaraland."(1)
The peripheral mountains and sea create an internal plateau 
which is triangularly shaped and has three main features: the 
Elborz mountain range to the north and north-east; the Zagros 
mountain range to the west, south-west and south; and plains 
and lakes, salt and sand deserts of the interior.
The Elborz mountain system breaks up in the east into 
subsidiary ranges extending across the Afghan frontier to the
(1) Fisher, W. B. "The Middle East", Part I; Physical Geography, Fifth edition, 1963, p. 21.
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Hindu Kosh. The Zagros system, extends from Kurdistan in the 
northwest as far south as Western Pakistan. Near Bandar 
Abbas, this mountain range divides into two main branches: 
one swings southwards and disappears in the Straits of Hormuz 
and reappears on the other side, in northern Oman, whereas 
the other branch, of very different structural composition, 
continues eastwards into Pakistan. The latter branch (Makran 
Ranges) is barren with one distinguishing feature - the only 
still active volcano in Iran.
The highlands of Eastern Iran constitute the final segment of 
the encircling mountains. These are a series of parallel but 
discontinuous ranges bridging the gap between the Elborz 
Mountains of Khorasan and Makran Ranges in the south. Ranged 
along the Irano-Afghanistan frontiers, the Eastern Highlands 
function as the divide between the interior of the central 
Iranian plateau on the west and the Afghan countries of 
Herat, Qandehar and Hirmand basin on the east (see figures I 
and II).
Figure I
The Central Iranian Plateau
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Within this plateau the country is divided into a series of 
separate basins which may be categorised into two overall 
groups:
1 - The well-watered basins of the north, north-west
and south-west which are agriculturally well 
developed and more heavily populated;
2 - The drier basins of the centre, south and east of
Iran which are more sparsely populated.
Figure II
A three-dimensional impression 
of Central Iranian Plateau 
(photographed from a three-dimensional 
map of Iran produced by National Iranian Oil Company)
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Towards the centre of the latter basins are found playa
lakes, most of which remain dry throughout the year. When
rain falls, however, such shallow playas may become enlarged
up to one mile across or more. The remaining lakes, foi’m
a waste of crusted salt known as "kavir" as a result of rapid
evaporation during the summer months. The Two great deserts
(2)(Kavirs) - Dasht-e Lutv J and Dasht-e Kavir (Kavir-e Namak 
or Salt Desert) - occupy a large part of the central plateau 
and together, they account for one-half of the desert areas 
and one sixth of the total land area in Iran^^. These two 
deserts are of the greatest geographical influence on the 
Eastern Iranian borderlands.
The Kavir Desert borders Semnan to the north, central areas 
of Iran to the west, Lut desert to the south and Eastern 
highlands to the east.
Lut desert is a vast sea of sand dunes, formed under the effect 
of a southerly wind.
Desert conditions intensify in the summer months, by the 
drying effect of a northerly wind known as "Bad-e Sad-o Bist 
Ruseh" or the wind of one hundred and twenty days. The 
unfavourable effect of this wind is felt in the Eastern 
Iranian Borderlands, especially in Sistan.
Rivers in Iran are divided into three categories:
1 Border rivers which form parts of the boundaries and 
flow in or out of the country and they are:
A. Rivers flowing into other countries, like the Zab 
(upper and lower) which flows into Iraq.
B. Rivers forming boundaries and flowing eventually into 
another country or into peripheral seas, like the 
Karun which empties into the Shatt al-Arab, forming
(1) Cressey, George B., "Crossroads*, Chicago - J.B, Lippincott Co., 1990, pp. 526-7.
(2) Dasht in Persian means "open plain" and Lut means “empty".
(3) Iran Almanac (and book of facts), 1987, eighteenth edition, published by the Echo of Iran,
p. 21.
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thereafter the southern parts of the Iran-Iraq 
boundary and eventually emptying into the Persian 
Gulf; Aras to the west and Atrak to the east of the 
Caspian Seaf forming parts of Iran's boundaries with 
the republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmanistan 
respectively, and finding their ways eventually into 
the Caspian Sea; the Kashaf Rud in Khorasan joining 
the Hari Rud, forming the northern portions of the 
Iran-Afghanistan boundaries, and flowing into the 
deserts of southern Turkmanistan; the Talab River, 
forming parts of the Iran-Pakistan boundaries, and 
eventually emptying into the Hamun-e Mashkil in the 
north-western corner of Pakistan.
C. Rivers flowing into the country from other countries, 
and forming parts of the Iranian boundaries, like 
Hirmand River which flows from Afghanistan and 
empties into the Hamund-e Hirmand after forming about 
50 miles of the Iran-Afghanistan boundaries.
2 Rivers rising in Iran and flowing into the peripheral
seas. There are a number of permanent and seasonal 
rivers of this category joining the Caspian Sea, the 
Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman, the most important of 
which is Sefid Rud in Gilan. This river - 765km. -
is the longest river in Iran, a mountain stream for most
of its length, rising in the Zagros and dropping swiftly
into the Gilan plain, eventually flowing into the 
Caspian Sea.
3 Inland rivers, rising inside the country and flowing
into the lakes and swamps of the interior. The largest 
and most important of these rivers is the Zayaindeh Rud 
which rises in the north-west uplands and disappears in 
the Gavkhuni swamp, after flowing through the highly 
fertile oasis of Isfahan (see figure III).
Climatically, Iran is a highly complex country, one of the 
few in the world in which all kinds of weathers are to be 
found, while the north and west of the country are covered
(1) Iran Almanac, op. cit., p. 21.
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with snow in the winter months, swimming is possible in the 
south, and while the south, south-east and central areas are 
burning in the heat of the summer months, the cool weather of 
higher altitudes of the north and west provides leisurely 
conditions.
Figure III
The most important Internal and 
Peripheral Rivers of Iran
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The situation of Iran between 25 and 40 degrees north 
latitude, the country's physical structure and her location 
within the Asiatic landmass, are responsible for the climatic 
conditions particular to Iran, the climate of Iran is of a
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hot and dry character: summers being hot and dry in most
areas, except at certain high altitudes and in parts of the
Caspian coasts, while the winters are cold and severe with
the exception of lower Caspian littoral, the Persian Gulf
(1)coasts, and the Khuzestan plain.v '
The high mountainous plateau of northern and western Iran cut 
off the central plateau from sources of moisture, and, as a 
result, the interior experiences deep rain shadow conditions. 
The interior of Iran, moreover, is subject to dry-cold air of 
the Siberian anti-cylcone, during winter and the dried out 
hot monsoonal air of north-west Pakistan and Baluchistan, 
during the summer months.
The hottest part of the country is probably the central and
northern areas of the Khuzestan plain in 'the south-west,
where average maximum daily temperature of the four
months of summer does not fall below +45 degrees centigrade.
The greatest variation in temperature, however, is noticed
along the border peripheries of the desert where, within a
distance of a few miles, temperature drops of 20 degrees
centigrade are recorded because of rapid changes in elevation
and where small distances separate frost-free areas from
(2 \villages with five to six months of freezing.' ' The 
narrow coastal belt of the Caspian Sea is characterised by 
moderate temperatures, low daily and annual ranges, 
excessively high in humidity and heavy precipitation. 
Mid-summer temperatures in the area is around +26 degrees 
centigrade and mid-winter temperature 7 degrees C. and frost 
is but short-lived (see figure IV).
The southern coastal plains of Iran, which widen considerably 
in Khuzistan at the head of the Persian Gulf, are hot with 
high relative humidity throughout the year. Absolute maximum 
temperatures in Khuzistan exceed +50 degrees almost every 
year. Temperature increases in the south-east and rainfall
(1) Hurray, John, (1950), “Iran Today", Vol. I, Tehran, p.26.
(2) Iran Almanac, op. cit., p. 26.
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decreases while moisture increases as high as 86%. Winter and 
early spring is the rainy season of Iran, but the annual 
rainfall is generally low except along the Caspian Sea,
The amount of rainfall, decreases from north to south and 
from west to east, whereas temperature increases in a reverse 
direction. The central areas of deserts which receive the 
lowest amount of precipitation have a short rainy season, 
limited to the coldest months of the year. Practically all 
the winter precipitation in Iran is a result of Mediterranean 
depressions which govern the weather patterns of the country 
throughout the winter and spring season (for climatical and 
temperature variations in Iran, see figures IV and V 
respectively).
Rainfall in Iran is heaviest at the Caspian Sea littoral and 
western hills, from 20 to 4 0 inches, and in the west it
averages about 12 inches per annum. It is about 9 inches in 
Tehran area and diminishes to 4 inches in the Isfahan area of 
the Central Plateau. Still south and east the rainfall 
becomes as little as two inches in Sistan.^^
EASTERN IRANIAN BORDERLANDS
Politically the Eastern Iranian borderlands are divided into 
two provinces of "Khorasan" and "Sistan and Baluchistan", 
whereas, geographically three distinct regions form the 
eastern flanks of Iran; Khorasan to the north, Baluchistan 
and Makran to the south, and the middle section of Sistan 
bridging the gap between the former two, with historical 
links with the Khozeimeh Amirdom of Qaenat and Birjand. These 
three regions differ from one another, not only in terms of 
their physical and climatical characteristics, but also in 
terms of their ethnicity, political history, and 
socio-economics. There are, at least, six separate drainage 
basins in the eastern Iranian borderlands which are:
(1) Hurray, op. cit., pp. 26-7.
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Figures IV
Climatic Divisions of Iran
OMKAJ* SU
Climate of Iran
Different types of arid climate: 1,200,00 Sq. km. 
(approx)
Moderate climate: 400,000 Sq. km. (approx)
Cold mountainous climate: 40,000 Sq. km. (approx)
Extra Cold Mountainous Climate 
Cold Mountainous Climate 
Wet Moderate Caspian Climate 
Mediterranean Climate with Spring Rainfall 
Mediterranean Climate 
Cold Semi-desert Climate 
Hot Semi-desert Climate 
Arid Desert Climate 
Arid Hot Desert Climate 
Coastal Arid and Hot Climate 
Coastal Arid Climate
(Source: Iran Almanac, op. cit., p. 30)
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Figure V
Annual Average Temperature and Rainfall 
for certain Cities of Iran 
1362 (1983-4)
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1 - The drainage system of Northern Khorasan (Kashaf
Rud and Jam Rud).
2 - The drainage system of Eastern Khorasan (Namak2ar).
3 - The drainage system of Southern Khorasan (Qaenat
and Birjand).
4 - The drainage system of Sistan (Hamun-e Hirmand
basin).
5 - The drainage system of Northern Baluchistan
(Hamun-e Mashkil basin).
6 - The drainage system of Southern Baluchistan (the
Oman Sea basin), (See figure VII).
The three main regions of Eastern Iranian Borderlands will be 
discussed in the following three parts:
PART I = KHORASAN AND THE DISTRICTS OF QAENAT AND BIRJAND
The word "Khorasan" is an ancient Persian term, derived from 
the term "Khavar" which means "East". The Sassanid Empire of 
Iran (AD 224 - 651), for instance, had divided their realms 
into four principal Kusts or countries, of which, the Kust of 
Khavar was one. Apart from the roots of the word, the term 
itself is a composition of two components; "Khor" and "Asan". 
The term "khor" is also an ancient Persian word meaning "sun" 
and "Asan" is a suffix which means "the place where 
(something) comes from". The two together, therefore, mean 
exactly as Rudaki, famous Persian poet of the 10th century 
said:
Meaning: Khorasan is the place where the sun comes from.
Alternatively, the composition implies that the country of 
such a name is the ultimate east. There are suggestions in 
the old records that the original form of this name was 
"Khorayan" ^ 1 ^ which is of the same meaning but more 
directly expressed.
(1) Dayerat al-Ma1aref-e Eslami (IsLamic Encyclopedia), 1927, VoL. II, p. 966.
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Historically, Khorasan included most parts of Afghanistan, 
Sistan and Trans-Oxania as well as the north-eastern parts of 
the present country of Iran. vIn the time of Arab caliphate of 
the Abbasid, Iran was divided into two distinct political 
zones, with a middle zone - from Ray (near Tehran) to Bandar 
Abbas separating the two. This middle zone was generally 
known as "Eraq-e Ajam" or "the non-Arab Iraq". Areas to the 
west of this zone was known as "Eraq-e Arab" or the "Arab 
Iraq", and areas to the east of this zone was generally known 
as "Khorasan."^^ Many of the famous names in Persian 
literature who were born and bred in Trans-Qxania describe 
themselves as children of Khorasan. Rudaki of Samarqand for 
example, described himself in the following terms:
u  l» ^  ^  J ® ^ i^* ^  A*. l^> l***1 ^  O  L*J y  T .*■
Meaning:
"The time has gone when all the world 
wrote his words (poems) : the time has gone when he
was a poet of K h o r a s a n (2)
The eastern and north-eastern parts of Khorasan were
partitioned in the second half of the nineteenth century, and
were included in the countries of Afghanistan and Russia
respectively. What is now known as "Khorasan" is the largest
(3 )province of Iran with a land area of 215,686.5sq.km.,v 1
and with a population of 5,280,605 which is the largest in
(4)Iran outside Tehran.v '
Khorasan is situated between longitude 30 deg.55' and 14
deg.61' east, and latitude 40 deg.30' and 17 deg.38'.^^
(1) Mir Mohammad Sadiq Farhang "Afghanistan Dar Panj Qarn' (Afghanistan in Five Centuries),
American Speedy, Virginia, US (1988), p. 12,
(2) Mohammad Sadiq Farhang, op, cit., p. 12.
(3) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran (Statistic Centre of Iran), General Census of Mehr 1365 (Sept, - Oct.
1986), Vol. 1, p. 5..
(4) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran, op. cit., p. 29.
(5) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran, op. cit., p. 4.
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To the east, Khorasan is bounded by Afghanistan, to the north 
by Turkmanistan; to the west by the provinces of Semnan, 
Mazandaran, Isfahan, Yazd and Kerman; and to the south by the 
provinces of Kerman and Sistan and Baluchistan (see figure 
VI) .
Geographically, Khorasan is a mountainous plateau with an 
average altitude of 985 meters above sea level. The
Figure VI
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northern part of Khorasan is characterised by high mountains 
which are the eastwards extensions of Elborz proper. The 
highlands of Khorasan constitute the final parts of the 
encircling mountains. These are a series of parallel but 
discontinuous ranges bridging the gap between the Elborz 
mountains on the north and the Makran ranges on the south.
North of Jajarm the crest of the Elborz proper falls to a 
pass just below 3000 feet above sea level. On the other side 
of the pass the mountains of northern Khorasan, in a series
of parallel ranges, form the borderlands between Iran and
Turkmanistan. Rising to 10,323 feet or 3,218 meters above 
sea level, the basaltic mountain of Hezar-Masjed forms the
peak of the Khorasan mountain ranges (see figures I and II).
GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS AND DRAINAGE SYSTEM OF 
EASTERN IRANIAN BORDERLANDS
Apart from the drainage systems listed above, the Eastern
Iranian borderlands fall into three distinct geographical 
regions of Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchistan, albeit Sistan
and Baluchistan are incorporated in one province.
These regions and drainage systems will be examined here in 
order of localities from north to south:
1 - Hari Rud Drainage Basin (area 1 of figure VII). This
basin is divided into six separate systems which are:
A. The northern section of Eastern Iranian borderlands 
which is a vast drainage basin of which Kashaf Rud is 
the largest river. Rising in the mountains of 
north-west of Mashhad, Kashaf Rud flows in an 
easterly direction, eventually emptying into the 
border river Hari Rud. This river is joined by a
number of seasonal streams along its course and runs
dry in the summer months. Jam Rud is the second most
important seasonal river in Khorasan which rises in
the mountains south of Mashhad and flows in a
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north-west to south-east direction, eventually
emptying in the border river, Hari Rud, after passing
(1 \by the town of Torbat-e Jam.1 '
Hari Rud or “Tajan" itself rises from Sefid Kuh and
(2 )Baba mountains in Afghanistan' ' and flows towards 
Iranian borders after passing through Herat Valley 
and Ghurian Plain. Near the Iranian border, Hari Rud 
is no longer a permanent river. It is seasonal and at
the confluence of Kal-e Kaleh seasonal stream on the
Iranian Border, the river changes its course towards 
north and forms about 100 kilometres of the 
Iran-Afghanistan boundaries. After passing through 
Sarakhs Oasis, Hari Rud flows across Zolfaghar pass 
where boundaries between Iran, Afghanistan and 
Turkmanistan meet. From this point the river 
continues northwards and empties in the Qaraqum sand 
desert of southern Turkmanistan (see section 1 of 
Figure VII).
B. Hashtadan Plain
To the south of Hari Rud is situated the Hashtadan 
Plain which is surrounded by Kuh-e Senjidi on the
north, Hashtadan hills on the west and inside Iranian 
territory, Kuh-e Sang-e Dokhtar on' the east and 
inside Afghan territory, Kuh-e Gadayaneh and Kuh-e 
Yal-e Khar mounds on the south. Waters from the
Hashtadan wells and springs are carried northwards 
into Hari Rud by Kal-e Kaleh which, in turn, forms 
the Iran-Afghanistan boundary line between Hashtadan 
and Hari Rud.^^^
(1) Mahmudi and others, "Joghrafiay-e Iran1*, Published by the Ministry of Education of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran 1988, p. 62.
(2) Badiei, Rabi, "Joghrafiay-e Mofassal-e Iran", Eqbal Press, Tehran 1983, p. 183.
(3) More details of Hashtadan geography are provided in Chapter V, section on the northern 
section of Eastern Iranian Boundaries.
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C . Gadayaneh Mounds
Gadayaneh is a hilly district with a number of 
inter-mingled mounds, 1130 meters above sea 
l e v e l . T h e  highest of these mounds is 325 
meters above the plain. This district begins from 
Puzeh-e Gadayaneh to the north which is the first 
mound and where border pillar no 29 is erected, and 
continues southwards for four kilometres (2.5 miles) 
until border pillar no 37, and has a width of about 
6.5 kilometres (4 miles). A number of springs and 
wells are to be found in this district with little 
water in winter and spring months. These are:^^ 
Tagharak well on the Iranian side of these 
borderlines' drainage systems, Masjedak well on the 
Afghan side, Ghashlushi on the Iranian side, Sorkh 
well on the pass between Gadayaneh, Yal-e Khar and 
Shantigh with red soils, Rabat-e Turk on the east of 
Sorkh well.
D . Musa Abad District
Musa Abad is the name of the district below Hashtadan 
and Gadayaneh. It is the name of the district as well 
as the only hamlet and three agricultural fields 
therein.
The Iran-Af ghanistan boundaries at Musa Abad were
delimited by the 1935 arbitration in a way that gave
the hamlet of Musa Abad to Iran, but its fields and
(3 ^springs were given to Afghanistan.v •
E . Shantigh and Zanqlab
This hilly district is about 15 kilometres (10 miles) 
long and situated inside Afghan territory, below Musa 
Abad. This hilly district is very dry with a small
(1) Mokhber, Mohammad All, "Marzhay-e Iran11, Tehran, 1945, p. 98.
(2) Ibid.
(3) More Geographical details of Musa Abad are provided in Chapter V, section of ALtay
Arbitration of 1935.
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number of wells and springs on its southern slopes 
which are: the Shantigh spring, Zanglab spring, Bozou 
(Boz Ab) spring with very little water, Bad well with 
an adjacent spring.
F . Bakharz Region
Bakharz is a vast region between Torbat-e Jam and 
Khoaf. Separating this region from Khoaf, the 
Bakharz range is distinct with its high peaks such 
as Garmeh and Farzaneh. There are remnants of what 
once was a forest of mountain woods near Farzaneh, 
and a number of springs and wells are to be found, 
especially on the northern slopes of this range. The 
Chah Qaleh Plain of Bakharz is situated between Kuh-e 
Sar— Khar of Shantigh range and Gadayaneh mound. An 
old qanat poorly waters this plain. Apart from Chah 
Qaleh well, there are a number of other wells and
springs in this region, the most important of which 
are: Kazem spring between Chah Qaleh and Khoshab, the 
Khoshab wells which water the Khoshabeh plain 
situated between Garmeh and Shantigh, the Ayyubi 
springs on the south-west of Khoshabeh, Fazl well and 
Chah-e Shur well on the north of Namakzar where
border pillar no 51 has been erected.^ Apart
from these water sources there are a number of
seasonal and occasional streams in Bakharz which end 
up in Hari Rud.
Lieut. Colonel Yate visited Bakharz district at the end of 
the 19th century and gave the following account of the region:
"Our route now led up the valley in centre of the 
Bakharz district. We passed through continuous 
villages and cultivation, and the stream flowing down 
the valley, with the springs and grassy sward along 
its banks, gave a look of fertility to the place that 
one rarely sees in Persia. Bakharz was devastated 
during the time of the Turkoman raids, and the total 
revenue in 1894 was said to be only 3400 tumans (£680)
(1) More detaiLs in Chapter V, section on ALtay Arbitration of 1935.
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in cash and 1800 kharwars of grain, but the country 
seemed capable of great improvement. The population 
was comprised of Persians known as Bakharzis, with a 
small proportion of Hazarah, Timuri, and Afghan 
settlers; and in years of good spring rains a large 
quantity of unirrigated grain was produced and 
exported."(1)
2 - Namakzar Basin
Namakzar is a vast plain on the south of Shantigh and 
Zanglab heights. Most of this district is covered by 
a salt lake of the same name. Lake Namakzar is a 
seasonal lake which drains part of the waters of 
Khoaf, Bakharz, Qaenat and Musa Abad, through a 
number of "kals", or seasonal and occasional streams.
Coming alive in winter months, these kals are: Kal-e
Sargardan which drains Musa Abad's southern waters,
Kal-e Gav Khuki, Kal-e Chahar Khal, Kal-e Kordian.
There are two larger seasonal steams which run into
Namakzar from the Iranian side of the district. These
two are: the seasonal stream from Khoaf region and
12\Rud-e Shur from Farrokh district in Qaenat.v 1
Namakzar Lake is very shallow in the summer months, 
but seasonal streams bring enough waters during 
winter and spring months to make it a proper lake.
This district has two distinct zones of different
characteristics: the north-eastern section which is a
proper salt mine where salts are to be found in a
(3 )depth of 40 centimetres,v 1 and the south-western 
section which is swamp and useless. The former 
section is situated on the Afghan side of the
(1) Yate, Lieut-Colonel C.E., “Khurasan and Sistan*, London 1900, p. 137.
{2) Mokhber, op. cit., p. 99.
(3) Mokhber, op. cit., p. 100.
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border, and the latter on the Iranian side. There
are a number of wells around Namakzar such as the 
wells of Siah Kadu, Chalang, Bajgir, Katuri, Fil and 
Mazar, and the Shekar spring.^^ The water of 
these wells are brackish and useless in the summer
months, but drinkable through the rest of the year.
The lands around Namakzar are also salty and 
inundated with some pastural possibilities used by 
nomads (see section 2 of figure VII).
The Iran-Afghanistan boundary line turns southward
below Musa Abad and runs across Namakzar in a
straight line, as far as Kal-e Yarak on the
southernmost of this district where border pillar no
54 is erected. Namakzar had, prior to the 1935 
(2)arbitration,v ' been disputed between Iran and
Afghanistan. In a Consular report in 1912, Captain 
J. Hunter of Sistan Consulate noted:
"Namaksar" - Half Afghan half Persian.
Some Gazik people who went to collect salt 
from the Namaksar last June were made to 
pay a tax by "Afghans". I am told that 
the tax is not authorised by Afghan 
authorities and it must have therefore
been black-mail extorted by some of the 
numerous bad characters who have settled 
about the disputed area.(3)
3 - Qaenat and Birjand Basin
Qaenat and Birjand are two separate Shahrestans in 
the modern political and administrative divisions of 
Iran. Together they formed one province in older times 
until 1930, in which, the Khozeimeh dynasty ruled for 
centuries.
(1) Ibid.
(2) See Chapter V, section on Altay Arbitration of 1935,
(3) Extract from ConsuLar Report, by Captain J.B.D. Hunter of H.B, Majesty's Consulate of 
Sistan, dated 19th September, FO 248/971, p.19,
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Qaenat and Birjand are mostly mountainous regions, 
hence the name of the district appears in the 
historical works of geography as "Qohestan" or 
"Kuhestan" which means "the land of mountains".
As from the eighteenth century this name changed into 
"Qaenat" which is an Arabic plural for "Qaen". The 
plural form of this name clearly refers to Qaen and 
its dependencies, ruled by the Khozeimeh dynasty. 
This name appears to be most convenient as a term of 
reference to the region in the geographical and 
historical discussion of this section.
The mountain ranges of Qaenat form the middle section 
of the Eastern Iranian highlands, bridging the gap 
between the easternmost part of Elborz in the north, 
and the Makran ranges in the south. Ranged along 
Iran-Afghanistan borders, these mountains function as 
the divide between the interior plateau region on the 
one hand, and western Afghanistan on the other (see 
figures I and II). This mountain range, at the same 
time, functions as a barrier, protecting Qaenat from 
the eastward extension of the great central desert 
(Lut). This mountain range has a generally 
north-west to south-east direction and includes Kuh-e 
Kalat, Kuh-e Soleiman, Kuh-e Ahangaran with the 
highest peak in the region, Kuh-e Shah,^1  ^ and 
Kuh-e Baran. The south-easternmost of this range is 
Siah Kuh on the borders of Qaenat and Sistan where 
border pillar no 87 is erected.
Qaenat is a dry country with little precipitation 
and some ground-water. Summers are hot and dry 
except at high altitudes. There is no river of a 
permanent nature in the entire region but the 
seasonal and occasional streams, carry flood waters 
of winter and springs months into two basins: one
(1) Badiei, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 51.
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eastwards into Afghanistan like the stream from Sedeh 
which runs south-eastwards and runs into Daghgh-e 
Tondi after passing by Avaz and Gazik, and the stream 
which begins at Sarbisheh and similarly runs 
south-eastwards like Rud-e Birjand which rises in the 
mountains of southern Qaen and northern Birjand and 
empties into the Lut desert. This stream is the 
largest in the region and has water most of the year 
through. Its water is salty and called "Rud-e Shur". 
There are considerably high levelofunderground waters 
in Qaenat which are brought to the surface by 
numerous qanats, wells and springs. It is, therefore, 
clear that water-holding in Qaenat plays a highly 
significant role in the agricultural life of the 
region.
Khozeimeh family's strategic land and water holdings in
Qaenat and Tabas, Khoaf and Gonabad formed their power-base
in the region for centuries, (see next chapter).
Rud-e Shur-e Birjand, the only long-term flowing river of 
Qaenat which carries salt water into the Lut basin. White 
patches in the photograph are salt deposits of the river.
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On the historical geography of Qohestan "Kuhestan" or Qaenat, 
Le Strange remarks:
"The province of Kuhistan, like Sijistan, was 
generally held to he a dependency of Khurasan by the 
Arab geographers. Kuhistan means 'the Mountain Land' 
and the province is thus named in accordance with its 
distinguishing physical features, the hills here being 
contrasted with the lowlands of Sijistan, lying to the 
waste of Kuhistan on the Helmund delta. Kuhistan, as 
Ibn Hawkal remarks has for the most part a cold 
climate from its elevation, and the date palm only 
grew at Tabas Gilaki on the edge of the Great Desert. 
In the 4th century (10th) the nomad inhabitants of the 
country were Kurds, who possessed great flocks of 
sheep and camels. Without doubt this province is 
identical with the 'Tunocain kingdom' of Marco Polo, 
who took the names of its two chief cities (Tun and 
Kayin) to be the designation of the whole country. The 
chief town of Kuhistan was Kayin, which Ibn Hawkal 
describes as protected by a strong fortress, 
surrounded by a ditch; and the Governor's house stood 
here, also the Friday mosque."(1)
A map appearing in Le Strange's book demonstrates the
political position of this province in the time of the
Abbasid Caliphate (see figure VIII). A relatively
comprehensive report to the British Embassy in Tehran, in
1912, the British Consulate at Sistan put the population of
Qaenat (Shahrestans of Qaen and Birjand together) at 200,000
(2 )at the turn of the twentieth century, v J whereas the 1986 
census puts the total population of these two Shahrestans at 
483,552.
Qaenat or the old "Qohestan" was ruled by the Khozeimeh 
dynasty since the early years of the Abbasid Caliphate until 
1937 when the last ruling Amir (Amir Masum Khan Hesam 
ad-Doleh) resigned from the official post of governorship as 
a result of re-organisation of Iran's political and
(1) Le Strange, G. “The Lands of Eastern Caliphate", London 1966, Chapter XXV, p. 352.
(2) Consular Report by Captain Hunter, op. cit., p. 3.
(3) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran (Statistic Centre of Iran), Vol. 2-118, p. 3 and Vol. 3-108, p. 3.
71
administrative divisions (see next chapter). The chief town 
had for centuries been Qaen, but the capital was moved to 
Birjand in the early nineteenth century. Politically, 
however, Qaenat has been divided into two Shahrestans in the 
latest (19 7 3) major rearrangement of Iran’s political and 
administrative divisions; Shahrestan-e Qaen or "Qaenat", and 
Shahrestan-e Birjand.
Figure VIII
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A. - Shahrestan Qaenat
Qaenat is one of Khorasan's seventeen shahrestans. The other 
sixteen being: Mashhad, Daregaz, Quchan, Shirvan, Bojnord,
Esfaraien, Taibat, Sabzevar, Kashmar, Torbat-e Heidarieh, 
Torbat-e Jam, Gonabad, Nishabur, Ferdos, Tabas and Birjand.
With a land area of 15,050 square kilometres, Qaenat is 
shaped almost like a rectangle (see figure IX). This
shahrestan is bounded by Afghanistan to the east, Birjand to 
the south, Torbat-e Heidarieh and Gonabad to the north and 
Ferdos to the west. Shahrestan-e Qaenat is administratively 
divided into one Bakhsh and eight Dehestans, with the town of 
Qaen (population 15,955) as its administrative centre. The 
one Bakhsh of this Shahrestan is Bakhsh-e Markazi, and its 
dehestans are: Dehestan-e Qaen, Dehestan-e Nimboluk,
Dehestan-e Paskuh, Dehestan-e Zohan, Dehestan-e Fandokht, 
Dehestan-e Gazenak, Dehestan-e Gozokht and Dehestan-e
Shahrokht (see figure IX). Each of these dehestans includes a 
number of "deh's" or villages.
Apart from the town of Qaen, Khezri of Dehestan-e Nimboluk,
with a population of 4,026 is the only other urban district
of this shahrestan. Shahrestan-e Qaen's total population was
(1)recorded by the 1986 general census as being 122,149v * 
which represented a density of 8.1 per square kilometre. Of 
this figure, 13,696 were recorded as being foreign immigrants 
which represented 11 per cent of the total population who 
are, almost exclusively, Afghan refugees.
Of the eight dehestans of Qaenat, two are strategically 
situated on the Afghan borders. These are: Dehestan-e
Shahrokht and Dehestan-e Gozokht. The border districts of 
these two dehestans begin from Namakzar on the north and 
continue as far south as above SunniKhaneh which is known as 
Tabas Masina of Shahrestan-e Birjand. The most important of 
these districts is Yazdan.
(1) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran, “The Statistic Centre of Iran", General. Census of Mehr 1365 (Sept. - 
Oct. 1986), Vol. 118-3, Shahrestan-e Qaen, pp. 1 and 3.
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The District of Yazdan
The district of Yazdan is situated below Namakzar, and 
surrounded by Daghgh-e^) Kul Berenj with permanent 
drinkable water, Daghgh-e Petergan to the west with some 
springs around it, dasht-e Na-Omid or "the plain of no hope" 
which is divided between Iran and Afghanistan with some wells 
and springs.
Yazdan district consists of three separate localities: the
hamlet of Yazdan and its fields with qanats of good water;
the fields of Kalateh-Nazar which is situate on the
south-west of Yazdan hamlet with wells and springs; Kabudeh
hamlet and fields on the south-west of Kalateh-nazar, also
(2)with wells and springs.v '
In his consular report of 1912, Captain Hunter of the British 
Consulate at Sistan said of Yazdan:
"Yazdan was formerly a large and important place and 
has been described to me as the bandar (3) of Kain 
from the east. It is said that including those of 
Kabuda and Zainabidin, situated a little distance 
away, there were in all 72 Karezes.(4)
"The present abadi(5) of Yazdan was the joint 
private property of the Hissam-u-Douleh(^) and his
(1) Daghgh is a Local term describing inundated low Lands in which flood waters from the surrounding 
hills gather for a short period annually and remains dry and hard with deep grooves for the rest 
of the year,
(2) See Chapter V, section on Altay Arbitration of 1935 for more details;
(3) Meaning “port".
<4) Local name for "Qanat". Kariz is the original Persian term for qanat, still used in Afghanistan
and parts of Iran.
(5) Meaning "developed", "cultivated", or "inhabited".
(6) Amir Masuro Khan Khozeimeh, Hesam ad-DoLeh, who was, at the time, Deputy Governor of Sistan. The
Khozeimeh family sources toLd this author that Yazdan beLonged to Amir Mohammad Reza Khan Samsam
ad-DoLeh, elder brother of Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-DoLeh, with the exception of western parts
including Kabudeh which beLonged to the Latter.
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Figure IX Administrative Divisions of Qaenat
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late sister, known as the Nawab. On the latter's death 
her property was divided.
"There are in Yazdan about 10 families of
cultivators, and the produce is about 40 Kharwars
(14,500 lbs) of grain.
"I think it is probable that when the Kain
frontier comes to be demarcated, the ownership of 
Yazdan with the adjacent Karezes will be contested.
"My opinion, formed from such documentary and
other evidence as I have been able to discover is that
Yazdan and its Karezes has always been considered part 
of Zirkuh Buluk itself being from old times under the 
Chief of Sunni-Khana or of Kain according to which of 
the two was predominant for the time being.
"A farman(l) of 1124 H (1712), of which mention 
is made in the note on the history of Zirkuh, show
that at this time the revenue of Yazdan was paid to
Kain and not to Herat, which was also at that time
under the Suffavin Kings."(2)
Of Kabudeh, he stated:
"Kabuda is a spring of alkaline water near Yazdan. The 
land around it is cultivated by Yazdan people for the 
Hissam~u~Doleh whose private property it is. As 
regards grazing rights, the Dasht-i-Naomed is open to 
all, and as stated above, I think that the presence or 
not of Afghan M a l d a r s(3) affords no indication at 
all as to ownership"(^)
In the advent of Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh's demise 
Kabudeh was inherited by his son Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime 
Alam who developed new fields and qanats therein and named 
them after his daughter "Tahereh". The new fields and qanats 
near Kabudeh are known as "Taherabad".
Yazdan is the easternmost part of the district of Zirkuh of 
Dehestan-e Shah-rokht. The boundary arbitration of 1935 
decided that Yazdan and Kabudeh belonged to Iran, and Kalateh 
Nazar belonged to Afghanistan.
(1) Means “order* or "decree".
(2) Consular Report by Captain Hunter, op. cit., pp. 23 ~ 4.
(3) MaLdar is a Persian term meaning the one who makes his business by breeding and renting
mules, horses, camels, cattle or sheep.
(4) Consular Report by Captain Hunter, op. cit., p. 26.
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B - Saharestan-e Birjand
With a total land area of 70651 square kilometres, 
Shahrestan-e Birjand is the southernmost Shahrestan of 
Khorasan with the city of Birjand as its administrative 
centre,
The city of Birjand with a population of 18,300 in 1986 
is one of the most important urban and political centres in 
the middle section of the Eastern Iranian borderlands. 
Writing about Birjand at the end of the nineteenth century, 
Mr Yate's estimated Birjand's population, at the time, at 
about 25,000:
"Birjand itself was a good sized town, and was said to 
contain 25,000 people. The town had a flourished look, 
in so far that all the houses appears to be inhabited, 
and few ruins were to be seen about, as is generally 
the case in most Persian towns. There were few gardens 
around it, owing to the general want of water. The 
kanat water in the town was brackish and sweet water 
had to be bought from springs near the chief's village 
at the foot of the Kuh-i-Bakiran. these hills, which 
bound the Birjand plain in the south, are said to be 
twelve farsakhs in length and four in breadth, and to 
have numbers of small springs in the upland villages, 
to which many people move up in the summer. This may 
account for the want of game in them, as both ibex and 
oorial were said to be scarce."(1)
Another Englishman who lived and worked in Birjand in the 
early years of the twentieth century as the manager of the 
British bank ''Bank-e Shahi" was Mr Hale who has written of 
Birjand city:
"I shall never forget my impression as I rode into the 
Birjand valley next morning and caught sight of a part 
of the town, looking exactly like another dingy 
stopping-place on a caravan road. My distaste was 
heightened by a nearer view of barren hills, below 
which, on a long hump sticking out of the valley, was 
dumped a pell-mell heap of little mud and plaster 
houses with domed roof and mean walls. My feelings 
were partly relieved when I found a friendly reception 
and comfortable quarters awaiting me, and my first 
disappointment gradually gave way to something 
else."(2)
(1) Yate, Lieut.-Colonel C.E., op. cit., p. 69.
(2) Hale, F. “From Persian Uplands", London (Early 1920s), pp. 18 - 19.
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Some seventy years earlier, General Goldsmid, British 
arbitrator of Sistan boundaries (1872), visited Birjand
and noted:
"From Mud a march of twenty-three miles
west-north-west brought us into the capital city of 
Birjand, from which there was a distance of about 400 
miles further to Mashhad, The march from Mud to
Birjand exhibited quite a change in the scenery. The 
road ran over a fertile valley some ten to twelve 
miles broad, bounded on either side by a range of 
barren hills, and beyond these on the right hand was 
another valley of which we caught glimpses through 
openings in the hills, the summits of which were 
streaked with snow. At every two or three miles we 
passed abambars or water tanks, some of them dry and 
ruined, but the generality in good repair, with an
excellent supply of fresh and cold water - furnishing 
another proof of the excellence of the Amir of Kain's 
rule in his own province: wherever we have been we
have noticed that he seems generally popular, and the 
flourishing condition of the villages bears testimony 
to the security the inhabitants feel under his 
government. Our road made a gradual and very slight 
ascent for the first ten miles and then commenced an 
equally slight descent. Four miles from Mud is
situated the flourishing village of Yek-Darakht (or 
'one tree*), and at sixteen miles we passed the large 
village of Bojd on the right hand, situated at the 
extremity of the range of hills which divided the 
valley we were traversing and the plain we had noticed 
lying beyond. Bojd is a village of considerable size, 
and is built on the surface of the hills, being 
surmounted by a ruined fort. It is surrounded by 
gardens and cultivation. Half a mile further on is the 
pretty little village of Hajjiabad, standing in a 
perfect grove of orchards, and also surrounded by 
cultivation; while five and a-half miles further is 
Birjand, situated at the end of the valley with 
surrounding country and scenery much resembling the 
neighbourhood of the Alburz at Tehran."(1)
Shahrestan-e Birjand is bounded by Shahrestan-e Qaenat on the 
north, Afghanistan on the east, Ferdos and Tabas on the west, 
Sistan and Baluchistan on the south (see figure X).
The 1986 general census puts the total population of this 
shahrestan at 361,403 which represents a density of 5.1 per
(1) Goldsmid, General Frederick, “Eastern Persia", London 1976, VoL. I, p. 334.
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square kilometre.^^ Of this figure, 77,123 were recorded
12 )as being foreign immigrants,' ' which are almost 
exclusively Afghan refugees, and make up about 25 percent of 
total population of this Shahrestan, which is exceptionally 
high.
Historically, Shahrestan-e Birjand had, until 1937, been the
centre or the heartland of the autonomous Amirdom of
Khozeimeh with the city of Birjand as its capital since the 
early eighteenth century.
The history of this district is almost exclusively the 
history of the Khozeimeh Amirdom which will be discussed 
extensively in the following two chapters.
Shahrestan-e Birjand is divided into the following four 
bakhshs:
1. Bakhsh-e Markazi (central) with the city of Birjand as
its administrative centre. This bakhsh is divided into
three dehestans, each including several dehs or 
villages. These dehestans are; Dehestan-e Alqur,
Dehestan-e Shahabad, Dehestan-e Naharjan.
2. Bakhsh-e Nehbandan with the town of Nehbandan as its
centre. This bakhsh is divided into eight dehestans 
which are; Dehestan-e Chahan, Dehestan-e Shusf,
Dehestan-e Arab-Khaneh, Dehestan-e Parak, Dehestan-e 
Mighan, Dehestan-e Neh, Dehestan-e Basiran, and 
Dehestan-e Bandan.
Nehbandan has recently been promoted to the status of a Shahrestan, independent of 
Birjand with Chahan, Shusf, Arab-Khaneh, Parak, Neh, Mighan, Basiran and Bandan as 
its new bakhshs.
3. Bakhsh-e Khusf
This bakhsh is divided into three dehestans which are; 
Dehestan-e khusf, Dehestan-e Qeisabad and Dehestan-e 
Barakuh.
(1) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran, General Census of 1986, Vol. 108-3, p.1.
(2) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran, op. cit., p.3.
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Figure X
Administrative divisions of Biriand
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4. Bakhsh-e Darmian
This bakhsh is divided into six dehestans which are;
Dehestan-e Darmian, Dehestan-e Momenabad, Dehestan-e
Doroh, Dehestan-e Tabas-e Masina, Dehestan-e Marufan,
(1)Dehestan-e Shakhenat.v '
The towns of Nehbandan and Sarbisheh are the only two urban 
areas of this shahrestan other than the city of Birjand 
itself.
Of these dehestans, Tabas-e Masina and Doroh are more 
significant in these studies owing to their location on the 
borders with Afghanistan. Most of these two districts are in 
the Iranian side of Dasht-e Na Omid. This plain (Dasht-e Na 
Omid) is a drainage basin of its own and several seasonal and 
occasional streams run into it, eventually discharging flood 
waters into the lower depression of Daghgh-e Tondi where 
there is a small and dry salt lake on the border (see figure
VII) .
The two border districts are of the following description:
A- Tabas-e Masina or Sunni-Khaneh
This district, as the name suggests, is populated by Sunni 
Moslems. The existence of this Sunni enclave in the
predominantly Shiah region of Birjand and Qaenat has
encouraged speculations that the local population had 
immigrated or moved to this district at the time of the
Safavid Empire of 16th to 18th centuries. The speculation is 
further strengthened by the fact that the family ruling 
Sunni-Khaneh were Sunnis immigrated from Balkh in the said 
period. Yet, documents of historical nature examined by this 
author suggest that Sunnikhaneh had been of the same name
long before the advent of the Safavid Empire. Colonel Yate 
visited Sunni-Khaneh in the late 19th century and described 
it as follows:
(1) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran, op. cit., p. 17.
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"Tabas, the headquarters of the Sunnikhana district, 
was a village containing some 150 houses, and standing 
out in the open in the centre of the valley, with a 
row of thirty or forty windmills some little distance 
off. The water here was derived from Kanats, bringing 
it in underground channel from the foot of the hills, 
and the chief of Kain owned most of these Kanats. The 
arrangement under which the land was cultivated was 
that he supplied the seed and bullocks and paid the 
government revenue, and took three-fourths of the 
produce, leaving one fourth for the cultivators.
"The Tabas fort had been a strong place in its 
day. The walls and bastions stood high on the top of a 
lofty rampart, all around which were the remains of a 
double row of shirazis or loopholed shelter trenches, 
with a deep ditch in front, the scarp and counterscarp 
of which were still in good condition. The place was 
garrisoned by a small detachment of Kain infantry. 
Gazik, a large village of some 500 or 600 houses, was 
the northern point of the Sunnikhana district. Beyond 
that our road led across stony slope immediately under 
a range of hills, and there is not a sign of life. 
Hills and plain were equally deserted."(1)
In his Consular Report of early twentieth century, Captain 
Hunter of the British Consulate at Sistan indicated that 
Sunni-Khaneh had been mentioned in the works of Arab 
geographers of 2nd and 3rd centuries of Hijrah (AD 9th an 
10th centuries):
"The Arab geographers writing of this period mention 
Duroh, Tabbas-i-Masinan (Sunni-Khana) and Zirkuh, and 
it is clear that even at this early date these small 
districts formed part of the "Kuhistan" and not of 
Herat or Sabzawar. The existence of the Naomed desert 
stretching all along the Kain frontier affords an 
obvious physical reason why this should be so."(2)
Following the assassination of Nader Shah Afshar in 1747, the 
Khans of Sunni-Khaneh began a life of independence. With the 
restoration of the power of Khozeimeh Amirdom in Qaenat, at 
the time of Amir Alam Khan III, Heshmat al-Molk (see chapter 
II), Sunnikhaneh was reincorporated into the Amirdom of 
Qaenat.
(1) Yate, Lieut.-CoLonel C.E., op cit., pp. 126-7.
(2) Extract of Captain Hunter's Consular Report of 1912, p.2.
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In his relatively comprehensive report on the border areas of 
Eastern Qaenat and Birjand of 1912, Captain Hunter summarised 
this development in the following manner:
"In 1268 H (1851), Sultan Murad Mirza,
Hissam-ul~Sultaneh, despatched a force with guns from 
Tehran under Sartip Pasha Khan for the final 
subjection of Sunni-Khana. The strong and picturesque 
fort at Furk, which had always been the Sunni Khan's 
strong-hold was taken and Mirza Rafi Khan fled to 
Herat, Mir Alam Khan was again rewarded for his
services. On Pasha Khan’s return to Tehran, he left a 
garrison at Furk, Sunni Khana thus came finally under 
Persian rule and was incorporated in the Province of 
Kain. The chief of Sunni Khana, Mohammed Wali Khan 
(Rafi Khan III ), having failed to get help from
Herat, went to Tehran and being recommended by Pasha 
Khan, who was also Sunni, was made Governor of
Sunni-Khana under the Amir of Kain with an assignment 
on its revenues of Tomans 500/-, On his way back from 
Tehran, he was murdered at Samnan by an emissary of 
the Kain chief."(1)
B- Doroh
Captain Hunter's Consular Report of 1912 speaks of Doroh in 
the following words:
"The Naib(2) is Khoja Jan Muhammad. He has an 
assignment on the revenue for the maintenance of 6 
sorwars(^) and 4 jambazes,(4)
"The revenue is about tomans 850/- (included from 
old time and in the Mustansir-ul-Mulk * s settlement in 
the Jama(5) of Sunnikhana).
"The people of Doroh are exempt from the payment 
of poll tax or sari and are in consequence liable for 
militia service lashkar kashi.
(1) Extract from Captain Hunter's Consular Report, op. cit., p. 9.
(2) Naib, or correctly "Naieb" means "representative*', in this case referring to Deputy
Governor, representing the Amir of Qaenat and Sistan in Doroh.
(3) Sowar, or correctly "Savar" means cavalry-man.
(4) Jambaza, or correctly "Jammazeh" means camel cavalry.
(5) Jama, or correctly "Jame" is an Arabic word in reference to the principal mosque of a town.
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"There is a Customs house at Duroh subordinate to 
that at Ahwaz.(l) The present Kirza(^) is Ali 
Akbar, who was transferred in connection with a case 
of extortion from Afghanistan (mentioned under the 
head of Sunnikhana). The authorised route across the 
frontier is thus described by the Customs Department 
"From Kandahar and Farrah to Birjand by Damdam 
(Afghan) by Chah-i-Sagak, Chashma-i-Shutaran,(3) 
Duroh.
The only Karez or cultivated land in this part of 
the frontier which might conceivably come within the 
disputed area (though the Afghans have so far made no 
claim or taken other action with regard to it), is 
that of Asperan (As-i-Parian) . (4) The ruins at this 
place testify to its having once been a big place, but 
no one that I have spoken to has been able to afford 
any clue as to when and why it was abandoned. The 
reason put forward for the abandonment of other big 
villages on this strip of frontier is that of Turkoman 
raids and it is possible that Asperan should be 
included in the same category". )
PART II - SISTAN DISTRICTS AND DRAINAGE SYSTEMS
Qaenat and Birjand form the upper part of the middle section 
of the Eastern Iranian borderlands, whereas Sistan forms the 
lower part. Great variation has existed, since the dawn of 
history, in naming this province. Zabolestan, Nimrouz, 
Darangian or Zarang, Sakistan, And Sistan are the more 
celebrated names that this province has been called 
throughout history.
Whereas Zabolestan is geographically believed to have been 
the name of the Upper Sistan in the ancient world, Heredotus 
and other ancient Greek historians described "Sarangian" or 
"Darangiana" or "Zarangian" or "Zarang" as being the 14th
{1) This name is "Avaz“ which is situated north of Tabas Masina.
(2) Hirza is an old term meaning “Learned" in this context “office clerk".
(3) Correctly “Cheshmeh-e Shotoran" = Shotoran spring.
(4) See chapter V, section on ALtay Arbitration of 1935 for more details.
(5) Extract from Captain Hunter's Consular Report, op. cit., p. 14.
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Satrapy of Achaemenian Darius the Great, and included the
present day province of Sistan. This name survived for a long
period of time since the Achaemenids, and was given to its 
former capital "Zarang" much later, and as "Zireh" is still
used in connection with one of its two main lakes. Similarly, 
Zabolestan reappeared in the first half of the twentieth 
century in naming the capital city of Sistan as "Zabol".
Nimrouz appears to have been the most ancient name of Sistan, 
a Persian term, literally meaning "mid-day", a name according 
to local legends, was given to the province after the prophet 
Zoroaster established his famous observatory in Sistan where 
scientific measurements of time and space began on the basis 
of mid-day zero hour of Sistan (mean) time. The name
"Nimrouz" has also reappeared in the early twentieth century 
and has been given to the eastern half of Sistan by the 
Afghans.
J.P. Ferrier who had spent many years in Iran and Afghanistan 
studying places and politics of these countries, suggests 
that s
"The word Seistan, the present name of this province, 
came originally from the word Saghis, the name of a 
wood much used in Persia for burning at this 
time".(1)
This seems to be an unlikely explanation, for the word
"Sistan" in no way shows similarity to the name "Saghez"
which Ferrier suggested. A more plausible explanation could
be that the name "Sistan" is a shortened version of the name
"Sakistan" by which this province was named in ancient times.
Sakistan, of which "Sajistan" is an Arabic corruption,
virtually means "the land of the Sakaes" an early branch of
the Aryan Tribes who settled in this province. Sir Percy
Sykes goes even further by suggesting that the word "Saxon"
I 2)is believed to be another form of "Sakae",v ' the western
(1) Ferrier, General Joseph Pierre, "Caravan Journeys and Wandering in Persia, Afghanistan, 
Turkistan and Baloochistan" London 1857, p. 160.
(2) Sykes, Major (later Sir) Percy, "Ten Thousand Miles in Persia", London 1902, p. 362.
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offshoot of which being Saxons appeared on the European scene 
almost subsequent to the disappearance of the Sakae in Sistan.
Sistan in the Shahnameh of Ferdosi (AD tenth century) which 
is believed to have been Shakespeare's source of inspiration, 
was the country of legendary Rostam the greatest champion of 
Persian legends, fighting in favour of good against evil, and 
championing the cause of Iran against her foes.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The province, however, was the 14th Satrapy of the 
Achaemenian Empire (BC 559-330) and formed a part of the Kust 
of East under the Sassanid Empire (AD 224 - 651) . In the
post-Islamic era, Sistan became a major centre of struggles 
for the revival of Iranianism. Many movements began in Sistan 
and engulfed the entire countries of Iran. The Saffarids (AD 
867 - 910) of Sistan were the first to throw off the yoke of 
the Abbasid Caliphate (AD 749 - 1242). The subsequent
dynasties made a point in including Sistan within their 
realms.
In the Safavid Empire (AD 1501 - 1722), Sistan was a large
"Velayat" or province governed by a "Vali" and included
/1 \
Makran and parts of Baluchistan.v ’
The Afghans' political push into Iranian territory in the
early nineteenth century coincided with the British Indian
Empire's strategic perceptions of nineteenth and . early 20th
centuries that, in order to prevent a Russian thrust into the
western flanks of Indian, territories of strategic
significance in Sistan and Baluchistan should be given to the
(2 \buffer states of Afghanistan and Kalat.v ' In a letter to 
the British Government, the Indian Foreign Ministry indicated:
(1) Rohrborn, Klaus-Michael, "Provinzen und ZentralgewaLt Persiens im 16 und 17 Jaharhundert", 
translated into Persian by K. Jahandari, Tehran 1978, pp. 126.
(2) See chapter VI for more details.
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"As you are aware, the Government of India attach the 
highest importance to the assertion of the paramount 
interest of Great Britain in Seistan and in 
South-Eastern Persia. They are of opinion that in no 
circumstances should Seistan be permitted to pass, 
like the northern provinces of Persia, under the 
control or even the preponderating influence of 
Russia, and that British prestige and influence in 
that quarter should be constantly and actively 
maintained."(!)
Although British support for Afghan claims varied according 
to circumstances throughout the years, the overall British 
inclination towards Afghanistan vis-a-vis Iran in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries is undeniable. The Afghan 
encroachments in Sistan motivated Amir Alam Khan III, the 
Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat to react. He recaptured parts of 
territories occupied by the Afghans. This victory resulted in 
political incorporation of Sistan into the Amirdom of 
Khozeimeh in 1865. As disputes between Iran and Afghanistan 
in Sistan intensified, British arbitration was sought and 
General Goldsmid's arbitral commission decided in 1872 that 
the eastern half of the province should be given to 
Afghanistan and Hirmand1s main channel in the delta region 
should be recognised as a boundary between the two countries 
(see Chapter VI for details). Sistan remained as part of the 
Khozeimeh Amirdom until 1937 when it was included in the 
eighth Ostan (province) of Kerman and, later was included in 
the Ostan of Sistan and Baluchistan.
GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND
Sistan is almost a flat land, mostly made up of sediments
(21from Hirmand river. The lowest point is Hamun-e Hirmandv '
(1) Extract from clause 3 of despatch No. 1291F of H.S. Barnes, Secretary to the Government of 
India in the Foreign Department, to H.B, Majesty's Minister at the Court of Persia, dated 
Simla 29th May 1906. FO 60/730.
(2) Hamun is an ancient Persian word for “Lake"
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which drains all waters in the region. The surrounding lands 
have a very gentle, almost negligible slope towards the Hamun 
depression. To the west of this region, the southward 
continuation of the Eastern highlands separate Sistan from 
the Lut desert. The only mountainous part of Sistan is its 
north-western corner where the Bandan range ends, and its 
western flanks where Kuh-e Palangan represents the highest 
peak in the region. Although Sistan lies geographically in 
the Iranian plateau, most of it falls politically in Afghan 
territory with a small portion in Pakistan, and only 36,000 
sq. km. in Iran; hence Iranian Sistan occupies the 
west-central part of the most depressed zone of the entire 
basin.
Of the geological features of Sistan, a relatively detailed 
survey carried out in the 1950's, remarks:
"Iranian Sistan has a make-up very similar to that of 
the other depressions of eastern Iran and of 
Baluchistan. The mountainous chains which border it 
are made up of a very varied series of rocks, greatly 
disturbed tectonically, among which the Cretaceous and 
Eocene formations predominate, while the depressed 
zone is filled, for thicknesses not well-defined but 
certainly of some hundreds of meters, by recent 
Plio-pleistocene detrital formations."(l)
The same report described soil formation in Sistan as being 
of three distinguishable series:
"Three series of detrital formations which fill 
the depressions can be distinguished; from the bottom 
to the top, i.e. from the oldest to the most recent, 
they are the following: Sivalik formations (also
called Gobi formations), in great part of the Pliocene 
age; pebbles and alluvial Pleistocene clays; recent 
accumulations. " (2)
(1) ItalconsuLt, “Socio-Economic Development PLan for the South-Eastern Region-, Rome 1959, pp. 
45-6.
(2) Ibid, p. 46.
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These deposits forming almost the entire area of the Iranian 
Sistan, create one of the most fertile lands in the country, 
but its fertility cannot be utilised to its full capacity 
owing mainly to the shortage of precipitation and water,
Sistan's climate is classified as being of semi-desert kind. 
Great variations exist in the temperatures of day and night 
and between summer and winter. Summers continue for 5 to 7 
months during which temperature rises to a very high level. 
The wind from the west brings little cloud and rain to 
Sistan. The annual precipitation in Sistan is about 2 inches 
or 40 millimetres^
Another high velocity northerly wind blowing from the 
mountains of Afghanistan in the spring and early summer 
months with a speed of 70 to 100 miles ph., brings hot and 
dry air mixed with sand and continues for 110 to 120 days. 
This wind is locally known as Bad-e Sad-o bist Ruzeh "the 
wind of 120 days".
100
50
mm. 0
Average Annual Precipitation recorded in Sistan(2)
(1) Hurray, op. cit., p. 27.
(2) Mahmudi and others, op. cit., p. 41.
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Sir Percy Sykes saw this wind at the turn of the twentieth 
century as a providence to Sistan because:
"In fact, were it not for the 
Bad-i~Sad-u-Bist-Ruz or Wind of 120 days, Sistan 
could scarcely be inhabited. This providential blast 
blows across the district from April to July, and 
although hot and disagreeable, carries away malarial 
taint. When it dies away, the mass of the inhabitants, 
who struck me as a sickly race, suffer terribly from 
fever."(1)
A western geographer who visited the region in the 1930s 
described this wind as:
"So dry that it absorbs all moisture from every living 
organism".(2 )
This wind together with high temperature causes intense 
evaporation of the sheets of water in the region. 
Notwithstanding shortage of water in Sistan, Lake Hamun 
and River Hirmand are the main geographical features in the 
region.
A-Lake Hamun
Historically known as "Sea of Zereh" (see Lake Zarah - figure
VIII), Lake Hamun, or Hamun-e Hirmand, is the most important 
lake of the eastern parts of the Iranian plateau due to its 
extension and perennial character, and above all, to the fact 
that its waters are fresh. As a major basin, Hirmand collects 
all waters of a considerably vast area, including about 
three-quarters of Afghanistan, and flood water from the 
mountains of its immediate vicinity.
This factor together with the lake's shallowness (apparently 
not more than 10 meters deep at most), on account, also, of 
minimum slope of the shore lands and finally, because of the 
inconstant regimes of the various tributaries, the surface
(1) Sykes, Major Percy, op. cit., p. 393.
(2) Gabriele, Alfons, “The Southern Lut and Iranian Baluchistan", Geographical Journal, XVII, 
(1938, p. 194.
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occupied by the lake varies considerably in the course of the
year, as well as from one year to another: "The sheet of
water, at the end of the high-water period (May), can reach
an area of about 3,200 sq. Km., and the waters mingle with
those of the much smaller Hamun-e Puzak, situated in the
Afghan territory, into which pours one of the branches of the
delta of the Hirmand, the external Parian. Very soon,
however, because of the rapid shrinking of the
tributaries, the outflow of the Shallaq outlet, and the
intense evaporation of the sheet of water, favored by the
high temperatures and by the strong arid wind blowing in this
period from the North-West (wind of 120 days), the surface
area of the lake is reduced to a mere 1,200 sq. Km, thus
diminishing by about 2,000 sq. Km., of which 800 sq Km.
remain in swampy state, while 1,200 sq Km. become covered by
/1 \
canebrakes and pastures."v '
During the low water season the lake is divided into at least 
four separate sheets of water which are locally known as: 
Hamun-e Sabery to the north which is the deepest: Hamun-e
Puzak to the north-east and inside Afghan territory; Hamun-e 
Shapour to the south; and a central pool which is considered 
as the main body of the lake and this is known as Hamun-e 
Hirmand (see figure XI). British Sistan arbitration 
Commissioner, General Frederick Goldsmid, who visited Sistan 
in 1871-2, after three years of drought, described the lake 
in the following terms:
"Another extraordinary change in Sistan is the drying 
up of the lake, which can be no longer held to exist. 
It does not appear difficult to account for the 
circumstance. For some three years before our arrival 
the drought had been terrific: the smaller feeders 
of the lake, the Farah-rud, the Adraskand, the 
Khash-rud, and their still smaller tributaries, had 
either not filled at all after the winter season, or 
in such a very moderate degree that their outflow into 
the lake was not sufficient to provide for the amount 
of water lost in the immense annual evaporation; while 
the Helmand, the principal feeder, instead of as in 
former years bursting after the winter through its 
band, and rushing northward into the lake by its 
proper bed above Chakhansur, had been completely
(1) Italconsult, op. cit., p. 48.
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diverted into the great canal by the permanent band 
constructed by the Amir at Kuhak; and whatever 
overflow might escape over or through the band would 
not now probably arrive at the north-eastern bed of 
the lake, which is to a great extent still covered 
with detached pools of stagnant water, will, if the 
present state of affairs continue, become completely 
dried up and a large area of immensely fertile soil be 
thus redeemed for cultivation; while the whole 
conditions of life in the province will undergo a very 
marked change - though it is difficult to imagine 
Sistan without its plague of insects and its countless 
myriad of snakes and water- fowl."()
The only landmark which stands out in Sistan plain is Kuh-e 
Khoajeh (stone mountain), a small island rising about one
Kuh-e Khoajeh 
The eastern face - old ruins at the top 
and present dwellings below.
(1) Goldsmid, General Sir F., “Eastern Persia", London 1876, pp. 272-3.
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hundred meters above the level of the lake. This stoney and
conical shaped mound with its flat top, is round and measures
2.5 X 2.0 kilometres. Its origin is said to be of a tabular
lava filtration. ^ 1 ^ It is situated near the west shore of
Hamun-e Shapor, and is separated from the shore by a narrow
body of water, which, at flood time, is about 2 kilometres
(2)and less than 2 meters deep.' '
Visiting the site at the end of the nineteenth century, Sir 
Percy Sykes wrote of Kuh-e Khoajeh:
"Kuh-i-Zor, Kuh-i-Rustam or Kuh-i-Khoja, the 
latter term being almost universal nowadays, is 
generally more or less of an island, although at the 
time of the Goldsmid Mission the lake was waterless. 
On the occasion of our visit, in order to approach it 
we employed tutin or reed rafts, which resemble 
bisected cigars, and are very fairly steady. The water 
being shallow, we had to wade in for some distance, 
and, upon reaching the raft, we sat upon a roll of 
felts. The ordinary tutin is some nine feet long and
Sistani Men sailing Tutin or "Tuten"
(1) Italconsult, op. cit., p. 49.
(2) Ibid.
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two feet six inches wide, and lasts about ninety days 
after which the reeds rot. We occupied more than an 
hour in being slowly punted across the open water, 
which was brackish and perhaps four feet deep, there 
being very few reeds in this particular section.
"The Kuh-i-Khoj a rises 400 feet above the plain 
and is only accessible on the south and 
south-east. I may mention that it is apple-shaped, 
with a diameter of about a mile...."(^)
Kuh-e Khoajeh - an impressive table-hill in Lake Hamun - is 
the site of an ancient palace and fire temple.
The ruined palace and fire temple of 
Kuh-e Khoajeh, built in the Partho-Sassanian period
(1) Sykes, Sir Percy "Ten Thousand Miles in Persia", Chapter XXXIII, p. 377.
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Mark Aurel Stain, a Hungarian by birth who became 
British serving in India, and spent most of his life 
discovering traces of Alexander the Great, was the 
first European to discover the ruins of Kuh-e Khoajeh
in Sistan. He published the results of his discovery
in the Geographical Journal in 1916 and later in his 
book "Innermost Asia" (Oxford 1928).
The ruins of Kuh-e Khoajeh were visited by the German 
Orientalist Ernest Herzfeld in the winter of 1924-25. 
He carried out some excavation works on this site in 
the spring of 1929. He found buildings of great 
significance of the site, including a palace and a 
fire temple of Zoroastrianism, which probably date 
back to the Parthian and Sassanid periods. Some of the 
walls of the ruined palace were found lavishly
decorated with colorful frescoes and an ornate stucco
design.(1)
One of the Parthian frescoes from the 
palace at Kuh-e Khoajeh: a man's head in profile.
(1) Hermann Georgina, "The Iranian Revival* of the Making of the Past Series, Oxford 1977, p. 19.
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The separate sheets of Hamun water become one at flood times 
when the level of the lake rises considerably. The surplus 
water flows out, at the southern end of the lake, through 
Shila of Shallaq, into the depression of God-e Zereh
inside Afghan territory.
"The Shallaq has an ample and well-cut bed in the 
plain adjacent to the crossing of the Zahedan-Zabol 
road, and its length of a hundred km. varies with the 
advance or regression of the waters of the Hamun on 
its southern shore.
"The dip of the Shallaq is proportionally small, 
inasmuch as the difference in level between the 
Hamun-e-Hirmand and the Goud-e-Zerre seems to be of no 
more than 20 m.; furthermore, the bottom of the 
watercourse is at a somewhat higher level than that of 
the lake. For these reasons, the flow of the Shallaq 
river is, in general, abundant only in the period of 
high waters, while in the remaining period of the year 
it is so strongly reduced as to disappear, while the 
water becomes saline after evaporation, which is quite 
intense, due to the largeness of the riverbed."(2)
Another view of Kuh-e Khoajeh as appeared 
on page 378 of Sykes' "Ten Thousand Miles in Persia"
(1) Shila is a strange term in Persian, used locally in reference to the river bed connecting
Hamun lake to the God-e Zereh. Some say its original form is Arabic *Masilah“ meaning the 
channel of flood passage.
(2) Italconsult, op. cit., p. 49.
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Visiting Hamun Lake towards the end of the nineteenth
century, Colonel Yate has given the following geographical 
descriptions of the lake:
"A glance at the map will show that the Helmund, 
flowing from south to north along the eastern side of 
Persian Sistan, empties itself into the Hamuns or
lakes on its north. When the snow in the mountains 
melts and the river is in flood these lakes overflow, 
and the surplus water flows back again from north to 
south along the western side of Sistan, eventually
emptying itself into the Gaud-i-Zarih, the lake on the 
south. Just to the south of the two Hamuns is the 
large tract of country covered with high reeds known 
as the Naizar. The water in these reeds advances and 
recedes with the level of the lakes. We for instance 
had to pass through several miles of dry reeds before 
we got to the edge of the water on our way out from 
Nasirabad, and we also got in to Nasirabad from Bandar 
dryshod, but then 1893 was an exceptionally dry
year." (1J
Hamun Lake's role in the life of Sistan is pivotal; it is the 
principal accumulation of fresh water in the entire Iranian 
plateau and, with its oscillations, permits the formation of 
extensive pastures. Its supply of underground waters is the 
source of life of the province. Its fish resources 
constitute one of life resources of Sistan population. The 
Neizar (reed forest) around it not only provides good grazing 
for the live stock and fine hunting grounds, but also is the 
source of many kinds of handicrafts for the local population. 
Colonel Yate's description of duck hunting in the Neizar, at 
the turn of the century, would probably give a clue as to the 
importance of Hamun's role in local life since time 
immemorial. He wrote:
"Next day we were out early, directly after breakfast, 
and first of all were shown how the Saiyads, as the 
Shikaris of Sistan are called, netted wild-fowl. In 
the open pools of water dry reeds are stuck in the 
mud, in rows at short intervals, and bent down on to 
the next so as to form long lines along the surface of 
the water, by which an obstacle is created. The 
ducks, when swimming, follow along these lines, and 
are thus diverted over the net. The net is fastened 
in the centre and at the corners to sticks driven
(1) Yate, op. cit., p. 81.
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firmly into the ground. These sticks are then hent 
down outwards, two on one side and two on the other, 
under the water, and hitched into nicks in four stakes 
fixed in the ground opposite to each corner of the net 
when thus spread out, the sticks thus forming a 
powerful spring. The Saiyad sits concealed in the 
neighbouring reeds, and when a flock of ducks swim 
over the submerged net, he pulls a rope which releases 
the four sticks. These at once spring upright, thus 
bringing the two sides of the net together and 
enclosing the birds between them. The ducks caught 
are then pinioned in an ingenious manner by crossing 
their wings at the back of their heads and putting 
their feet up on their backs and sent to town for 
sale. " (1)
Sir Percy Sykes also provides a visitor's view of the lake 
and life around it. He writes:
"Our first stage was Hamadi, situated close to the 
lagoon, which I now meant to explore thoroughly. 
Along its edges dwells a tribe of Saiads or fowlers, 
who struck me as being perhaps aborigines, both from 
their appearance and from the account they gave of 
themselves. Living close to them, but entirely 
distinct, are the Gaudar or cow-keepers, whose herds 
of cattle graze in the lagoon, feeding off the young 
reeds. Sistan is famous for its cows.
"The feather trade is their chief interest, only 
one or two families are engaging in fishing, but at 
present the results of their labour are entirely used 
for stuffing cushions, although, no doubt, in time, 
the sale of plumes will largely increase their 
incomes; the total output is 4000 lbs per annum.
"The birds are caught by means of nets held open 
by stakes, into which they are slowly driven, lanes 
being cut in the reeds or staked out in the open water 
as a further assistance. A man lying hidden on his 
tutin watches until his prey is swimming over his net, 
when he pulls a string, releases the stakes which form 
a rude spring, and the hapless fowl is his.
"Early one morning we rode to the Hamun, a dense 
jungle of reeds, down which runs the narrowest of 
creeks. Here we stepped on board our tutin and were 
slowly punted along an open lane about the width of a 
main road. On each side we heard the calls of 
countless birds, and many descriptions of hawks 
hovered above, The first bird shot was a bostani, 
which is non-migratory. To some extent it resembled 
the minaul pheasant of Kashmir, with blue plumage and
(1) Yate, op. cit., p. 80.
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scarlet beak. Then coots swam across the water-way 
and a tiny blue bird darted about just like a 
kingfisher.
11After being punted for three or four miles, we 
reached the hunting-grounds, which consist of a series 
of lagoons opening one into the other. Here a few 
duck were bagged, and we passed a fisherman on his way
home with twenty or more freshly caught fish. Some
were three or four pounds in weight."
Finally, the great mass of Hamun's waters cannot fail to
affect strongly the weather of the surrounding region, both 
in terms of humidity in the air, and moderating action of
thermic currents, whereas Hamun's fresh waters, much more 
limpid than those of the Hirmand River, can supply a drinking 
water distribution network throughout Sistan, its basin's 
underground water resources play a highly significant role in 
the agricultural life of the region and as drinking water 
supply for its population.
According to the statistics of 1985 from the Iranian Ministry
of Energy, the Hamun basin's underground water supplies are
{2)731 million cubic metersv ' per annum which constitutes for
1.6 per cent of total distribution in the country. Of this,
268.5 million cubic meters were from 449 deep wells in that
year; 349 million cubic meters from 953 qanats; and 71
(3 )million cubic meters from 180 springs.' 1 
B- Hirmand River
There are a number of streams emptying into Lake Hamun of 
which River Hirmand is the only perennial and the most 
important tributary. Hirmand's delta region is measured as 
being 150,000 sq. km. The course of this river, upstream of 
delta, lies entirely in Afghanistan (see figure XII). Rising
(1) Sykes, op. cit.. Chapter XXXIII, pp. 386 - 7.
(2) This figure cannot be correct as the itemised figures add up to 1029 million cubic meters.
(3) Statistics from 'Atlas-e Abhay-e Iran" (Atlas of Water Resources of Iran), Ministry of 
Energy of the islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran 1369 (1990), VoL. II, page 158.
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in the kuh-e Baba range, north-west of Kabul, Hirmand flows 
in a north-east to south-west direction, towards Iranian 
Sistan, after meandering for 1050 km. in Afghanistan. 
Throughout its course in Afghan territories, Hirmand receives 
a number of significant tributaries of which , two are most 
important; one, the Musa Qaleh which drains together with 
Hirmand upstream of central Afghanistan, southern slopes of 
Hendu-kosh and Afghan massif; the other, Arghandab 
(historically known as Khar-darya)^^ which drains southern 
mountains and plains of Afghanistan. Having received Musa 
Qaleh, Hirmand is joined by Arghandab near the city of Bist 
(or Bost) at the edge of mountain zone. Arghandab itself 
receives a number of tributaries of which Arghasan is the 
most important (see figure XII).
From Bist, Hirmand crosses the deserts of Riggestan and 
Dasht-e Marg for about 400 Km., within definite banks with 
respect to plain, before reaching Chahar Borjak which is the 
beginning of Greater Sistan; 7 0 km. upstream of the Iranian 
border, where there is a measuring station (see figure XII).
Of particulars of Hirmand river in Afghanistan, Mr Tate of 
Colonel McMahon's Sistan Arbitration team, remarked at the 
turn of the twentieth century:
"The average fall of the river-bed is probably
not less than thirty-five feet in a mile...  below
Girishk the fall in the river-bed diminishes rapidly.
"The valley of the Helmand below Khwaja Ali, 
where it runs almost due east and west/ presents a
very peculiar feature. On the north the valley hugs 
closely the edge of the Dasht-i-Margo, while to the 
south it is separated from the basin of the Gaud-i
Zireh only by a watershed which in places is a mere 
dividing wall, on which the effect of the wind's 
action can clearly be traced. Abreast of Rudbar the 
valley is three hundred feet higher than the 
Gaud-i-Zireh, and the narrow trough in which the
Helmand lies, though all the time descending gradually 
towards the west, never reaches the level of the 
Gaud."(2)
(1) Literally meaning "Great River".
(2) Tate, 6.P., "The Frontier of Baluchistan = Travel on the borders of Persia and Afghanistan", 
London 1909, pp. 283 - 241.
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Hirmand and its Tributeries in Afghanistan
Of the waters that Hirmand drains and successfully brings to 
its delta annually, more than one billion cubic meters are 
used for agricultural irrigation in the Zabol plain every 
year. The Afghans have constructed a number of dams of 
various kinds along the course of Hirmand and Arghandab 
causing reduction in the annual amount of water reaching 
Sistan. The utilisation of the accumulated waters, if 
limited to the middle basin of the Hirmand, would have a 
strong repercussion on the delta region, where the amounts to 
be destined for irrigation and those flowing into the lake 
would diminish. From this, there would be a consequent 
reduction in the size of the lake, and should the outflow of 
the waters through Shila-Shallaq to God-e Zereh cease, a 
progressive increase in the salinity of the waters and in the 
severity of the climate with disastrous consequences for both 
Sistan and south-west Afghanistan. (For information on the 
annual variations in the volume of water reaching delta 
region and variation of volume from one year to another, see 
Chapter VIII on Hirmand Water Disputes).
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In the delta region which begins at Kuhak, Hirmand divides 
into two main branches of the Sistan River and Rud-e Parian 
(Parian-e Moshtarak), each, in turn, subdividing into many 
branches and canals.
In the following table are given, for the individual 
hydrological years of the period 194 7-1952 from Mehr to 
Sharivar (about October to September), the amounts of flow 
into the delta by the main branch of the Hirmand; annual, 
monthly maximums (mostly Shahrivar) expressed in millions of 
cubic meters:
"Year Annual Flow Monthly Flow
max. min.
1947-48 3,400 956 11
1948-49 3,620 958 15.5
1949-50 4,460 1,063 34.8
1950-51 4,580 1,165 52.7
1951-52 3,990 1,026 46.3
"Jt should be noted that, in the period of the 
observations, no year had particularly small flows, 
such as 194 6-47, when the entire annual volume of flow 
of the Hirmand at Chahar Burjak was less than 2,220 
million cu. m. and the minimum monthly flow was less 
than 1 million cu, m,
"The variability of the flows of the Sistan 
proves to be less accentuated than that of the 
Hirmand, as it receives the greater part of the low 
flow of the Hirmand, while the high flow discharges 
principally into the Parian, as results from the 
following amounts of mean monthly capacity (Iranian 
Calendar) at Kuhak in the period 1947-52, expressed in 
% of mean value of the entire period (127 cu, 
m,jsec.)
Month M A A  D B E  F O K  T M C  
12 23 34 50 89 155 262 296 183 61 24 11
"The variability of the annual flow of the 
Hirmand is also noteworthy; it varies, for example, at 
Chahar Burjak, from 2,2 to 6.5 thousand million cu. 
m. in a period of only four years."(1)
{1) ItalconsuLt, op. cit., p.54.
An Old Windmill in Nehbandan
WATER CONSERVATION
Considering Sistan plain's physical characteristics and rapid 
evaporation together with reduction in the volume of Hirmand 
water reaching the delta region, implementation of water 
conservation plans in Sistan will be of great consequence to 
the province. Several bands (dams made of wood and branches) 
have existed on Parian, Sistan and the main channel of the 
Hirmand' for centuries. Of these "Band-e Kuhak" at the point 
where the Sistan River branches out, "Band-e Parian" or 
"Band-e Jangjah" where Rud-e Parian takes off, and "Band-e 
Kamal Khan" on the main channel of the Hirmand inside 
Afghanistan are more famous.
In the years between 1950 and 1954, the fixed cross-channels 
of Kuhak and Zahak were constructed by the Bongah-e Abyari 
(Irrigation Foundation) of Iran. Their principal 
characteristics are:
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"Kuhak cross-channel; in reinforced concrete, 
surmounted by sluice gates, 67 m. long, sustained by 
the left bank of the river and linked to the right 
bank with an embankment 95 m. long, with upstream 
slope faced with reinforced concrete slabs.
"Ten sluice gates,each 5.80 m. long and 4.30 m. 
high, impound the waters. The sill altitude is 543.20 
m. above sea level; the normal high water surface is 
3.80 m. above this level, or 547 m. above sea 
level.
"Downstream from the cross-channel, a stilling 
basin has been built, 14 m. long and 1 m. deep, with 
piles to break the rush of the water.
"The diversion works of the Azar canal, to which 
the function of supplying the Miankangi has been 
definitely assigned, are placed on the right 
embankment of the cross-channel, and are composed of 
three arches, 2.5 m. long, with a sill altitude of 
544.40 m., intercepted by sluice gates of 2,50 X 2.80 
m.
"The canal, downstream of the diversion works, 
has its initial section placed in the embankment 
which, as aforementioned, completes the barrage on the 
right; after that, it is excavated in the right bank 
of the Sistan river.
"The capacity diverted in the Azar canal, 
according to a capacity measurement taken on 19 April 
1958, was 12.4 cu. m./sec., with a hydrometric
reading in the canal of 2.37 m. and a water level 
above the cross-channel, at 546.20 m. of altitude, of
about 80 cm., i.e. lower than the height of normal
high water surface.
"Zahak cross-channel: has been placed in a
particularly narrow section of the Sistan river, with 
a resultant barrier length of 53.40 m. The
cross-channel, in reinforced concrete with sill 
altitude of 538.70 m., was built with eight openings,
each one 5.80 m. wide, barred by sluice gates of 5.80
X 3.80 m. The normal high water surface level is 543 
m. above sea level.
"The headworks for irrigation are situated a 
little upstream of the cross-channel; on the right 
bank, that of the Nahr Shahr, with three arches of 
2.50 m., with a sill altitude of 540.40 m.,
intercepted by sluice gates of 2.50 X 3.10 m.; on the 
left bank, that of Nahr Taheri, it is composed of a 
single arch of 2.50 m., with a sill altitude of 540.80 
m., intercepted by a sluice gate of 2.50 X 2.60 m.
"Measurement of the capacity in these canals have 
not been made, but from local information it seems to 
be around 6 cu. m./sec. for each of them."(%)
(1) Italconsult, op. cit.r pp. 56 - 7.
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More recently (1972), an artificial reservoir lake was 
constructed at the Chah-Nimeh depression to accumulate the 
waters of spring through which used to run unused into the 
Hamun; making use of the waters of its artificial lakes in 
summer and autumn months (see figure XIII). The outstanding 
particulars of this project can be summed up as follows: "The
capacity of the impounding area between elevation 547 and 541 
is about 110 X 106 cu. m., with 94 useful volume, net of 
surface evaporation; this amount of water will enable the 
natural flow of the Sistan in its four lowest months 
(generally August-November) to be increased by around 10 cu. 
m./sec.; the average flow during this period will rise from 
30 to 90% (estimated on the basis of the years 1942-43 and 
1947-1951 for which flow measurements are available), and the 
increase of the minimum monthly flow will be more than 
100%.
This reservoir covers about 4700 hectares with a capacity of 
660 m. cu. meters.
The principal river channels, other than Hirmand, that run 
into the lake, from east and north and north-eastern sides 
are, from west to east; Khash, Khuspas, Farah and Harut 
rivers. All these are of the nature of torrents, rising 
swiftly and subsiding almost as rapidly. For the greater 
part of the year they contain no flowing water in their beds 
for some distance above Lake Hamun.
The Khash river ceases to exist at the Oasis of Khash in 
Afghanistan. Its channel is fairly well defined down to 
Chokhansur, and can be traced till it finally loses itself in 
the north-eastern pocket of the lake Hamun-e Puzak which is 
situated mainly in Afghan territory. Like Hirmand, the 
spring is the season of the heavy flooding which finds its 
way into the lake in a considerable volume, after irrigating 
Chokhansur district.
(1) Atlas-e Abhay-e Iran, op. cit., p. 159.
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Figure XIII
Lakes, Dams and Reservoirs in Sistan
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Rud-e Khospas, further north-west of Khash, is of the same 
character, but before reaching the lake it dwindles to a 
narrow ditch full of brine and fringed with reeds.
Farah Rud drains the Ghur country and flows southward towards 
the Hamun after passing through Farah District in 
Afghanistan. Floods of great violence flow down this river 
into the lake for a very short period of the year.
Harut river enters Hamun-e Saberi about 20 miles north of the 
confluence of Farah river. Like the other three, it rarely 
adds any water to the volume of the lake (see figure XII).
There are a number of insignificant seasonal and occasional 
streams discharging flood waters into the lake from the hill 
sites of the west of the Hamun. The most important of these, 
is Rud-e Bandan which discharges its flood waters into the 
lake no more than once or twice in five or six years.
Waters from these rivers, especially from the Hirmand, if 
reached Sistan delta uninterrupted, as Hirmand waters did 
throughout the history down to the beginning of the twentieth 
century when the region was known as the "bread basket of 
Khorasan", Sistan would indeed be no less than the Nile delta 
in Egypt. Making such comparisons between the two, Sir Percy 
Sykes writes:
"I have been much struck by the resemblance that 
exists between Sistan and Egypt on the one hand and 
Sarhad and Palestine on the other, Sistan absolutely 
depends on the Helmand, much as Egypt does on the 
Nile, both districts being the granaries of the 
surrounding tribes. Again, in Sarhad, just as in 
Palestine, drought renders the land uninhabitable, the 
flocks of sheep and goats dying from want of 
nourishment, and, during my journey across Sarhad, 
every enquiry as to absent tribes elicited the 
invariable reply 'Gone to Sistan. '
"In the same way as the patriarch Abraham, and 
later on Jacob, were forced to seek Egypt, to preserve 
their families alive, so today the nomads of Sarhad 
are collected in and around Sistan, although the 
skeletons that we passed proved that there had been a 
considerable loss of life on the road. To complete 
the parallel, just as the traveller to Egypt traversed 
the Arabian Desert, partly in sight of the 
Mediterranean Sea, so too the famine-stricken herdsmen 
painfully urge their worn-out flocks across the desert
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A village dwelling near Lake Hamun, 
made of reeds from the Neizar of Hamun.
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to Sistan and see the great Hamun, and then the 
glistening Helmands, which, like the Nile, guarantees 
the wanderer and his flocks from death by 
hunger."(^)
This was Sistan until the beginning of the twentieth century 
when there was no interruption in the flow of the Hirmand 
waters into the delta region. Construction of dams and
canals in Afghanistan has resulted in the decrease in volume 
of Hirmand water with consequent diminishing waters of the 
lake and with disastrous results on the irrigation and other 
economic life of the region (see Chapter VIII for more 
details on Hirmand water disputes).
ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT
Water shortage is not the only handicap slowing down 
economic development of Sistan. Complicated and often 
uncertain land ownership together with tribal culture create 
a powerful mixture which hampers economic development of this 
highly fertile region.
The arable lands of Sistan - 90,000 hectares in total - were 
declared in 1865 as "Khaleseh" or Government owned. This was 
a measure of punishment against local Sardars who owned most 
of the lands in Sistan and who had put Amir Alam Khan III the 
Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat and Sistan under siege in spite of 
his efforts in safeguarding Sistan from the Afghan 
encroachments (see Chapters II and IV for more details) . 
These lands remained Khaleseh and under-developed until 1932 
when the Government began leasing them to the local Sardars. 
This measure did not solve the problem. The Sardars did 
little to develop agricultural lands while their exploitation 
of the peasantry and their non-payment of rent levies 
resulted in successive decisions by the government between 
1932 and 1940 in redistributing lands among local Sardars and 
peasants. This policy though positive, did not settle the 
question of complicated tribal affiliation and land ownership.
(1) Sykes, op. cit., pp. 373 - 4.
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The arable lands of Sistan are now as follows:
"According to the quotations made by the Khalise, 
the surfaces are calculated in share, that is in 
pieces of land of about 3.6 -4 hectares.
"At present the share subject to payment are the 
following, in the four areas into which the region is 
divided (the two last ones are now joined together):
POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY
Frequently referred to in the historical documents as the 
"bread basket of Khorasan", Sistan has, throughout history, 
always been an important political centre in addition to its 
significant economic situation. It has always been a highly 
significant political division of Iran. It was ruled by the 
Saffarid kings in early Islamic centuries. Then a number of 
local dynasties ruled Sistan, including the Keyani family, 
and then ruled by various local Sardars. As from 1856 Sistan 
was incorporated into the Amirdom of Khozeimeh of Qaenat and 
remained so until 1937 when it came under the direct rule of 
the central government of Iran as part of the province of 
Kerman in the new political and administrative arrangement of 
the country introduced that year.
Sistan's political importance has diminished in the modern 
times with its diminishing economic significance as a result 
of water shortage in the region. In the current political 
and administrative arrangement of Iran, even the name 
"Sistan" is replaced by the name of its capital "Zabol" and 
it constitutes for a shahrestan in the larger province of 
Baluchistan, whereas the name "Sistan" is added to the name
Miankangi (North) 
Posht Ab (Centre)
8,000
7.000
8.000 
4,000
Shib Ab (South) 
Shariqi Nahruei
(South-east)
27,000."(!)
(1) ItalconsuLt, op. cit., p. 64.
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of the province of "Sistan and Baluchistan". The reason must 
be the presence of a larger Baluch population in Sistan.
Shahrestan-e Zabol (Sistan), with a land area of 8,117 sq. 
km. is one of six shahrestans of the province of "Sistan and 
Baluchistan". Internally, this shahrestan is divided into 
five bakhshs, six dehestans and 847 towns and villages, with 
the city of Zabol as its centre.
With a population of 274,611 in 1 9 8 6 which represented a
density of 33.8 per sq. km., this shahrestan is the most
populated region in the entire Eastern Iranian borderlands.
(2)Of this population, 16,346v ' were immigrants which is 
about seven per cent of the total population, and are almost 
exclusively Afghan refugees. The majority of Sistan's 
population belong to various Baluchi tribes, of which, 
Nahruei, Shahraki, and Keyani (non-Baluch clan) are more well 
known. Shahrestan-e Zabol is made up of five bakhshs which 
are:
1 - Bakhsh-e Markazi with the city of Zabol as its
administrative centre. This bakhsh has only one
dehestan which is Dehestan-e Humeh, with Bonjar as 
its centre (see figure XIV).
Gazmeh - A village in Sistan
(1) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran (Statistic Centre of Iran), General Census of Mehr 1365 (September
October 1986), Vol. 142 - 3, p. 1.
(2) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran, op. cit., p. 3.
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2 - Bahksh-e Mian Kangi which also has only one dehestan,
with the town of Dust Mohammad Khan as its centre.
3  ^ Bakhsh-e Poshtab (Posht Ab) with one dehestan of the
same name.
4 - Bakhsh-e Shibab (Shib Ab) with one dehestan of the
same name, and with Mohammad Abad as its centre.
5 - Bakhsh-e Nahruei and Shahraki with two dehestans:
A. Dehestan-e Nahruei on the Afghan border; and
B. Dehestan-e Shahraki with Khamak as its centre (see 
figure XIV).
(1)
The city of Zabol (population 75,105) had, in the past, been 
called "Nosratabad" or "Nasftrabad" or "Shahr-e Sistan" which 
was built by Amir Alam Khan III, the Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat 
and Sistan, in the late 1860s. Prior to that, the town was 
known as "Zahedan" or "City of Saggestan" for centuries until 
it was believed to have been razed to the ground by Amir 
Teimur Lane in about AD 1383.
Visiting Nas&rabad in 1871, General Goldsmid described the 
town as:
"The new Fort or Town of Nasirabad, simply called the 
'Shahr', or town, by the natives of the province, is 
built in the shape of a quadrangle, with very strong 
and high mud walls, having towers at regular intervals 
along its face, and surrounded on all sides by a deep 
wet ditch of considerable breadth, between which and 
the walls a covered way, some twelve feet broad, leads 
all round the fort. The present fort measures, 
according to a rough calculation, 400 by 500 yards,
and is called by the natives the Shahr-i-Kadim (old 
city), in contradiction to the Shahr-i-Nau (new city) 
which is gradually being built contiguous to it, and 
to mark the limits of which a mud wall has been
raised, prolonging the sides of the Shahr-i-Kadim, and 
with a face* to the north. The dimensions of this new 
fort will be about 1000 yards by 600 yards, and it 
will enclose an area of nearly half a square mile.
Within this space the ancient Sistan village of
Husainabad has been enclosed; a fact which has 
apparently occasioned some confusion in India, for, in 
a report by Colonel Phayre, the Persians are described 
as strengthening a fort name Husainabad, on the banks
(1) Markaz-e Araar-e Iran, op, cit., p. 3.
(2) Le Strange, op. cit,, p. 335.
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of the Helmand, near Traku, whereas the allusion is 
evidently to this rising city of Nasirabad. The new 
town is almost entirely populated by people from Kain 
and Khurasan, but the village of Husainabad contains 
original Sistani inhabitants. Twenty thousand people 
were driven by famine into the province last year, 
from Persia, and have of course received every 
possible inducement to settle down, and so propagate 
Persian influence; and all the necessaries of life are 
cheap and abundant. The quasi-modern capital, though 
quite close to the populous and fertile portion of the 
province, has been built in the middle of a most 
desolate tract of country."(*)
Ruins of Zahedan near Zabol
Of the important and populous localities in Sistan, other
than Zabol and Dust Mohammad Khan, one is Sekuheh in the
southern section of Sistan. General Goldsmid provides a
comprehensive description of this locality in the
mid-nineteenth century, when, unlike the present time, Skuheh
was an. important town in Sistan. He wrote: "The town of
Sekuha, which derives its name from three clay or mud hills
in its midst, is built in an irregular circular form around
the base of the two principal hills. The southernmost part
of these hills is surmounted by the ark or citadel, an
c
ancient structure known as the citadel of Mir Khuhak Khan 
(the grandfather of Sardar Ali Khan); which is at present 
neither armed nor garrisoned, though kept in excellent
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., pp. 266 - 7.
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repair. Adjoining this and connected with it, is the second 
hill called the Burj-i-Falaksar, on which stands the present 
Governor's house; and about 150 yards to the west is the
third hill, not so high as the other, two, undefended and 
with no buildings on it but a mud caravanserai. The two 
principal hills thus completely command the town lying at 
their base, and are connected with one another by a covered 
way. Sekuha is quite independent of an extra-mural water 
supply, as water is always obtainable by digging a few feet 
below the surface anywhere inside the walls, which are
twenty-five feet high, strongly built of mud and in good 
repair. The houses are half dome-shaped and half 
flat-roofed, and we noticed that in almost every courtyard 
were tethered two or more excellent donkeys. The population, 
which is somewhat migratory, numbers about 5000 all told, 
living in 1200 houses,
The other important locality is the town and district of
Hozdar to the south-east of Lake Hamun. Sir Percy Sykes
described this locality at the end of the nineteenth century 
as follows:
"Hauzdar, as we saw it, is comparatively modern, 
and consists of an irregular, many-sided wall inside 
which were hundreds of houses, the largest being 
two-storied. It was at one time the property of the 
Rais tribe, but the Sarabandi chief, having gained a 
footing by marriage, seized the fort and dispossessed 
its previous owners, most of whom were probably 
killed."(2)
PART III: BALUCHISTAN - DISTRICT AND DRAINAGE SYSTEMS
What is now the border province of Sistan and Baluchistan, is 
a collection of pieces of three ancient provinces of Iran; 
Sistan to the north, western half of old Baluchistan in the 
centre, and Makran to the south. Apart from Sistan which
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., pp. 258 - 9.
(2) Sykes, op. cit., p. 373 (footnote).
116
has previously been discussed, the rest of this border 
province will be discussed here without any attempt being 
made in distinguishing between Baluchistan and Makran, as
little exists in the way of difference between the two in 
terms of geographical and population features. With a land 
area of 181,471 sq. km. which is 11.1% of total land area 
of Iran, this province is bounded by Pakistan on the east, 
Sistan and Khorestan on the north, Kerman on the west and the 
north-west corner of the Indian Ocean (Sea of Oman) on the 
south.^ ^^
Baluchistan was one of the Satrapies of the Achaemenian 
Empire and was ruled by local chiefs for centuries as
dependencies of Iran until 1870 when the province was divided 
between Iran and the British Indian Empire. The eastern half 
of Baluchistan, together with the districts of Sind and 
Punjab and Pakhtunistan formed the country of Pakistan in 
1948.
The mountains of this province form the central link of
mountain ranges which start from Zagros and continue into 
Pakistan. These mountains are joined by another mountain 
range which cover the border lands of Qaenat and west of 
Sistan and continue the Khorestan ranges in a southerly 
direction (see figures I and II).
These mountain ranges are not interconnected in all parts of
the province. The internal depressions have created separate
12)ranges in Baluchistan which are:' •
A - Kuh-e Taftan of Khash and Mirjaveh, locally known as 
the Kuh-e Chehel Tan, with its highest peak 4042 
metres above sea level. This volcanic mountain is
semi-active which erupts from time to time.
(1) Iran Almanac, op, cit,, p. 20.
(2) Iran Almanac, op. cit., p. 20.
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B Kuh-e Bazman of the north of Jazmurian depression 
with its highest peak 3497 metres above sea level. 
This range separates the Jazmurian depression from 
the Lut desert with Pirshiran range on its west.
C Kuh-e Malek Siah of north of Zahedan with its highest 
peak 1642 metres above sea level. This mountain is 
also volcanic but non-active and its highest peak is 
the point where Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan boundaries
meet.
D Kuh-e Birg, mostly situated in the Shahrestan-e 
Saravan.
E Kuh-e Bamposht which is situated between Saravan and 
Chah-Bahar near the sea shore.
Baluchistan has four drainage basins, disregarding Sistan. 
Of these, two are internal (Jazmurian and Lut); one external 
(Hamun-e Mashkil) ; and the fourth being the Oman Sea. Of 
these four systems, the Hamun-e Mashkil and Oman Sea are of 
concern in this chapter:
1 - Hamun-e Mashkil is a seasonal lake situated within
Pakistani territory with its westernmost corner 
falling inside Iranian territory. There are a number 
of tributaries to this lake from the Iranian 
Baluchistan, the most important of which are Mashkil 
and Tahlab.
A, Rising in the mountains of eastern parts of 
Baluchistan, in the vicinity of Esfandak and Kuhak, 
Mashkil river flows eastwards into Pakistan and after 
receiving a number of streams from around Panjgur, 
turns towards north, eventually discharging in the 
Hamun-e Mashkil. The most important tributary of 
this river on the Iranian side is Rud-e Nahang.
1X8
B. Tahlab or "Talkhab", locally pronounced as Talabf
rises in the mountains of Mirjaveh and Zahedan 
(Kacheh Kuh) and flows in a south-east direction as 
far as Hamun-e Mashkil after forming Iran-Pakistan
boundary for about one hundred kilometres (see figure 
VIII).
2 Of the rivers flowing directly into the Oman Sea, on
the Iranian side of the border, Rud-e Sarbaz or Bahu 
Kalat is the most important. Rising in the mountains 
of Bampur and Iranshahr, this river flows, in a 
north-west to south-east direction, as far as Sarbaz 
and Firouzabad. From below this point, it changes 
its course towards south-west and after passing by 
Bahu Kalat receives a major tributary from Qasr-e 
Qand, and once again changes its course into a 
south-easterly direction and discharges its water in 
the Govater Bay.
3 Of the Jazmurian tributaries, Rud-e Bampor and Halil
(1 \Rud are the most important.' '
4 - Two systems of Rud-e Shur and Nahrud drain flood
waters of north-east of Baluchistan into Lut desert.
The Iranian Government is planning the construction of two 
dams in Baluchistan on Halil Rud and Rud-e Sarbaz.
Akin to its dry surface, Baluchistan's underground water 
resources are not very impressive. The annual underground 
water discharge in the province is about 535.4 million cubic 
metres. The following table provides detailed information of 
this province's method and volume of underground water 
discharge per annum.
(1) Mokhber, op. cit., p. 104.
(2 ) Atlas-e Abhay-e Iran, op. cit., p. 159.
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Table of Underground Water Utilised in 
(m. cm.) Baluchistan
Region Deep Wells semi-deep
Wells
Qanat Spring Total Annual 
Discharge
Zahedan 48 210 56 6 32.5
Gohar Kuh 40 198 107 26 70.6
Ladis 5 10 117 30 58.1
Nosrat Abad 5 20 12 12 2.8
Gorgi Ziarat 2 50 40 1 3.6
Rusak 29 145 31 1 34.7
Kacheh Rud 39 20 22 2 31.4
Hormak 8 4 13 5 4.0
Kurin and Shuru 8 236 24 2 42.0
Khash 107 209 18 49 84.0
Posht Kuh 16 94 21 6 38.7
Abkhoan 12 76 17 1 11.0
Saravan 5 169 34 12 31.0
Sib and Muran 150 189 15 18 56 .7
Hasar Rais 5 18 25 2 4.3
Total 479 1630 552 173 505.4 m. cm
(Source: Bank of Agriculture (of Iran),
"Report on Potential and Actual Possibilities of 
The Province of Sistan and Baluchistan", no date, p. 11)
Excavation of deep and semi-deep wells was promoted in 
Baluchistan in late 1950s and early 1960s when Ministry of 
Agriculture actively encouraged them. The consequences 
proved to be damaging to the underground water resources of
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the province. The underground water table dropped and many 
old qanats ran out of water. Whereas ganats do not harm the 
underground water table and their function is principally 
similar to that of the natural spring, water has to be pumped 
out of the wells artificially and in large volumes which 
damages the limited underground water table of dry countries 
like Baluchistan. Interviewed on Sunday 17th May 1992, Amir 
Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam, who was once Governor General of 
Baluchistan and then Deputy Minister of Agriculture, with 
family ties and interests in Baluchistan, told this authors
"I was against promotion of deep wells in Baluchistan 
and argued against it with the Minister Mr Ruhani who 
did not agree with me and continued promoting it for 
years. I argued that deep wells will damage the 
underground water resources in that dry province. It 
took years before the Minister realised how harmful 
the experiment was. The Government subsequently 
banned excavation of more deep wells in Baluchistan."
Annual precipitation is also low in the province. The
recorded average annual precipitation at Zehedan is 120
millimetres which is the highest in the province. Other
recorded annual averages are: Chah Bahar 74 mm., Iranshahr 82
(1 ^mm. Saravan 7 9 mm.^ }
The climate is hot and humid near the sea, whereas heat and 
humidity decreases in the higher altitude towards north.
Apart from bad climate and water shortage, Baluchistan's 
great distance from the economic and administrative centres 
of Iran, together with lack of considerable mineral resources 
and its complex tribal culture, present considerable handicap 
for economic development of the province.
POLITICAL DIVISIONS
Politically and administratively, the province of Sistan and 
Baluchistan is divided into six shahrestans (see figure XV) 
with the city of Zahedan, formerly known as "Dozdab" as its
(1) Bank of Agriculture, op. cit., p. 8.
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Figure XV
Political Map of Sistan and Baluchistan
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capital. Of the six Shahrestans, Sistan is one, and the 
other five are:
1 - Shahrestan-e Zahedan with a population of 38975 and
with three bakhshs. City of Zahedan is the centre, 
and Mirjaveh is the only urban centre of the 
Shahrestan, other than Zahedan.
2 - Shahrestan-e Khash with 24038.9 population and two
bakhshs. The town of Khash is the centre.
3 - Shahrestan-e Iranshahr with the town of Iranshahr as
its centre and with a population of 55221 and five 
bakhshs.
4 - Shahrestan-e Saravan with the town of Saravan as its
centre and with a population of 25464 in four bakhshs.
5 - Shahrestan-e Chah Bahar with the Port Chah Bahar as
its centre and with a population of 2 9 655 in four 
bakhshs.^  ^
There are a number of towns other than Chah Bahar in this 
Shahrestan. All shahrestans of the province have common 
borders with Pakistan except iranshahr* Of the shahrestans 
of this province, Saravan and Khash are situated on the
border areas of Pakistan, whereas of the shahrestan chah 
Bahar, only the easternmost parts are facing Pakistani 
borders. Finally, the eastern regions of Shahrestan-e 
Zahedan face both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
(1) Markaz-e Amar-e Iran (Statistics Centre of Iran), General Census of Mehr 1369 (September - 
October 1986), Vol. I, p. 8.
C H A P T E R  I I
THE FRONTIER-KEEPING AMIRDOM OF KHOZEIMEH 
SECTION I - THE KHOZEIMEH AMIRS AND THEIR RULE
INTRODUCTION
Before engaging ourselves in the main discussion, it is of 
some significance to know that the term "AMIR" or "EMIR" is 
Arabic, literally meaning "commander". However, within its 
Iranian context, the term constitutes for a position long 
since disappeared, which was self-made entailing a wide range 
of political titles such as the leader; the governor; the 
commander of forces; the ultimate judge in the district; the 
defender of the territory; the protector of the inhabitants; 
the ruler of the region. In short, it means "the vassal 
king" of the classic description. In most cases the Amirs 
were self-appointed, and created their Amirdom by gradually 
expanding their areas of influence. The power of such Amirs, 
inherited by their descendants, was a natural one. It was 
further strengthened, in some cases, by being officially 
designated as ruler of their own realm by the King of Kings. 
Thus, theirs was a two tier power; the natural power and the 
official title. These descriptions were most applicable to 
the state of the Khozeimeh Amirdom.
THE ORIGIN OF THE KHOZEIMEH FAMILY
Almost all recent literatures, both in Persian and English, 
limited as they are, describe the Khozeimeh family as being 
of Arab origin. The reason is that the roots of the family 
are traced to a Khazem (or"Hazem") Bin Khozeimeh, an "Arab" 
commander of the early Abbasid Caliphs who was dispatched by 
Caliph Mansour to put down the revolt in Sistan of Ostad of 
Sis aided by a certain Harish Sistani. Upon his arrival in 
Qohestan, the district to the north of Sistan, Khazem Bin 
Khozeimeh succeeded in quelling the revolt. He remained in
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that region and founded a dynasty of Amirs who ruled the area 
for over a thousand years. The family gradually adopted the 
name "Khozeimeh" and was so known until the time of the 
Afshar and Qajar dynasties when at least three Amirs of the 
family, named "Alam" played significant roles in the region. 
The glory of the roles played by two of those three Amirs led 
to the adoption of the name "Alam" in the first half of the 
twentieth century, and the family was subsequently referred 
to as "Khozeimeh Alam" or simply "Alam". To this date, 
different branches of the family have adopted the surnames 
"Khozeime", "Khozeimeh Alam" and, "Alam". Writing on the 
Arabic background of the family, Sir Percy Sykes goes as far 
as saying:
"Three days after our arrival we received a call from 
the Amir of Kain, who is one of the last feudal 
chieftains in Persia representing the old order. 
Although they have kept no record, they believe 
themselves to be of Arab descent, and of the Khuzaia 
or Khuzaima tribe, which was ruled by Tahir the 
Ambidexter, a doughty warrior, who set Hamun on the 
Caliph's seat. Apparently forced to emigrate from
Bahrein, they gradually became the ruling family of 
Kain, the districts of Neh and Bandan first falling 
under their control, when they marched up from the 
south."(1)
The family itself, however, disputes its Arabic origin.
There is little historical evidence decisively supporting 
either arguments. One of the historical document this 
author has come across, which supports the argument of the 
family, is the History of Islam in Iran by Abbas Khalili in 
Persian. Using numerous documents of early Islamic 
centuries, Khalili describes Khazem Bin Khozeimeh as a
victorious commander of Iranian stock from Marvrud
(north-east of the old Khorasan). He asserts: "For the first 
time, a commander of Khorasani origin, who was living in 
Iraq, close to the Abbasid Caliphate, changed his views and 
stripped the Caliph of his title in an announcement and 
returned to Iran. He was Basam Bin Ebrahim....Abul-Abbas 
Saffah appointed Khazem Bin Khozeimeh as commander of a
(1) Sykes Major Percy M., "Ten Thousand Miles in Persia", London 1902, p. 393.
125
specially selected force, and he pursued the former as far as 
the mountains of Iran killing many of his s u p p o r t e r s ^  ^ 
Kahili then explains: "When passing through the village of
Bani Hareth who had the honour of being related to the 
Caliph, Khazem, an arrogant general, expected courtesy from 
them. As they were from the clan of the Caliph's mother, 
they did not pay respect to him. To find an excuse for 
punishment, he asked why had not they arrested and killed 
such and such outlawed who had passed through their 
villages. They said; we do not know of such a person. 
Khazem destroyed their houses, massacred them all, and looted 
their belongings. Their tribe complained to the Caliph and 
almost succeeded in convincing the Caliph to kill Khazem. 
However, commanders of the Khorasan divisions intervened and 
prevented it. He was, thus, sent to Oman where he 
successfully regained possession of a number of islands from 
the Khawarej and that story is outside of this subject. From 
this calamity the extent of power and pride and daringness of 
the Khorasanis can be measured. How they used to take
revenge of the Arabs and how did they kill them for what 
kinds of excuses. Even the relatives and associates of the 
Caliph did not escape their vengeance, and this event is an 
example of other important events taKing place in Khorasan and 
in central Iran where the Arabs were destroyed group by 
group."
On Abdoj-Jabar Bin Abdor-Rahman revolt against Caliph Mansour
in Khorasan and Khazem's action, Khalili asserts: "As Mansour
reviewed the gravity of the situation, he found no
alternative but to send his heir Mohammad Mehdi, later a
Caliph himself, to Iran to reside there and to maintain
security of his surroundings in Khorasan, Deylaman, and
Tabarestan. To put down Abdoj-Jabar's revolt, Khazem Bin
Khozeimeh, the famous warrior, was assigned and he captured
the enemy and sent him to Mansour, sitting back to front on a 
(21camel."v 1
(1) Khalili, Abbas, “Iran Va Eslam = Iran and Islam* - Persian text Tehran 1957, VoL. 2 pp. 187 -
8 .
(2) Khalili, op. cit., p. 211.
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Khazem Bin Khozeimeh, a commander of Abu-Moslem's forces, 
according to the same document: "It is noteworthy that when
Abu-Moslem Khorasani turned against the Caliphate, the 
commanders and soldiers supporting him, were all of the
Iranian stock.. . . " ^ ^
"Abu-Moslem sent messages to Hasan Bin Qahtabah, commander of 
the right wing of the army to weaken that flank of the 
battalion by sending as many men as possible to the left 
flank, commanded by Khazem Bin Khozeimeh." This tactic had 
apparently led to the victory of Abu-Moslem over the
Caliphate forces. Khazem Bin Khozeimeh fights on the side of 
the Caliph again;
"Sanbad the Zoroastrian revolted in Khorasan against the
Caliph to avenge the murder of Abu-Moslem. He was
subsequently defeated. The other notable Iranian known as
/ o \
"Ostad of Sis" revolted against the Caliph...."' }
"When Ostad of Sis revolted in Khorasan, he successfully
captured most of Khorasan, and Mansour saw no alternative but
to quell the fire by a fire of the same flame, and to wash
the blood of the Khorasanis with the blood of the Khorasanis
themselves. He, therefore, dispatched a well equipped army
of Iranians commanded by Khazem Bin Khozeimeh Marvrudi, whose
name has repeatedly been mentioned here, to fight the Ostad
of Sis. At that time Mehdi, the Crown Prince of the Caliph,
was living in Iran. Ostad of Sis had captured Khorasan with
an army of three hundred thousand people of Herat, Sistan,
and Bad-Qeis. A furious war broke out in the vicinity of
Marvrud and many of famous commanders of Ostad were killed,
including Abul-Najim Sistani and Davud Bin Garaz and Ma'az
Bin Salim. Cities were recaptured one after the other.
After Sanbad, this event was the biggest war between the
/ 3 \
Caliph and the Iranian independence seekers. "' 1
(1) Khalili, op. cit., p. 190.
(2) Khalili, op. cit., p. 220,
(3) Khalili, op. cit., pp. 220 - 221.
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The fact stated in this document that Khazem Ben Khozeimeh 
was sent to Oman, confirms the statement by Sir Percy Sykes 
that he was "forced to emigrate from Bahrein". It is 
noteworthy that the entire southern coasts of the Persian 
Gulf was generally referred to, by the old Islamic historians 
and geographers, as "Bahrein" to the west, and as Oman to the 
east. In other words, it is logical to assume that Khazem 
Ben Khozeimeh was sent, by the Caliph, to fight the Khavarej 
forces of the eastern section of that region "Oman". He 
defeated them and proceeded towards west "Bahrein", from 
where he was forced to leave. This whole theory corresponds 
with the historical records "Tarikh-e Tabari" which speaks of 
Khazem Ben Khozeimeh as a general of the Abol-Abbas Saffah 
around the year 132-6 AH (749-754 AD), originally from 
Marvrud of Khorasan, who was sent, by the said Caliph, to 
fight the Khavarej in Oman.^^ Moreover, Tarikh-e Tabari 
speaks of a Khozeimeh and his son Khazem who had been ruling 
Khorasan about a century earlier. These historical records 
mention a Khazem who was the "Vali" or Amir of Khorasan. 
This Khazem had a son named Abdollah, who succeeded Khazem as 
the "Vali" or ruler of Khorasan. Abdollah had two sons; 
Mohammad, who was sent by Abdollah to Herat as Amir of that 
district; and Khozeimeh, who succeeded Abdollah in Khorasan 
and Qohestan. These events took place in the years 64 to 66 
AH (6 84 to 686 AD) when Marvan I Ommayyad was on the throne 
of the Caliphateship.^^
This must be the actual origin of the Khozeimeh dynasty of 
Qaenat as, Tarikh Tabari asserts:
"The Omayyad caliph of the time said to Salim Ben 
Ziad/ Oh Abu~Harb, I would like to give you the job of 
your brothers Abdor-Rahman and Abbad. He then was
made the governor of Sistan and Khorasan."(3)
This document, however, mentions that when Salim left for 
Khorasan, he was accompanied by a number of dignitaries,
(1) Tabari, *Tarikh-e Tabari’, translated into Persian by Abot-Qassem Payandeh, vol. XI, Tehran
1974, pp. 4671 to 4672.
(2) See Tarikh-e Tabari, Vol. VIII, pp 3279 to 3284.
(3) Tarik-e Tabari, op. cit,, Vol. VII, p. 3087.
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This document, however, mentions that when Salim left for 
Khorasan, he was accompanied by a number of dignitaries, 
including "Khazem Ben Salmi", possibly his o^Vn son. Was he 
the first Khozeimeh Amir succeeding Salim Ben Ziad and 
founding the Khozeimeh dynasty of Qohestan? It appears to be 
the case.
Interviewed by this author, Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam 
dismissed the idea of Arabist origin of the family arguing:
"I The Khozeimehs have always been Shi'ah Moslems
unlike all Arab Amirs throughout the world of 
Islam who were of Sunni persuasion.(1)
"2 The Khozeimeh Amirs have proved themselves,
throughout the history to be Iranian patriots
with strong attachment to Iranianism which has
never had precedence among the Arab Amirs of the 
Islamic realms.
"3 There is a small settlement of Arab families near
the town of Birjandf the seat of Khozeimeh
Amirdom, towards whom the Khozeimeh Amirs have 
never extended any special favour or support.
"4 No sign of regionalism of separatist nature is
indicated in the history of this family, which 
again is totally out of character for the Arab 
Amirs of Iran."
As a life-time reader of Persian Gulf affairs, this author 
could not help but unintentionally compare, throughout this 
research work, the Khozeimeh Amirdom with such Emirates as 
that of Al-Khalifah of Bahrain who descended on that Iranian 
frontier state and created the separate Emirate of Bahrain, 
eventually independent of both Iran and Britain.
The Khozeimeh Amirdom was also situated on the remote 
frontier areas of Iran and, like Bahrain, it also fell on the
(1) On the Khoseimeh Amirs' devotion Shiah Islam, it Is noteworthy that all Amirs of the modern generation of this 
family (from Amir Esrnall Khan- 1729 to Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Holk II and his son, Amir Assadollah Alam, 
have been entombed in their private mausoleum inside the shrine of Imam Ro*a, the holiest Shiah shrine in Iran.
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crossroad of Anglo-Russian and Anglo-Iranian geopolitical 
rivalries. Not only did the Khozeimehs not pursue a 
political path that would guarantee them a similar 
eventuality as it did for the Al-Khalifah at Bahrain, but 
they displayed maximum loyalty to Iran and its central 
Government, and actively influenced the boundary delimitation 
between Iran and Afghanistan, in favour of Iran. Such an 
attitude would indeed be out of character for an Amirdom of 
non-Iranian origin.
On the basis of the historical records of the early Islamic 
centuries this author is of the opinion that the
Khozeimeh family was of Iranian origin from the land of 
Khorasan. The fact that their early ancestors fought in 
various parts of the Islamic empire for the Caliphate and 
then returned to Khorasan has led some historians of modern 
times to assume that they were Arabs. What these historians 
brushed aside is that the family’s ancestors left Khorasan in 
the first place and that they were originally from Marvrud.
Finally, it must be noted that tracing ones origin to the 
Arab tribes, if not to the prophet of Islam himself, was a 
common practice until as late as the turn of the twentieth 
century, in some parts of Iran and central Asia. However, 
just what happened to the family, following their settlement 
in Khorasan, is shrouded in obscurity. There are a number of 
theories concerning this, the most commonly accepted one is 
that; with the rise into power of Taher Zolyaminain 
(Ambidexter) in Khorasan, the Khozeimeh power was wiped out 
alongside all other regional dynasties, especially if they 
were of Shi'ah persuasion. Ayati argues in "Baharestan":
"At the time of Mamun (Abbasid Caliph) the political 
rivalries made Taher Zolyaminain, himself once a local 
Amir - subservient to the Arab Amirdoms of the region- 
to subdue these families, specially if they were of 
Shi'ah persuasion. Hence, there is no mention of this 
family in the history of those times."(1)
(1) Ayati, Haj Sheikh Mohammad Hussein, “Baharestan", Tehran 1948, p. 109.
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The overwhelming weakness of this argument is that, not only 
is there no historical evidence supporting the idea that 
Taher had wiped out the Khozeimeh dynasty but also, Ayati 
introduces no evidence as to who the Khozeimeh Amirs of the 
time of Taher were. Yet, he assumes that they were of Shi'ah 
persuasion. In other words, Ayati claims that the Khozeimeh 
Amirs of that era were Shi' ah Moslems without knowing who 
they were and what their names would have been. 
Paradoxically, there are theories suggesting that Taher 
Zolyaminain himself was a Khozeimeh Amir, and the Amirs of 
this family, from the 9th century AD onward were his 
descendants. A well known Iranian scholar, Ali-Asghar 
Hekmat, asserts:^^ ^
"....Unwritten traditions trace the origin of this 
family (Khozeimeh family) to Taher Zolyaminain, the 
renowned Khorasani general who put Mamun on the seat 
of Caliphateship(2) and thus/ secured for himself 
the Amirdom of Khorasan and Transoxania.
"The Shahs of the Taherid dynasty were the first 
Iranian vassal kings and Amirs who established an 
independent kingdom (in post-Islamic Iran). Taher's 
origin is traced by some historians to Bahram 
Chubineh,(3) the famous general of Khosro Parviz the 
Sassanid Shahanshah."
This theory is reflected, albeit vaguely, in Sir Percy Sykes'
writings, part of which has been quoted earlier in these
(4 )pages, specifically where he says:v '
"....they believe themselves to be of Arab origin, and 
of the Khuzai or Khozaima tribe, which was ruled by 
Taher the Ambidexter, a doughty warrior who set Mamun 
on the Caliph's seat."
{1) Hekmat, Ali-Asghar, "Yek Gentleman-e Tainan Ayar", in Mohammad-Ali Monsef's book "Amir
Shokat al-Molk ALam, Amir-e Qaen", Tehran 1975, p. 290,
(2) Taher defeated Caliph Amin Abbasid and repLaced him by his brother Hamun or-Rashid in 813 AD.
(3) Bahram Chubin, according to Tarikh-e Tabari, was not a General of Khosro Parviz (originally 
Pirouz). Rather, he was a noble General, rivalling Khosro Parviz, trying to assume the 
Sassanid throne from the latter, (see Tarikh-e Tabari, Vol. II, pp. 728 to 737).
(4) Sykes, Major Percy, “Ten Thousand Miles in Persia", London 1902, p. 399.
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This theory, however, does not correspond with what is 
indicated in the Tarikh-e Tabari. According to these 
historical records, when Taher Ben Hussein the Zolyaminein 
was preparing for war with Mohammad Ben Harun in 198 AH (813 
AD), he wrote to Khozeimeh Ben Khazem (in Qohestan) that "if 
he succeeded in this war against Mohammad, and Khozeimeh had 
no role in the achievement of that victory, he would not 
hesitate in overthrowing the latter".  ^  ^ Upon receiving 
this note of warning, Khozeimeh apparently declared his 
obedience to Taher. Khozeimeh, however, according to the 
said document, played a significant role in Taher's campaign 
against Mohammad Ben Harun and won himself such a reputation 
that Hussein Khali'e, a famous poet of the time, versified 
him by saying:
"Khozeimeh has obliged us all, As the lord has quelled
the fire of war through him...."(2)
This evidence leaves no doubt that; the Khozeimehs were Amirs 
of Qaenat at the time; of Khorasani origin# and Taher was not 
a member of the family.
MODERN BRANCH OF THE FAMILY
When the Safavid fortune overwhelmed the entire Iranian 
plateau and the largest empire of post-Islamic Iran emerged, 
the Khozeimeh also seem to have regained their former glory 
and fortune. Their Amirdom (of Qaenat) was once again 
recognised as a Velayat (province) in the political 
organization of Iran of the Safavid period. The Amirs of 
Khozeimeh, once again started to rule sizeable parts of the 
empire and were officially recognised as autonomous 
frontier-keeping Amirs. Apart from all else, the fact that 
the Safavid Shahs were of Shi'ah persuasion attracted 
Khozeimeh Amirs’ maximum loyalty. They remained loyal to the
(1) Tarikh-e Tabari, op. cit.. Vol. XIII, Tehran 1974, p. 5556.
(2) Tarikh-e Tabari, op. cit., pp. 5557-8.
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Safavid even after the assassination of Nader Shah Afshar
which revived the possibility of restoration of the Safavid
dynasty. Nader Shah was the only member of the Afshar
dynasty who received loyalty from the Amirs of Khozeimeh.
After the fall of the Safavid dynasty, Nader Shah took the
province of Qaen and restored it, with the blessings of Shah
/1 \
Tahmasp II Safavid, to Amir Esmail Khan Khozeimeh.v 1
He was the son of Amir Ebrahim Khan (1699) son of Amir 
(2 ^Mohammad Khan.v 1 Amir Esmail Khan rs regarded as the 
first Khozeimeh Amir of the present family line, known to the 
historians of modern times. It is, however, hard to believe 
that a ruling dynasty, regained their rule, in the same 
district, after an interruption of about nine centuries. A 
period between the time of Mamun the Abbasid until the last 
Shah of the Saf avids. This author is of the opinion that 
there was no interruption in the rule of the dynasty and the 
reason for the obscurity of the history of the dynasty in the 
pre-Safavid centuries is that the dynasty in Qaenat (old 
Qohestan) attracted little attention of the history 
recorders, mainly owing to two factors:
1 With the consolidation of the Abbasid Caliphate in Iran, 
those provincial chiefs who adhered to the Caliphate did 
little more than nothing that would attract any 
attention.
2 The entire history of this period is devoted to the 
successive regional powers revolting against the 
Caliphate of Baghdad and/or against other outside forces 
invading Iran and dominating the country in the 
post-Islamic era, including the Mongolians and Tartaris.
(1) Lovet, Major Beresford, "Journey in Baluchistan", in Major-General Goldsmid's Eastern 
Persia", Vol. II, London 1876, p. 341, footnote.
(2) Hunter, Captain J.B.D., Her Britannic Majesty's ConsuLate at Sistan, "Consular Report", 
dated 19th August 1912, p. 3, FO 248/971 ■
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The Khozeimeh dynasty, traditionally loyal to the central 
authorities of the country, naturally had little reason, 
throughout this period of nine centuries or so, to attract 
the attention of the historians who were pre-occupied with 
recording massive upheavals occurring throughout the country 
in this period of the history of Iran.
Nevertheless, accidentally, in historical records, we
sometimes come across the names of some Amirs of Qohestan who
must have been members of the same dynasty, as no other
dynasty has been recorded to have ruled the district and no
change of governorship, from one dynasty to another, has been
recorded or suggested to have taken place in this
frontier-keeping province, throughout the history since
Khazem Ben Salmi and Khozeimeh Ben Khazem arrived in
Khorasan. In the historical literatures of the 13th century
AD, we come across one of these names, an Amir Naser od-Diny
Mohtasham of Qohestanj1  ^ whose name has entered in
(2 \history solely because Khajeh Nasir od-Din Tusi,v } the 
renowned Vazir of Mongolian Holaku Khan (mid-13th century) 
had dedicated to and named after that Amir of Qaenat or 
Qohestan, his famous book "Akhlaq-e Naseri". Another such 
name is that of Amir Sultan who had contacted Shah Esmail the 
founder of the Safavid dynasty (1501-1786) and was given the 
official title of Amirdom of Qaen by the said Shah:
"Monday 25, Moharram 921 AH(3) the radiance of his
(Shah Esmail* s) glory arrived in Ujan where he(4)
went to circumambulate the Safavid shrine.($) Then
(1) Tabandeh, Haj Sultan-Hussein, "Tarikh Va Joghrafia-e Gonabad", Tehran University Press 
1969, p. 12.
(2) It is recorded that Khajeh Nasir od-Din Tusi enticed HoLaku Khan to overthrow the CaLiphate
of Baghdad by suffocating Caliph Al>Mostasara Bellah, while wrapped in a rug, in order to
prevent the Caliph's blood being shed on the ground which wouLd otherwise, according to a 
tradition of the time, destroy the heavens and the earth. This was done in 1258 AD.
(3) March 12, 1515 AD.
(4) shah Esmail Safavid.
(5) Tomb of Sheikh Safi od-Din.
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he returned to mountainous settlements of Sahand,
Amir Sultan Saheb of Qaen(l) reached the feet of the 
mighty throne and reported short accounts of the 
desolate state of Khorasan.
"Also Divan Sultan, arrived from Balkh, and confirmed 
those accounts. Hence, the kingdom of Khorasan, from 
the banks of river Amir to Semnan was entrusted to 
His.... Majesty's nayebs,(2) Amir Sultan was given 
the assignment of Lale (guardianship) (3) and the 
title of "Khan" and was sent back to Khorasan with the 
Amirdom of Qaen...,"(4)
This Amir Sultan must have been of the Khozeimeh dynasty. 
There are at least three reasons supporting the thought. 
Firstly, he has the title "Amir" which was almost exclusive 
to this family in that part of the country at that particular 
time; secondly, he is described as the "Saheb" or owner of 
Qaen which is a clear reference to the family's long-standing 
and vast land ownership in the entire region; thirdly he is 
given the title "Khan" which did not appear after the names 
of those members of the dynasty mentioned hitherto, and 
appeared after the names of all Khozeimeh Amirs thereafter.
THE AMIRDOM OF KHOZEIMEH IN RECENT CENTURIES
Under the Safavids, Qaen and Sistan were separate Ayalats 
(provinces). Immediately after Shah Esmail I overwhelmed the 
forces of Shibak Khan near Marv in 1510 AD, Malek Mahmud 
Sistani, the local governor of Sistan who was of the Keyani 
Amirs, arrived in Herat and declared his loyalty and
(1) Saheb, in this instance, means owner or governor.
(2) In the Safavid political organisation of the country “Nayeb'1 or Nayeb as-Saltaneh was a
deputy representing the Shah in various districts, or ruled in different districts on behalf 
of the Shah.
(3) Laleh was a titLe for the Statesmen who were sent to various parts as guardians of the minor
Nayebs who would normally be selected from among the Safavid princes usually remaining in the
capital.
(4) Qazvini, Qazi Ahmad Qaffari, "Tarikh-e Jahan Ara", ed. Mojtaba Minovi, Tehran 1964, p. 278.
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obedience to Shah E s m a i l . H i s  dominion included Neh,
Qal'eh-gah, Hash, Garmsirat Hirmand, with its capital city of 
(2 )Nimruz.v ; Shah Esmail first bestowed the governorship of 
Sistan on him and sent him back to the province with an army 
of one thousand Turkamans under the command of a Qezelbash 
Amir as his assistant.
This Qezelbash Amir is not named in the said document, but he 
could have been the same Amir Sultan Khan, or another member 
of the Khozeimeh family. At the time of Shah Tahmasp I (1524 
- 76) the governorship of Qaen was with his brother Ebrahim
Mirza (1563 - 66), but no name of the Laleh or Guardian, who
would have been a local Amir, appears in the history books. 
The governors of the Ayalats were mainly in charge of the 
armed forces, paying them from the endowments of the
district. Sistan was a separate Ayalat at this period.
/ 3 \
Sultan Hussein Mirza, a nephew of Shah Tahmasp Iv , was 
appointed as governor of Sistan (1555 to 1558), followed by
(A)
Badi oz-Zaman Mirza, another nephew of the Shahv 1 who was 
a minor and under the guardianship of Emam Qoli Beg Badr 
Khan, then Mohammad Khan Mossellu Turkaman, and then, Teimur 
Khan Estajlu.^^
Until 1577-8, Sistan was governed by Qezelbash Amirs. Shah 
Abbas I (1558-1629) gave Sistan to the governor of Kerman 
after repossessing Khorasan from the Keyanis. The Sistani 
chiefs renewed their allegiance to the Shah and have remained 
so ever since.
Nader Shah Afshar pursued a completely different course of 
policies in this context. Instead of assigning his close
(1) Rohrborn, KLaus-MichaeL, "Provinzen und ZentratgewaLt Persians", Persian text, Trans, by 
Jahandary, Keykavous, Tehran 1978, p. 125.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Rohrborn, op. cit., p. 65.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Rohrborn, op, cit,, p. 126.
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relatives to the governorship of all provinces and districts, 
he would capture the districts if needed, and return their 
governorship to their traditional Amirs or governors in 
return for their undivided loyalty. This policy seems to 
have worked to a great extent, especially in the case of Qaen 
and Sistan districts. One such Amir was Amir Esmail Khan 
Khozeimeh who was given the governorship of Qaen, Farah, and 
Koh-Kiluyeh in the Fars province.
It is from this time that the Khozeimeh Amirdom appears once 
again on the political map of Iran. The Amirdom gradually 
expanded to include Sistan and parts of northern 
Baluchistan. During the career of Amir Alam Khan I, the 
Amirdom reached its peak. It expanded far beyond the 
traditional limits of Qaenat and Sistan. It included, albeit 
for a short period, such significant areas and cities as 
Mashhad and Herat (1748). The Amirdom, at this time, 
included Mashhad and its dependencies to the north, Herat and 
its dependencies to the north-east, Farah and its 
dependencies to the east, Tun and Tabas to the west.
The southern outposts being put in the central areas of 
Baluchistan, Sistan and Birjand, the traditional heartland of 
the Amirdom, forming the political centres (see figure IV ).
In the wake of Amir Alam Khan's death, the Amirdom shrank in
might and size, restricted at most times to Qaenat and Sistan 
(see figure III ) until early twentieth century when it 
expanded once again to include Baluchistan. Amir Mohammad 
Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk's successful campaign against 
frequent raids of the surrounding districts by the Baluchi 
chiefs almost coincided with Dust Mohammad Khans insurgency 
in Baluchistan, on the one hand, and Reza Khan Mir Panj 1 s 
rise into power in Tehran as the Minister of war, on the 
other. Reza Khan (later Reza Shah Pahlavi) who knew of Amir
Shokat al-Molk for his role in settling the question of
Colonel Mohammad Taghi Khan's uprising in Mashhad (1921) and 
later acquainted the Amir personally during the latter's 
visit to Tehran in 1921-2, assigned the Amir to put down Dust 
Mohammad Khan's insurgency. The following is the text of a 
telegraph, dated 28 Mizan 1302 (1923 ) from the Joint Command
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of the Armed Forces Headquarters to the Commander of the
divisions of south and eastr ordering reinforcement for Amir
Shokat al-Molk's campaign against Dust Mohammad Khan in 
/1 \
Baluchistan:v '
"Commander of the Division of East 
Commander of the Division of South
"Whereas, on the decision of His Excellency a company 
of at least 600 to 700 must be put under the command 
of Amir Shokat al-Molk in Baluchistan for joint 
actions there, please arrange for the study of all 
related matters; time, situation, and routes of the 
movement of such forces and convey to this office the 
results on which final decisions have to be made.
3252 Offices of the 
Joint Command of the 
Armed Forces."
In another telegraph to the capital, dated 21 Aqrab 1302 
(1923), Amir Shokat al-Molk suggests:
"....the Qaenat and Sistan armed forces should take 
the responsibility for campaign in half of the 
Baluchistan district known as Sarhad, and Qal'eh-e 
Khash."
These areas of Baluchistan remained under Amir Shokat 
al-Molk's rule and were for a short period of time the latest 
addition to the Khozeimeh Amirdom.
POWER BASE OF THE AMIRDOM
Khozeimeh Amirdom's power was both of a natural and an 
official nature. Its natural power was traditionally assumed 
which lasted for several centuries. They were self-appointed 
Amirs in the fashion of the Iranian traditions. The 
legitimacy of this self-appointment is justified by the same
(1) Monsef, Mohammad-Ali, "Amir Shokat aL-Molk Alam", Tehran 1975, p. 100.
(2) Ibid.
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tradition that has justified legitimacy of the ruling 
authorities of Iran throughout its history. The tradition 
which justifies these legitimacies has been studied in the 
"Introduction" on the "Evolution of the State and Boundaries 
in Iran". Whenever the vast country of Iran was divided into 
administrative districts, the natural Amirdom of Khozeimeh 
remained unscathed. The division of the eastern areas of the 
country always corresponded with the natural state of the 
Khozeimeh Amirdom and almost all other Amirdoms for that 
matter. Hence, the Khozeimeh Amirs always received the 
official title of "governor" from the central authorities. 
This title or assignment was the basis for their official 
power, in effect, reinforcing their natural power. Contrary 
to what is generally believed, land ownership was not the 
only or even the main source of this Amirdom's power, though 
ownership of agricultural lands and water resources 
strengthened their power base. The main base of the 
Khozeimeh power in Qaenat, Southern Khorasan, Sistan, and 
Northern Baluchistan was their historical entitlement of 
Amirdom recognised by the central power throughout the 
post-Islamic history of Iran down to the early 20th century. 
This historical rule together with the strategic situation of 
the Amirdom and the role of the Amirdom as a frontier-keeping 
state form the bases for the continued power of the Khozeimeh 
dynasty: "The case is of general interest for two reasons.
The first is that the Amirs of Kain are among the few 
remaining hereditary governors in Persia, and they are 
perhaps the only instance of a family, without royal blood 
and with no tribal chieftainship, retaining through many 
generations, by wealth and local influence, their 
administrative powers over a considerable district. The 
second reason is that Birjand, their present seat of 
Government, being midway on the route from Russia through 
Khurasan to India, has in the past frequently been a scene 
of rivalry and covert contention for influence between the 
representatives of England and Russia: the town itself was
allocated in 1907 by the two powers as being within the 
British sphere of influence, of which it marked the north 
eastern limit. This rivalry, though hushed by the greater
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business of the war, continues even now on friendly lines as 
between Khurasan and Seistan, or between Petrograd and Simla.
To keep his position, in the altered state of Persia, the 
governor of Kain has to maintain his authority and popularity 
with the people, to act in concert with the views of England 
and Russia, and to placate the court at Teheran.
The Khozeimeh Amirs ruled the largest part of Eastern Iran 
for several centuries. Their role as the rulers, the 
leaders, the ultimate district judges, the defenders of the 
territories, the protectors of the people, the promoters of 
various regional services deepened the roots of their 
influence in the societies of their Amirdom. This historical 
power of the family was much greater than the power they 
might have assumed through ownership of their agricultural 
state. An acknowledged authority on Iranian agriculture, 
Professor K.S. McLachlan asserts:
"The family influence throughout Khorasan, Sistan, 
Baluchistan was mainly historically based on qualities 
of traditional leadership, successful mediation with 
the central authorities and an ability to dispense 
patronage in the regional civil service. In southern 
Khorasan the basis for political influence on the
part of the family was strategic land ownership of 
villages. Thus, the tabas outpost of the family was 
held through the arm of extended alliance with 
B i r j a n d i ( 2) family and a small element of
landownership. In Gonabad, the family had far more 
influence over local events than was justified by 
their land and water holdings, which were almost 
negligible."(3)
As the family expanded, the landownership and water holdings 
of the Amirdom broke down through inheritance into smaller 
units. Yet it made no impact on the power of the Amirdom, 
led by one, and lately by two independent Amirs.
Constitutionalism and introduction of new political divisions 
in the country made little impact on the power of the
(1) Hale, F., "From Persian Uplands*, no date of publication is indicated but it seems to have
been published in earLy 1920s, pp. 100 - 1.
(2) A branch of the Sheibani
(3) McLachlan, K.S., *The Neglected Garden*, London 1988, p. 124.
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Amirdom. Though Khorasan on the one hand, and Sistan and
Baluchistan on the other, were considered in the modern
political arrangement as two different provinces, the 
Khozeimeh Amirdom of Qaenat (in Khorasan and Sistan remained
unscathed. The rise of Reza Shah Pahlavi into power in 1921
and his accession to the throne of Iran in 1925 brought a 
sweeping change in the affairs of the state. The Khozeimeh 
Amir of the time "Amir Shokat al-Molk II", in rivalry with 
his nephew "Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh III", signed a 
peace treaty with the latter in 1921 and subsequently 
proceeded to Tehran where he was appointed as a cabinet 
minister. It was Reza Shah's policy to keep influential 
figures of different regions away from their traditional 
dominions.
"He was in residence now at his kelateh/ Akbarieh, 
after an absence of no less than six years, a painful 
exile for him and his family. This, he told us, had 
been spent partly at high posts at the capital or in 
the western provinces, partly in attendance on Reza 
Shah, whose policy it was to keep powerful local 
magnates at a safe distance from their domains - not 
that the late Shah need have worried about his 
loyalty."(1)
Shokat al-Molk's nephew too, resigned in 1937, from the 
governorship of Qaen, therefore, officially bringing the 
Amirdom to its end. The Khozeimeh Amirdom thereafter, was 
but a nominal entity. The land reforms of the 1960s made 
little difference to the position of the family. Professor 
McLachlan states:
"....in the case of Alams the land reform would not 
deeply hurt them since their lands were fragmented 
among various branches of the family and their 
ownership was in a large number of separate villages 
scattered over a considerable area of south-eastern 
Iran."(2)
(1) Skrine, Sir Claremont, "World War in Iran", London 1962, p. 100.
(2) McLachlan, op. cit., p. 124.
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STRATEGIC LOCATION OF THE AMIRDOM
The Khozeimeh Amirdom of Qaenat and Sistan, geographically
situated at the gateway to British India, was of extreme
importance to the British whose main preoccupation in the
past two centuries was to obstruct the spread of Russian, and
briefly, German influence east and south-eastwardly. This
geographical situation was, for a considerable length of
time, a scene of rivalry and contention for influence between
representatives of Britain and Russia, both of whom had
opened their respective consulate at Birjand, where they
could monitor the events in the Amirdom. Birjand itself was
allocated, by the 1907 Anglo-Russian treaty, as being within
the British sphere of influence in Iran, of which it marked
/1 \
the north-eastern limit.' } Yet the Russians maintained 
their consulate there owing to the strategic significance of 
the Amirdom.
The Russian consulate retained only an escort of a few 
Cossacks, whereas the British consulate maintained a regular 
military force in the Amirdom. This force was best described 
by Mr. Hale who had on April 2, 1917 personally seen it:
"This morning, as I was out walking before breakfast, 
I passed our football ground, where I saw the
consular levy sowars at foot-drill. It was
interesting to find that they had not the field to
themselves as they usually have, but were sharing it 
with the local artillery company. It was a curious 
juxtaposition one side an artillery unit of the 
Persian army under their own officers, marching and
manoeuvring smartly enough: on the other side a troop
of Baluchis and Seistanis in the pay of the British 
government, armed with our service rifles and
performing evolutions at the command of an Indian 
N.C.O, The Persian gunners are much superior in 
appearance and efficiency to their humble brothers of 
the regular Persian infantry, being better equipped 
and better paid than the mere sarbaz. Their
commissioned officers, like those of the infantry and 
the cavalry, are trained in Teheran. The men 
themselves are a mixed draft from the local 
population, some of them are petty shopkeepers torn 
by force from a thriving business. Their term of
service is nominally three years.
(1) HaLe, op, cit., p. 101.
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"The consular levies are recruited from the 
tribesmen, stock-raisers, and cultivators of the 
Seistan and frontier districts. They have not been 
assigned full uniform as yet, but being well paid and 
well officered they have already imbibed the company 
spirit, and have contrived a certain uniformity in 
their native dress, assisted by the indispensable 
puttee. Some of them are handsome fellows, 
soft-featured, dark-hued, curly-haired, supple of 
limb. They are a promising, workmanlike lot, with a 
pride of arms and a responsive manner very different 
from that of the Persian regular. Their scraggy, 
sinewy little ponies are provided by themselves, and 
are well broken to work. The force numbers a hundred 
men, and is principally engaged on patrols and 
outpost duty towards the Afghan frontier....
"The Hazara levies in Birjand are only a small guard 
party. Their headquarters are a few stages to the 
south at Neh, where a part of the levy force is 
recruited from yet another tribe the Bahlui. The 
Bahluis are tent-dwellers of pure Persian descent, 
breeders of sheep, stout fellows who think nothing of 
fifty miles for a day's march.
"Apart from these levies we still have about fifty 
men of an Indian cavalry regiment stationed at Birjand 
and a stage or two north."(1)
The spreading German influence in Iran on the threshold of 
both world wars was an addition to the existing rivalries of 
the European powers in the region. When, in 1915, the 
British Consul in Esfahan was shot, the British influence 
there was replaced by that of the German. They began to send 
their emissaries east and southwards. Mr Hale wrote of this 
matter:
"They dream of emulating the deeds of Alexander and repeating 
the history of 327 B.C. by an overland march to India. As 
this is impracticable for a modern army in modern Persia, 
they are trying to raise Afghanistan and Persia itself 
against us. If they can't succeed in embroiling the Persian 
Government they will create local hostility. Persia is a
(1) Hale, op. cit., pp. 151 - 2 - 3,
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suitable country for such a policy, as its means of 
communication are hopelessly slow, and it is peopled by very 
diverse races and tribes, many of whom can't be properly 
controlled from the capital. As the agitators are well 
provided with money, they have managed to engage a good many 
mercenaries and to secure desirable adherents. 'Here am I on 
Tom Tiddler's ground,' says the bold Teuton, 'scattering gold 
and silver. Gather round, brother Mohammedans, and I will 
fight your battles for you*. Whatever the results, they have 
had fair success already, as several hundred emissaries from 
Germany and Austria have necessitated the sending of some 
thousands of British and Russian troops to Persia for the 
protection of our interests, when these troops might have 
been profitably employed elsewhere."^ ^
These rivalries in Qaenat, stemming from the Amirdom's 
strategic sensitivity, caused many problems for the Amirdom. 
One such problem, resulted in the dismissal of the Amir of 
Qaenat and his exile to Tehran in early 1916. Iran had 
declared neutrality in the World War I, but Iranian soil was 
the arena of great rivalries between the European powers, 
which eventually led to the division of the country in 1907, 
into the British and Russian spheres of influence, with the 
Khozeimeh Amirdom in the zone of the British interest. To 
keep his position in the confusion of the war years, the Amir 
(in this instance, Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk
II), had to maintain his authority and popularity with the 
people; to act in concert with the views of Britain and 
Russia; to observe neutrality in the eyes of the Germans; and 
to keep the Imperial Court at Tehran happy. Early in 1916, a 
group of German emissaries, led by "Nider Myer", crossed the 
Kavir desert and entered Qaenat district. The British Consul 
at Birjand, "Major Prideaux", exerted much pressure on the 
Amir to arrest them and put them in the custody of his 
consulate. The Amir, fully aware of Iran’s declared state of 
neutrality in the war and strongly loyal to the instructions 
of neutrality from Tehran, refused the British Consul's
(1) Hale, F., op, cit., pp. 8 8 - 9 .
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request. Neither did he pay any attention to the orders for 
the arrest of the Germans received from Tehran in the form of 
a telegraph in Latin, through Indo-European telegraph line 
which apparently did not convince him of being authentic. 
Threatened by Major Prideaux with being removed from office 
and accused of being "Germanophile", the Amir re-stated his 
position of neutrality in accordance with the war-time 
policies of his country. The angry Consul complained to his 
embassy in Tehran, and it was shortly afterwards that Amir 
Shokat al-Molk was removed from the governorship of Qaenat, 
summoned to Tehran, and replaced by his nephew, Amir Masum 
Khan Hesam ad-Doleh, Amir of Sistan.
Amir Shokat al-Molk's exile lasted about two years during 
which time the British were convinced of his genuine 
neutrality policies and that, "he supported no one but his 
own country, Iran".^1^
THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE ARMED FORCES OF THE AMIRDOM
The power of the Amirdom was executed through an 
administration system hardly developed from its traditional 
form. A relatively unsophisticated administration, directly 
accountable to the Amir himself as the head of the state, and 
in his absence, to his Nayeb or deputy. The Amir was aided 
by two administrators; one (jMostofi) in charge of affairs 
of the state (chief administrator); the other ( Pishkar) , in 
charge of the family state and endowments. The family state 
constituted of considerably large agricultural lands, 
water-holdings, and a number of buildings and castles etc,. 
Each property (agricultural land and water source) created by 
the family, was registered in the traditional Iranian system, 
as a six "dong" unit, regardless of the actual size or 
value. Of this six-dong, one dong would be allocated to the
(1) ColoneL Prideaux is quoted by Monsef to have recorded this remark: Monsef, Mohammad-Ali, 
“Amir Shokat al-Molk ALam“, Tehran 1975, pp. 49 - 50.
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endowments, the revenue from which would finance religious 
establishments, schools, and other public services. Thus, 
the endowments alone consisted of sizeable states, 
administered also by the Mostofi in charge of the family 
state. The first Mostofi (chief administrator), in charge of 
the affairs of the Amirdom was assisted by Monshis 
(secretaries or clerks), whose number varied from time 
to-time, each of whom were designated to supervise a 
particular branch of the administration tasks. The district 
centres were administered by the Nayebs (Nayeb al-Hokumeh) or 
deputy governors who, in turn, were accountable to the Amir, 
the nayebs' Mostofis were the administrators of the affairs 
of their districts, accountable to the nayebs. In charge of 
the villages were the Kadkhodas (village head-men) who
reported to the Nayebs or their Mostofis (see fig.l ). In 
addition to these, a Kargozar (head of diplomacy), assigned 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, was in 
residence in the Amirdom who supervised the foreign affairs 
in connection with the Consulates of Britain and Russia in 
the Amirdom. Similarly, in residence was a Pishkar
(representative of the Ministry of Finance) in charge of the 
revenue of the Amirdom. It is noteworthy that Pishkars used 
to be assigned to the provinces. But, in this instance, 
there were two pishkars in the province of Khorasan, one in 
Mashhad, the centre of Khorasan province, and one in Birjand 
the seat of the Amirdom. Both these Government officials
were paid by the Amirdom and were, in effect, members of the
administration of the Amirdom.
Whenever there was an Amir in Sistan, other than the Amir of 
Qaen in Birjand, a similar administration set up would also 
be created for Sistan which, ultimately, reported to the 
administration of the Amirdom at Birjand.
The Khozeimeh Amirdom, though officially part of the province 
of Khorasan, in practice had nothing to do with Mashhad. It 
conducted its affairs semi-independently, and reported to 
Tehran on general principles.
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The defence of the realm was, primarily, the responsibility 
of the Amirdom's own army, commanded by the Amir as its 
commander-in-chief, and composed of several thousand soldiers 
divided into three skills; the infantry, the cavalry, and the 
artillery. Each of these three forces was commanded by a 
Sartip (Brigadier-General) or a Sarhang (Colonel) who would 
normally be selected from among the trained officers in 
Tehran or Mashhad in more modern times, and from among 
trained members of the family in older days. The forces
stationed in Sistan were commanded by a Sartip or Sarhang 
from the family itself which signified the strategic 
importance of that province for the Amirdom. Another 
officer, separately accountable to the Amir, was the 
inspector general of the armed forces (bazras-e qoshun) who 
also was a member of the political administration of the 
Amirdom (see Fig. I ).
The infantry consisted of the Sarbaz or ordinary
foot-soldiers, and eilyatis or ,irregular tribesmen. The
sarbaz and artillery men were mostly recruited from among the
Azarbaijanis who have always had the reputation of being very
loyal and fine warriors. Scores of gunners hailed from
Tabriz and held a better position in the army of the
Khozeimeh Amirdom, mostly because they were not committed to
(1 \any regional affiliation in the Amirdom.v } The soldiers 
were armed with various types of rifles in the post-Nader 
Shah era; i.e. Werndel^^ Jezail,^^ and Miskets,^^
and artillery men were armed with cannons of various kinds. 
The cavalry, a mounted force, used both camels and horses, 
and the entire force of Qaenat Amirdom accounted for one fowj 
(an old Iranian division) at the time of Qajar kings of Iran. 
"The divisions of Khorasan are three; (of) Qaen, one
(1) Sykes, Sir Percy, "Ten Thousand Miles in Persia", London 1902, p. 375.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Yate, Lieut. CoLoneL C.E., "Khorasan and Sistan", London 1900, p. 78.
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division, belonging to Heshmat al-Molk (Amir Alam Khan III) 
Amir of Qaen and Sistan...
Figure I
Political Administration of the Khozeimeh Amirdom 
at the turn of the twentieth century
The Amir __________________
The Nayeb 
(in the absence of the Amir )
Pis ikar
administration of 
the family state
I
Monshis 
(clerks or 
secretaries)
administration of 
endowments
' I
Monshis 
(clerks or 
secretaries)
Mostofi 
Chief 
Administrator
Monshis 
(clerks or 
secretaries)
district
Nayebs
Mirzas
Kadkhodas
Pishkar 
representative of 
Ministry of Finance
Kargozar 
in charge of 
foreign affairs
Bazras
(Inspector of the 
armed forces)
Commander 
of Cavalry
Commander 
of Infantry
Commander 
of Artillery
This army fluctuated in size and number according to the 
fluctuating size of the Amirdom at various periods, and was 
divided into three to five regiments. Of these regiments, 
two were garrisoned at Nosratabad since the annexation of
(D Qaem-Haqami, Sarhang Jahangir, “Yeksad-o Panjah Sanad-e Tarikhi", Tehran 1969, p. 236.
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Sistan to the Khozeimeh Amirdom. One of these two regiments 
was disbanded at home towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, while "the other supplied the shopkeepers for the
capital (of Sistan) in the intervals of their military
duties". At the time when Amir Alam Khan III was in
Amir of Qaen and the Staff of the Amirdom
From right: Colonel Ali-Naghi Vaziri Commander of the
Cavalry; E'tesam al-Molk, Kargozar; Amir of Qaen, Amir 
Shokat al-Molk II; Baq a ' ad-Doleh Vakili, Pishkar-e Daraei; 
Motazedi, Military Investigator; Dr. Mahmud Kasravi, Head 
of the Clinic; ......
Sistan,' he uprooted the Afghan influence and built the town
of Nosrat-Abad (later on, named Zabol), 400 cavalry men were
(2 )with him.' ’ Quoting Sartip (General) Amir Masum Khan 
Khozeimeh, commander of the Sistan regiment and governor of 
that province of the Amirdom at the turn of the twentieth 
century, Colonel Yate indicates:
(1) Sykes, op. cit., p. 375.
(2) Goldsmid, General Frederick, “Eastern Persia-, Vol. II, London 1876, p. 268.
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"The fort or citadel (of Nosrat-Abad) had been built 
by his grandfather , the late Amir of Kain, some 
twenty-five years before, and that the garrison 
consisted of a regiment of Kain infantry 800 strong 
and 500 iliyats or irregulars. These iliyats or 
nomads, he said, all came from Kain. They paid no
revenue, but performed service instead, and were sent 
to serve in Sistan."(1)
The sarbazes were paid, towards the end of the 19th centuryy 
seven tumans, or about £1.8s in cash, and three Qaeni
Kharvars, or about 1095 lbs. of grain, per annum. The
artillery men were of superior standard, in equipments and 
efficiency, compared with their counter-parts in the 
infantry. They were also better paid.^^ Their 
commissioned officers, like those of the infantry and 
cavalry, were trained in Tehran. Almost all European 
travellers, who visited Qaen and Sistan at the end of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, spoke of the 
poor condition and poor organization of the army of the
Khozeimeh Amirdom. This was true not only of that army
alone, but, of the military forces of the entire country. 
Yet, this poorly maintained army of Qaen was able to defend 
the Amirdom, and the eastern frontiers of Iran, for that 
matter, against numerous raids and encroachments from the 
east.
TAXES, TRADE, REVENUES, AMD ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The Amirdom paid no regular taxes to the central Government 
until the second half of the nineteenth century. The
revenues were spent on maintaining the Amirdom1s 
frontier-keeping forces and other administrators and
(1) Yate, op. cit., p. 77.
(2) Yate, op. cit., p. 78.
(3) Hale, F. “From the Persian Uplands*, op. cit., p. 151.
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officials in the region. Major Euan Smith, a member of
Goldsmid's British arbitration team visiting Sistan and
Qaenat in 1872, asserts: "the Amir of Kain pays no fixed
revenue to the Shah, but supports the whole expenditure of
troops and Government servants located in his province, as
well as that incurred in the Government of Sistan: moreover,
he transmits from time to time presents or "Ta’arufs" in
(1 'Imoney and kind, to Tehran."v 1
Birjand, the capital city of Qaenat traded mainly with Bandar 
Abbas, Sabzevar, and Mashhad. Qaenat1s exports, towards the 
end of the nineteenth century, consisted of carpets and 
Gelims, which mainly found their way to Tehran and Istanbul. 
About 3800 camel-load of dried fruit, skin, Saffran and opium 
was mostly sent to Bandar Abbas. 5000 camel loads of wool 
and other commodities, were sent to Sabzevar and shipped to 
Armenia via the Caspian Sea.
Other measures of commodities were sent to Mashhad to be
traded with the Russians. In return, piece goods such as
sugar, tea, spices, iron, indigo, and copper were imported
(2 )from all directions' } The revenue of Sistan province of
the Amirdom was mostly in kind, and was fixed at 24000
kharvars (649 Lbs. to each kharvar) of grain per annum
(3 )towards the end of the nineteenth century.' ' Of this, 
6850 kharvars were paid out locally in allowances to
officials and troops, and the balance had to be accounted for 
by the Amir to the Government at the rate of 7 qarans (later 
rials). The Government rate of 7 qaran per kharvar of grain 
was, as always, much below the market value, as for instance 
in Khorasan, the average value of wheat was 50 qarans a 
kharvar, while the rate at which the revenue grain was
accounted for to the Government was only 25 qarans, "the
(1) Smith, Major Euan, “Perso-BaLuch Frontier", in Goldsmid's “Eastern Persia", Vol. II, London
1876, p. 337.
(2) Yate, op. cit., p. 70.
(3) Yate, op. cit., p. 83.
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difference", says Yate,^^ "being one of the prerequisites
of the governor-general (of Mashhad), who made what he could
(2 )by the sale..."' ' In addition, a sum of 2600 tumans was
also levied in cash. This amount represented taxes on sheep
and cattle at the rate of one qaran per 20 sheep and 2.5
(3 )qarans per 100 cows.' • Bullocks were not taxed as they
(4)were rarely kept by the villagers.v •
For the entire Amirdom of Khozeimeh, the amount of 32,300
tumans (£6660) was levied in cash from the Amir towards the
end of the nineteenth century, by the central 
(5)Government. ' ' The Amir himself, and in his absence, the 
Mostofi (Chief administrator), received in his office the 
officials who reported to him developments of any kind within 
the limits of their responsibilities. Other individuals also 
came to him with their grievance. His office was normally 
crowded every day, with clerics, merchants, landowners, 
officials, travellers, leaders of tribes and sometimes, 
visitors of official business from other districts or from 
Mashhad or Tehran. Mr. Hale, having observed the 
administrative and judiciary proceedings of the office of the 
Amir of his time (Shokat al-Molk II) in November 1913, 
describes it in the following terms:
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Yate describes the condition of the Sistani cultivators as miserable, explaining; “I do not
think I ever saw a more miserable looking lot. There were no landowners in Sistan. All the land 
and water beLonged to the Government (in Tehran), who took a third of the produce. Consequently 
the revenue fixed at 24000 kharvars would represent an annual out-turn of 72000 kharvars of 
grain" (p.84). The reason for this miserable condition was that the central Government had, 
through the authority of governorship of khorasan, confiscated all lands at Sistan following an 
uprising of the Sistanis, by both landowners and peasants in Late 19th century. Prior to this, 
the Khozeimeh Amirs better maintained agricultural and economic conditions of the province. 
With Reza Shah's rise into power, the Government decided to change this whole situation. Lands 
were redistributed to the cultivators, but water suppLies remained a mighty problem which has 
not as yet been resolved.
(5) Yate, op. cit., p. 70.
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"The governor is away just now on business at Teheran. His 
deputy is a cheery, open-eyed fellow, with a hearty laugh 
and a good-natured desire to please everybody, to which end 
he works hard from early morning till night. What does he 
do? He owns a lot of carpet factories, but besides that he 
administers a district with several hundred thousand people 
in it. How does he do it? Well, he goes about seeing people 
sometimes, but generally he sits in his office at one end of 
a big garden, and talks to priests and merchants, and 
landowners and officials, and village headmen and tribal 
leaders. Some of them have important grievances, others 
none at all, but they almost all want something from him, 
and they often get what they want. His office is a general 
court-house too. The man whose neighbour has damaged his 
wall or stolen his wife, the traveller who has been robbed 
or says he has, the late pedestrian arrested for being out 
in the streets after closing time without the password, the 
two strangers who have quarrelled, the two friends who have 
fought, the baker suing for debt, the petty farmer claims 
water rights, the man who has been called bad names in 
public, the man who has resisted the 'police, ' and the 
'policeman' who has overstepped his authority all these 
come along and swear and forswear and counterswear, each of 
them with a crowd of witnesses, real or imaginary, and all 
of them, by their own eloquent showing, harmless, innocent 
and hapless ones who have been vilely wronged and seek the 
protection of a benign Government against the most evil of 
men. Out of contradiction comes truth not always, but 
surprisingly often. Occasionally a severe beating takes 
place in the high-walled garden in front of the court-house, 
and as my own quarters are just on the other side of the 
wall, I hear the howls of the victim of justice while I am 
having my poached eggs of a morning. My boy cocks his head 
to catch the groans, and grins appreciatively. If I ask him 
what the culprit is being bastinadoed for, he is sure to 
know all about it. I went on my roof the other day 
(somewhat shamefacedly) to watch the operation, as I had 
never seen a beating before. The wretch lay on his back 
with his feet tied to a cross-pole, and two men were laying
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on to his upturned soles in deliberate fashion with stout 
loose whips. When it was over he was carried to a stable 
and left there with his swollen feet in the litter. 
Sometimes jagged branches of pomegranate are used, and blood 
flows quickly. Even death may result if the flogging is 
exceptionally severe. Horrible, you say; and what a 
barbarous country, you think. But is there as much 
barbarity in that as there was in Europe less than a hundred 
years ago?
There is a prison in Birjand, but the only occupant at 
present is a man committed for murder and awaiting sentence. 
The murder was cold-blooded, and the man has confessed his 
crime before three priests in turn, but if the son of the 
victim accepts blood-money he will be let off at that."
With the rise of Reza Shah into power, the autonomous 
Khozeimeh Amirdom was but a nominal entity. With the 
introduction of the 1937 administrative divisions of the 
country, Sistan was incorporated into the province of Sistan 
and Baluchistan, whereas Qaenat and Birjand were recognised 
as two separate Shahrestans (administrative districts) of the 
province of Khorasan. It was in the same year that Amir 
Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh tendered his resignation from the 
Governorship of Qaenat and Sistan as will be discussed, and 
thereupon, put an actual end to the Khozeimeh Amirdom of 
Eastern Iran.
THE KHOZEIMEH AMIRS 
1. Amir Esmail Khan
In the absence of any reliable record of the Khozeimeh Amirs 
of Qaen, in the history, prior to the last Safavid Shah 
(Tahmasb III), Amir Esmail Khan is, inevitably, considered in 
this work as the founder of the modern line of the Khozeimeh 
dynasty.
(1) Hale, op, cit., pp. 20, 21, 22.
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Unlike some members of his family, who are accused of having 
supported Mahmud and Ashraf Afghan in their raids and 
occupation of the Iranian cities and the Safavid capital 
city, Esfahan, Amir Esmail Khan accompanied the Safavid Shah 
Tahmasp III to Khorasan, were he joined Nader Shah (10 Nov. 
1588 - 19 June 1747) in his campaign against Mahmud and
Ashraf. While in Khorasan, the Safavid Shah entrusted the 
official title of governorship of Qaenat, Farah, Tun and 
Tabas, and Kohkiluyeh on to the Amir.
Amir Esmail Khan's titles were later reaffirmed by Nader Shah 
(then Nader Qoli) on the eve of preparing for war with the 
Ottomans (March 21-25, 1731).
Jahangoshi-e Naderi writes on the events of 1144 AH (1731):
"It was during these few days of Noruz  that the
Imperial decree issued for marching toward Iraq....
aia-lat~e Farah and governorship of Qaen were given 
to Esmail Khan Khozeimeh, and governorship of Asfzar 
was given to Esmail Sultan son of Bijan Sultan.... 
each one of them was sent to the district of his 
responsibility."(1)
The same source, commenting on the events of the year 1145 AH
(1732) records:
"At the time when the Iranian forces had the city of 
Baghdad under their siege, and on the other hand, 
Nader Shah was moving towards Karkuk and Musol.... the 
news that Mohammad Khan Baluchi had overwhelmed some 
regions of Fars, was communicated to him. As the 
task of prolonging the siege did not require a large
number of troops, to be kept stationed around
Baghdad, he decided to return Esmail Khan to his
Amirdom at Qaen by honouring him with the 
governorship of aialat-e Kohkiluyeh".(2)
Amir Esmail Khan was at the same time, assigned to fight 
Mohammad Khan Baluchi who had taken some parts of Fars (the
(1) Jahan-Goshai-e Naderi, quoted in Ayati's "Baharestan", op. cit., p. 110.
(2) Jahan-Goshaie Naderi quoted in Baharestan, op. cit.
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districts of Kohkiluyeh). His forces, together with the 
forces commanded by other Amirs, entered Fars.
"After Baghdad was captured and Nader Shah returned to 
Iran,.... Tahmasp Qoli Khan from Esfahan and Esmail Khan 
Vali (governor of kohkiluyeh), from his quarters, moved and 
joined forces to topple Mohammad Khan (Baluchi). Mohammad 
Khan moved out of Shiraz to halt their advances..."^^
2 . Amir Alam Khan I 1 Vakil ad - Doleh "
Amir Alam Khan, son of Amir Esmail Khan, joined Nader Shah's 
army still a young man (1736). He, very soon, proved himself 
worthy of reputation as being brave and a wise warrior. He 
is so mentioned in the Jahan-Goshi-e Naderi and Mojmal 
ot-Tavarikh-e Golestaneh historical records of the time. He 
had fought, at the head of the Khozeimeh army, alongside 
Nader Shah in many campaigns of the latter in the east and 
west of Iran. It was because of his braveries that he became
one of the few of Nader Shah 's elite officers.
Jahan-Goshaie Naderi indicates that when Nader put his 
military camp at Morad Tappeh near Iravan (Yaravan), to 
prepare for a battle against the Ottomans in 1151 AH (1738), 
the Ottomans appeared before him with one hundred thousand 
mounted cavalries and an infantry of forty thousand strong. 
Ottoman forces were defeated after a few rounds of battles 
were fought. Jahan-Goshie Naderi asserts: "after the battle
of Sar-Askar (in which the Ottomans were thoroughly
defeated), he (Nader Shah) wrote a letter to His Majesty the
Ottoman Emperor, sent it to the Ottoman court by Fath-Ali 
Khan, via Baghdad. Himself returned to Khorasan from 
Morad-Tappeh, He assigned Mohammad-Ali Khan Qaraquyunlu as 
the commander-in-chief, aided by Haji Seif ad-Din Bayat with 
a portion of the victorious army, and Amir Alam Khan, at the 
head of the Khozeimeh Arabs and Lolaei and Nakhaei forces of 
altogether twenty thousand of the victorious troops, to hold 
Iraq. They were assigned to put down any attempt of revolt
(1) Ibid.
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there. A few days later, Mohammad-Ali Khan came up with his
designs for subordination and dictatorship, the Alvar-e Fili
tribe joined up with him, undertaking to support him for one
year without payment as from the time when he declares his
uprising. A number of other Khans and chiefs had also
joined him. Since Mohammad-Ali Khan was not sure of Amir
Alam Khan' s loyalty to Nader Shah, shared the secret with
him in private, hoping that he would also go along with the
idea. But, since Amir Alam Khan did not see himself less
than Mohammad-Ali Khan in rank or position, refused his
proposition. Finally conflicts broke out between the two
commanders in the vicinity of Fili. Although Mohammad-Ali
Khans forces were about four thousand strong, Amir Alam Khan
fought him in one whole day, from morning to the evening,
with two thousand Arabs in his command, defeated him and
captured him, and sent him to the supreme leader.
Mohammad-Ali Khan was blinded and Emam Qoli Khan Abivardi,
his accomplice, was killed. Of the fortunes of Mohammad-Ali
Khan, one thousand tumans went to Amir Alam Khan, and the
(remaining) five thousand tumans he distributed among his
soldiers as reward. Amir Alam Khan was also the recipient of
(Nader Shah's) special reward. Amir Alam Khan was one of the
nobles of Nader Shah's forces who joined in the competition
for the leadership of Iran in the wake of the latter' s
(1)assassination."v 1
Mojmal ot-Tavarikh Golestaneh, another historical record of
12)the time, explains' J that Nader Shah had rendered 
admirable services to the country of Iran at the beginning of 
his career. Whatever destruction accured by the Afghani 
domination, he had repaired, and whichever of the Iranian 
territories occupied by the encroaching powers, recaptured, 
except that towards the end of his rule he changed.
{1) Jahan-Goshaie Naderi, quoted in Baharestan, op cit.
(2) Mojmal ot-Tavarikh Golestaneh, ed. Malek as-Shoara Bahar, quoted in Ayati's Baharestan, op.
cit.
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This change of behaviour, clearly resulting from 
psychological strains, that Nader Shah suffered towards the 
end of his career, has been extensively discussed in numerous 
works of historical analysis. Shortly, a series of rapidly 
spreading insurgencies appear to have shattered his nerves. 
Almost immediately after accepting the Jafari sect as the 
official religion of Iran, and thence declaring himself as 
the Shah of Iran in 17 36, the powerful Bakhtiari tribes of 
southern Iran revolted against him. Their revolt was put 
down swiftly. When Nader Shah was still fighting his way to 
India, the Lazkis of Daghestan revolted and killed his 
brother Ebrahim Khan Zahir ad-Doleh. While still in India, 
he had to send another army to put down the Lazki uprising. 
Another incident in India forced him to open his soldiers 
hands on the people of Delhi. When he was going from 
Mazandaran to Mashhad in 1741, an attempt on his life took 
place in the jungles of Mazandaran by unknown elements who 
had opened gun fire on him. Nader was injured in the arm. 
Later on, people of Shirvan and Fars and some other parts of 
the country revolted against him. In 1744 someone claimed in 
Kerman to be a brother of Shah Sultan Hussein the Safavid. 
He declared himself as successor to the last Safavid emperor 
and sought asylum in the Ottoman capital. The Ottomans used 
the opportunity and declared war on Nader Shah, but were 
defeated. The clerics who never trusted Nader on the 
religious matters, and the feudalists whose power he had 
curtailed, never kept quiet throughout his reign. They 
spread their influence among Nader Shah's family.
Their close association with Reza Qoli, Nader Shah’s first 
born caused Nader's suspicions of his son's conduct. They 
succeeded in encouraging Ali-Qoli Khan, Nader's nephew, to 
revolt against the uncle in Sistan. Nader Shah used force to 
uproot these issues. His use of force gradually became 
increasingly cruel. He blinded his own son, Reza Qoli, which 
he regretted tremendously later. His cruelty increased to an 
extent that was no longer tolerable. Finally on Jamadi 
al-Akhar 1161 (19 June 1747), a number of his noble officers 
conspired, some historical sources say, "at the instigation
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(1)of his own nephew, Ali-Qoli Khan"v ' killed him in the
district of Khabushan at night and threw his head to the
soldiers. Great chaos befallen the vast country in the wake
of Nader Shah's assassination in 1747. Almost all nobles of
his army and a few of his own family entered a cruel race for
succession to the throne. The first to claim succession, was
Nader Shah's nephew Ali-Qoli Khan who proclaimed himself
"Adel Shah" by ascending the Naderi throne. To attract the
support of the nobles and commanders, he condemned Nader
Shah's "barbarism" and "atrocities" by accepting the
(2)responsibility for his assassination.v } Little did he 
know that the nobles and the commanders of Nader Shah' s 
forces were too loyal to their murdered master to accept his 
proclamation. He massacred all male members of the royal 
family, except Shahrokh Mirza, son of Reza Qoli Mirza, and 
grandson of Nader. He was dethroned by his brother Ebrahim, 
who was, in turn, killed by his own troops.
At this time, the throne of the kingdom was, once again, open 
to contest by the eligible leaders. Among those 
participating in this contest, one was Amir Alam Khan I of 
the Khozeimeh Amirdom of Qaenat and Sistan. To ensure his 
success in this great contest, he had to overcome powerful 
rivals such as Shahrokh Mirza in Mashhad, Ahmad Khan Abdali 
in eastern Khorasan (Afghanistan), Mohammad Hassan Khan Qajar 
in Mazandaran, Mir Hassan Khan in Esfanan, Karim Khan Zand in 
Shiraz, Ali-Qoli Mirza in Sistan, Ebrahim Mirza, Sam Mirza, 
Mohammad-Ali Khan, and so on. Mohammad-Ali Khan Qaraqayunlu 
was defeated by Amir Alam Khan, long before Nader Shah's 
assassination. Ali-Qoli Khan and Ebrahim Mirza finished each 
other off, as has been discussed. Among Others, Shahrokh 
Mirza was installed on the throne by commanders of the army, 
loyal to their assassinated master. He was immediately 
challenged by an influential cleric, Mirza Seyyed Mohammad, 
son of Mirza Davood (a superintendent of the shrine of Imam 
Reza in Mashhad).
(1) Tarikh-e Jahan-Goshai-e Naderi, Mojmal ot-Tavarikh GoLestaneh, Tarikh-e SuLtani and so on.
(2) Sing, Ganda "Ahmad Shah Durrani", Bombay 1959, page 82.
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Seyyed Mohammad revolted against Nader Shah's grandson with
the help of Amir Alam Khan, a Shi'ah Moslem, religiously
still loyal to the Safavid Shi'ah dynasty, who saw no room in
task of Iranian monarchy for the Afshar "usurpers", except
for Nader Shah himself to whom Amir Alam Khan was a loyal
general and a trusted noble. Mirza Seyyed Mohammad blinded
Shahrokh^^ and declared himself "Shah Suleyman the
Safavid" by ascending to the throne in Mashhad. Shah
Suleyman, a nephew of Shah Sultan Hussein Safavid and his
son-in-law, immediately embarked, in association with Amir
(2 )Alam Khan,v ' upon unifying the country by appointing Salim
Khan Afshar as commander of Iraq, with Fath-Ali Khan as
commander of Azarbaijan, and with Mohammad Hassan Khan Qajar
(3 \as commander of Astar-Abad and Mazandaran.v 1
Amir Alam Khan, at the same time, sent his brother Amir Masum
Khan with a sizeable army to Herat where they succeeded in
capturing the city for a very short time. Other armies were
(4 )sent to restore security in Qandahar and Kabul.v ' These 
expeditions naturally clashed directly with the interests of 
Ahmad Khan Abdali, who himself was a powerful contender of 
the leadership of Iran, and was, at the time, recapturing 
India and repeating Nader Shah's famous Indian campaign. 
However, Shah Suleyman was not to reign for a long time. He 
was soon overpowered by Yusof-Ali Khan Jalayer, Shahrokh 
Mirza's general. Mojmal ot-Tavarikh Golestaneh has the 
following accounts for Shah Suleyman's final days;
"The nobles of Khorasan who believed in the family of the 
Seyyed more than the usurping family of Afshar, and who were 
all of pure Shi' ah faith, went to the Seyyed and begged him
(1) Tarikh-e Jahan-Goshai-e Naderi; Atashkadeh-e Azar; Mojmal at-Tavarikh-e Golestaneh; Ahmad 
Shah Durrani; Afghanistan Dar hasir-e Tarikh; etc.
(2) Ayati, op. cit., p. 118.
(3) Ibid.
(A) Ayati, op. cit., p. 120,
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and chose him as Shah, and named him Shah Suleyman II. They 
blinded Shahrokh Mirza on the instigation of Amir Alam Khan 
who, at the time, had the title of "Vakil ad-Doleh", They 
eventually installed a Government that was aspired by the 
Qezelbash for so many years. They dispatched an army, 
commanded by Behbood Khan and Amir Masum Khan, brother of 
Amir Alam Khan, to Herat and captured the city. Immediately 
another able army was sent to restore security in Qandahar 
and Kabul. Even war was declared on Ahmad Khan Durrani. All 
these activities were taking place owing to the personality, 
power, wisdom, and political acumen of Amir Alam Khan 
Khozeimeh Vakil ad-Doleh. It is unfortunate, for the people 
of Iran, the first day of whose misfortune must be counted 
from the day when the efforts of Amir Alam Khan were wasted 
because of the betrayal committed by Yusof-Ali Khan Jalayer, 
prompted by the women of Shahrokhi harem. Shortly on the day 
when Amir Mehrab Khan, a close associate of Amir Alam Khan, 
died and the nobles of the court whose forces usually 
monitored activities at the (strategic point of) Chahar Bagh 
of Mashhad, were mourning the former and reciting from the 
Qoran, Yusof-Ali Khan Jalayer entered the Chahar Bagh with a 
group of armed men, on the order of Habibeh Sultan Begom, the 
wife of Shahrokh Mirza, captured Shah Suleyman and
blinded him and sounded the trumpet in the name of Shahrokh. 
Amir Alam Khan, who had not even thought of such deeds, was 
surprised. He attacked the Chahar Bagh, aided by other 
commanders. Yusof-Ali Khan opened cannon fire on them and 
killed scores of the Seyyed's supporters. The news of 
Seyyed's loss of sight disappointed the people. Amir Alam 
Khan and other nobles went to their own realm of power. 
Yusof-Ali Khan after restoring the blinded Shah (Shahrokh) on 
the throne, took by use of trickery, all the money and 
jewelleries that Shahrokh had, and left Mashhad to the Kalat 
(Naderi) to live in feasting and drinking. After all these, 
and the fact that a blind Shah was left in Mashhad on his 
own, the influence of the Government decreased to its lowest 
level. On the other hand, Ahmad Khan Abdali arrived in
161
Khorasan with a large army where Behbood Khan and Amir Masum 
Khan surrendered themselves to him."^^
The unexpected action of Yusof-Ali Khan, however, angered 
Amir Alam Khan who decided to take the whole. of the country. 
Ahmad Khan Abdali had returned to Afghanistan and Amir Alam 
Khan advanced troops to the Kalat-e Naderi, captured 
Yusof-Ali Khan Jalayer and his brother. He subsequently 
marched on Mashhad, dethroned Shahrokh for the second time, 
and declared himself as lord sovereign in 1 7 4 8 . Quoting 
a number of rare historical records of the time, Baharestan, 
itself a rare book, has the following account of this 
development:
11Amir Alam Khan found (the Jalayeri Yusof-Ali* s) 
behaviour most distasteful. He wrecked his vengeance 
upon Yusof-Ali Khan by marching, with his men, on 
Kalat where he fought and captured Yusof-Ali Khan and 
his brother and a number of others. He brought them, 
as prisoners, to Mashhad and put them to death on the 
advice of the military chiefs. He then hoisted the 
flag of independence and gathered around himself 
large groups of the Khozeimeh, Nakhaei, Lolaei, and 
other clans of Khorasan. He ordered a few leaders of 
the Kurdish clans opposing him, to be blinded, and 
married the sister of Duli Khan Shadlu (a Kurdish 
chief). wherever there was a notable chief in 
Khorasan, accepted the authority of the Amir of "the 
astronomical troops' willingly or otherwise. Amir 
Alam Khan killed or injured many of the leading 
insubordinates and moved troops to capture 
Nishabur."(3)
Amir Alam Khan seems to have been unfortunate in the sense 
that his capture of Khorasan and Herat and Baluchistan, 
brought him in direct confrontation with his more powerful 
rival, Ahmad Khan Abdali (later Ahmad Shah Durrani).
(1) Mojmal ot-Tavarikh-e Golestaneh, quoted inAyati's "Baharestan", op. cit.
(2) Coins are reported to have been found in some households of Khorasan and Tehran with Amir 
Alam Khan's insignia as lord sovereign of Khorasan.
(3) Ayati, "Baharestan", op. cit., p. 121.
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From Mashhad, he advanced his forces to open the city of 
Nishabur, where the Bayat clan refused to accept his 
sovereignty. Near Nishabur, Amir Alam Khan sent messages to 
the Bayats inviting them to surrender in peace and to accept 
his authority. His invitation was turned down. He besieged 
the city and was about to succeed when the news of Ahmad Khan 
Abdali*s arrival in Jam and Lankar reached him.
Amir Alam Khan left Nishabur to appear before Ahmad Khan. 
Majmal ot-Tavarikh-e Golestaneh has the following account of 
this fateful event which had put the final touch on Amir Alam 
Khan's career: "....(he was trying to capture the city of
Nishabur when) the news of the arrival of Ahmad Khan Abdali, 
with a fateful army, in Jam and Lankar reached this Amir. 
He had no alternative but to abandon the siege of Nishabur 
and to prepare for war with Ahmad Khan. He reviewed his 
troops which included thirty five thousand young men, all 
armed, each resembling Rostam (son) of Zal, The military 
secretaries brought the lists of army to the Khan of mighty 
rank. After reviewing the list, he organised a cavalry 
force of five thousand to ride in advance of the army and 
ordered the troops to move to the front on the following 
day. The Kurdish leaders and other tribal chiefs began 
dissension and decided to abandon the Amir. At dawn when the 
splendour of the eastern sun began its manifestation....the 
Amir, unaware of the fast approaching fate, moved his flag 
of independence towards Jam and Lankar. He was marching in 
those directions when the hypocrite generals left him, each 
taking his own men to his own country. The Amir was left 
with a few groups, and since he saw his fortune turned and 
his fate darkened, decided to suspend punishment of the
Kurds for the time being. He reached the Tun fortress which 
was very strong and in his possession. He left the 
military baggages and his harem there with his brother Amir 
Masum Khan in charge. Himself went to Duli Khan with the 
few groups he had and began to mass another army to send to 
war with Ahmad Khan. The leaders of the Kurds learnt of
this matter and sent messages to Duli Khan (a Kurdish chief 
and the Amir's brother-in-law) advising him that supporting
the murderer of our people is against our tribal principles
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and honours. If you are concerned with our tribal honours, 
send the Amir to us without any excuses. Otherwise be 
prepared for war'. Since Duli Khan had no desire for tribal 
discords and since he saw supporting the Amir was beyond his 
capability, he sent him towards Asfzar. The Kurds, informed 
of this move, mounted their horses immediately. Amir was 
about to enter the Asfzar fortress when the Kurdish groups 
reached him, captured him and sent him to Shahrokh bounded 
up. As Shahrokh found the source of his blindness in his 
captivity, blinded him and gave him to Jafar Khan the Kurd 
who was also blinded by the Amir. Jafar Khan took his 
revenge by having the Amir flogged.
Other historical sources, however, record Amir Alam Khan's 
fate differently. These sources speak of Amir Alam Khan’s 
direct involvement in war with Ahmad Khan Abdali on the 
arrival of the latter in Jam and Lankar, where the Amir of 
Qaen fought the Afghan leader forcing him to retreat in the 
first round of engagement. The author of "Ahmad Shah 
Durrani", using various sources gives the following accounts 
of the event:
"Mir Alam Khan was at this time the master of Mashhad, and 
he was preparing to besiege Nishapur when he heard of the 
fall of Herat into the hands of Ahmad Shah and of his march 
against Mashhad. He suspended his activities at Nishapur and 
hurried down to Mashhad to meet the advancing Afghans. He 
prepared the fortifications, provisioned the place, and, 
after having confided the defence to the inhabitants, whom 
he believed he could trust, he marched out of Mashhad, 
determined to pounce upon Herat, if possible.
Ahmad Shah detailed an advance army of five thousand 
selected Afghans under the command of Jahan Khan Popalzei, 
assisted by Mir Naseer Khan, chief of Kalat, in Baluchistan, 
to march against Mashhad. On arriving at Turbat-i-Shaikh 
Jam, Jahan Khan sprang a surprise upon Mir Alam Khan by
(1) Mojmal ot-Tavarikh-e Golestaneh quoted in Ayati's "Baharestan*, op. cit., p. 122.
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attacking him. Recovering from the first shock, Mir Alam hit
back with great intrepidity and pushed back the Durranis.
But the position was soon retrieved by a bold attack of Mir
Naseer Khan of Kalat, who charged the Persians with his
three thousand horse and drove them away. Mir Alam was
killed in the battle and his army was cut to pieces.
Whereas Ferrier asserts that Amir Alam Khan immediately gave
up the idea of keeping Mashhad and retired in the direction
(2\of Qaenat to his tribe,v } Sir Percy Sykes indicates:
"The province of Khorasan was in a state of anarchy
at this period. The various successors of Nadir Shah 
had been successively killed or blinded. In the 
latter category was a grandson of Nadir, Shah Rukh 
Mirza, a boy of fourteen who was at that period
merely a puppet in the hands of Mir Alam Khan of 
Sistan. This chief, who had defeated his rivals, 
left Meshed with a strong garrison with the intention 
of surprising Herat. He was, however, himself 
surprised at Turbat-i-Shaykh-Jam by Timur Mirza, who 
was marching on Meshed in command of the Afghan
advance guard. Mir Alam, recovering from the 
surprise, fought bravely, but was defeated and his 
army was cut to pieces by a charge of 3000 Baluch
cavalry under Nasir Khan of Kalat. Ahmad Shah then 
besieged Meshed, without much success, but finally, 
upon receipt of large sum of money, he replaced Shah 
Rukh on the throne under his sovereignty(*)
Whichever of these accounts was more precise, the family 
tradition favours the first account. In a farman (decree)!4 ), signed 
by Ahmad Shah Durrani (Abdali) and dated 16 Shavval 1167 (1753), Amir Alam Khan I 
is compared with Nader Shah Afshar. The Amir is reported in the farman as being 
under siege in Sabzevar* Amir Alam Khan's death must have, therefore, occured around 
that date of 1753. Other sources have recorede his deathe as in 1749. Amir Alam 
Khan was, undoubtedly a significantly effective leader of the 
time and the greatest Amir of the Khozeimeh whose dominion 
expanded to include a vast country. His Amirdom included 
Qaenat (the old Qohestan), Sistan, Baluchistan, Khorasan, 
Herat, and Farah (fig. IV ) . He put his Amirdom’s 
south-western out posts in Kerman. He had his capital moved
(1) Sing, Ganda, "Ahmad Shah Durrani", Bombay 1959, pp. 57 - 8.
(2) Ferrier, General J.P. "Caravan Journeys and Wandering in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and 
Baloochistan’, London 1857, pp. 508 - 9.
(3) Sykes, Sir Percy, "A History of Afghanistan", London 1940, Vol. I, p. 356.
( 4 )  P nm inn  o r  A lim nd  Slinli D u rran i ( A b d a l i}, a s  a p p e a re d  in  (lie " fnrlinng-e Irnn -Z am in  ", pcrsn io  pub lica tio n .
T e h ran  195R, pp . 161 - 163.
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from Birjand to Mashhad which was the capital of Iran at the 
time. Had not his fortune clashed with that of Ahmad Khan 
Abdali so soon, he would, most probably, have influenced 
Iran's political history for a long period thenceforward, 
with major impacts on the country's future. From among his 
rivals Ahmad Khan Abdali founded the kingdom of Afghanistan 
with himself its first king (Ahmad Shah Durrani); Mohammad 
Hassan Khan Qajar strengthened his own position in Mazandaran 
and Astar-Abad (Gorgan). His son, Agha Mohammad Khan, 
founded the Qajar dynasty in Iran which lasted until 1925; 
Karim Khan Zand founded the Zand dynasty in Shiraz.
Amir Masum Khan
Amir Masum Khan, son of Amir Esmail Khan and brother of Amir
Alam Khan, who in spite of never having ruled as a Khozeimeh
Amir, played an effective role, under Amir Alam Khan, as
commander of the Amirdom's forces. Most of Amir Masum Khan's
time was spent with Amir Alam Khan during the latter's
contest for the leadership of Iran, acting as his general and
commander of the army whom Amir Alam Khan trusted most. When
the Abdali Khan finished Amir Alam Khan's career, by bringing
(1 \the fortress of Tunv 1 under siege, pressurised Amir Masum
Khan to surrender. Unaware of his brother's fate, Amir Masum
Khan strengthened his fortifications with the help of the
small garrison he had under his command, hoping that his
brother would send him reinforcements. The fort could not
hold out for a long time, Amir Masum Khan resisted for some
time but lost all hope when news of his brother's death
reached him. He sued for peace and Ahmad Khan Abdali invited
him to his presence, whereupon Amir Masum Khan presented to
the Abdali Khan the keys to the fort and surrendered
I 2}himself.' 1 He was spared and invited to continue as Amir 
of Qaen, which he refused. Consequently, Amir Alam Khan's 
son was nominated for the position.
(1) This name appears in some English history books in the form of "Nun".
(2) Sing, Ganda, op. cit., p. 88.
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Ahmad Khan Abdali, in this respect, followed the example of 
Nader Shah's policy; i.e. reinstating the defeated
leaders, and demanding their maximum loyalty.
Amir Masum Khan, suffering from the grief of his brother's 
tragedy and the death of a number of his family in that 
tragedy, was not apparently able to continue in Khorasan. He 
left Khorasan for Tehran, where he spent the rest of his 
life. While in Tehran, he endowed a . piece of land to the 
students of the Masumiyeh School of Theology at Birjand. The 
deed of this endowment was written in Tehran by the clerics 
of the capital.^
3- Amir Ali Khan
Amir Ali Khan, son of Amir Alam Khan, restored the Amirdom of 
Khozeimeh in Qaenat after his father was killed and his 
uncle, Amir Masum Khan left the district for Tehran. His 
Amirdom of Qaenat was confirmed by the Khans of the Zand 
dynasty. According to Sir John Malcolm, Amir Ali Khan was a 
well known noble of Khorasan at the time. In the event of 
the contests between the Zand and Qajar dynasties for the 
monarchy of Iran, Amir Ali Khan fought on the side of 
Lotf-Ali Khan Zand against Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar.
/ 2 \
According to Tarikh-e Giti Gosha,v 1 when Lotf-Ali Khan was 
defeated at Kerman in 1208 AH (1793) and was pursued by Agha 
Mohammad Khan, Amir Ali Khan gave him refuge in Qaen and 
prepared an army for him made up of Qaeni and Sistani 
cavalries. Lotf-Ali Khan entered the second round of battles 
with Agha Mohammad Khan at Kerman with the help of this 
army. Sir John Malcolm says of Amir Ali Khan:
"The town and district of Kayn, to the south-east of 
Tuhhus f were under an Arabian family of high rank, 
whose ancestor, Meer Ismael Khan, received a grant of 
it, to maintain his tribe, from the last Seffavean 
monarch. This chief served with distinction in the 
army of Nadir Shah: his grandson now inherited this
sterile possession. Numbers of camels are reared in 
the plains of Kayn, and its mountains are covered with
(1) Ayati, op. cit., p. 122.
(2) Tarikh-e Giti Gosha quoted in Ayati's “Baharestan*, op. cit.
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sheep; from the wool, carpets of different textures 
are made, of a quality equal to any produced in 
Persia. The rulers of this province usually pay their 
tribute in this manufacture; but the military service 
of their followers has always been an object more 
desired/ by their paramount lord than the revenue of 
their lands; for the Arabs of Kayn have long enjoyed 
the reputation of being the hardiest and bravest 
infantry of Khorassan. Their present chief Amir Ali 
Khan had aided Lotf Ali Khan; but the nature and 
situation of this country left him little to fear from 
Agha Mahomed, whose wisdom, he knew, would at all 
times prefer his proffered allegiance, to the 
hazard, " (*)
Amir Ali Khan's Amirdom extended from Qaen, the traditional 
heartland of the Khozeimeh Amirdom, to Sistan.
4- Amir Alam Khan II
Amir Alam Khan II, son of Amir Ali Khan, was named after his
grandfather whose memory was to be cherished by the family
for over two centuries. He succeeded his father in Qaen, and
before that, had joined Lotf-Ali Khan Zand's campaign in
Kerman as a commander of the Zand army. His Amirdom
coincided with the rule of Fath-Ali Shah Qajar in Iran, who
restored the official title of the Amirdom of Qaenat for the
Khozeimeh family, in the person of Amir Alam Khan II. In
1213 AH (1798), when Mahmud Mirza Afghan sought refuge in
Iran, he was hosted by Amir Alam Khan II in Kashan. Fath-Ali
Shah Qajar, thinking of Iran's repossession of Herat,
extended Mahmud Mirza Afghan some support and, according to 
(2 ^"Baharestan",v ' the Qajar Shah ordered Amir Hassan Khan 
Sheibani, related to the Khozeimeh family and the governor of 
Tabas at the time, and Amir Alam Khan II to accompany Mahmud 
Mirza and to support him in Kabul. Amir Alam Khan II was 
apparently highly respected in Qaenat and the surrounding 
districts for the peace and tranquillity that he brought back 
to the region. He had erected buildings and a fine fort in
(1) Malcolm, Sir John G.C.B./K.L.S., "History of Persia, London 1829.
(2) Ayati, "Baharestan", op. cit., p. 123.
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Birjand. In 1205 AH (1790) Akhund Molla Abdul-Karim Eshraq, 
a highly respected cleric of the time and a disciple of Agha 
Mohammad Bid-Abadi Esfahani, composed some poems in praise of 
this fortress and its builder. According to these poems, the 
fortress of Birjand must have been of an excellent design, 
comparable even to the monuments at Esfahan. The actual 
Persian words read:
<_J ■ 1*  ^ <■■ ■  ^ (j t X J J  l y >  1 (-# I l j  k j
j 11-.. ■. < j Li j ..... ^« (3 Ho iu Hj
i. i‘n Lj *S" jJ j ij ■ in 1 1 fr
I ^ li Ml C 1..*^ k lumA ^  I u
U  ■i*"f *-* \5*J*
&  I— * S .  Jp J  I llaii j  J
O Lj_Xj j—*3 L..■ !■» (3^-; Ua
d i 1 j J  Lj  (T j- * -?  U "
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5- Amir Asadollah Khan (Hesam ad-Doleh I)
Amir Asadollah Khan, son of Amir Alam Khan II, succeeded his
father in Qaen; Tun and Tabas, He was apparently renowned
for his bravery, and joined Abbas Mirza Qajar "Nayeb
as-Saltaneh" Fath-Ali Shah's crown prince in his campaign of
Khorasan in 1247 AH (1831). Abbas Mirza Nayeb as-Saltaneh
apparently had high regard for this Amir. When Abdor-Reza
Khan Yazdi, governor of Bafgh who had defied Abbas Mirza,
escaped from Bafgh and sought refuge in Tabas, Amir Asadollah
Khan used his influence with the Nayeb as-Saltaneh and
guaranteed the latter1s forgiveness for the refugee Khan of
Bafgh. When in 1249 AH (1833) Abbas Mirza Nayeb
as-Saltaneh advanced his troops towards Herat, Amir Asadollah
Khan Khozeimeh and Amir Ali-Naghi Khan Arab commanded parts
of his military machine. In a report to his father, Fath-Ali
t o)
Shah Qajar, Abbas Mirza writes:' '
".... having put his reliance on the blessings of the 
almighty and on the eternal fortune of His Imperial 
Majesty, this devoted servant left the Naderi fortress 
to besiege Khabushan. His excellency Sohrab Khan
Sartip (Brigadier) was put in charge of the gate of 
Mashhad with the Shagagi and Maragheh soldiers and 
with Qaen and Nishabur riflemen, and a group of
cavalries with a number of cannons. Himself took 
position at the gate of Shiran with the rest of the 
soldiers and cannons. The soldiers of the victorious 
divisions were made to dig meandering entrenchments
and fill in the ditches. Qahraman Mirza, son of this
servant of the mighty court of H.I.M. was put in
charge of this task on his return from Sabzevar. On 
the other hand, his excellency Sohrab Khan the 
engineer and Bruski the engineer designed the
entrenchments of the Shaqaqi soldiers to be connected 
to the ditch (surrounding the city) in three 
directions. The entrenchments of the Maragheh 
soldiers under the command of Colonel Hassan Pasha
Moghaddam were brought to ten Zar'(^) of the gates
of Mashhad. The other entrenchments were put in 
charge of their excellencies Amir Asadollah Khan 
Khozeimeh Amir of Qaen and Mirza Hussein Khan Darudi 
chief of Nishabur."
(1) Ayati, op, cit., p. 125.
(2) Qaem-Maqam Farahani, “Monsha-at-e Qaem-Maqam“, edit. Qaem-Maqami, Jahangir, Tehran 1337
(1958), p. 163. The Letter is dated 18th of Rabi ol-Aval 1248 = 1832.
(3) Zar* was a unit of Long measure in Iran, long since replaced by metric system. A zar‘ was
aLmost as Long as a yard (3 ft.).
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It was during this movement of the Iranian troops towards 
Herat that Abbas Mirza Nayeb as-Saltaneh died and his son, 
Mohammad Mirza, later Mohammad Shah Qajar, returned the 
expeditory forces to Mashhad. He himself returned to Tehran 
after leaving most of the responsibilities in the region with 
Amir Asadollah Khan. In 1253 and 1254 (1837 and 1838) when
Mohammad Shah Qajar besieged Herat, Amir Asadollah Khan was 
present once again, fighting as a commander of the Iranian 
army. Herat was about to fall when the British intervened 
and the Iranian troops returned, as will be discussed in 
chapter IV. Amir Asadollah Khan too returned to his Amirdom 
of Qaenat, Tun, and Tabas.
In 126 9 (1852) when Sardar Ali Khan Sistani refused to accept 
the authority of the central Government of Naser ad-Din Shah 
Qajar, Amir Asadollah Khan dispatched his son, Amir Alam Khan 
(later Amir Alam Khan III, Amir of Qaenat) to join Hassan 
Khan Jalilvand, sent by Prince Hesam as-Saltaneh, Governor 
General of Khorasan, to enter Sistan and enforce the rule of 
the central Government there. They hoisted the national flag 
of Iran at the entrance of the fort of Sekuheh , took Sardar 
and put an end to his mutiny.
In 1277 (1860) the Turkaman raiders invaded Qaenat, however,
Amir Asadollah Khan was able to overpower them and drive them
back to Afghani territories. Amir Asadollah Khan was
praised by the Shah for this bravery and his son, Alam Khan,
was conferred to the honourary rank of Sarhang (Colonel) for 
f 2 ^his bravery.v '
Amir Asadollah Khan had also participated in the siege and 
capture of Quchan and its unruly Khan, Reza Qoli. But before 
all these, he was embarrassed by the revolt of the Sarder in 
Khorasan which proved to be an arduous experience for himself 
and for his family. Baharestan, quoting a number of original
(1) Ayati, op. cit., p. 125.
(2) Ibid.
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historical manuscripts of the time gives the following 
account of that event:
"Salar, Mohammad Hassan Khan, son of Allah-Yar Khan Asef 
ad-Doleh whose father was vali (governor) of Khorasan in 1251 
(1835) succeeded him in 1262 (1845) as governor.
Shortly, Salar and his brother, chief of Mashhad, opposed the 
Government and began a rebellion against the central 
authority. In 12 63 (1846) Hamzeh Mirza Heshmat ad-Doleh was 
assigned to put his rebellion down in Khorasan with a large 
army. In the first instance, Salar moved to the Dasht-e 
Akhal, but his brother, Mohammad Khan, was in Mashhad when 
Heshmat ad-Doleh's army reached the city. He created a total 
chaos inside Mashhad, in which Mirza Abdollah Khuei, 
superintendent of the holy shrine, was killed in front of the 
Goharshad Musqu, by a gun shot. About seven hundred soldiers 
of the Government forces were also massacred and the rest of 
them were besieged inside the citadel of the shrine with 
Heshmat ad-Doleh among them. Meanwhile, Mohammad Shah died 
in Tehran. When news of the Shah's death reached
Mashhad, Heshmat ad-Doleh escaped to Herat with Yar-Mohammad 
Khan Herati, taking the Government forces with them. Some of 
the officers and Soldiers escaped to Tehran and, thus, 
Mashhad was left in total domination of Salar. In the wake 
of Naser ad-Din Shah's ascendancy to the throne, Prince 
Sultan Morad Mirza Hesam as-Saltaneh was assigned to Khorasan 
to uproot Salar's mutiny. Moreover, groups of Khorasani 
nobles joined Hesam as-Saltaneh. In the event of Hesam 
as-Saltaneh's arrival in the province of Khorasan, Sam Khan 
Ilkhani Zafaranlu and people of Khorasan abandoned Salar. 
Local dignitaries were given assurances of the Government's 
kindness. Hesam ad-Saltaneh besieged the city. The regiment 
stationed at Khajeh Rabi, began to attack the city from that 
direction. Famine increased and Salar daringly violated the 
sanctity of the shrine using the gold and silver of the doors 
and other parts, making coins in his own name. He arrested a 
number of the learned men of the city and imprisoned them. 
This actions worsened the predicament of his own and of the 
city. The Government forces eventually opened the city. 
Salar took refuge in the holy shrine in 1266 (1849). Hesam
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as-Saltaneh arrived in the holy shrine and released Salar's 
prisoners. Following this development, Salar and his son, 
Aslan Khan, and his brother, Mohammad Khan, were captured and
put to death for what they did."^1^
Baharestan sums up the events of the Salar rebellion in
connection with Qaenat and the Khozeimeh Amirdom, in the 
following words:
"But, as the velayat (province) of Qaen is concerned, 
following Salar1s domination of Khorasan districts, he moved 
troops towards Qaen. Amir Asadollah Khan embarked upon 
defending his Amirdom. After a while, as he saw the Qaeni 
soldiers could no longer resist the Asefi troops, and himself 
might be punished in the event of defeat for being involved 
in Hesam ad-Doleh's campaigns against Salar, Amir Asadollah 
Khan escaped to Herat. His son, Alam Khan, was captured and 
the family of the Amir was put under the late Akhund Mulla 
Sar-Chahi, the Friday Imam of Birjand. Alam Khan was 
imprisoned at Mashhad for a while. He eventually escaped 
from the prison and joined his father in Herat, They 
remained there until peace was restored in Mashhad. All 
these times, Mohammad-Ali Khan Asef ad-Doleh, son of the
Salar, retained the governorship of Qaenat. He applied a
cruel policy there.
"Of the amazing events of this time, one was that Akhund
Mulla Hussein (Sar-Chahi), a learned cleric an eloquent poet, 
and a sincere friend of Amir Asadollah Khan, continued 
praising the Amir and damning his foes during his sermons. 
Asef ordered him to be punished for opposing the Salar regime 
and inciting disturbances. To punish the cleric, he was
ordered to be tied up at the end of the cannon and the gunner
was ordered to fire. The gunner tried a few times to fire 
the gun, but it failed. He lost his temper, hit his hat on 
the ground, tore his shirt, and said; don't you see that the 
cannon does not affect the servant of imam Hussein. He then
(1) Ayati, op cit., pp. 125 - 6 - 7.
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shouted; Ya Aba-Abdollah, O' father of Abdollah,^ I adore
you, and thus, brought this whole episode to an end. The
cleric, rescued from a certain death, composed and recited
(2 )the following verses:v >
(the king (Imam Hussein) who has saved me from the fire of 
this world, will save me from the fire of the next world)."
During their stay in Herat, Amir Asadollah Khan and his son, 
Alam Khan, apparently purchased many lands there and extended 
the family's land-holding state as far as Herat itself, Amir 
Asadollah Khan died in 1845.
6- Amir Alam Khan III (Heshmat al-Molk)
Another highly notable Amir of the Khozeimeh family was Amir 
Alam Khan III, son of Amir Asadollah Khan, who succeeded his 
father's Amirdom and expanded its influence. His Amirdom was 
almost a replica of the Amirdom of Amir Alam Khan I, short of 
Herat and Mashhad dependencies. He uprooted the minor chiefs 
ruling in the districts of his family's traditional Amirdom, 
such as the chiefs of Nakhaei, Khu^f, Neh, and Sonni-Khaneh 
plain. He soon restored the Khozeimeh Amirdom in the entire 
region of Qaenat and its dependencies.
He received a Farman (royal decree) from Mohammad Shah Qajar,
13 ^dated Safar of 1264 (1847),v ' recognising him officially 
as the new Amir of Qaenat, stating that he was "recognised as 
frontier-keeping Amir of Qaenat". Members of the family
(1) Aba-Abdollah “Father of Abdollah" is one of the nicknames of Emam Hussein (p.b.u.h.).
<2) Ayati, op. cit., p. 127.
(3) Ayati, op. cit. pp. 127 - 8.
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state that unfortunately this document is displaced and its 
present whereabouts is not known.
However, Amir Alam Khan III subsequently advanced troops to 
Sistan (1865), where some Afghan and Baluchi chiefs had 
defied the rule of the central Government in that province. 
In the event of fighting, Amir Alam Khan's stronghold of 
Nosrat-Abad fort, built by himself, was besieged by his 
adversaries. The siege lasted for about six months during 
which the Amir's son, Ali-Akbar Khan, failed to send 
reinforcements. Eventually he succeeded in breaking the 
siege and defeating the Baluchi forces, with the help of 
reinforcements sent from Mashhad. Amir Alam Khan's victory 
in Sistan resulted in the re-annexation of that province to 
the Khozeimeh Amirdom. Moreover, in a politically motivated 
move, to seal an alliance with the Baluchi chiefs, he married 
the daughter of Sardar Ebrahim Khan Baluch,^) married his 
elder son, Ali-Akbar Khan to the daughter of Sardar Sharif 
Khan Baluch, and his second son, Mohammad Esmail Khan, to the 
daughter of Sardar Ahmad Khan Baluch. This move, later
on at the time of boundary arbitration between Iran and 
Afghanistan, worked in favour of Iran owing to the Baluchi 
chiefs who, under the instigation of Amir Alam Khan, 
testified that their territories belonged to the country of 
Iran. Amir Alam Khan's victory in Sistan included the fort 
Nad-e Ali on the eastern side of the Hirmand river, now 
situated inside Afghanistan territory. A chronicle of the 
time reported this event as follows:
"Thursday 19th Jamadi al~Avval - at this time another 
carrier arrived from Mostofi-al-Mamalek delivering 
reports from Mohammad Esmail Khan Vakil al-Molk, 
governor of Kerman and Mir Alam Khan, Amir of Qaen and 
Sistan. The report from Sistan indicated that 
resultant from the good fortune of the Shahanshah, the 
fort Nad-e Ali, situated on the other side of river 
Hirmand, and a strong fort, was captured after four 
hours of sieqe and battle, from Ebrahim Khan Baluch 
(Pordeli)".(3j
(1) Ayati, op. cit., p. 128.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Hakim at-MoLk, ALi-Naghi, “Rouznameh-e Safar-e Khorasan" (1872) Tehran, 1977, p. 476.
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The Qajar Shah, much delighted by this news, dispatched, as a 
token of his appreciation, an ornamented sword to Amir Alam 
Khan, together with the official title of governorship of 
Sistan and the titles of "Amir Tuman". General Goldsmid 
states:
"...but we hear that a sword of honour is on its way 
to Sistan as a present to the Amir from the Shah."(l)
■T' . 1 - L7 ’ '
Major General Goldsmid and his staff of the 
British frontier arbitration at breakfast with 
Amir Alam Khan of Qaen and Sistan.
(Goldsmid, Major General F ., "Eastern Persia" 
London 1876, Vol. II, Frontspiece".
(1) Goldsmid, Major General F., "Eastern Persia", London 1876, Vol. II, p. 335.
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Amir Alam Khan was subsequently received by Naser ad-Din Shah 
Qajar in Mashhad where he was given the Shah's personal words 
of thanks and encouragement. Later on the Amir received a 
Farman from Naser ad-Din Shah, dated Jamadi al-Awal 1298 
(1880) awarding him the title of "Heshmat al-Molk" and the 
official governorship of Sistan. The actual wording of this 
Farman describes the Amir as "Heshmat al-Molk, Amir Tuman, 
and Amir of Qaenat, to whom the governorship of Sistan is 
entrusted for the maintenance of order in Sistan, because of 
his worthiness" .
The Amir is described, in General Goldsmid's book, as a "tall
fine-looking man, with a countenance principally noticeable
for the immense size of the jaw bones, which project from his
face like fins. He wears a thick moustache, is not unlike
the Shah, and his expression - though somewhat stern and
cruel, with a want of frankness in it - can at times be made
/ o)
very courteous and engaging",v '
Apart from being an able warrior, Amir Alam Khan III was 
keenly interested in construction and development . He built 
the fort of Naser-Abad, later named Nosrat-Abad, the actual 
capital city of Sistan.
"The new fort or town of Nasirabad, simply called shahr', or
town, by the natives of the province, is built in the shape
of a quadrangle, with very strong and high mud walls, having
(3 )towers at regular intervals."v 1
The existing town of Naser-Abad roughly measured about 400 by 
500 yards, and was called Shahre Qadim (old city), while the 
new fort or town, called Shahre Now (new city) was built to 
prolong the size of the old town, facing north, with a 
measurement of about 1000 yards by 600 yards. The new town
(1) This document too has been lost in the wake of the 1979 revolution.
(2> Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 267.
(3) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 266.
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was entirely populated by Qaeni settlers, whereas the old 
town was inhabited by the Sistanis. Nosrat-Abad was renamed 
"Zabol" at the time of Reza Shah, commemorating an ancient 
location of Sistan. Irrigation systems were improved under 
Amir Alam Khan III. New qanats and Ab-Anbars (water 
reservoirs) were built in every settlements.
"He intended to make it (Sistan) the garden of Persia. Men 
had been sent for in Tehran to instruct the inhabitants in 
the cultivation of the potato, orange, date-palm, tobacco, 
and other plants - as he was of opinion that the soil of 
Sistan would produce every fruit or vegetable known to 
man
With these measures of fighting off the separatist elements 
and building and populating Sistan, Amir Alam Khan III was 
extremely successful in maintaining his dominion in Sistan, 
and saving that province from going to the Afghans altogether 
during the boundary arbitration of 1870s. The British 
arbitration team of 1872, impressed by his works in this 
respect, remarked:
"... we learnt how completely successful had been the 
able measures taken by the Amir of Kain to thoroughly 
Persianise the whole of the province on the west bank 
of river (Hirmand); how thoroughly the old Baluch 
chiefs in the vicinity, with the exception of 
Chukhansur and Lash Juwain, were inclined to play into 
his hands, and how contented with the present state of 
affairs, or at least insouciant of change, were the 
general inhabitants." (2)
The news of development of the town of Nosrat-Abad had 
somewhat apprehended politicians of the Indian empire:
"....Jn a report by Colonel Phayre, the Persians are 
described as strengthening a fort named Husseinabad 
(the ancient site of Nasratabad) on the banks of the 
Helmand, near Traku " (2)
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 268.
(2) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 271.
(3) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 267.
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Hussein-Abad, however, was another town, further north, which 
was also built by Amir Alam Khan Ills
"Husseinabad, which is only of eight years' standing, 
owes its existence to the energy of Mir Alam Khan of 
Kain, who built it of neatly-constructed houses, 
surrounded it with a wall flanked at the corners by 
four towers, and induced immigrants from Kain and Sar 
Bisheh to settle in it."(l)
Apart from building and developing, Amir Alam Khan was 
successful in restoring peace and stability and security in 
the Amirdom. The British boundary arbitration commission, 
travelling through the districts of his Amirdom in 1872, 
remarked:
"From the peasants who accompanied the camp, we learnt 
that in olden times this road (from Sistan to Birjand) 
was most unsafe, but since the advent of the Amir of 
Kain highway robberies had ceased,"(2)
Amir Alam Khan III is specially noted for his appreciation of 
politics of the time. He had apparently detested the advent 
of Shir-Ali Khan in Afghanistan and his designs on Sistan. 
Amir Shir-Ali Khan was in close contact with British India 
and, among other things, wanting from them guarantees for his 
younger son as his heir apparent against his older son Yaqub 
Khan. Amir Alam Khan III made it sure that he befriended and 
supported the latter against the will of Shir-Ali Khan and 
the Indian Government.
"The Amir gave some interesting particulars concerning 
Sher Ali's son Ya'kub Khan, who had passed through the 
province the previous year, on his way to Herat. He 
was guest at Nasirabad for two months,living inside 
the fort, while his 2000 followers were encamped 
outside the walls...."(3)
(1) GoLdsmid, op. cit., p. 332.
(2) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 330.
(3) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 269.
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The Amir was generally suspicious of the work of the British 
boundary arbitration mission, and totally convinced that the 
arbitration was only to legalise cessation of significant 
parts of Sistan and Baluchistan to Afghanistan:^1^
"... on this occasion (of meeting) he expressed 
himself very jealous of the proceedings of the Mission, 
and especially suspicious as to Colonel Pollock's 
presence with the Afghan Commissioner which he seemed 
to think intimated a foregone adverse conclusion on the 
part of the British Government. "(2)
The Amir seems to have been so convinced of this matter that
he actually ignored documents signed by the Shah agreeing to
settlement by the arbitration mission. Complaining about
Amir Alam Khan's behaviour, Major General Goldsmid, head of
the British arbitration team, remarks: "... on arrival at
Nasirabad, the headquarters of Persian Sistan, the opposition
was strengthened and, as it were organised by the accession
of the Amir of Kain.... the letter of diplomatic agreement
acknowledged by the Shah and his Ministers was virtually
(3)considered waste paper...."v '
Amir Alam Khan was not alone in suspecting the task of the
boundary arbitration. Mirza Masum Khan, the Iranian
commissioner, was also highly suspicious of the arbitration's
intentions. His unfriendly behaviour towards the arbitration
team gradually worsened to the extent that it was no longer
tolerable for the British commission. Sir Percy Sykes
asserts that Mirza Masum Khan was "anxious to make 
(4)money".' ' Whereas Mirza Masum Khan similarly complains to
the Foreign Ministry of Iran, of the behaviour of the
(5)arbitration team.v 1 Iranian observers on the whole, were
(1) Sykes, Sir Percy, op. cit., p. 368.
(2) Goldsmid, op. cit., pp. 267 -8.
(3) Goldsmid, op. cit.. Vol. I,
(4) Sykes, op. cit.
(5) Mirza Masum Khan's Letter to the Foreign Ministry, Document 93rd. of the “Yeksad Sanad-e
Tarikhi", ed. Ebrahim Safaei, Tehran 1974.
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also suspicious of the work of the British arbitration 
(1 \team.v '
Amir Alam Khan was also noted for his respect for the 
religion and the traditions. He was in constant contact with 
the Olama (clerics)v } and upheld religious traditions. 
General Goldsmid records: "....while we were at Birjand a
great distribution of alms took place in the town on account 
of the close of Muharam, during which time the Amir had at 
his own expense no less than seventy Tazias, or 
representations of the death of (Imam) A l i , & c . , &c., 
continually exhibited in various parts of the province".
Amir Alam Khan's defence of the realm, development of the
towns and villages, improvement of economy, maintenance of
security, and his respect for the religion made him a very
popular Amir commanding the respect and admiration of his
people as well as that of the central Government. It is
particularly interesting that members of the British team of
boundary arbitration, who did not experience a particularly
pleasant time in the dominion of Amir Alam Khan III, have
said of his popularity with the people of Qaenat and Sistan:
"wherever we have been, we have noticed that he seems
generally popular, and the flourishing conditions of the
villages bears testimony to the security the inhabitants feel
(4)under his Government..."v 1
Amir Alam Khan III, a devoted Shi'ah, built a number of 
Tekiyehs (places of mourning martyred Imam Hussein), 
financially supported by endowments from him. He himself has 
written some poems in praise of the Imam such as the
(1) See EsmaiL Raein, “Mirza Malkam Khan", Tehran 1971, section on “Kalat and Kuhak".
(2) Ayati, op, cit., p. 129.
(3) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 335.
(4) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 334.
(+) “Imam Hussein” is correct.
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following verses in which he invites the Imam to look towards 
him as a devoted servant.
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Returning from a pilgrimage to the holy shrine of Imam Reza 
at Mashhad, Amir Alam Khan died in Gonabad in 1891, at the 
age of 64.
f -i- ■: {
Amir Alam Khan III, Heshmat al-Molk, 
towards the end of his career.
7- Amir Ali-Akbar Khan (Hesam ad-Doleh II)
Amir Alam Khan's family consisted of one daughter and four 
sons, all four of whom ruled after his death, whereas his 
mother was no less a good governor than the rest of the
(1) Ayati, op. cit., p. 129.
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family. Whenever the Amir was away from Birjand, his mother, 
not his sons, would rule the Amirdom in his place. General 
Goldsmid indicates:
"While the Amir himself is away in Sistan, it is said 
that his mother rules the province of Kain, and that 
it was principally to her obstinacy that we owed so 
much difficulty in obtaining camels."(1)
When Amir Alam Khan died, his elder son, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan 
was in Sistan where he continued as the Amir of Sistan and 
Tabas. His younger brother, Amir Mohammad Esmail Khan 
succeeded the father in Qaenat, and Amir Ali-Akbar Khan never 
made any overture to his rule at Birjand, albeit he resided 
in Birjand for most of his life, away from both Sistan and 
Tabas, Hence, for the first time the Khozeimeh Amirdom was 
divided into two separate dominions of Qaenat, and Sistan and 
so it remained until early twentieth century when Amir 
Ali-Akbar Khan's son, Amir Masum Khan arrived in Birjand and 
took over the Amirdom of Qaenat from his uncle Amir Shokat 
al-Molk II, for a brief period of about two years.
Amir Ali-Akbar Khan is variably described as "a brave young
man whose decisive action kept the neighbouring Baluchis and
Afghans at bay, thus, safeguarding the region for 
(2}years”:'1 } "A singularly woodheaded youth, wanting manners 
and conversation, and was entirely in the hands of the
Mustofi or manager of affairs, who was remarkably
(3)intelligent".' ' Interviewed by this author, Amir Hussein 
Khan Khozeime Alam, a grandson of Amir Ali-Akbar Khan 
asserted:
"Stupid and wooden-headed? I do not know, but he must 
have been somewhat a simple man putting too much trust 
in his Mostofi, Mirza Mohammad-Ali. When Amir Alam 
Khan (III) was under the siege of the Baluchis and 
Afghans in Sistan, sent for reinforcement from 
Birjand. Amir Ali-Akbar Khan (his son) wanted to send 
troops to help him, but under the influence of his
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 335.
(2) Ayati, op. cit., p. 130.
(3) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 335.
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Mostofi he decided not to do so. However,
reinforcement was sent from Mashhad, and Amir Alam
Khan defeated the enemies. On his return from Sistan, 
he learnt of the reasons of his son's lack of action, 
and he was furious with the son and more so with his 
Mostofi. Amir Ali-Akbar Khan found it necessary to 
leave Qaenat travelling around as a "Darvish" or a man 
of no earthly desires. Mirza Mohammad Ali, the 
Mostofi too, escaped to Torbat-e Heydarieh where he 
lived the rest of his life, and his descendants are
now there, known as the Monsef Family."(1)
Before Amir Mohammad Esmail Khan died, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan
sent his son, later, Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh III, to
Birjand where he was received with kindness by his uncle.
This kindly reception marks the good relationships between
the two brothers, who are reported in some historical
writings, to have been enemies from the beginning. After a
while, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan decided to send his son out of
Birjand to Tabas, to substitute him and to prevent any clash
of interest between him and his brother. The events of
Ali-Akbar Khan’s effective rule in Sistan, administered by
his son, Amir Masum Khan, and his defence of the security of
that province against the Baluchi adventures, and also
sending the son to Birjand, appear in a poem, made by Mirza
Mohammad-Hussein Khajavi, an official of the Amirdom of
(2 )Sistan and an entourage of the Amir's son in Birjand:v 1
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After the death of Amir Mohammad Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk 
I, Amir of Qaenat, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan claimed the unity of 
the family and the Khozeimeh Amirdom, He arrived in Birjand 
for the fulfilment of this purpose. His arrival in Birjand 
coincided with Mohammad-Ali Shah Qajar's rule. The Amir
(1) Mohammad-Ali Monsef, author of "Amir Shokat ol-Molk-e Alam* was the grandson of this
Mostofi.
(2) Ayati, op. cit., p. 131.
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tried to unite the family under his own leadership, but was 
unable to do so; i.e. he sided with Mohammad-Ali Shah 
whereas his much younger brother, Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan, 
later, Amir Shokat al-Molk II, sided with the constitutional 
revolutionaries. The younger brother saw accession to the 
Amirdom of Qaenat as his own right, mainly owing to the fact 
that he was like a son to his other brother (the previous
Amir of Qaenat) Amir Esmail Khan who had fathered no child
and made him his heir. A year later (1909), when
Mohammad-Ali Shah was toppled, Ayatollah Sheikh Fazlollah 
Nouri was executed, and the constitutionalists succeeded in 
establishing the parliament, Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan used 
his influence with the leaders of the constitutional
movements such as Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Tabatabaei and 
Ayatollah Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani, and regained the Amirdom
Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Hesam ad-Doleh II, Heshmat al-Molk II
Amir of Sistan and Tabas
188
of Qaenat from his much older brother. Following this 
development, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan remained in Birjand until he 
died in January 1915.
8- Amir Mohammad Esmail Khan (Shokat al-Molk 1^
Following the death of Amir Alam Khan III in 1891, his elder 
son, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan, inherited his title "Heshmat 
al-Molk" and the governorship of Sistan, as has been 
discussed. A new title "Shokat al-Molk" was created for his 
second son, Amir Mohammad-Esmail Khan, who inherited the 
father's title "Amir Tuman" together with the Amirdom of 
Qaenat. Colonel Yate was of the opinion that:
"The Persian government, by thus splitting the family 
up, were enabled to reduce its power and also to drop 
the title of Amir, and the sons are now simply 
designated the Hukmrans or governors of Kain and 
Sistan respectively. Once the power of the family has 
thus been broken, the probability is that the
hereditary government in time will go too, and in the 
end the governors of Kain will come to be ordinary 
Persian official with no local connection."(*)
This assertion, although it was a prophecy of what was to
become of the Khozeimeh Amirdom about three decades later,
did not apply exactly to the state of affairs at this
juncture. That is to say that the splitting up of the
Khozeimeh Amirdom in the wake of Amir Alam Khan Ill’s demise,
had nothing to do with the policies of the central Government
of Iran. Rather, it was the outcome of a dispute between the
brothers, as to who was the rightful heir to the 
(2 )Amirdom.^ ' In the meantime, Amir Esmail Khan Shokat 
al-Molk I continued the traditional rule of the Khozeimeh 
Amirdom in Qaen effectively. Yate asserted towards the end 
of the 19th century that:
(1) Yate, Lieut. Colonel C.E., "Khorasan and Sistan", London 1900, p. 66.
(2) The dispute between the two brothers was first triggered at the time when their father died
in Gonabad in 1891. Amir Esmail Khan arrived in Gonabad and swiftly moved the body to 
Mashhad without waiting for the older brother, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan, to arrive from Sistan.
189
"His father was said to have left 60,000 tumans 
(£12,000) in cash as well as a large amount of 
jewellery and arms and considerable landed 
property."(1)
Amir Esmail Khan's dominion of Qaen was still a large 
country. It extended as far as Neh-Bandan, near Sistan, to 
the south, and the village of Sar-Chal-e Amiri at the edge of 
the great desert on the Kerman side, to the south-west. The 
capital city of Birjand too, was a large town at this time. 
It had a population of 25,000.
Amir Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I
Still a young Amir, at his residence in the village 
of Abedi near Birjand.
However, in 1903 Amir Esmail Khan, like Amir Ali-Akbar Khan, 
was summoned to the Imperial Court of the Qajar Shah, 
presumably for a final settlement of differences between the
(1) Yate, op. cit., p. 67.
(2) Yate, op. cit., p. 69.
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two brothers. Amir Esmail Khan declined the summons owing to 
the fact that he was too ill to travel. Instead, he sent his 
younger brother, Mohammad Ebrahim Khan to Tehran, where he 
received the official order of governorship of Qaen upon the 
receipt of news of Amir Esmail Khan's death in 1904. 
Visiting Qaenat and meeting both Amir Ali-Akbar Khan and Amir 
Esmail Khan in 1894, Lieut. Colonel Yate writes:
"Shortly after their arrival I received formal visits 
from both the Hashmat-ul-Mulk and the 
Shaukat-ul-Mulk. The former drove over in his
carriage from the village of Hajiabad, six miles out, 
where he lived. He came alone, his eldest son, then 
some fourteen years of age, being away in Sistan, 
acting as deputy-governor for his father. The 
Shaukat-ul-Mulk came accompanied by his younger
brother, Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, his cousin, and the
Sarhang of artillery. I returned the
Shaukat-ul-Mulk's visit at his residence in the
village of Abidin, about 1.5 miles out of the town. 
The chief had here built for himself a reception-room 
some 25 feet in length, with verandahs on either side 
and a fortified enclosure at the back of it for his 
andarun, or family quarters. The village formerly 
occupied by his father, named Akbarabad, a mile to the 
east, was left uninhabited."(^)
Interviewed by this author on Sunday 4th April 1993, Amir 
Parviz Khan Khozeimeh Alam told this author:
"The Kalateh' or village of Abedi was purchased by 
Amir Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I when his father was 
still living. He gradually constructed a number of 
buildings in that Kalateh including:
1- The two-storey central building and its garden.
2- The building of family quarter.
3- The northern building with the description 
provided by Colonel Yate.
4- The Arg' or citadel near family quarter.
"The Kalateh of Akbariyeh' or Akbarabad' was built 
by Amir Alam Khan III and was named Akbariyeh as a 
sign of his devotion to the elder son of Imam Hussein 
(p.b.u.h.) who was martyred in Karbala in the famous 
battle of Ashura against the forces of the Omayyad 
Caliph Yazid."
(1) Yate, op. cit., pp. 66 - 7.
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Amir Mohammad Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I, however, remained 
in Birjand as the Amir of Qaen until he died in 1904. Like 
his father, Amir Esmail Khan was a religiously conscious 
Shi’ah, who had built the Shokatiyeh Husseiniyeh (place of 
mourning Imam Hussein) of Birjand, which was considered to be 
a fine building with adequate provisions from the endowments 
devoted to it by the Amir. This building was later turned 
into Birjand's famous Shokatiyeh school and high-school. He 
had poetic talent and attended religious ceremonies 
regularly. One year he failed to do so and went out hunting 
instead, he was accidentally shot in the arm. He saw the 
incident as well-deserved divine punishment, and made the 
following poem while surgery was being carried out on his 
wounded arm.
L jL; j (j I—* *—«— p-i >• J ^
Amir Mohammad Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I, 
as photographed by Lieut. Colonel Yate in 1894.
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9- Amir Heidar-Qoli Khan
Amir Alam Khan's third son was Amir Heidar-Qoli Khan who was 
given the governorship of the small district of Neh-Bandan by 
his eldest brother, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan. Neh-Bandan was, at 
the time, the realm of influence of Amir Esmail Khan's 
in-laws. He had married the granddaughter of Lotf-Ali Khan, 
governor of that district. When the British frontier 
arbitration commission was in the region. Amir Heidar-Qoli
Khan was about ten years of age, and was described by the
visiting commissioners as:
"At one mile and a-half from the town we were met by 
an istikbal (welcoming party) with two led horses, 
headed by the youngest son of the Amir, a very little
fellow of some eight or nine years old, who had
already made a visit to Tehran: he was an exact
representation on a small scale of his father the 
Amir, riding a very large horse that he could barely 
straddle in a very plucky manner; and whenever he 
could bring the horse within speaking distance, was
most anxious to engage in conversation. )
Unfortunately, not much is known of his Amirdom or of himself
and his family for that matter.
10-Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan (Shokat al-Molk II)
Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan was the youngest of Amir Alam 
Khan's sons with a considerable age gap between himself and 
his elder brothers. When his second eldest brother, Amir 
Esmail Khan was summoned by the Shah to attend the Imperial 
court or to be replaced, he was sent to Tehran instead of the 
ailing Amir. He was in Tehran until his brother died* He 
then obtained the official title of "governorship" of the 
Amirdom together with the title "Shokat al-Molk"t a title 
with which he was better known throughout his career. 
Alongside the Amirdom of Qaenat and the title, Amir Mohammad 
Ebrahim Khan inherited his brother's large fortune and the 
family disputes between the older brothers and their sons.
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 334.
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The massive wealth, at the disposal of the young Amir, 
enabled him to rule with the generosity that he was renowned 
for. This generosity brought the Amir much fame and respect 
both in the district and in Tehran. Hence, it is easy to 
understand why so many poems and other works of literature 
have been made in praising him. While still a young Amir, 
Shokat al-Molk II, was described by Mr Hale, Manager of'the 
Imperial Bank of Persia "Bank-e Shahanshahi" at Birjand, who 
had spent about three years in the region, and published one 
of the most informative books on this Amir and the Khozeimeh 
Amirdom, in the following letter:
"BIRJAND, 23rd March 1914.
The Duke, the Amir, the great man, has arrived from 
the capital, with his men-at-arms and his train of
followers. Which is to say that the Governor has
returned from Teheran. There was a great stir and
clamour at his coming, as you may imagine, for I have 
told you how popular he is, and you know that a
provincial ruler is a powerful man in Persia. The 
town had a field-day for his entry, and did no work 
for three days, most of the chief people having ridden 
out thirty miles to welcome him and escort him in.
X. and I sent him letters of salutation with mounted 
representatives who joined his escort. He must have 
been very tired, I'm afraid, though very happy, for 
was he not returning to the home of his fathers and 
the people his fathers had ruled for generations, and 
had he not been honoured by the Shah and given an 
addition to the territories under his administration? 
So the band played and the horses pranced and his
carriage rolled past the town and across the plain to
his house a couple of miles away. There he had a
great reception, with mullas uttering benedictions and 
poets reciting odes, On the following afternoon I 
called on him and drank tea and exchanged polite
remarks. He is a tall, lean man of about
thirty-three, with fine-cut, mobile, Arab features, a 
prominent nose, and a sallow complexion. His voice is 
soft, his speech clear and rapid. His bearing is
unaffected, and his manners are full of restrained
vivacity and natural courtesy and gentleness. He is 
evidently a man of keen perceptions, with an active
mind and a marked individuality, for which the gods be 
praised, He was accompanied by three young
officials-one of them our stout, ruddy-faced prince of
the blood royal, the other two, just arrived with the
Amir, being a vigorous and honest-looking officer of 
cavalry and a revenue collector. The last has an 
incipient beard, but the others, including the Amir,
are clean shaven but for their moustaches, which a 
Persian never on any account shaves. The revenue 
collector didn't seem at all pleased at the idea of
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living in such a hopeless little hole as Birjand, and 
he even said as much. The Amir, of course, showed no 
sign that he didn't like the remark, which somebody 
else countered by asking the tired one if he had not 
come here to have an occupation, and to be, in a 
sense, a guest.
"My visit was returned a few days afterwards, 
when the Amir told me he was getting his tennis court 
ready and hoped we would meet there once a week and be 
good friends."(1)
Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk'sdominion has been described 
somewhat vaguely, by the same author in the following terms:
"In the eastern part of Persia is a province which is 
called the Qayinat, and the chief town of this
province is Birjand. From Birjand if a man journey
northwards he will reach the frontier of this province 
in three or four days, and if he travel towards the 
rising sun he will come in six days to the country of 
Afghanistan; likewise if he go by the south road he 
will arrive in six days within the bounds of Seistan,
while if he follow the setting sun he will pass by the
edge of the great desert of the south-west - a land 
which owns but little lordship."(2)
Sistan and Tabas, at this time, were under the rule of 
Shokat-al Molk's eldest brother, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Hesam 
ad-Doleh II, who took Qaen as well in 1907, which lasted for 
only about one year. in 1909 , Qaen was returned to Amir 
Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II. His rule in Qaenat was to be 
interrupted once again in 1916, at this time his nephew, Amir 
Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh III, son of Amir Ali-Akbar Khan 
Hesam ad-Doleh II, took Qaen from Shokat al-Molk for a period 
of about two years.
During his relatively long duration of rule, Qaenat benefited 
from the Amir’s patronage of development. Several 
development programmes were implemented, the most significant 
of which were:
(1) Hale, F., “From Persian UpLand1*, London, no date of publication is indicated, but it is 
suggested that the book was published in earLy 1920s, pp. 45 - 6.
(2) Hale, op. cit., p. 25.
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1- Drinking water supplies for Birjand
The city of Birjand had been suffering from lack of drinkable 
water ganats ever since it was founded in the Safavid time. 
The inhabitants had to use the only source of brackish water 
that ran through the town. Following World War I, Amir 
Shokat al-Molk noticed piles of unused pipes, left behind by 
the British forces in the locality of Sefid-Ab. He purchased 
the pipes from the British and with an investment of 5000 
tumans, he constructed the water-pipe network for the supply 
of Birjand's drinking water in mid-1910s, when even Tehran 
was suffering from the lack of such an essential service. 
With this, project - carried out with active participation of 
the people of Birjand and the assistance of Amir Masum Khan 
Hesam ad-Doleh III, the then Amir of Qaenat and Sistan - 
drinking water was piped to the town from hills of Aliabad 
six miles away, near Shokat al-Molk's own residence.
2- Agricultural development
Shokat al-Molk II, distributed among the peasants of the 
Amirdom, large numbers of valuable grafts of fruit trees, 
pistachio trees, and other crops. Not only did he employ 
from Tehran, agricultural experts, he encouraged young 
members of his own family to study in this field in Tehran 
and Europe, bringing back modern methods and techniques in 
agriculture. One such young member of the family was his own 
son, Amir Asadollah Khan, who studied at Tehran University's 
Faculty of agriculture at Karaj. His father had hoped that 
Amir Asadollah would return to Birjand to help improve 
agricultural life of the Amirdom. Instead, Amir Asadollah 
Khan went into politics and spent little time in Qaenat. The 
other member of the family to be educated in the field of 
Agriculture, was his nephew's son, Amir Hussein Khan who 
obtained his degree in agriculture from the British academic 
establishments.
3- Educational developments.
Amir Shokat al-Molk established the first modern school at 
Birjand in 1908. This school, named Shokatiyeh, was 
established in the building of the Shokatiyeh Husseiniyeh, 
built by his elder brother, Amir Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk
196
I. The building, Shokat al-Molk II found more suitable for 
educational purposes. This school gradually grew to be 
expanded to a school and a high school for boys, and a school 
and high-school for girls, and to a number of schools in 
Birjand and other towns and villages of the Amirdom.
The students of the Shokatiyeh schools not only were given 
free education, but those of poorer families, received 
annually two sets of clothing, 84 rials each, and 70 kilos of 
wheat. Teachers were employed from amongst the better 
trained individuals, and the curriculum included such 
subjects as geography, history, Persian, French, and hygiene.
Visited by Mr, Hale, in 1914, the Shokatiyeh primary school 
is described in his book in the following terms:
11BIRJAND, 30th June 1914.
"DEAR M. , - We have all been to school, to the
Madreseh Shoukatieh (the Shoukat's College), to hear 
the boys examined on the last day before their summer 
holidays. You know what the ordinary idea of a school 
is in the backwaters of Persia - a room where a few 
urchins have the three R's hammered into them by a 
fusty old pedagogue full of wise saws and pious cant. 
The late Amir Shokat al Molk, brother of the present 
governor of the same title, bequeathed part of his 
estates for educational purposes, and this trust was 
applied by his successor in founding and maintaining a 
school worthy of his name. The result of six years' 
work is something to be proud of, and the present 
Shoukat al Molk gets all the credit for it. Why? 
Because, instead of forgetting his obligations and 
allowing the bequest to be dissipated as bequests so 
often are in Persia, he has actually applied the trust 
for the good of the rising generation.
"Education was in the air in those revolutionary 
days. Effete old Persia, fired by the examples of 
Japan and Turkey, was thinking repentantly of her 
sons, and borrowing, for their guidance, the light of 
European science. So the old town citadel was put to 
new uses, and the boys of Birjand were invited to come 
there and be taught as their fathers never had been. 
Instructors were brought from Teheran, and pupils of 
all classes were admitted free. Maps were put on the 
walls, and the boys learned for the first time that 
there was a science called geography, and that ancient 
history was something different from mythology The 
little fellows entered a new world of fairy tale, and 
shocked their fathers and mothers with assertions 
about the Law of Gravity and how the sun and the moon 
were made and how ridiculously the earth behaved, all 
of which made the dear old mullas shake their heads.
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The hoys of the first year are now young men, and in 
another year they will complete their studies and go 
out with an elementary knowledge of such things as 
hygiene and the French language.
"For the closing day we received and accepted 
written invitations from the headmaster, and at nine
o'clock we went along to the school, shook hands with
the teachers, sat down and drank tea. The Governor 
arrived in his carriage and drank tea likewise, and
the boys were marshalled into the big hall, at the end 
of which they stood facing us till they were ordered 
to sit. In the front row were children of six or 
seven, with the big boys of eighteen to twenty-five 
behind, all with their legs tucked under them and
their knees on the carpet, which is a more respectful 
but less comfortable posture than cross-legged 
squatting. The boys, even the youngest, were dressed 
in a variety of frock-coats, long trousers, and the 
native white slippers, and they all bore the school 
badge in silver on their black pill-box hats. They 
numbered about a hundred, and represented all grades 
of society, the deputy-governor’s son rubbing 
shoulders with the son of his servant or of some small 
shopkeeper. The boys pay nothing for their education, 
and some of the poorest of them are even clothed and 
fed at the school's expense. " (1)
The Shokatiyeh school for girls was established in 1922. The 
Amir's daughters, Bibi Fatemeh Khanum and Bibi Zohreh 
Khanum , were the first to register in a gesture of 
encouragement for the traditional Birjandi families who were 
initially reluctant in sending their daughters to the 
school. After completing their studies the Amir's daughters 
remained with the school working as teachers and 
headmistresses. Many of the Birjandi students at the 
Shokat.iyeh school of Mr. Hale's description, have become, 
men of skills and professions. Many of those completed their 
studies at Shokatiyeh and went out with "an elementary 
knowledge of such things as hygiene and French language", 
continued their education and later served the country in 
various capacities and professions. The Shokatiyeh students 
later occupied high posts and positions in Iran. Many of 
them became doctors, engineers, agriculturalists, historians,
(1) HaLe, op. cit., pp. 5 1 - 2 - 3 .
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geographers, professors of various Iranian universities.^1^
Eventually in the early 1970s, the Shokatiyeh educational
establishments developed to the extent that the Shokatiyeh
University was founded by Amir Shokat al-Molk's son, Amir 
Asadollah Khan Alam. This university, called "University of 
Shokat al-Molk", has ever since been expanded and it is now 
known as the "University of Birjand". Financially, this 
university has been founded on the basis of being supported 
by large endowments from the family property of "Shokat-Abad 
Endowments", supervised by a board of governors which
included four members who were:
1- Amir Asadollah Alam.
2- Rudabeh Alam.
3- Amir Parviz Khozeimeh Alam.
4- Ali-Naghi Assadi.
Amir Asadollah Alam was in charge and superintendent of the 
Shokat-Abad Endowments and signed an agreement with Professor 
Mohammad Hassan Ganji on 1st Shahrivar 1355 (23 August 1975) 
whereby the latter was appointed as the Chancellor of the 
University and in charge of the income from the endowments
for the annual budget of the university (see Appendix I).
4- Rehabilitation Services
A building was constructed in the Amir's property near 
Abbas-Abad Lushi, in which orphans, poor individuals , and 
famine-stricken families were looked after. These services 
were expanded by the establishment of the municipality of 
Birjand.
(1) When this author was working towards his first degree at the University of Tehran (Late 1960s 
and early 1970s), he knew, at Least, three Birjandi professors, at the Faculty of Literatures 
and Humanities alone, who had completed the early stages of their education at Shokatiyeh. Of 
these three, one was Professor Mohammad Hassan Ganji, founder of the Iranian Meteorology 
organisation, who can, unreservedLy, be described as the father of modern geographical studies 
in Iran, and many of whose students have become geographers of high standard teaching in various 
Iranian universities and universities around the world. The other two, both vice-deans of the 
Faculty at the time, were: Dr. Jamal Rezaei, Professor of Persian Literatures; and Dr Esmail 
Rezvani, Professor of History.
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5- Hygiene Services
A clinic was established in Birjand during the early years of 
Shokat al-Molk's Amirdom. Towards the end of his career, 
Amir Shokat al-Molk II, began the construction of a hospital 
at Birjand, which was completed after his demise.
The First Shokatiyeh School for Boys
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6- In 1925, Amir Shokat al-Molk II, invited the Birjandi 
dignitaries to establish the Red Lion and Sun Society of the 
Amirdom. The society was established that year in a building 
donated by the Amir, and actively participated in the hygiene 
and other services, especially at the time of famine and 
natural disasters.
Like his forefathers before him, Amir Shokat al-Molk II was a 
devote shiah Muslim. An Iranian historian Says of his devotion 
to "Ashura" - the most revered shiah Muslim's mourning 
ceremony- "Amir shokat al-Molk had recognised Ashura that in 
spite of being so close to the Reza shahi set up, he went to 
his place of eternal peace with his dignity intact". (1)
FRONTIER KEEPING AND NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS
Almost immediately after inheriting the Amirdom of Qaenat f
Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II, began
the process of modernising the armed forces of the Amirdom.
For this purpose he had requested assistance from the central
Government to assign trained officers to his forces. Three
officers were nominated by the central Government who were
appointed to train and to command the armed forces of the
(2)Amirdom in the following orders'
1- Brigadier Ali-Akbar Khan, in charge of the artillery.
2- Major Ashraf Nezam, in charge of the infantry.
3-Colonel Ali-Naghi Vaziri/3  ^ in charge of the cavalry and 
Jammazeh.^ ^
( 1 ) Mohammad Ebrahim Bastani-Parizi, " Az Sir Ta Piaz", Tehran 1989 P. 553.
(2) Honsef, op. cit., p. 47.
(3) Colonel Vaziri was better .renowned as a musician and composer. In fact, he can,
unreservedly, be described as the father of the revived'Persian Music,
(4) Jammazeh was a company of the Amirdom's cavalry, mounted on camels.
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With the aid of his mobilised army, the Amir was able to 
establish peace and security throughout the Amirdom, badly 
shattered hitherto by some Baluch and Afghan tribes who 
regularly carried out raids of "chapo" or looting on Qaenat 
and Sistan settlements since the death of Amir Alam Khan 
III. When the army of the Amirdom was being modernised and 
equipped by the aforesaid officers, the Mohammad Zehi, Esmail 
Zehi, and Rigi tribes conducted a series of chapo raids on 
the Sistan and Baluchistan of Iran. Amir Shokat al-Molk 
massed his troops to uproot their insurgencies. While in 
Sistan, his forces were reinforced by groups of the Sistani 
regiment of the Amirdom in addition to the volunteer units 
from Bahluchi tribes of Qaenat.^^
The Khozeimeh forces descended on the district of Malek-Siah
Kuh, junction of the Iran-Pakistan -Afghanistan boundary
lines, in November 1914. The Baluchi chiefs had concentrated
their forces at Dozdab, later named by Reza Shah's Government
as "Zahedan", from where they carried out their raids on
Sistan and Qaenat settlements. Hearing of Amir Shokat
al-Molk's military expedition, the Baluchi chiefs sued for
peaceful settlement. Amir Shokat al-Molk assigned his
cousin, Gholam-Hussein Khan Askari, to lead a delegation from 
(2 )the Amirdomv ' to conduct negotiations. The Amir's 
delegation demanded the immediate return of the stolen 
properties together with promises of a complete halt on the 
chapo activities on the part of the Baluchis, in return for 
the Amir's forgiveness.
When the delegation went to Dozdab to hold the third round of 
negotiations, it found that the Baluchi chiefs had evacuated 
the area heading towards their respective tribes in what is 
now known as Pakistan. Some units of the forces of the 
Amirdom pursued them and were able to defeat them in several
(1) Monsef, op. cit., p. 48.
(2) Monsef, op. cit., p. 48.
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locations, and thus, putting a final end to their raids of 
chapo
Amir Shokat al-Molk's rule coincided with a series of events 
in Iran and within the Qaenat and Sistan regions. On the one 
hand, chaos and upheavals in the country, resultant of the 
First World War and constitutional revolution in Iran, 
encouraged some Baluchi tribes of the nearby regions to 
invade and plunder the towns and villages of the Amirdom. 
Much of the time and energy were spent in suppressing these 
plunders. Mr Hale, an eye-witness, statesi
"The Amir has gone south to put the Baluch tribes in 
order, and he and his army won't be back till the 
spring. We shall miss them very much this 
winter. 11 (2)
On the other hand, rivalries between Shokat al-Molk and his
nephew, Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh were ignited by the
political tensions in the country at large. Hesam ad-Doleh,
Amir of Sistan dominion of the family, was a Moghalled
(religious follower) of Ayatollah Sadr and a friend of
(3 \Ayatollah Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri^ ' who were opposed to the 
constitutionalism of the sort that was taking shape in the 
country. Whereas, Amir Shokat al-Molk was a follower of the 
Fetva (religious decree) of Ayatollah Mulla Mohammad Kazem 
Haravi Khorasani, and a friend of such constitutionalist 
leaders as Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Tabatabaei and Ayatollah 
Seyyed Abdollah Behbahani.^^ These differing political 
affiliations caused chaos in the Amirdom and in the family 
itself, increasing the existing tensions between the two 
branches of the family. Using his influence with the 
anti-constitutionalists in Tehran, Hesam ad-Doleh managed, in 
February 1916 to take the governorship of Qaen from Shokat
(1) Ibid.
(2) HaLe, op. cit., p. 60.
(3) Ayati, op. cit., p. 136.
(4) Ayati, op. cit., p. 136.
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al-Molk. Comparing the uncle and nephew with King Charles 
and Roundhead respectively, Mr. Hale (who was present in 
Birjand at the time), described on 17th March 1916 the change 
in the following manner:
"King Charles has lost his head, and the 
Roundhead sits in his place - by which you are to understand 
that the Amir Shoukat al-Molk has been dismissed and ordered 
to Teheran, and that his nephew and rival, the Amir Hisam ud 
Douleh, is now governor in Birjand, It is a sad business and 
rather a long story.
"As a matter of fact, the Hisam ud Douleh left Teheran about 
this time and arrived in Meshed. In February the Shoukat 
ul-Mulk received a telegram from Teheran instructing him to 
proceed to Meshed 'to discuss with the governor-general 
certain matters of revenue' Shortly afterwards he received 
sanction to go direct to Teheran, and on the 27th of February 
he left Birjand, accompanied by the majority of his 
satellites and followers. A few days before his departure a 
telegram was received by the revenue collector and the agent 
for foreign affairs from the Hisam ud Douleh, directing them 
to assume control pending his arrival. These two officials 
commenced to act without waiting till the Shoukat al Mulk had 
left the town, and amongst other things a retainer of the 
dismissed governor was engaged by them. The angry Amir sent 
for the revenue collector and gave him a severe rating, and 
the servant in question, who was a son of the former chief of 
police, was likewise sent for, and was given a sound whipping 
as a lesson in fealty and good manners. On the day of the 
Amir's departure the soldiers were drawn up in line at a 
point of his route just outside the town, and there a crowd 
assembled. Across the roadway at this point a string was 
stretched, attached to an upheld pole on either side of the 
road. In the middle of the string a copy of the Koran was 
suspended, and the Amir kissed the book as his carriage 
passed under it, many of his followers doing likewise. About 
the same time the Hisam ud Douleh left Meshed for Birjand,
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and the two Amirs, uncle and nephew, who had not seen each 
other for some years, passed on the road within a few miles 
of each other without meeting or exchanging messages. On the 
12th of this month the Amir Hisam ud Douleh arrived in 
Birjand, and was welcomed by a much larger crowd than had 
witnessed the Shoukat ul Mulk's departure. We called on him 
the following day, and he made many protestations of 
friendship, which were repeated when he returned the calls. 
He spoke to me of what he had heard as to the Shoukat ul 
Mulk's friendship. They much indication of kindness with the 
slave had, ' I replied. ' No doubt your Excellency in the 
same way will make command. ' We smiled gravely, and he 
remarked that the Shoukat ul Mulk (who is thirty-four and 
about the same age as himself) was a good lad' - an 
expression which amused me by its studied detachment.
"Well, King Charles, with his Gallic grace and esprit, his 
bel air and princely manners, has left us, and here we are 
exchanging compliments with Cromwell, who is of average 
height, stout and round-headed, and has weak eyes and a soft 
voice and manner, and a facile flow of speech. X. has asked 
for leave, and I am trying to get away too. I haven't much 
hope though, and neither has X., though he hasn't been home 
for seventeen years. As for the officers of our Indian 
troops, they have wanted to leave Persia from the day they 
arrived. But they like the new governor because he is 
amiable and talkative.' The other fellow was a bit lordly,' 
and they didn't altogether trust him. Never quite knew where 
you were with the Shoukat! ' Even they, however, regret King 
Charles and his tennis and bridge parties, and his 'jolly 
little dinners.' As for the people of Birjand, their small 
arms don't count for much when the big guns are booming. We 
rather expected a hostile demonstration, but no such thing 
happened. Only the active partisans of the Shoukat al-Molk 
are apprehensive, and many of their number went away in his 
train. The soldiers received a donative, and are pleased for 
the moment. The whole of the ex-governor's staff is now out 
of office, and the Hisam ud Douleh will have to find a new 
set of officials for the town and district. This wholesale 
change of personnel always takes place when a provincial 
governor is dismissed, and the result is delay and expense
206
and incompetence and intrigue for some time afterwards 
between the new set, who are ignorant of local affairs and 
routine, and the old set, who are out of employment and feel 
it their duty and pleasure to be obstructive^
This change, however, did not last long. Little more than a 
year later (February 1917) Amir Shokat al-Molk managed to use 
his own influence in Tehran, with the constitutionalists and 
regained the official governorship of Qaenat. Witnessing the 
second change of Amirs of Qaenat, Hale explains:
"BIRJAND, 20th February 1917.
"DEAR M. , - The Amir Hisam ud Douleh has been
dismissed from the governorship, and the Amir Shoukat 
ul Mulk has been reappointed and will be here in a 
month or so. The people are rather apathetic about 
it. What they would most like is to see the rivals 
made friends. They are tired of this ding-dong 
business with governors and officials, which 
encourages maladministration and hastens the 
impoverishment of the country. No one has serious 
fault to find with either of the two amirs, both of 
whom are excellent governors when judged by Persian 
standards, though, if the truth be said, neither of 
them has shown much public spirit or interest in the 
progressive development of the d i s t r i c t (2)
Another problem of this period was the rebellion in 1921 of 
Colonel Mohammad-Taghi Khan Pessian in Mashhad against the 
newly appointed Government of Qavam as-Saltaneh in Tehran.
In a telegraphic message to Amir Shokat al-Molk, Prime 
Minister Qavam as-Saltaneh asked him to "consider Lieut. 
Colonel Mohammad-Taghi Khan as an outlaw", to "send troops to 
stop his agitations", and to "put down his rebellion".
The Amir was wiser than declaring war on the Colonel. 
Instead, he opened an arduously long negotiation, through 
telegraphic messages with the Colonel and his supporters. 
This undertaking was about to result in a satisfactory 
conclusion and the Colonel set off for Gonabad to meet and
(1) Hate, op. cit., pp. 105 - 6 - 7.
(2) Hale, op. cit., p. 147 - 8.
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talk personally with the Amir, but, upon receiving news of 
mutiny of his troops in Quchan, he went there and was 
subsequently killed, thus, bringing this whole episode to an
It is noteworthy that these chaotic situations were 
coincidental, not only with Iran's post-constitutional 
revolutionary disorder but also with the World War I 
political chaos in the Middle East which resulted in the 
dividing of Iran into two spheres of British and Russian 
influence, leaving Qaenat and Sistan in the interest zone of 
the British. Writing on the chaotic post-World War I 
situation in Iran, Mr Hale indicates:
"The present state of Persian politics hardly conduces 
to the fostering of national vitality. The tribal 
chiefs and political hotheads who butted in to the 
support of our enemies have mostly dropped out of the 
losing game, and the British and Russian 
representatives, threatened, you remember, with a stab 
in the back at a critical time, have since been in no 
mood to repeat their handsome proposals for a friendly 
understanding which would have been creditable to all 
concerned. While the war continues, the military 
interests of the Allies are paramount in their
thoughts. The native virtues of the Persian placemen 
who gain their approval are necessarily of less
immediate importance than their subservience to our
interests, and the under-current of corruption flows
on with but little check or restraint. "(2)
This condition continued for a short while, until Reza Khan 
Mir-Panj (later Reza Shah Pahlavi) staged his coup d'etat of 
1921, in association with Seyyed Zia ad-Din Tabatabaei. Reza 
Khan immediately began an ambitious task of creating a 
centralized Government and a national army, replacing the 
autonomous regional powers and their armies. As, 
traditionally, loyal subjects of the central Government of 
Iran, the two Khozeimeh Amirs realised that massive changes 
were on the way. They, therefore, signed a treaty of
(1) For details see Bahar, Dr. Mehrdad, “On the Uprising of Khorasan Gendarmerie-, Tehran 1990, 
Section on Documentation.
(2) Hale, op. cit., p. 148.
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friendship between themselves dated 20th Jamadi as-Sani 
1339 (1921) whereby declaring:
"We the undersigned, call upon the almighty to be our 
witness and by placing the holy Qoran as the 
arbitrator between us, that from this date onward, not 
to act in any war against one another; to consider our 
dignity, credits, and our estates as commonly owned by 
the two of us; not to allow any internal or external 
conspiracy to influence us; and abiding by the spirit 
of this treaty, to be benevolent of the Moslems and to 
protect our fellow human beings, and to be obedient to 
our Islamic Government,"(^)
The two Amirs remained faithful to the spirit of this treaty 
as long as they both lived, albeit, they chose slightly 
different surnames when the newly introduced legislations 
made it compulsory for all Iranians to drop their Qajari 
titles and to adopt official surnames. Amir Shokat al-Molk 
assumed the surname "ALAM", clearly upholding memories of
three of his forefathers named "Alam Khan" the last one being 
his own father, Amir Alam Khan III. Whereas Amir Hussein 
Khan son of Hesam ad-Doleh assumed the surname "Khozeime^^ 
Alam" more in keeping with the historical name of the 
family.
Shokat al-Molk's other nephew, Amir Mohammad-Reza Khan Samsam 
ad-Doleh and the rest of the family chose their surname to be 
"Khozeimeh" only.
Following these developments, Amir Shokat al-Molk Alam 
decided to retire from the governorship of the Amirdom. He, 
thus, divided the Amirdom between his two nephews; giving the 
Amirdom of Qaenat to Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh III 
previously Amir of Sistan, and the Amirdom of Sistan to Amir 
Mohammad-Reza Khan Samsam ad-Doleh. He himself chose to 
retire and live the rest of his life in peace, but peace was 
not to come yet.
(1) Ayati, op. cit., p. 137.
(2) Khozeime, without “H“ at the end.
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Following Reza Khan’s assumption of the monarchy of Iran, 
Shokat al-Molk was summoned to Tehran and was appointed as 
Governor General of Fars (province of Persia in Southern 
Iran) . A year later he returned to Tehran and was given the 
portfolio of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, both positions, 
apparently, he accepted without enthusiasm, as his passion, 
then, was to live in peace in his native Birjand. Sir 
Claremont Skrine writes of the Amir's latest years:
"He Had aged since we had last seen him on our drive 
to Europe in 1931, but he was as charming; and 
hospitable as ever, and it was clear that he intended 
to help the Allies, and through them his own beloved 
country, no less effectively in the Second World War 
than he had done during the latter years of the 
First. His first action on his return a week before 
had been to open the granaries throughout his wide 
domains and thus knock the bottom, if only for a few 
weeks, out of the local hoarders' market. Only the 
abdication of his formidable master had made it 
possible for the Shaukat to return to the home of his 
ancestors, but Reza Shah Pahlavi had no more loyal 
subject. In hours of talk with me he let slip not a 
word of criticism or complaint, although it was clear 
that he had desired neither the Governorship of Fars 
nor the portfolio of Posts and Telegraphs nor any of 
the responsibilities that his Sovereign had thrust 
upon him. All he had wished was to get back to his 
beloved Qaenat and administer his ancestral estates in 
peace, a model to aristocratic landowners throughout 
the length and breadth of Persia. Alas, it was not to 
be for long; his heart was worn out by exile and many 
labours and he died, by no means an old man, two years 
later."(1)
Almost all those who visited Qaenat, met and talked to Shokat 
al-Molk II and wrote about him, have described him 
unanimously as a kind, generous, intelligent, and hospitable 
gentleman. As for his philosophy of realism, Hale notes:
"On one occasion when we were a party of eight, a new 
arrival, a young Persian with an earnest mind and a ponderous 
manner, was edifying us with a discourse on the immorality of 
war in general, and the necessity for its abolishment
(1) Skrine, Sir Claremont, “UorLd War in Iran", London 1961, pp. 100 - 1.
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ethically considered, and the sure prospects of perpetual and 
world-wide peace that lay at most a matter of centuries 
ahead. Protests were made, heads were shaken in
disagreement, and a mild argument followed. An Englishman 
evoked natural law and appealed to the past, challenging his 
protagonist to prophesy against the whole teaching of history 
and experience. The peace-lover, who had been educated in 
Europe, persisted in his views and kept the ball rolling till 
our host was referred to. The Amir smiled. What can I
say?' he asked, bending a little forward and fixing his dark
eyes on a dish of grapes. It would be a fine thing
certainly if war was to cease, but I can't dare to expect
it. As So-and-so said just now, when you speak of war you 
mean blood-spilling on a battlefield, which is only one kind 
of war. There are innumerable other kinds, of which trade 
competition is one, and if we consider a state of humanity 
where all rivalry and jealousy and emulation are done away 
with, we must imagine a sort of living creature the like of 
which is not to be seen in the whole world of nature.
Natural perfection as we see it in plants and the lower
animals is only reached by the exercise of force. 
Self-expression is a manifestation of force, and is always
directed against some form of resistance. Here are eight of 
us engaged in a discussion, for instance, and as there are 
two sides to the discussion we have a battle. We may say
that any struggle or endeavour, down to the simplest motion,
is an attempt to overcome some form of resistance, and is
therefore a kind of war, however much it may differ in
degree. The principle of pressure, whether it hurts or 
wounds or slaughters, is the same. So it comes to a question 
of degree, and how far it is necessary to go in a certain 
line. Yes? Well, if you clean away all evil and crime from 
the mind of man you will have no blood-spilling, and the more 
evil you eliminate, the less blood-spilling you will have, I 
suppose. Also, the more harmony and co-operation against 
inorganic force, the less blood-spilling. But can you 
eliminate evil without eliminating the good also? Are they 
not relative ideas? You say that the progress of 
civilisation is improving matters, but if so, then the lesser 
evil of the future will not be judged less, because it will
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contrast with the higher good of the future. So, relatively 
speaking, evil and crime and vice will always exist. But you 
say evil can be controlled without bloodshed. I suppose it 
can, when the good controls it; but until you can eliminate 
the possibility of private murder by an individual man who is 
subject to law and restraint, how can you eliminate the 
possibility of war by one state on another? Let them submit 
to arbitration? Well, when two individuals disagree, they 
have an unlimited choice of arbitrators, and also the law and 
police of their Government, and yet they often come to blows, 
either from excess of passion or from distrust of law and 
arbitration.’ The Amir paused, and the earnest young man took 
another mouthful of rice. Our host continued with slackened 
speech and in a pensive tone. 'In spite of what I have just 
said, I have always had the idea that the greater and more 
civilised a race might be, the more peace it would enjoy. 
But what can we Persians think nowadays? When the mightiest, 
most wealthy and prosperous and intelligent powers of Europe, 
to whom we look for the teachings of science and good 
Government, are engaged in savage warfare on a scale that we 
can hardly form a conception of? Bah, bah! When we consider 
that already the casualties in Europe almost equal the whole 
population of Persia!'...."^1^
After signing the peace treaty with his nephew Hesam 
ad-Doleh, and dividing the Amirdom between him and his 
brother Samsam ad-Doleh, Shokat al-Molk gave in marriage, his 
elder daughter "Bibi Fatemeh Khanum" to Hesam ad-Doleh's son, 
Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam, and his second daughter 
"Bibi Zohreh Khanum" to Samsam ad-Doleh's son, Amir Esmail 
Khan Khozeimeh. Some writers have asserted that by doing so 
the Amir was trying to put the finishing touches to the unity 
of the family. If this was the motivation for these 
marriages, it certainly worked. Interviewed by this author, 
Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam disputed this assertion 
reiterating that his marriage to Bibi Fatemeh Khanum was not 
arranged for political reasons. It was the decision of the
(1) Hale, op. cit., pp. 8 5 - 6 - 7 - 8 .
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two of them only. Reconciliation of the two branches of the 
family, however, came a bit too late as the highly 
centralized Government of Reza Shah left no room for the 
survival of the Khozeimeh Amirdom. While in the Government, 
Shokat al-Molk enjoyed much respect from Reza Shah and other 
political leaders of the time. He prided himself as an able 
statesman and a knowledgeable politician. Noting this aspect 
of the Amir's personality, Alamouti asserts:
"Shokat al-Molk Alam, Minister of Post, Telegraph, and 
Telephone in Mansour's cabinet, who had a special
affection for Reza Shah and believed in him, and was
favoured by the old Shah until his very last days, 
said; one day I asked the Shah for an audience. It 
was July 1941. I expressed my apprehension of the 
propaganda from London and pointed out that although 
the fate of the war is not known, there would not
be any direct benefit or damage to us from the 
Germans, whereas our northern and southern neighbours 
can cause some damage to us. Suspecting the Germans 
(in Iran) is an excuse, perhaps they (the British) are 
thinking of supplies to the Soviet Union via Iran. 
Isn't it better to be certain of their aims, specially 
that the Americans are noticeably leaning towards the 
allies, The Shah asked; what makes you to think so? 
Considering the Shah's suspicions that foreign agents 
(talking to every one) had motivated me to say so, I 
explained; nothing but my affection and faith in your 
Majesty and in the survival of these massive 
development plans which have taken place. After 
walking up and down for a while, he said; I will think 
of what you have said. After the events of the 25th 
of August (1941), one day in the council of ministers, 
the Shah told me; Mr. Alam, your assessment of the
situation was correct, but unfortunately it is too
late."(1)
Of all those who have written about Shokat al-Molk, none has 
said so much in so little words, as did the British diplomat 
Sir Claremont Skrine, who dedicated his book "World War in 
Iran" to the memory of Shokat al-Molk dated winter of 1945:
"Shaukat-ul-Mulk, head of the seigniorial Alam family 
of the Qaenat which dates back to the Middle Ages and 
still owns large estates in the Birjand-Qain 
district. I wrote about him as follows in a private
(1) Alamouti Dr Mostafa, "Iran Dar Asr-e Pahlavi*, Vol. II “Reza Shah Dar Tabeid", London 1988, 
pp. 45 - 6.
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letter from Birjand In October 1927, the first year we 
were there. One need not altogether despair about
Persia so long as there are one or two men in it like
the Shaukat-ul-Mulk, our Acting Governor, whose guests 
we have just been on a partridge shooting expedition.
Until I came here I did not think there existed in all
Persia, from what I had heard, a genuinely patriotic, 
public-spirited and incorruptible Persian landlord of 
high degree. But the Shaukat is all that, and more. 
You can get a glimpse of his love of his country, and 
of the Qaenat in particular, if you get him talking of 
past times. He is also a specimen of that rara avis, 
a devout and deeply religious Shi'a gentleman Who is 
not in the least bigoted. As for his public spirit, 
he is the one Persian I know of who, being in charge 
of big religious trust (vaqf ) properties, devotes the 
income from them (along with much of his own) to such 
objects as education (his school at Birjand contains 
300 boys between 6 and 18, and 80 girls), public works 
(he has installed a piped drinking-water supply for 
Birjand town from hills 6 miles away), agricultural 
improvement (he has distributed free to his tenants 
large numbers of valuable grafts of fruit-trees and of 
the pistachio nut, at great expense to himself), and 
so on. He is hospitable in a big way, especially to 
the poor. With all this, he is full of humour and fun 
and excellent company, quite free from any kind of 
swank either about his ancient lineage or about his 
doings...."(1)
However, Amir Shokat al-Molk II Alam died of heart disease in 
November 1949 and was buried in Mashhad.
Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II, married four
times in the hope of fathering children. His first three
successive marriages failed to produce him any children,
albeit his second marriage was only a matter of safeguarding
the family honour. His second wife was the widow of his
elder brother, Amir Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I, who was not
able to mother any children for her first husband either.
Amir Ebrahim Khan married her only to prevent her marriage to
an outsider which would then have been considered harmful to
(2 \the family honour.v 1 An added reason would have been that 
she was the daughter of Sultan Sardar Ahmad Khan (Shah of
(1) Skrine, op. cit., pp. 100 and 214.
(2) Honsef, op. cit., pp. 56 - 7.
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01722973
215
Herat) and sister of Sardar Agha of Zabol, and her marriage 
to the outsiders would probably break the alliance between 
the two families.
Amir Shokat al-Molk's fourth marriage (to the daughter of 
Amir Parviz Khan, a cousin of the Amir) proved to be 
fruitful. This marriage resulted in the birth of six
children altogether, two of whom died at very young age. The 
other four were:
1- Bibi Fatemeh Khanum, married to Amir Hussein Khan
Khozeime Alam, son of Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh 
III, and a grand nephew of Shokat al-Molk II.
2- Bibi Zohreh Khanum, married to Amir Esmail Khan
Khozeimeh , son of Amir Mohammad Reza Khan Samsam 
ad-Doleh, and a grand-nephew of Shokat al-Molk II. She 
died while still a young woman.
3- AMIR ASADOLLAH KHAN ALAM. Amir Shokat al-Molk's only 
surviving son was first educated at Shokatiyeh School of 
Birjand, then finished the Agricultural College of the 
University of Tehran. He married Malektaj, younger 
daughter of Qavam al-Molk, a powerful personality of 
Shiraz. Amir Asadollah Khan's political career began 
with an appointment as Governor General of Sistan and 
Baluchistan whilst still a young man (1945), and in 
spite of his young age, he was subsequently given 
several cabinet portfolios including: Agriculture; Roads 
and Communications; and twice Interior Ministry.
With the so-called electoral reform in the 1950s, 
Asadollah Alam was instructed by the Shah to form the 
official opposition party to the Government of Dr. 
Manuchehr Eqbal and his Mellioun party. He formed the 
Mardom Party.
As trusted confidant of the Shah, he was assigned in the 
mid-1950s to organise and distribute the "Pahlavi 
lands". This was the basis on which the well-known
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"land reform" in Iran emerged. In 1962 Asadollah Alam 
was asked by Mohammad Reza Shah to form the cabinet. 
Alam's Government lasted little less than two years 
only to be replaced by Hassan-Ali Mansour’s Government 
in 1964. Alam was then appointed as the Chancellor of 
the University at Shiraz, then named "Pahlavi 
University" under the Shah’s personal patronage. The 
ambition was to expand the university to rival Tehran 
University. Under the Shah's personal patronage much 
was done for the University of Shiraz as it is known 
now.
In 19 66 Amir Asadollah Khan Alam was summoned to the 
capital where he was appointed as the "Minister of the 
Imperial Court" with such power and influence as 
exceeding those of the Prime Minister of the country. 
He held this post until August 197 7 when he retired for 
health reasons. It was in this period that he began to 
record the daily occurrence in the Imperial Court and 
his confidential diary of the Imperial Court "The Shah 
and I" recently published in London is now considered as 
the most significant document of the history of Mohammad 
Reza Shah's one man rule' between 19 6 9 and 1978. Amir 
Asadollah Alam died of cancer in Paris in 1978 and left 
behind two daughters.
4- Amir Shokat al-Molk's last child was also a girl,
Belqeis Khanum, married to the powerful family of
Farman-Farma . She too, died while still a young woman.
11- Amir Mohammad-Reza Khan Samsam ad-Doleh
Amir Mohammad-Reza Khan Samsam ad-Doleh, second son of Amir 
Ali Akbar Khan Hesam ad-Doleh II, was given the governorship 
of Sistan in 1921 by his uncle Amir Shokat al-Molk II, who
had decided to divide the Khozeimeh Amirdom between his two
nephews. Sistan, though a separate Amirdom of the Khozeimeh
(1) From 19 JuLy 1962 to 7 March 1964.
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family's traditional realms since the death in 1891 of Amir 
Alam Khan III, was more of an autonomous province of the 
Khozeimeh Amirdom of Qaenat and Sistan. Before Amir 
Mohammad-Reza Khan, Sistan was autonomously governed by his 
younger brother, Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh III, who had 
inherited it from his father, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan. In 1921, 
Shokat al-Molk simply replaced Amir Masum Khan in Sistan by 
Amir Mohammad-Reza Khan, giving the former, an experienced and 
more able Amir, the governorship of Qaenat, the traditional 
heartland of the Amirdom. This exchange of seats of Amirdom 
made no impact on the considerable estates of the two Amirs 
in each other's new dominions.
Amir of Sistan, Amir Mohammad-Reza Khan Samsam ad-Doleh had a 
relatively peaceful duration of governorship, spending most 
of his time and fortune on developing the economic and social 
life of Sistan. He had a keen interest in the industrial
Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk, II 
flanked by his two nephews:
Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh (right) 
Governor of Qaenat and 
Amir Mohammad-Reza Khan Samsam ad-Doleh (left) 
Governor of Sistan (1921).
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aspects of development, using his own family fortune for the 
construction of modern small-size industrial units. By- 
selling most of his lands and other properties in Birjand, he 
was able to venture on such projects as an electric power 
station for the province; a flour-mill at Zabol; an 
ice-making factory; a cinema, and a number of other projects.
The machineries, for these plants, were purchased either in 
India or from Europe, all transported to the Iranian border 
of Sistan and Baluchistan by railways, and from there, by 
buffalos to Zabol and other parts of the province.
Amir Mohammad-Reza Khan Samsam ad-Doleh died in 1942, leaving 
behind six sons and two daughters:
1 -  Mohammad Amir Khan
2- Amir Ali Khan, who married his cousin, daughter of Amir 
Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh and sister of Amir Hussein 
Khan Khozeime Alam.
3- Amir Esmail Khan, who married his father’s cousin, 
daughter of Amir Shokat al-Molk II, Bibi Zohreh who died 
still a young woman. He served as governor (a 
Government post, not the traditional Amirdom) of Birjand 
and Zabol successively and died in 1988.
4- Ali-Akbar Khan.
5- Hussein Khan.
6- Taghi Khan.
7- Marziyeh Khanum
8- Qodsiyeh Khanum.
12- Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh III
Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh III, Heshmat al-Molk III, 
began to experience the task of Amirdom while still very 
young. When Ali-Akbar Khan Hesam ad-Doleh II, (Heshmat 
al-Molk II) was ruling Sistan, he stayed for most of the time 
in his residence at Birjand and sent his third son, Amir 
Masum Khan to Sistan as deputy governor (Nayeb al-Hokumeh). 
His family connection with Sistan's influential Nahruei 
tribe, under the chieftainship of Sardar Said Khan, (see 
Appendix III) Amir Masum Khan's maternal uncle, made it easy
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for him to establish himself as an effective de facto ruler. 
While still a young Amir, he was met, at Sistan, by the 
well-known British diplomat-historian, Sir Percy Sykes, who 
writes of this Amir in the following terms:
"we were met by Mir Masum Khan, the Governor, a boy of 
nineteen, whom, however, I took to be at least 
twenty-five, partly because he wore blue spectacles. "
"We returned the Governor's call the day after our 
arrival, and, upon entering the village, turned sharp 
to the right and passed a rusty cannon, with its 
rammer stuck in its mouth, and about six gunners drawn 
up behind it. We thence rode through a second 
gateway, finally alighting at a low door and skirting 
a pool of water where two swans were swimming about, 
we entered a mean room in which Mir Masum Khan 
received us. He is the son of the Heshmat-ul Mulk, 
himself the eldest son of the late Amir, and had been 
Governor of Sistan for the last six years, under the 
guidance of a vizier.
"He was rather sallow and unwholesome-looking, and, as 
may be supposed, was ignorant and somewhat conceited, 
having been a Governor surrounded by menials all his 
life. However, we got on well enough, especially as I 
had no cases to settle with him, in which event I 
think that there would have been difficulties, as his 
mother, the daughter of Sardar Sherif Khan, must have 
been taken into account."(1)
When reading this passage, one must remember that Amir Masum 
Khan was then a very young man and Sir Percy Sykes, on the 
whole, disliked the Iranians.
Another European visitor who met Amir Masum Khan Hesam 
ad-Doleh in the same period, was Lieutenant Colonel Yate, who 
has provided a very useful manuscript of his journey in 
Sistan. He writes:
"At the head of the party was the young chief Sartip 
Mir Masum Khan, and with him were Sirdars Sa'id Khan, 
Khan Jan Khan, and Purdil Khan, and they all escorted 
us into camp, and then came in and sat down with us to 
tea. Our camp was pitched near the garden, or rather 
enclosure, called the Chahar Bagh, a little distance 
from the town, and as we rode in, our numerous escort
<1) Sykes, Sir Percy, op. cit., pp. 374 and 376.
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galloped around, firing off their guns in every 
direction.
"Sirdar Sa'id Khan, the maternal uncle of the young 
chief, was the son of the late Sirdar Sharif Khan, 
Nahruei, who held a prominent position in Sistan 
politics at the time of the Goldsmid Boundary 
Settlement in 1872. He subsequently submitted to the 
Afghans, and died at Kabul about 1889. The 
Hashmat-ul-Mulk had married his daughter, and she was 
the mother of Mir Masum Khan. Sharif Khan's two sons 
were both summoned to Kabul by the Amir after their 
father's death, and were sent off by him to Turkistan, 
but they escaped on the road. Sa'id Khan made his way 
to Peshawar, and thence to Sistan via Quetta. The 
other brother, Muhammad Ali Khan, came down the 
Helmand to Sistan, and since then had lived mostly 
with the Baluchis in Sarhad.
"Sirdar Ibrahim Khan of Chakansur, also a well-known 
man in former days, the father of Sirdar Khan Jan 
Khan, had died in Sistan just two months before my 
arrival, after having lived in huts as a wanderer in 
the jungle for many years, and, like him, all the 
other old Sirdars of Sistan were dead and gone, and 
there was no one left with any power or following.
"Later on the young chief came to pay me his formal 
visit, accompanied by the Peshkar, and I duly returned 
it. We rode along outside the walls to the gateway of 
the fort, and then through it to the ark or citadel in 
which he lived. The Sartip met us at the door, and 
took us into his reception room - a cold place for 
winter, as I remember I was seated on a raised dais at 
the end just under the badgir or windshaft, which, 
though excellent in summer, was a trifle too draughty 
for the cold weather then prevailing. Almost all the 
better-class houses in Persia have these windshafts to 
catch the air in hot weather. The Sartip told us that 
the fort or citadel had been built by his grandfather, 
the late Amir of Kain, some twenty-five years before, 
and that the garrison consisted of a regiment of Kain 
infantry 800 strong, and 500 iliyats or irregulars. 
These iliyats or nomads, he said, all came from Kain. 
They paid no revenue, but performed service instead, 
and were sent to serve in Sistan. Both these and the 
" ' ‘ n" uartered in the fort or
The son of Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Hesam ad-Doleh II, grandson of 
Amir Alam Khan III and Sardar Sharif Khan Nahruei, and nephew
(1) Yate, Lieut. Colonel C.E., “Khurasan and Sistan" , London 1900, pp. 76 - 7.
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of Amir Shokat al-Molk II and Sardar Said Khan Nahruei was a
somewhat arrogant young Amir who, as Sykes asserted "made
himself disliked by the leading men of the province".^^
Repeated complaints against his conducts in Sistan, to his
father, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan resulted in the latter's
decision, of sending his eldest son, Amir Mohammad-Hussein
(2 )Khan, by an inferior wifev J to replace his half brother. 
Amir Mohammad-Hussein Khan's party arrived in Sistan in 
1898. Amir Masum Khan declined to hand over the fort of 
Nosrat-pleading illness as an excuse. Being supported by his 
uncle and the Sistan regiment, he dragged on. Sykes' account 
of this event is as follows:
"Upon being repeatedly petitioned, the Hishmat-ul-Mulk 
decided to send his eldest son by an inferior wife to replace 
his half-brother, putting him in charge of Abdul Wahab Beg, 
brother of Mohamed Reza Khan's mother.
"The new Governor and party reached Sistan early in January 
1898, and asked to have the fort handed over to them Mir 
Masum Khan, however, had no intention of throwing up the 
sponge, and pleaded illness as an excuse for delay. Thus 
matters dragged on for about three months, there being two 
Governors in Sistan Mir Masum, however, had the advantage of 
possession, and the regiment was also on his side. To end 
the complication, Abdul Wahab collected his party with a view 
to rushing the fort, but after a conflict he was deserted, 
and had to surrender at discretion. Meanwhile, a strong desire 
for his death had grown up, and the pretext was soon 
forthcoming, as he had been implicated in the assassination 
of a certain Dervish Khan, who was murdered on his return 
from Meshad, a short distance from Tabas, and whose family 
lived in Sistan and was clamouring for vengeance. Abdul 
Wahab Beg, however, swore to be a supporter of Mir Masum - 
the half-brother apparently counted for nothing - and it was 
arranged that he was to proceed to Meshed, in order to try
(1) Sykes, op. cit., p. 376,
(2) Ibid.
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and win over the Governor-General to his new views. In spite 
of this, as his fidelity was doubtful, it was finally decided 
to kill him, and one day, in broad daylight, he was shot with 
a revolver. He rushed off from the fort, pursued by his 
assassin to the Deputy-Governor's house, and, upon his 
promising to die speedily, no more shots were fired, but he 
was carefully watched to see that he did not break his wordl 
The murderer then rode quietly off towards Birjand to be 
rewarded by the Amir of Kain - at least so it was stated - 
and every one considered that the atmosphere had been cleared 1
"The Hishmat-ul-Mulk, upon receiving information of what had 
happened, was furious, not only on account of the murder, but 
also at his orders being, slighted, and instructed Purdil 
Khan, the one-armed Sarbandi chief, to drive out the Nahrueis 
and to use force should Mir Masum decline to leave 
Sistan^^ A sharp skirmish or two ensued, just about the 
date of my arrival, and the Nahrueis finally crossed into 
Afghan territory, to await further developments, while Mir 
Masum tried to avoid leaving Sistan.
"I may here perhaps anticipate events so far as to say that
he finally did quit Sistan and visited his father at Tun, who
merely said to him, Masum, by killing Abdul Wahab you have
(2 )knocked my staff from my hand"' •
An additional force that aided Amir Masum Khan's dismissal 
from the Amirdom of Sistan was the British policies in the 
region:
"Hisam ud Douleh, became a Russian protege, and looked 
mainly to Russia for diplomatic support. The Hisam ud 
Douleh was, moreover, in disfavour with the British, 
having been dismissed from Seistan, partly their 
instance, on a charge of tacit encouragement to the 
Baluch tribes who raided southern Kain four years ago.
"Matters stood like that in 1914, when the rival 
interests of Britain and Russia were suddenly united
(1) The order was that he might resist so far as to kill one man but that if he went further, he 
was to be killed himself.
(2) op. cit., pp. 376 - 7.
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for the war, much to the annoyance of those Persians 
who had enjoyed knocking their heads together."(1)
Following these events, Amir Masum Khan stayed away from 
Sistan for a while, but returned there as the governor (Amir 
of Sistan) in the wake of the death of his father, Amir 
Ali-Akbar Khan Heshmat al-Molk II, Hesam ad-Doleh II in 
1914. With this inheritance, Amir Masum Khan inherited his 
father's title "Hesam ad-Doleh". By this time, a much more 
experienced Amir Hesam ad-Doleh III began to contest the 
Amirdom of Qaenat, the traditional heartland of the family 
Amirdom, and thus, entering rivalries with his young
(paternal) uncle Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II.
When Amir Alam Khan III died, the Khozeimeh Amirdom was
divided into two governorships of Sistan under the rule of 
his eldest son, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan, and of Qaenat under the 
rule of his second son, Amir Esmail Khan. This 
unpremeditated arrangement was mainly because Amir Ali-Akbar 
Khan had been governor of Sistan when their father died in 
1891. When Amir Alam Khan III died in Gonabad in that year, 
Amir Ali-Akbar Khan was in Sistan as Deputy Governor and it 
took him quite a long time to arrive in Gonabad. His younger
brother, Amir Esmail Khan, was in Birjand and arrived in
Gonabad much sooner than the elder brother. Amir Esmail Khan 
immediately arranged for his father's corpse to be taken to 
Mashhad where it was buried, without Amir Ali-Akbar Khan 
being given the chance of reaching Gonabad and fulfilling his 
traditional duties as the eldest son. This incident became 
the bone of disputes between the two brothers and continued 
after them by Amir Ebrahim Khan, the youngest brother, and 
heir to Amir Esmail Khan's estate and Amirdom on the one 
hand, and Amir Masum Khan, the third son of and heir to Amir 
Ali-Akbar Khan's Amirdom on the other. The father and son, 
although continued governing Sistan, never gave up claims to 
their "rightful" inheritance of the Amirdom of Qaenat. Amir 
Masum Khan, still bitter about the "unjust" arrangement of
(1) Hale, op. cit., pp. 102 - 3.
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the inheritance of the Amirdom between his uncles and his 
father, decided to restore the Amirdom of Qaenat to its 
rightful heirs, namely his father and himself. He thus, 
began to use his influence in Tehran, with the court of the 
Qajar Shah. Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk*s 
sympathy with the Constitutionalists on the one hand, and his 
reluctance to do what the British wanted him to do regarding 
German travellers in Qaenat which made the British to use 
influence in Tehran against him, on the other, resulted in 
Shokat al-Molk being unseated in 1915 and replaced by Amir 
Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh III. While in Birjand, Hesam 
ad-Doleh applied a much more strict administration, unlike 
his predecessor, living in the town itself.
"The Hisam ud Douleh, unlike his predecessors, lives 
in town. His residence is built on the usual lines of 
house construction here, consisting of a square 
brick-paved compound with rooms on every side and a 
small shallow tank in the middle. On one side is a 
paved verandah, behind which is what is intended for 
the main reception room."(l)
Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh's rule in Qaen lasted little 
more than one year, from late 1915 until February 1917. 
During this term of office, Hesam ad-Doleh experienced much 
difficulties in running the affairs of the Amirdom mainly 
owing to the uncooperative behaviour of the administration of 
the Amirdom which favoured the dismissed Amir and therefore, 
shunned proper service for a smooth business of 
governorship. This state of affairs deprived Amir Hesam 
ad-Doleh, a well organised and rather strict ruler, the 
opportunity of putting his finer qualities on display. 
Nonetheless, he managed to serve the Amirdom as best as it 
was possible for him, in a period as short as it was. 
Perhaps, his endeavours in developing the qanats and 
irrigation systems of Qaenat was his best service to the 
Amirdom at this period.
Amir Hesam ad-Doleh was replaced in February 1917, by his 
uncle and predecessor, Amir Shokat al-Molk, and his Amirdom, 
once again, was restricted to the province of Sistan. This
(1) Hale, op. cit., p. 115.
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state of affairs continued until 1921 when Amir Shokat 
al-Molk decided to abdicate from the Amirdom in favour of his 
nephews Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh and Amir Mohammad-Reza 
Khan Samsam ad-Doleh. Amir Hesam ad-Doleh was given the 
Amirdom of Qaenat, whereas the latter was given the 
governorship of Sistan. During his second term of Amirdom of 
Qaenat, Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh had more opportunity 
to serve the Amirdom. His uncle, Amir Shokat al-Molk, though 
retired from the task of ruling the Amirdom, took an active 
role in developing the Amirdom in cooperation with Amir Hesam 
ad-Doleh. The results are the Shokatiyeh schools and high 
schools; the Birjand clinic; the Birjand drinking water-pipe 
network and so on. Amir Hesam ad-Doleh, known as a strict 
ruler, possessed finer qualities which were not universally 
acknowledged mainly owing to the fact that he was upstaged, 
throughout most of his career, by his uncle and rival Amir 
Shokat al-Molk. Of those who praised Hesam ad-Doleh, one was 
Haj Sheikh Mohammad-Hassan Ayati, author of "Baharestan", 
according to whom, Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh was a
"personality worthy of reverence^1  ^ He asserted:
"While being Amir, he (Hesam ad-Doleh) would scrutinise 
the activities of his agents so closely that they were 
not able to extort even one qaran from the people.
His deputy governors (nayebs) too knew of this and
would employ maximum caution. Consequently, the 
people lived in the Amirdom free of all misconducts on 
the part of the officials."(2)
Ayati goes on reciting a lengthy poem that he had composed in 
praising Amir Hesam ad-Doleh.
Finally in 1937 Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh, tired of 
rivalries and disappointed by the results of a life-time of
struggles and aware of the new political orders in the
country, tendered his resignation from the Amirdom of Qaenat, 
by writing officially to the Prime Minister of Iran, who in 
accepting his resignation wrote back stating:
(1) Ayati, op. cit., p. 138,
(2) Ayati, op. cit., p. 139.
(3) Ayati, op. cit., pp. 140 - 141.
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"Ref. 3374 Date 30.4.1937
Mr. Masum Khozeimeh,
J am in receipt of your letter of 26 April 1937. I 
have been saddened by the news of your eye~ache and 
indigestion problem that you have recently^ been 
inflicted by and consequently requested retirement 
from the service. It is necessary to point out that 
your services in the regions of Sistan and Qaenat have 
always been highly appreciated by the leadership (the 
Shah) of the country who considers you one of the most 
sincere servants of the state, and herewith conveys 
his gratitude. The Ministry of Interior has been 
instructed to arrange for your pension and you will be 
duly informed of the results.
Mahmud Jam Prime Minister."(*)
Amir Hesam ad-Doleh's resignation from the governorship and 
Amirdom of Qaenat put a final end to the Khozeimeh rule in 
that region and thus, putting an end to one of the last 
autonomous frontier-keeping states in Iran.
While Amir of Qaenat, Amir Hesam ad-Doleh maintained his 
state in Sistan until 19 34 when the Government in Tehran 
decided, on the instruction of Reza Shah, to distribute the 
lands of Sistan amongst the peasants in attempt to improve 
the miserable conditions of the population of that province. 
Mr. Mohammad Naragi, an official of the Ministry of Treasury 
arrived in Sistan for the purpose and found that Amir Masum 
Khan Hesam ad-Doleh had, in anticipation, written to the 
Government offering his entire estate of eleven villages to 
be distributed among the peasants.
After resigning from the Amirdom, Hesam ad-Doleh III spent a 
few years in seclusion at Birjand, then decided to travel 
abroad. He spent the rest of his life mostly in Beirut and 
in European countries until he died in 1951.
From his two marriages, Hesam ad-Doleh had five children:
1- Amir Aqdas Khanum.
2- Heshmat Khanum.
3- Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam.
4- Talat Khanum»
5- Amir Alam Khan.
(1) Ayati, op. cit. p. 140.
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Amir Hesam ad-Doleh's elder son, AMIR HUSSAIN KHAN KHOZEIME 
ALAM, continued the traditional leadership of the family in 
the region albeit unofficially. His career, in this respect, 
began with his appointment in the 1940s, by the Government of 
Reza Shah, as the Governor General of Sistan and Baluchistan, 
in which capacity he served for five years.
Governor-General of Sistan an Baluchistan 
Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam
Though he was quite young for such an appointment at the
time, two major factors made him the most suitable candidate 
for the job in the circumstances:
1- The province of Baluchistan and Sistan was still
neighbouring British India, and no one else in that part of 
the country had his family’s record of traditional loyalty to 
the central Government of Iran, on the one hand, and his
family's influence among the people of the region, on the
other. These qualities, almost an inborn trait of the career 
of the latter Khozeimehs, made Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime, 
the unique choice for the appointment.^1^
(1) Amir Hussein Khan's family influence in Sistan stemmed from his father and his grandfather's 
Amirdom of Sistan, and in Baluchistan it stemmed from his maternal uncle and grandfather's 
chieftan of the Baluchi tribes of that province.
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Quoted by Dr. Mostafa Alamouti, Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime 
indicated:
"J remember, when I was a young man, just returned to 
Iran after completing my studies in England, the 
Ministry of Interior employed me for a salary of 400 
tumans per month, which was a considerable amount 
those days. It was learnt that General Rafat,
commander of Baluchistan division told Reza Shah that 
governors such as Brigadier Tajbakhsh and Colonel 
Mokri were not suitable for Baluchistan. A well 
informed and educated person is needed for the
province as Governor General. Reza Shah asked 
Ali-Asghar Hekmat, Minister of Interior, for a list of 
suitable names. He presented the Shah a list 
containing names of a number of people. Since Reza 
Shah was a shrewd man, turned those names down and 
said; go and bring me names of young educated men. 
When he did so, Reza Shah singled out Amir Hussein 
Khan's name and said this young man is suitable. He 
is educated with good knowledge of the province, and 
enjoys family influence there. He then sent me to
Baluchistan as Governor General. Many works were 
done. When the incident of Shahrivar 1320 (September 
1941) occurred(l)* I used my good offices with the 
English and secured food and other goods for
Baluchistan. But at the time of election, I noticed
that the English were interfering. I stood before 
them and said; we have friendly relations with your 
country, therefore we will accept your negative notes
on the individuals, but will not accept your
interference in the election. They accepted it and
Farrokh won the election in Zabol."(2)
On the subject of securing cooperations from the British for
the supplies of food and other goods for Baluchistan during
the occupation of Iran by the allies in September 1941, which
made famine an imminent eventuality. Sir Claremont Skrine,
(3)the British Consul General says:v J
"The following morning I paid my respects to the 
Governor. We greeted each other warmly; he was the 
son of an old friend of mine from Sistan Consulate 
days and I remembered him as a young graduate of an 
English agricultural college His English was better
(1) Iran was occupied by the Soviet and British forces in September 1941 which brought chaos and
famine to the country.
(2) Alamouti, Mostafa, "Iran-e Asr-e Pahlavi, Vol. Ill, London 1989, pp. 396 - 7.
(3) Skrine, Sir Claremont, op. cit., p. 95.
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than my rusty Persian, and we soon got down to 
business in the former language over our tea glasses. 
I said I had heard he had been to Zabol with the local 
representative of the Ministry of Food and Economics 
to get wheat. Had he had any luck?
"Very little, " he said. "The Government ambars 
(warehouses) there are nearly empty. There's a good 
deal of grain hidden away in the villages, but even if 
the Maliya (Finance Ministry) people could get hold of 
it they couldn't bring it here because the road is cut 
by floods from the Helmand, as you know it usually is 
at this time of year. I managed to bring three 
truckloads back with me by a circuitous route, but 
most of it will have to be allotted to the troops. We 
don't want to have a mutiny."
"I did some quick thinking before I spoke again. At 
that early stage I knew little of the grain-collection 
and bread-rationing system evolved under the late Shah 
- I was to learn something of its ramifications later 
at Meshed but I knew that, whatever it was, it 
encouraged hoarding; and the black market at the 
expense of the rations sold at the bread-shops to the 
impoverished bulk of the population. I strongly 
suspected that this was what was happening at Zahedan 
and Zabol. If I could bring, an appreciable amount of 
food-grain from Nok Kundi quickly, with promise of 
more to come, it might knock the bottom out of the 
local black market, at any rate for the time being.
"The Indians are clamouring for their bread-rations," 
I said. "A big deputation of them came to me this 
morning. Obviously you can't allot them wheat you 
haven't got. If I can get an export permit from India 
for a consignment of wheat or flour, will you arrange 
with the revenue Superintendent to buy it from the Nok 
Kundi merchants and use it for rationing the Indians?"
"The Governor hesitated. "I'll see what I can do," He 
said. "Anyway you can go ahead. I'll see that the 
grain is allowed in."
On the question of preventing the British from interference
(1)in the election, Alamouti remarks:v *
"Farrokh says in his book of memories; when I was 
nominated as a candidate for the Majlis from Zabol 
(capital city of Sistan) and arrived there, some one 
with the name of Shimi(^) had also nominated
(1) Alamouti, op. cit., pp. 395 - 6.
(2) This candidate was aLLegedLy supported by the British Consul General in the region.
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himself. Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam, then 24 
years of age, stood firmly before the English Consul 
and said that they had no right to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Iran, and if they continued doing 
so, he would take the matter up to the higher 
authorities. This action resulted in the English 
Consul to refrain from interfering in the election".
2- Amir Hussein Khan, though a young man, was highly educated 
with qualifications in agriculture from the Royal 
Agricultural College of the United Kingdom. A point that 
would not be missed by Reza Shah whose drive for reforms in 
Iran needed young and educated energies. While in 
Baluchistan, Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime told this author, 
that he prepared a five-year development plan for the 
province, financed by the central Government. The first 
payment was made, the plan was put in implementation, but it 
was soon brought to a halt by the events of the World War II 
and the occupation of Iran by the British and Soviet forces.
In the post-war era, after serving as deputy Minster of 
Agriculture for some years, Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam 
chose to serve the people of Qaenat and Sistan in the 
capacity of representing them in the Iranian parliament, 
first as a Majlis deputy for several durations, and then as 
Senator for Khorasan and later for Baluchistan and the 
adjacent districts, appointed by the Shah.^1  ^ In the last 
monarchic parliament, Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime served as an 
elected senator from that province. Alamouti describes this 
changed status in Amir Hussein Khan's parliamentary career in 
the following words:
"Tn the general elections of the period of the 
Rastakhiz (party) (1975) (2) Amir Hussein Khan
(1) The constitution of the PahLavi regime, allowed sixty members for the upper house, thirty 
from the capital and thirty from the provinces. Of each category fifteen were elected by the 
people, and the other fifteen appointed by the Sovereign as his constitutional right.
(2) The parliamentary period 1975-79, in which the Rastakhiz Party, initiated by the Shah, as
the party of Iran's new single-party system, is generally referred to as the Rastakhizi 
period.
231
Khozeime Alam was named as a candidate for election to 
the Senate, from Kerman, Baluchistan, and the Persian 
Gulf coasts and ports, after serving for some
durations as an appointed Senator. Some assumed that 
he had lost the favour (of the Shah), When the matter 
was brought up with His Majesty, he replied that 
according to the studies carried out, he enjoys an
outstandingly popular position in the region and will 
be able to pull massive votes. Hence, it has been 
said that it would be better for him to be nominated 
for election'. Incidentally this was proved to be the 
case, and in spite of strong rivals being nominated as
well(1), he won the election with considerable
majority. His vacant seat amongst the appointed 
Senators, was given to someone else,"(2)
Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam is married to Bibi Fatemeh 
Khanum, daughter of Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk 
II, with four children:
1- Tahereh Khanum, married to Peter Temple-Moris.
2- Amir Parviz Khan, married to Naz Diba,
3- Dariush Khan, married to Nilufar Diba.
4- Ziba Khanum, married to Keyvan Khosravani.
(1) During the Rastakhiz period, three candidates were introduced by the party for each 
constituency, from among whom the electors had the choice of electing one.
(2) Alamouti, op. cit., p. 395.
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Appendix I
Original text of agreement between 
Amir Asadollah Alam and Professor Mohammad Hassan Ganj 
regarding the University at Birjand.
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Appendix II
Construction Works of the Khozeimeh Amirs, 
Still to be seen in Qaenat and Birjand and in Sistan
********
1. Amir Alam Khan I and his brother Amir Masum Khan.
A- The fort of Birjand.
B- The religious school "Musumiyeh" of Birjand
endowed to Mashhad endowments.
2. Amir Ali Khan.
A- Fortification of Khoond-e Mud with;
B- qanat of mud; and
C- start of the Omar-shah dam for the supply of
drinking water for the city of Birjand and supply 
of agricultural water.
3. Amir Alam Khan II
A- Completion of Omar-Shah dam.
B- The Arg-e Bozorg "Great Arch or Citadel" of
Birjand. This building is locally known as "Arg-e 
Khesht-e Kham".
C- Water tanks of south of Fort of Birjand.
4. Amir Asadollah Khan "Hesam ad-Doleh I".
A- The Arg-e Kuchak "Small Citadel", locally known as
the "Arg-e Khesht-e Pokhteh".
B- The Bagh-e Amir gardens and buildings in Tabas.
C- Arg-e Kalateh-e Khan some 6 k.m. south of Birjand.
D- Qanat of Amirabad "Kalateh Khan"
E- Supply of drinking water to Amirabad "Kalateh Khan"
5. Amir Alam Khan III "Heshmat al-Molk I, Amir Tuman".
A- Construction of Nasratabad, now Zabol, the capital
city of Sistan.
B- Construction of Fort Husseinabad in Sistan, later
developed into a town.
C- Construction of Band-e Dareh "Dareh Dam" for
supply of drinking water to Akbariyeh, Rahimabad 
(Kalateh Abedi), Bidokht and for irrigation.
D- Construction of Akbariyeh buildings and gardens.
E- Construction of qanat Bid-e Meshk south of Kuh-e
Baqeran,
F- Construction of qanat Bidokht also south of Kuh-e
Baqeran.
G- Construction of qanat Give also south of Kuh-e
Baqeran.
H- Construction of Husseiniyeh and Religious School
in Sistan.
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6. Amir Ali-Akbar Khan "Heshmat al-Molk II and Hesam
ad-Doleh II"
A- Qanat of Avaz of Tabas-e Masina (Sunnikhaneh).
B- Qanat of Shamsabad of Tabas-e Masina.
C- Qanat of Ahangaran of Zirkuh.
D- Qanat of Mohammadabad of Zirkuh.
E- Expansion of Kalateh Akbariyeh.
7. Amir Mohammad Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I.
A- Qanat and buildings of Shokatabad (east of
Birjand).
B- Buildings of Rahimabad (Kalateh Abedi), including
the citadel; Family quarters; the northern 
buildings of the Kalateh.
C- The Shokatiyeh School at Birjand.
8. Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II (Alam)
A- Qanat of Losoeiyeh of east of Birjand.
B- Drinking water pipeline network for Birjand to
which local people contributed financially. This 
water was piped from Ali-abad, some 9 k.m. outside 
Birjand.
C- Alam Hospital of Birjand. This project was
completed by Amir Asadollah Khan Alam in the event 
of his father's demise.
D- Shokatiyeh School and High-School. The project
continued by his son, Amir Asadollah Khan Alam and 
developed in the establishment of the University 
of Shokat al-Molk Alam in Birjand, now known as 
the University of Birjand.
E- Birjand School and High-School for girls.
F- Completion of the buildings of Shokatiyeh and
Akbariyeh Kalatehs.
G- Constructions for the mineral waters (Ab-e Torsh)
of Goj-e Morgh.
H- Road Construction from this mineral water sites to
Birjand.
9. Amir Mohammad-Reza Khan Samsam ad-Doleh.
A- Power plants for Zabol, and Birjand.
B- Ice making factory of Zabol
C- Flour mill of Zabol
D- Cinemas for Birjand and Zabol.
E- Revitalisation of qanats at Zirkuh, Yazdan and
Farzaneh.
10. Amir Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk III, Hesam ad-Doleh III.
A- Qanat, buildings and gardens of Masumiyeh of West
of Birjand.
B- Buildings of Shamsabad and Avaz of Tabas Masina
(Sunnikhaneh).
C- The Chaharbagh of Zabol.
D- Masumabad Qanat of Zirkuh.
E- Kabudeh Qanat of Zirkuh.
F- Falaki Qanat of Zirkuh.
G- Amirabad qanat and gardens of Zirkuh (south of
Masumabad to the north).
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11. Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam.
A- Khozeimeh-Alam Hospital and Maternity Hospitals of
Birjand.
B- Khadijeh Alam Orphanage of Birjand, originally
donated by Bibi Khadijeh Alam.
C- Khozeimeh Alam High-School for boys at Birjand.
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Appendix 111 Page 1
Genealogical Tree of 
early generations of the Khozeimeh family
if $$$$
Khazem ben Salmi
Contemporaryof Ommayyad Caliph Marvan 1 
arrived in Khorasan in 680 AD 
as Governor 
Abdollah ben Khazem 
Marvrudi
Mohmmad Khozeimeh
sent to Herat as Governor in 686 AD made Governor o f Khorasan in 686 AD
Khazem ben Khozeimeh
General of Abbasid Caliph Mansur sent to the Persian Gulf from 
where he returned to Khorasan as Governor in 749 AD
Khozeimeh ben Khazem
Amir of Qohestan who assisted Taher Zol Yaminein in 813 AD
Not Known
i
Amir Naser ad-Din 
Mohtasham of Qohestan, contemporary of Holaku Khan 
Moghot (1250s), Philosopher khoajeh Nasir Tusi wrote his 
famous book (Akhlaq-e Naseri) in the name of this Amir
Amir M ansur
Mohtasham of Qohestan, 
the Nakhaei family branched out of the dynasty alter this Amir
Not Known 
I
Amir Sultan Khan,
Contemporary of Shah Esmail Safavid (1510s)
Not Known
Amir Mohammad Khan 
Amir Ebrahim Khan (1699)
Amir Esamil* Khan (1724)
regarded as the founder of the modern generation of Khozeimehs
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KHOZEIMEH FAMILY TREE 
Modem Line of Khozeimeh
Page H
1- Amir Esmail K han Khozeimeh,
(About 1731 AD)
2- Amir Alam Khan I, Vakil ad-Doleh
(d. 1753)
I
3 - Amir Ali Khan (d. 1796)
Amir Mausm Khan
(Amir Alam Khan's- 
Commander of Army)
4 - Amir Aim Khan H (d.1822)
A
5 - Amir Asadollah Khan.
Hesam ad-doleh I (d, 1862)
Haji Bi£>i, married to 
Reza Qoli Khan Tabasi
B
Amir Parviz Khan Haji Abd al-Aii Khan 
Mir Panj, Commander 
of Amir Alam Khan Ill's 
Army, Dughter married 
Shkat al-Molk II
A_______________________ B__________
Amir Aim Khan HI
Amir Tuman, Heshmat 
al-Molk I (d. 1891)
Navab al-Hajieh, first married 
to Mir Hassan KhanTabasi, 
then to Yamin Nezam 
( G h a f f a r i )
D
ikaji Bibi 
Married to 
Haj. Abd al-Ali
Amir Ali Akbar Khan
Heshmat al-molk II, 
Hesam ad-Dileh II, 
Married daughter of 
Sardar Sharif Khan 
Nahruei Baiudhi Chief 
(d. 1915)
See Page III 
an d  IV
8- Amir Esmail Khan
Shokat al-molk I, 
Married daughter 
of Sultan Ahmad 
Khan Baluch, Shah 
of Herat
9-Amir Heidar
Qoli Khan, 
Amir of 
Nehbandan
10 - Amir MohanJmad Ebrahim Khan Alam,
Shokat al- Molk II, (d. 1944 ), Married four 
wives, including daughter of Amir Parviz Khan 
Mir Panji mother of the Amir's Children; and 
daughter of Sultan Ahmad Khan Baluch, Shah
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Bibi Fatemeh 
Married Amir Hussein 
Khan Khozeime Alam, 
son of Amir Masum Khan 
Hesam ad-Doleh III
See Page IV 
for children
of Herat, who had previously been wife of his older 
brother Amir Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I
B_______________
Bibi Zohreh 
Married Amir 
Esmail Khan, son 
of Amir Mohammad- 
Reza Khan Samsam
see page III 
for children
Amir Asadollah Khan 
Alam (d. 1978), 
Married to Malek-Taj 
Qavam Shirazi
Rudabeh
Nilufar Peymaneh
Naz
Amir
 P
Bibi:Belqeis 
Married to 
Bahram 
Farman-Farma
Abbas
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Khozeimeh Family Tree Page III
7- Amir Ali-Akbar Khan, 
Heshmat al-molk II, 
Hesam ad-Doleh II,
(d. 1915)
B D
Mohammad Amir Mohammad Hussein 
Khan Khan
1 I
11-Amir Mohammad-Reza 12-Amir Masum 
Khan, Samsam ad-Doleh Khan,
Married Daughter of Hesam ad -D o leh
Sardar Pordel Khan 
Sarabandi
See
Mohammad 
Amir Khan
D
Page IV
Amir Ali Khan, 
Married Amir- 
Agdas Khanum, 
Daughter of Amir 
Masum Khan 
Hesam ad-Doleh
Khanum Khanum Khan
i
Amir Esmail Khan, Ali-Akbar Khan Marzieh Qcidsiyeh Hussein 
Married Bibi 
Zohreh 
daughter of Amir 
Shokat Al-molk II
Taqi Khan
Leila Sara
Maryam Minu Mahvash Manuchehr
Isa Khalil Sudabeh
Masud
N.mi Lili Yasamin Roia
u<a
+j
njHh
-4- mother
Amir-Dokht Mehr-Jahan
Mahin Shahin Amin
Jamshid
Yasaman
1
Hushang
Faezeh Kambiz Ali
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Khozeimeh Family Tree Page IV
7- Amir Ali-Akbar Khan, 
Heshmat al-molk II, 
Hesam ad-Doleh II,
B D
Mohammad Amir 
Khan
Mohammad Hussein 
Khan
B
11-Amir Mohammad-Reza 
Khan,
Samsam 
ad-Boleh
See Page III
C
 1
12-Amir Masum 
Khan,
Heshmat 
al-Molk II I, 
Hesam aa-Doleh 
I I I  (d.1951)
D E
Amir-Aqdas Khanum Heshmat Khanum 
Married Amir Ali Khan, 
son of Amir Mohammad- 
Reza Khan Samsam 
ad-Doleh
see page III 
for children
Amir Hussein Khan 
Khozeime Alam, 
Married Bibi 
Fatemeh Daughter of 
Shokat al-Molk II
Talat Khanum Married 
Hussein Assadi
A_
t
Farideh Far.ah Vali
Alexi Henry-Hussein
Amir Alam Khan, from Amir masum 
Khan's marriege to the grand­
daughter of Mirza RaFi Khan, Chief 
of Sunu-Khaneh (Tabas-Masina)
Reza
f
Hessam
D
“ 1
Tahereh 
Married 
Peter Temple-Moris
Amir Parviz 
Married 
Naz Diba
Dariush 
Married 
Nilufar Diba
Ziba 
Married 
Keyvan Khosravani
I
Keyvan Kambiz Amir
Eskandar
Negar Cyrus Ramin Nader Maryam
Marjan Mojdeh
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Appendix IV
A Brief Historical Account of the Chieftainship of Nahruei 
Baluch Sardars in Sistan Related to the Khozeimeh Amirs of
Qaenat and Sistan
■kick-k-k-kifc^krk
1- Sardar Alam Khan was the first Nahruei Tribe's sardar in 
Sistan. He was the first cousin of Shah Mehrab Khan of 
Bampur. He settled in Sistan under the auspices of 
Malek Bahram Keyani, on the borders of God-e Zereh, 
south of Sistan proper, where he built the famous Borj-e 
Alam Khan. Sardar Alam Khan had four sons, the eldest 
of whom was;
2- Sardar Dust Mohammad Khan, a powerful Baluch chief in 
Sistan:
"Leech writing probably in about 1838-9, mentions 
that he married the sister of Riza Khan, and gave 
his own sister to Ali Khan Baluch, adding he is 
under Kamran."(l)
Sardar Dust Mohammad Khan died in 1857 and is buried close to
Qaleh-e Nao which is also known as Qaleh-e Dust Mohammad Khan
near Borj-e Alam Khan, the seat of Nahruei Chieftainship.
3- Sardar Dust Mohammad Khan was succeeded by his eldest 
son, Sardar Darvish Khan who passed over, in the
succession to his father's chiefdom, in favour of his
uncle, Sardar Sharif Khan, the second son of Sardar Alam
Khan.
4- Sardar Sharif Khan Nahruei, became the principal Baluchi 
chief of Sistan in the 1870s. His devotion to Iranian 
interests during the Sistan Boundary Arbitration of 
General Goldsmid (1872) became a determining factor in 
consolidating Amir Alam Khan Khozeimeh's position in 
Sistan, consequently securing Sistan proper in Iranian 
possession. Writing on this subject, General Sir
Frederick Goldsmid asserts:
"Sharif Khan. The principal Baluch Chief in 
Sistan, whose devotion to Persian interests, 
whether assumed or real, has no doubt greatly 
tended to consolidate the power of the Amir of 
Kain."(2)
(1) Goldsmid, GeneraL Sir Frederick, “Eastern Persia", published in London 1876, VoL. I, p. 425,
<2) Ibid.
24 2
To create an alliance in Sistan, Amir Alam Khan III, the 
Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat and Sistan married his eldest 
son, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Khozeimeh (Heshmat al-Molk II) 
to the daughter of Sardar Sharif Khan. This alliance of 
the two influential families undoubtedly consolidated 
the interests of Iran in Sistan.
Following Iran's rejection of Goldsmid's Sistan boundary 
arbitration award of 1872, a coalition of Baluchi chiefs 
of Sistan who were enticed by Sardar Ebrahim Khan 
Sanjarani of Chukhansur to rise against Iranian Governor 
of the province, forced Amir Alam Khan III to take 
refuge, on 21st December 1872, in his newly built Fort 
Naseriyeh at Nasir Abad. Sardar Sharif Khan Nahruei 
joined the coalition simply because every other Baluchi 
chiefs had done so, albeit he was related to Amir Alam 
Khan by marriage. This event has been misinterpreted by 
some British historians as proof of Sardar Sharif Khan's 
submission to the Afghansfl) Sardar Sharif Khan died 
in 1889 and his two sons, Sardar Saeid Khan and Sardar 
Mohammad Ali Khan were invited by Amir Shir Ali Khan of 
Afghanistan who, instead of greeting them as his guests, 
send them into exile in Turkistan. The two brothers 
escaped on the road to Turkistan. Sardar Saeid Khan 
made his way to Pishavar, and thence to Sistan via 
Quatta. The other brother came down the Hirmand River 
to Sistan, and since then had lived mostly with the 
Baluchis in S a r h a d . ( 2 )
While Sardar Sharif Khan was in charge of the Nahruei 
Chieftainship in most parts of Sistan, his two younger 
brothers, Shir-Del Khan and Azim Khan were in charge of 
parts of Nahruei possessions in Sistan; Shir-Del Khan 
was in charge of Kimak and Borj-e Alam “Khan with 
acknowledged local influence and undivided loyalty to 
Iran's sovereignty in S i s t a n . (3) His son, Heidar Ali 
Khan was educated in Tehran and succeeded him in Borj-e 
Alam Khan; Azim Khan, the youngest brother of Sardar 
Sharif Khan, was in control of Deh-e Sharif Khan, also 
with local influence and loyalty to the Iranian 
sovereignty in Sistan.
5- Sardar Saeid Khan, eldest son of Sardar Sharif Khan who 
returned to Sistan after being exiled unlawfully to 
Turkistan by the Afghans, used his tribal influence in 
favour of Iran's interests in Sistan. His nephew, Amir 
Masum Khan Khozeimeh was Deputy Governor of Sistan at 
the time, whose family connection with the influential
(1) See for exampLe: Yate, Lieut. Colonel C.E. "Khorasan and Sistan", London 1900, pp. 76-7.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Goldsmid, op. cit.
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Nahruei Tribe under Sardar Saeid Khan, Amir Masum Khan's 
maternal uncle, made it easy for the young Amir to 
establish himself as an effective de facto ruler in 
Sistan, albeit the two fell out later.
Nahruei Sardars of Sistan
1- Sardar Alam Khan
2-Sardar 
Dust Mohammad 
Khan (d.1857)
3- Sardar Darvish 
Khan
Sardar 
Sharif Khan 
(d.1889)
5-Sardar
Saeid
Khan
Shir-Del Khan Azim
Khan
Daughter
Heidar Ali Khan
Sardar
Mohammad Ali 
Khan
C H A P T E R  I I I
THE KHOZEIMEH AMIRDOM 
SECTION II: FOREIGN RELATIONS
INTRODUCTION
A significant aspect of the role of Khozeimeh Amirdom in 
Qaenat and Sistan was its foreign relations. The latter 
Amirs of this Amirdom are still remembered in Iran for their 
relations with foreign powers. These relations had evolved 
from the Amirdom's basic function of defending Iran's eastern 
frontiers against foreign interference. A role which it 
played with a noticeable degree of independence. Officially 
the Amirdom was bound by the fundamental regulations of the 
State in Iran to confine its foreign relations within the 
official channels of the Central Government, namely the 
Foreign Ministry. This Ministry used to assign its 
representatives in the provincial centres where a foreign 
government maintained a consulate. This representation 
constituted the diplomatic post of KARGOZARI, and the 
KARGOZAR was the government's diplomatic representative in 
charge of provincial foreign affairs.
The Kargozari of Sistan and Qaenat was established 
simultaneously with the establishment in Sistan of the first 
foreign consulate, namely the British Consulate, in 1900.
In practice, however, the Amirdom's foreign relations, like 
most other aspects of the affairs of the Amirdom, bypassed 
the official channel of Kargozari and gradually developed 
into a somewhat semi-independent foreign relations on its own 
rights. This development was more in evidence at the time of 
Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Heshmat al-Molk II, Amir of Sistan (1891 
- 1914) and Amir Mohammad-Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I, Amir 
of Qaenat (1891 - 1904) and their successors. The fact that 
these two Amirs' terms of office coincided with the duration 
of capitulation in Iran, worked as a major encouraging factor 
for the foreign consulates to motivate direct and a somewhat
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semi-independent foreign relations in the 'Amirdom. The 
foreign policies of the Amirdom, mostly reflecting on the 
strategic significance of the Eastern Iranian borderlands and 
on the challenges mounted against the position of the Amirs, 
both from within and outside the family, were shaped by the 
following factors:
1 - General political situation of Iran both in terms of
varying attitude of the Central Government towards 
the Amirdom, and its fluctuating foreign affairs, 
which created confusion in the Amirdom and encouraged 
political initiatives of its own.
2 - Political threats posed against the Amirdom and/or
individual Amirs which necessitated foreign alliance 
whenever supports and protection from the Central 
Government were felt to be ineffective.
3 - Internal rifts and rivalries which in the greatest
part of the latter decades of the Amirdom1 s life 
increased to a dangerous level, not only threatened 
the position of the individual Amirs, but also put 
the existence of the Amirdom in jeopardy.
4 - The strategic location of the Amirdom which was
highly considered by the British and the Afghans, 
especially in the second half of the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century. This was the 
period in which Iran and Britain were engaged in an 
intensive process of pushing their frontiers towards 
each other in a vast area stretching from the Gulf of 
Gwader northward to the Russian frontiers, a long and 
gradual process which gave birth to the present 
boundaries between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
The Khozeimeh Amirdom was situated in the middle 
section of this stretch of land and this situation 
increased the strategic significance of the Amirdom 
in the eyes of the British and Russians.
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5 - The fact that almost the whole of the nineteenth
century and the first two decades of the twentieth
century was the period of capitulations in Iran makes 
it easier to understand why foreign consulates had 
increased their involvement in local affairs of the
Amirdom and, by doing so, encouraged the Khozeimeh
Amirs to develop their somewhat semi-independent 
foreign relations.
6 - The geographical situation of the Amirdom and its
considerable distance from the political centre of
Iran on the one hand, and the difficult geography of 
Central and Eastern Iran on the other, added to the 
problems of speedy communication with the Central 
Government. This factor necessitated adoption of 
instant initiatives which could not materialise but
on the basis of some degree of independence in the
Amirdom's foreign relations.
7 - Since the Amirdom was a frontier-keeping state of
Iran, it had to perform its duty in protecting the
frontier areas by implementing policies and 
initiating strategies it deemed fit. This was in 
keeping with the tradition of frontier-keeping states 
of Iran and the nature of the duty involved a certain 
degree of independence in foreign relations.
8 - Last but by no means least was the factor of
political rivalries between the British and the 
Russians in the region which created a situation the
Khozeimeh Amirs were able to exploit to their own
benefit. In short, the two foreign powers (Britain 
and Russia) on the one hand, and the Khozeimeh Amirs 
on the other, have been led into a situation where 
each side endeavoured to use the power and influence 
of the other to their own advantage.
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RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
The Khozeimeh Amirdom's foreign relations were limited to 
contacts with the British and the Afghans who were the 
immediate neighbours of the Amirdom, and with the Russians 
who were in the region as a result of their rivalries with 
the British.
RELATIONS WITH THE AFGHANS
Khozeimeh Amirdom's relationships with the Afghan Amirdoms of 
the late 18 th century and with Afghanistan of late 19 th 
century onward, were very limited. These relationships began 
with direct clashes between Amir Alam Khan I and Ahmad Khan 
Abdali (Durrani) founder of the kingdom of Afghanistan, in 
the wake of Nader Shah's assassination of 19th June 1747, 
which resulted in the defeat of the Khozeimeh Amirdom after 
Amir Alam Khan I was betrayed and murdered in 1749.
H.W. Bellew who visited the Amirdom in the winter of 1871 
asserts:
"Mir Ali, transferred his headquarters to Birjand. He 
was succeeded in the rule by his son Mir Alam, and he 
by his son Mir Asadullah, both of whom were subjects 
of the Durrani kings."(2)
Although no evidence has been introduced to prove these 
Amirs' adherence to the Durrani Khan, no evidence exists also 
to the contrary. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to accept 
that in the wake of Amir Alam Khan's defeat and murder, his 
son and successor, Amir Ali Khan accepted the authority of 
the Durrani king in return for retaining the Amirdom of his
(1) For detaiLs of this event, see previous chapter, section on Amir Alam Khan I.
(H) Bellow, H.W., “From the Indus to the Tigris", reprint 1977, Karachi, p. 305.
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dynasty in Qaenat and Sistan. This, if happened, did not 
last long as Bellew himself points out:
"On the break-up of this dynasty, Mir Asadullah became
Independent to all intent."(1)
Bellew claims a second period in which Amir Asadollah Khan
became a subordinate of the Afghan Khans. He states that in
the advent of the Governor General of Khorasan, Asef
ad-Doleh's attack on Qaenat in 1835 "Mir Asadullah, retired
to Sistan, and, as an Afghan subject dependent on Herat,
(2 ^sought the aid of its ruler."v '
Once again no independent evidence exists to substantiate 
this theory. Furthermore, there was not such a country in 
existence as Afghanistan at the time of which Amir Asadollah 
Khan could have been a subject and provincial governor. As 
for Herat, it is noteworthy that both Kameran Mirza and Yar 
Mohammad Khan, Governors at the time, were loyal to the 
Iranian Government, and Amir Asadollah Khan's plea for 
assistance from them would hardly make him an Afghan 
subject. Bellew goes further by indicating that Amir 
Asadollah Khan sought assistance from Yar Mohammad Khan of 
Herat a year or two later. As it will be examined in the 
following chapter, Yar Mohammad Khan, as ruler of Herat, was 
staunchly loyal to Iran and it was because of injustice to 
his son and successor in Herat that Iran attacked and 
captured the town in 1856. Again, Amir Asadollah Khan's 
request for assistance, if at all, from an Iranian-appointed 
governor of Herat would not make him an Afghan subject. Not 
only is there no mention of these events in the numerous 
documents of history examined by this author, many documents 
give evidence to the effect that the Amirs of Qaenat and 
Sistan participated in Iran’s military operations in Herat of 
1836 and 1856, as mentioned in the previous chapter.
(1) Bellow, op. cit.r p. 306.
(2) Ibid.
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Amir Asadollah Khan’s son and successor, Amir Alam Khan III, 
however, revived his great grandfather’s (Amir Alam Khan I) 
powerful rule in Qaenat. He successfully re-established the 
Khozeimeh rule in Sistan. As examined in the previous 
chapter, at the time of disputes between Iran and the Afghan 
chiefs on the question of sovereignty over the eastern 
section of Sistan, Amir Alam Khan III established his 
authority on the areas east of the Hirmand delta, by 
capturing Nad Ali. His dominion was extended to include the 
eastern sections of Sistan after the Iranian Government 
received the famous reply to its enquiry with the British, 
despatched by the British Foreign Secretary Lord Russell.
This development intensified border disputes between Iran and 
Afghanistan. Both parties called upon the British to 
arbitrate in Sistan. The Sistan arbitration (1871 - 1872),
led by General Frederick Goldsmid completed its work after 
experiencing a great deal of difficulties created by Amir 
Alam Khan III, the powerful Amir of Khozeimeh who saw in the 
arbitration work a foreign intrusion in favour of the Afghan 
leader, Shir Ali Khan. Amir Alam Khan detested the latter, 
whose "encroachments" in Sistan encouraged the Khozeimeh Amir 
to extend his support for the Afghan Chief's rebellious son 
Yaqub Khan. Amir Alam Khan harboured and entertained Yaqub 
Khan and his troops for some months, offering his Amirdom's 
support for his much hoped "triumphant" return to Kabul. 
This collaboration failed to achieve its objective, as Shir 
Ali Khan entered in a pact with the British whereby the 
nomination of his younger son as the heir to his throne was 
guarantied by the British.
The delineation of boundaries in Sistan, by the Goldsmid 
arbitration, however, put an end to the direct relations, 
limited as they were, between the Khozeimeh Amirdom and the 
Afghan chiefs, while it marked the beginning of a new and 
direct political relations between the Amirdom and the 
British and the Russians who announced their political 
presence in Sistan and Qaenat as soon as the British opened 
their consulate there.
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RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH AND THE RUSSIANS
British interests in the strategic significance of Sistan 
and Qaenat were the natural consequence of the establishment 
of their authorities in the eastern half of Baluchistan and 
consolidation of their influence in Afghanistan. 
Khozeimeh Amirdom of Qaenat and Sistan was the immediate 
Iranian territory neighbouring British Baluchistan and
the principalities of Afghanistan. British Secretary to
the Government of India in the Foreign Department informing 
the British Minister at Tehran of this interest states:
"....The Government of India attach the highest
importance to the assertion of the paramount interest 
of Great Britain in Sistan and in South Eastern 
Persia. They are of opinion that in no circumstances 
should Sistan be permitted to pass, like the northern 
provinces of Persia, under the control or even the
preponderating influence of Russia, and that British 
prestige and influence in that quarter should be 
constantly and actively maintained. Though the 
commercial advantages of the overland trade with India 
have not been overlooked and are of much importance 
both to India and Persia, you will readily understand 
that the objects of the Government of India in opening 
the route to Quetta and pushing the trade have been 
mainly political. It has been their desire not only 
to create and increase the trade, but by means of the 
trade to establish beyond a doubt the superior
interest of England in those parts of Persia which 
border on Baluchistan..."(^ )
The Khozeimeh Amirdom, on the other hand, was at the same
time, suffering from a growing internal dispute which emerged
(2 \in the wake of Amir Alam Khan's death in 1891. v ' His 
elder son, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Heshmat al-Molk II, who was 
serving as Deputy Governor in Sistan, was denied the 
leadership of the Amirdom by his younger brother, Amir Esmail 
Khan Shokat al-Molk I, who succeeded Amir Alam Khan in
(1) From H.S. Barnes, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, to his 
Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Persia, 
Tehran, No. 1291 F., Dated Simla, 29th May 19D1, FO 60/636.
(2) See previous chapter.
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Birjand. This dispute grew deeper as time went by and 
expanded to engage much of the time and energies of the two 
Amirs and their successors. The two parties in this family 
dispute employed every means at their disposal in securing 
the single leadership of the Amirdom, each for himself.
The establishment of the British consulate in Sistan in 1900,
which was immediately followed by the opening of a Russian
consulate there, gave Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Heshmat al-Molk the
opportunity of using the influence of the British in Tehran
in safeguarding his position in Sistan and in endeavouring to
obtain leadership of the Khozeimeh Amirdom of Qaenat as
well. The employment of this strategy coincided with the
British policies of securing influence in Sistan and the
grounds were, thus, prepared for mutual exploitation between
the two. Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Heshmat al-Molk's friendly
attitude towards the British and the encouragement and
support that he intended to the British Consul’s efforts in
advertising commercial advantages of the new commercial road
between Sistan and Qaenat, created a situation in which he
felt his position to be threatened. He, therefore, feared
the hostility of the Russian Consul. His fears were not
totally unfounded. Within a few days he was ordered to
Tehran. Though this order was the outcome of the Russian
activities in Tehran, the British saw it as "another form of
squeeze" and "a small pecuniary help of ten thousand tumans
(21would relieve pressure".' } This development coincided 
with the appointment of Yamin Nezam as the Iranian 
commissioner in the McMahon's Sistan arbitration. Yamin 
Nezam, related to the Amir by marriage, had for some time 
served in Sistan as commander of the border guards. His new 
appointment strengthened his position in Sistan and his 
display of friendship with the Russian Consul added to the 
political rivalries between the British and the Russians in 
the district. The British suspected Yamin Nezam of being in
(1) From Barnes to the British Envoy in Tehran, op. cit.
(2) From Major G. Chenevix Trench, Consul General - Meshed, to Foreign Secretary Simla, 31st May
1901, F0 60/636.
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the pay of the Russian Consul, ^ ^  who himself was suspected
by the British of using local Mollas for spreading rumours
among the poor people of Sistan that the British were the
cause of their misfortune. The British Consul General in
Mashhad, therefore, asked the British Minister in Tehran to
use his influence with the Atahk ■ Azam (Prime Minister) and
to remove Yamin Nezam from his appointment as the Iranian
Commissioner in the Sistan boundary arbitration and to
/ 2)
appoint Amir Heshmat al-Molk in his place.1 ' This tactic 
did not however succeed. Yamin Nezam (Abd al-Hamid Khan 
Ghaffari) was also suspected of conspiring with the Russian
Consul for the removal of the Amir of Sistan from his post of
governorship.
"The Amir inveighed very bitterly against the Russian 
Consul and the Yamin-i Nizam, who, he said, were both 
working for his removal and the destruction of British 
influence in Sistan. He welcomed the arrival of the
Arbitration Commission, and assured me that everything 
would be done to give Colonel McMahon and his officers 
the respect that was due to them."(3)
Yamin Nezam's intrigues in Tehran, for the removal of Amir
Heshmat al-Molk drew the Amir closer to the British. Yamin
Nezam's intrigues included securing a document for Sardar
Said Khan Nahruei, a Sistani Sardar who arrived there on 10th
April that year. The document demanded Amir Heshmat al-Molk
to give the Sardar, his own brother-in-law, the following
villages: Qaleh Nao, Khaajeh Ahmad, Sharif Khan, Deh Isa
(4)Khan, and Sekouheh.v ' Yamin Nezam sought an interview 
with the Amir on this subject but the Amir refused to meet 
him and the Sardar, and the problem was averted for the time 
being. Amir Heshmat al-Molk asked the British to help
(1) From H.B.M.'s Acting Consul General in Meshed - to H.B.M.'s Minister, Tehran, TeLegram No.
22, dated 17th February 1903, FQ 248/789.
(2) Ibid.
(3) From Diary No. 5 of H.B.M.'s ConsuL, Sistan and Kain, for Period 1st to 15th March 1903, FO
248/789.
(4) Sistan Diary, dated 16th ApriL 1903, by R.A.E. Benn, British Consul in Sistan, FO 248/789.
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removing Sardar Said Khan from the frontier, in return 
for removing obstacles he put in the way of trade with 
India. He, in the meantime, complained to Tehran of the 
arrangement which was favourably replied to by placing the 
disposal of the Sardar entirely in the hands of the 
Amir,^ ^  ^
Meanwhile, rivalries between Amir Heshmat al-Molk and his 
younger brother Amir Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk, Amir of 
Qaenat, took a new turn for the worse. The Shokat al-Molk 
sent a letter of complaint to the Shah (Mozaffar ad-Din Shah 
Qajar) in which he accused Amir Heshmat al-Molk of wanting to 
give Sistan to the British:
"I swear by the salt of the asylum of the universe 
that if the whole of Sistan was offered to me, I 
should not accept it and have resolved never to place 
my foot out of the soil of Qaen which is my ancestral 
inheritance, but my patriotism and love of the 
Imperial Government can never accept that Sistan, 
which is the "sangar" (rampart) of Persia against the 
Uzbaks, the Afghans, and the Turkamans, should fall 
with such ease into the hands of the English.... but 
my brother Heshmat al~Molk, I do not know with what 
thoughts and opinion, has been taken in by the English 
and it is now two years since he entered into a 
compact with them, so much so that he has strayed from 
the road of justice and virtue. He wants to give 
Sistan to the English without trouble or steps, 
fighting or dispute of any kind..."(3)
A further threat to his position in Sistan came from the new
Governor General of Khorasan, Rokn ad-Doleh, who hinted that
payment was necessary if the Amir wished to retain the Sistan
governorship. Amir Heshmat al-Molk had already remitted
50,000 qarans to the new Governor General whose father was
also Governor General at one time, and was not favourably
/ 4 \
inclined towards Amir Heshmat al-Molk.v '
(1) Ibid.
(2) Sistan Diary No. 10, of Major Benn, H.B.M.'s Consul in Sistan and Kain, dated 16th to 31st
March 1903, FO 248/789.
(3) Translation of report sent by Amir Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I to his agent in Tehran, to be
presented to the Shah, dated 17,04,1903.
(4) Sistan Diary No. 10, dated 16 - 31, May 1903, FO 248/789.
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Facing all these threats to his position in Sistan, the Amir 
threw in his lot with the British, the only source of 
reliable support for his survival. This was a mere regional 
repeat of the political situation that existed in the capital 
of Iran of the Qajar period. A situation in which bribery 
and dictatorship left no one throughout the country with the 
sense of security for his position, dignity, and his life. 
Even the Qajar princes found themselves compelled to seek 
friendship and protection of a foreign power.
The British, therefore took up the case of defending Amir
Heshmat al-Molk's position in Sistan, albeit they found
relations with the Amir of Sistan "have had but a negative
11)value" for them.v }
In a confidential report to the Secretary to the Government 
of India, the British Consul for Sistan and Qaen describes 
the political circumstances in which the British had to take 
up the case of Amir Heshmat al-Molk's position in Sistan, a 
summary of which is as follows:
"I have the honour of inviting the attention of the 
Government of India to the probability of the dismissal of 
the hereditary Governor of Sistan, the Amir Heshmat-ul-Mulk. 
This probability has been increased by certain recent 
incidents; and it is plain that no time should be lost in 
either preparing for, or attempting to avert, such an 
event.... The Government of India already know from many 
sources that the Yamin-i-Nizam, warden of the Sistan border 
and Persian Boundary Commissioner, has been intriguing for 
some time, with Russian help, to oust and supplant the Amir 
Heshmat-ul-Mulk. The latter has managed, by a constant 
supply of presents to Meshed, to keep in power. But with the 
new Governor of Meshed, a notorious Russophile and personally 
hostile to the Amir's family, this will be increasingly 
difficult. And two facts which have come to my notice during 
the last few days, coupled with the obvious wish of the
(1) Notes by Major R.A.E. Benn, Consul for Sistan, dated 31st May 1903, FO 248/789,
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Russians to effect a speedy counter-stroke to the British 
Arbitration Commission, seem to show that a deal set has now 
been made against Heshmat-ul-Mulk in Tehran, and that his 
fall may take place at any moment, the first fact is that 
Mons. Naus, in his letter of the 3rd May 1903, to His 
Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, written to explain 
the difficulty about supplies for the British Boundary 
Commission, remarked that the order prohibiting export of 
cereals was directed only against the Amir of Sistan, who had 
been smuggling corn across the frontier. The second fact is 
that Mons. D'Hoedt, inspector of Customs here, told me three 
days ago that he had heard from the new Persian Director of 
Telegraph for Seistan that, as the Amir Heshmat-ul-Mulk is in 
very bad odour with the Central Government, he (the Director) 
expects to make a large amount of money out of him by 
threatening to send unfavourable reports to the Shah.... It 
is also possible that if there is any truth in the hitherto 
unverified story of there being large consignment of arms in 
the Russian caravans which has arrived here, it is the 
intention of the Russian Consul to arm Saiyid Khan, Nahruei, 
and other enemies of the Amir against him and thus encourage 
disturbances which would result in his dismissal. The early 
dismissal of the Heshmat-ul-Mulk having been thus shown to be 
probable, it remains to be considered whether it is to the 
interest of the British Government to avert it. In this 
connection the following points seem to call for 
examination.
1) Would a change of Governors damage our interests?
2) Is the Amir worth supporting?
3) If the answer to the above question is in the
affirmative, to what extent must support of the Amir be
pushed, and how definite must it be to secure British 
**l 2 \interest?' '
(1) Hons. Naus was a Belgic national at the service of the Iranian Government, in charge of 
organising the country's Custom Services.
(2) From H. Dobbs Esq., H.B.M.'s Consul for Seistan to the Secretary to the Government of India 
in the F.D., No. 278, dated 18th June 1903, FO 248/789.
256
He then provides the Government of India with his own opinion 
which was adopted. His advise was:
"There can, I think, be no doubt that a change of Governors 
in Seistan would gravely damage our interests. Not only has 
Heshmat-ul-Mulk shown himself constantly friendly towards the 
British, whenever he has not been hampered and threatened by 
a Kargozar or a Yamin, but it is the common talk of the 
Province that, if he falls, his fall will be due to the 
Russians, and will be directed against the British. Russian 
and British power in Seistan will thus be brought to a public 
test, in which British power will be worsted: and it will be 
recognised that the British cannot help their friends or hurt 
their foes. It is, moreover, impossible to insist too 
strongly on the fact that, in the case of the Heshmat-ul 
Molk, his fall will make much more noise than that of the 
Governor of any ordinary province or tribe, who expects to be 
changed every Nauroz. The Amir being a hereditary Governor, 
his dismissal will be a flagrant violation of tradition: and 
the idea formed by the people of the country of the Russian 
power, which is able to bring about such a violation of 
tradition, proportionately exaggerated, the Russians will 
then be able to prosecute without hindrance their plan of 
building up material interests in Seistan; while British 
material interests will encounter endless petty opposition 
and will eventually decay. And, finally, when the time comes 
for the question of the possession of the strategically 
important oasis of Seistan to be decided, the British 
Government will have no material interest in it to show as a
justification for energetic action......  the question
whether the Amir Heshmat-ul-Molk is worth supporting, must, I 
think, be answered in the affirmative. It has to be 
remembered, in the first place, that as I have already 
written, he is a hereditary Governor, and that his retention 
in his place is in accordance with tradition. His hold over 
the country through strong chiefs like Sardar Purdil Khan,
who are attached to his cause, is exceptionally firm.
(1)Finally, his eldest son, Mir Masum Khan,v 1 who will in the
(1) Amir Masum Khan was Amir.Heshmat al-Molk's third son. His eldest son was Amir Mohammad Hussein 
Khan.
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ordinary course succeed him, appears now to be an especially 
nice youth, who since his journey to Calcutta, has been 
thoroughly friendly to the British, and who is disposed to be 
far more energetic than was at one time thought possible. It 
is clear, therefore, that the support of the Heshmat-ul-Mulk 
offers more certain advantages than does the support of the 
ordinary fleeting officials of Persia, who has no regular 
pied a' terre, and whose useful adhesion can at best be only 
for a few years.
"Regarding the extent to which the support of the Amir should 
be pushed, I venture to think that a definite statement 
should be made to the Government of the Shah that the British 
Government insists on the maintenance of the status quo in 
Seistan, and will not tolerate the dismissal of the Amir, 
inasmuch as the status quo would thereby be altered 
prejudicial to British interests
An incident that occurred in July 1903, further strengthened
Amir Heshmat al-Molk's case with the British. Briefly, an
agitation took place on the unfixed rate of that year's
abundant harvest. The agitation was apparently instigated by
the local agents of the Russian Consul who "made people
anxious about the price of grain by spreading reports of huge
purchases for the British, and then put the blame upon the
(2 \Boundary Commission".v ' Amir Heshmat al-Molk brought the
agitation under control with the assistance of the Kargozar,
by publicly flogging the ring leaders. "Being unable to save
the agitators from punishment, as he had promised, Mr.
Miller (Russian Consul) undertook to get the Amir
Heshmat-ul-Mulk dismissed for his action in protecting
/ 3  \
British property and interest".' '
(1) From Mr. Dobbs, to the Government of India, dated Nasratabad, 18th June 1903, FO 248/790.
(2) H. Dobbs, H.B.M.'s Consul for Seistan, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the 
F.O., No. c.4, dated Camp Bunjar, Seistan, 7th JuLy 1903, confidential, FO 248/790.
(3) Ibid.
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To the British, the Russian Consul's undertaking to dismiss
the Khozeimeh Amir created a serious challenge to defend
their political influence and credibility in the region. The
British found that "if the Amir Heshmat-ul-Mulk is kept in
office, in spite of Russian efforts for his dismissal, the
effect of the recent agitation will be excellent. For it
will be proved that we can help our friends and hurt our
foes, It will also have been proved that we are absolutely
disinterested, since, when the British Consulate and shops
were in immediate danger of attack, we trusted for protection
to Persian troops, and did not call in the Boundary
Commission escort, which was a short way off".^^
Continuing with his comment on the situation, in his report
of the incident, the British Consul asserts: "If the Amir is
now not supported, after I have taken upon myself the
responsibility of assuring him that the British Government
will not permit his dismissal solely on account of his
punishment of offenders against its subjects, British
prestige in Seistan will sink to a lower point than it has
(2)ever yet reached."v 1
The British Consul, therefore, successfully attracted the 
attention of the Indian Government to the vulnerable position 
of Amir Heshmat al-Molk which was tied up, from the British 
point of view, to the prestige of that power vis-a-vis the
Russians in Sistan. The British Foreign Office and the
Indian Government took on board the Amir's case to prevent 
"British prestige" from sinking "to a lower point than it had 
ever yet reached". In a telegram on July 9, 1903, India
Office informed the Foreign Office:
"....with reference to the further telegram from the 
Viceroy of the 8th July, of which a copy was sent to 
the Foreign Office to-day, that Lord George Hamilton 
trusts that Lord Lansdowne will instruct Sir A. 
Hardinge, in accordance with Lord Curzon's 
recommendations, to support with all means at his 
disposal the Heshmat-ul-Mulk and kargozar, in order to 
prevent developments of situation which might become
(1) From H. Dobbs, to the Government of India, Camp Bunjar, 7th July 1903, FO 248/790.
(2) Ibid.
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really serious. Lord Lansdowne's attention will 
doubtless be directed to the concluding passage in 
Lord Curzon's telegram, in which he suggests that the 
Russian Ambassador should be informed of Mr. Miller's 
consistently unfriendly conduct, which renders 
difficult the maintenance of friendly relations in 
Seistan. " (1)
Having interviewed the Foreign Minister, Moshier ad-Doleh, in 
Tehran, on this subject, the British Minister to the Court of 
Qajar Shah, concluded that:
''....As your Lordship is aware the Mushir ed-Dowleh is 
strongly Russophile & is suspected of being actively 
paid by the Russian Government. I think it is not 
impossible that his Excellency has been intriguing on 
his own account, & at the instigation of the Russian
Minister to have the Amir removed from Seistan, & it
may be that the Shah has never taken any decision in 
regard to the matter."(2)
While actively trying to prevent Amir Heshmat al-Molk*s 
dismissal from the Amirdom of Sistan, the British were 
risking his reputation as an independent Iranian Amir of 
Sistan, and they were aware of it. In a letter from Bahrain, 
addressed to Moshir ad-Doleh the Iranian Prime Minister, Mr. 
A. H. Hardinge British political representative in the 
Persian Gulf, explains:
''....We have no particular reason to regard the 
Heshmat-ul-Mulk as a specially able administrator or 
as one specially desirous of promoting friendly 
relations between Persia and Great Britain. On the 
contrary we have, as Your Excellency is aware, had 
frequent occasions to complain to Tehran of his 
conduct. But although he has not been specially 
friendly, he has generally abstained from conduct 
strongly or markedly unfriendly to our representative 
and to the good relations I have mentioned and has on 
that account incurred the resentment of those who view 
those good relations with dislike and distrust.... If 
we had any evil designs in Sistan we could wish for 
nothing better than the dismissal of the
(1) From India Office, to Foreign Office, No. 2., July 9th, 1903, F0 248/790.
(2) India Office to Foreign Office, No. 2, July 9, 1903, F0 248/790.
260
Heshmat-ul~Mulk under the circumstances I have 
describedf for it would give us an excuse for much 
greater interference than we have ever attempted 
before in the affairs of the province."()
Following the activities in Tehran by both Amir Heshmat
al-Molk's supporters and enemies, the new Prime Minister Ain
ad-Doleh summoned the Amir, on March 7th 1904, to Tehran.
After some efforts to avoid going to Tehran, the Amir visited
the capital where he experienced circumstances more friendly
(2)than he had feared.' J Amir Heshmat al-Molk's younger 
brother and his rival, Amir Mohammad Esmail Khan Shokat 
al-Molk I, Amir of Qaenat, was also summoned to Tehran at the 
same time. He had reportedly sent a douceur of 5000 tumans
/ 3 \
to Tehran.v > In the meantime the Khozeimeh Amirdoms of
Sistan and Qaenat were, at this time, in a worse situation
than ever before. In Birjand (Capital city of Qaenat) a
representative of the Central Government known as Moazez
al-Molk from Torbat-e Heidariyeh, was intriguing to assume
the governorship of Qaenat. At one point, it was rumoured
that he had succeeded in replacing Amir Shokat al-Molk 
14 ^I.v ' Meanwhile, still in Tehran, Amir Heshmat al-Molk was
rumoured to have been offered the governorship of Qaenat in
(5  "Iaddition to that of Sistan. v ; The uncertainty of Amir 
Shokat al-Molk's position in Qaenat apparently continued for 
some months. The British Consul's diary of Sistan and Qaen 
(no. 43, 1st to 7th December 1904) reads:
(1) From A.H. Hardinge to H.E. The Mushir ed-Dowleh, dated Bahrain November 26th 1903, FO 
248/803.
(2) From British Legation at Tehran (Gholhak) to the Marquess of Landsdowne, No. 128, July 18th
1904, FO 248/810.
(3) No. 1 Diary of the Turbat-i-Haidari (British) Consulate for the period 5th to 18th November
1904, Par. 6, FO 248/810.
(4) Ibid., Part 1.
(5) From British Legation at Tehran, to the Marquess of Landsdowne, No. 128, July 18th 1904, FO
248/810.
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"....The Kargozar informed me that the Shaukat ul-Mulk 
had been deprived of all powers and that the Muaziz 
ul-Mulk was now acting as the Governor of Kain. The 
Kargozar seemed to think that it was practically 
certain the Hashmat-ul-Mulk would eventually get the 
Governorship of Kain as well as of Sistan. "
The uncertainty of Shokat al-Molk1s position in Birjand had 
become so serious that he decided "at one time to pay the 
Muaziz al-Mulk tumans 3,500 if the latter would depart from 
Birjand". ^ ^  He later changed his mind as he thought that 
Moazez al-Molk was about to leave soon. As the dispute over 
the position of the Khozeimeh Amirs of Sistan and Qaenat 
continued, the British began to review their attitude towards 
the matter. They saw their other interests in the district 
of greater importance than trying to keep the Khozeimeh Amir 
in office for the mere consideration of prestige vis-a-vis 
the Russians:
"....J find that opinion has recently been expressed 
by His Majesty's Charge d' affairs at Tehran, and by 
Colonel McMahon,, that the Hashmat is not a worthy 
object of solicitude, and it is probable that we 
should not have committed ourselves to his support, 
had it not been for the attitude taken up towards him 
by the Russians in connection with the 1903 
disturbances."(2)
Thus, the British authorities found it more productive to 
their interests if they traded their support for the 
Khozeimeh Amir, for other considerations. The Viceroy of 
India wrote on this matter that:
"....It has occurred to me that it might not be 
impossible to make an arrangement with the Persian 
Government about Seistan affairs generally, which 
would be a gain rather than a loss to us, and which 
might be accepted by the Persian Government. Our 
objection to the removal of the Hashmat might be 
withdrawn, provided;-
(1) Diary No. 46 of Sistan and Qaen (British) Consul, for the period 22nd to 31st December 1904, 
FO 248/822.
(2) From Viceroy of India to the Foreign Office and Legation at Tehran, 3rd January 1905, FO 
248/833.
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1)~ That suitable provision is made for him in some
other province;
2)- That the Persian Government give a promise in
writing, that Yamin will be recalled from Seistan when 
our mission is withdrawn;
3)- That a strong Governor, to be approved by us,
shall be appointed to Seistan and retained in his
appointment."(*)
This change of policy on the part of the British, came at the
same time that it became apparent that Amir Heshmat al-Molk's
return to Sistan, as the Governor, was open to serious
doubt. By mid-March 1905 it was apparent that both Khozeimeh
Amirs of Sistan and Qaenat had lost their hereditary Amirdom
to Moazez al-Molk, an outsider. In a report from Birjand,
dated 11th March 1905, the British Consul registers in the
Consulate's diary that: "...The Muaziz ul-Mulk received a
(2\
copy of the telegram from the Sadr Azamv J to the 
(3 iAsef-ul-Dowlehv J to the effect that, on account of his
good services, H.M. the Shah was pleased to confer upon him
/ 4 \
the Governorship of Khorasan' } and Seistan for the current 
year."
Amir Mohammad Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I died in March that 
year, but his younger brother, Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan 
Shokat al-Molk II managed, in Tehran, to secure the 
governorship of Qaenat for himself for a revenue payment of 
tumans 80,000 annually, instead of the previous rate of
33,000 tumans per annum. Regarding Amir Heshmat al-Molk's 
position in Sistan, the British were still busy negotiating 
with the Iranian Government on a deal that would involve Amir 
Heshmat al-Molk's appointment to the governorship of Sistan 
in return for the British neglect of the Mirjaveh
(1) Ibid.
(2) Prime Minister.
(3) Governor GeneraL of Province of Khorasan.
(4) Very likely a spelling mistake. It should read “Kain* for “Qaen“, as this name was spelled
■Kain" by the British at the time.
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delimitation in Baluchistan where the Iranians had many 
grievances.^^ Amir Heshmat al-Molk II retired from active 
governorship, leaving his son Amir Masum Khan in charge of 
the affairs of governorship of Sistan, conferring on him his 
own title "Heshmat al-Molk", himself settling on his second 
title "Hesam ad-Doleh". The young Amir began changing side 
from the British to the Russians. While stranded in Tehran, 
he secured from the Russian bank, a loan of £2000, which was 
the equivalent of tumans 12000 and for which, he was 
originally in negotiations with the British Minister.
The British Minister at Tehran, however, managed to secure 
for Amir Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk III the governorship of 
Tabas, whereas the young Amir had cultivated friendship with 
the Russians. This whole affair proves that the Khozeimeh 
Amirs were, in the words of the British Minister at Tehran, 
using their foreign relations to their own ends. He stated: 
"... the fact of course is that all the Persian chiefs and 
dignitaries are guided in their relations with the rival 
foreign consulates solely by the considerations of their own 
personal interests for the moment, and that their friendship 
cannot be relied upon as a permanent factor by either 
power..."^  ^
The British changed their attitude towards Amir Ali-Akbar 
Khan Heshmat al-Molk so much that by April 1905, they 
considered his return to Sistan as incompatible with their 
interests:
"...Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed that the 
Heshmat-ul~Mulk had been offered the Governorship of 
Seistan and that he was trying to get Kain as well,
with every prospect of success. I am afraid the
return of the Heshmat-al-Mulk under present
circumstances to these parts is not calculated to
advance British interests."(4)
(1) From H.B.M.'s Minister at Tehran, to the Foreign Office, No, 33, Tehran, March 22nd 1905,
FO 248/837.
(2) Seistan Diary, March 29, 1905, FO 248/848.
(3) From H.B.M.'s Legation, to Foreign Office, No. 62, Confidential, Tehran, March 22nd, 1905,
F0 248/838.
(4) Sistan Diary of H.B.M.'s Consul, dated 20th ApriL 1905, FO 248/838.
264
Furthermore, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Heshmat al-Molk II was
accused of having instigated the poisoning of Sardar Said
Khan Nahruei, an enemy of the Amir and his brother-in-law,
who died on 27th April 1905. The Amir was, at this
time, still trying to secure governership of Qaen by heavy
bribery which was the order of the day. He did not succeed
and his young uncle, Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan's payment of
(2 )bribes had, apparently, superseded those of his.v } Amir
Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk's heavy bribing in
Tehran put him in great financial difficulties. He
approached the British bank in Mashhad for a loan of tumans
(3)50,000.'' ' This development marked a new phase in the 
history of the Amirdom's foreign ties. A new phase in which 
the two Khozeimeh Amirs changed sides in their relations with 
the foreign powers. Amir Shokat al-Molk II gradually 
favoured good relations with the British, while Amir Heshmat 
al-Molk III slowly moved towards the Russians. Relations 
between the two Khozeimeh Amirs, in the meantime, further 
deteriorated as a result of the following developments:
1- Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II inherited his older 
brother's state and title in Qaenat, with which went the 
old rivalry and conflict with his oldest brother Amir 
Ali-Akbar Khan Heshmat al-Molk II now inherited by Amir 
Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk III.
2- Amir Heshmat al-Molk II's efforts in Tehran to obtain
for himself the governorship of Qaenat in the wake of 
the death of Amir Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I, was
frustrated by the young Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk 
II's success in securing the Amirdom of Qaenat for
himself.
3- Amir Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk's will gave Shokat
al-Molk II two thirds of the land property and all of
(1) Sistan Diary of H.B.M.'s Consul, dated 18th May 1905, FO 248/847.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Confidential Diary of H.B.M.'s Consul in Seistan, dated 4th July 1905.
265
the rest of his wealth. Amir Heshmat al-Molk contested 
the will with the support of the Mojtahed (Jurisprudent) 
of Tehran.^ ^  ^
This whole affair made the two brothers, one very old and one
very young, prepare for a long lasting open conflict. The
young Amir, Shokat al-Molk XI, of Qaenat being inexperienced
and frail, was even too frightened to establish open
relations with the foreign power which he had to rely upon
for support. When diplomatic representatives of British
India went to see him in a courtesy call at his country
residence, the Kalateh Akbariyeh in 1907, the young Amir
received them "with great ceremony and was outwardly cordial
enough", but British Consul for Sistan and Qaen was not sure
"whether at heart" he was equally so. The Consul remarks:
"He is so ridiculously afraid lest he should be thought to be
at all intimate with us (he was afraid for instance, from all
I hear, of others coming to see me, that I cannot help
thinking that he has been got at by the Russians, either in
Tehran or in Meshed and that he has now some kind of
understanding with them, and is therefore extremely afraid of
(2 )offending them".v '
Moreover, Amir Heshmat al-Molk II remained in Tehran, still 
trying to obtain the governorship of Qaenat, and thus, 
uniting the Khozeimeh Amirdom of Sistan and Qaenat. By early 
April 1907, he succeeded in his efforts and attained this 
goal. British Consul for Sistan recorded:
"... Captain Watson telegraphs today that he hears the 
Heshmat-al-Molk has bought the Governorship of Kainat 
for tumans 100r000 and that he has been financed by 
the Russians. Sartip Mir Masum K h a n ' s (3) immediate 
departure for Birjand gives colour to the story, which
(1) Ibid.
<2) Confidential Diary, No. 25 of Captain A.D. Macpherson, H.B.M.'s Consul for Seistan and Kain,
for the period 13th to 17th July 1907, FO 248/910.
(3) Amir Heshmat al-Molk III.
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in one form or another has been current for some time 
past... " (1)
This success was short lived and Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat
al-Molk was reappointed to the Governorship of Qaenat within 
(2 ja few days.' ' Amir Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk III, who
had gone to Birjand to assume his role as deputy governor,
representing his father Amir Hesam ad-Doleh II, was escorted
out of Birjand by the Telegraph Sartip, an influential
government official. This development worsened the situation
between the two parties. Amir Masum Khan left Birjand but
remained in Qaenat, at or near Birjand, in clear defiance of
the orders of the Central Government. Amir Masum Khan
Heshmat al-Molk's supporters in Birjand and Qaen were
reported to have carried on an agitation in his favour,
circulating reports of ill-treatment of his supporters by
Amir Shokat al-Molk.(^  The conflict soon escalated and
penetrated the Tehran newspapers. The Habl al-Matin carried
an attack on Amir Shokat al-Molk in February 1908. The
British Consul for Sistan and Qaen supposed, at the time,
that the attack was engineered by one of the supporters of
/ 4 \
Amir Heshmat al-Molk.v * Whether Amir Heshmat al-Molk's 
supporters were behind this media campaign or not, it was the 
first of a long campaign waged and continued for varying 
reasons, aimed at damaging Amir Shokat al-Molk*s reputation.
While still in Tehran and barred from returning to Sistan, 
Amir Hesam ad-Doleh continued with his efforts for the 
removal of Amir Shokat al-Molk from the governorship of 
Qaenat.
(1) Confidential Diary of Seistan and Kain, dated 4th April 1907, FO 248/909.
(2) Summary of events in Sistan and Kainat for the week ending 4th Hay 1907, by H.B.M Consul for
Sistan and Kain, FO 248/909.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Confidential Diary No. 8, of Major B.L. Kennion, H.B.M.'s Consul for Sistan and Kain for the 
week ending 22nd February 1908, FO 248/941.
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Meanwhile, Sartip Mohammad-Reza Khan, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan
Hesam ad-Doleh's elder son, who was in Sistan, acting as
Deputy Governor since his brother Amir Masum Khan Heshmat
al-Molk III left for Birjand in April 1907, decided to resign
from deputy governorship as he could not alone carry on the
heavy duties. The end result of his decision was that
he was officially appointed, on May 13th 1908, as Deputy
(2)Governor of Sistan.v J
Amir Shokat al-Molk II had by then solidified his friendship
with the British who were the main power preventing his 
removal from the Qaenat Governorship. The British Consul for 
Sistan remarks:
"...There is no question of his very great and 
undisguised friendliness to the British Government. 
This is doubtless in great measure inspired by 
gratitude, as he is aware that he has been befriended 
by H.M's Legation more than once when his position was 
in jeopardy."(3)
This period of family disputes between the two Khozeimeh 
Amirs of Sistan and Qaenat was coincidental with the 
heightening tensions in Tehran between the Qajar Shah 
Mohammad-Ali and the Constitutionalists. The British in 
Tehran had sided with the Constitutionalists, whereas the 
Russians supported the anti-constitutional movements of the 
Shah. The heated constitutional debate in Tehran was 
reflected in the provincial centres. The state of affairs in 
the Khozeimeh Amirdom became a miniaturised version of what 
was going on in Tehran. Amir Shokat al-Molk II joined the 
constitutionalists, whereas Amir Heshmat al-Molk III joined 
supporters of the Shah. The British and Russian consuls 
acted the same way as their respective legations did in
(1) Sistan Confidential Diary for the week ending 9th Hay 1908, FO 248/941.
(2) Supplement to Sistan Confidential Diary for the week ending 16th May 1908, FO 248/941.
(3) Confidential Diary No. 24, of R.L. Kennion, H.B.M.'s Consul, for the week ending 6th June
1908, F0 248/941.
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Tehran. This realignment was in keeping with the two 
Khozeimeh Amirs' relations with their respective foreign 
power.
In June 1908, the Qajar Shah gained the upper hand in Tehran
and overthrew the Majlis (parliament). This turn of event in
Tehran was bound to work against Amir Shokat al-Molk.
British Consul for Sistan and Qaen reportedi
"J called on the Shokat-al~Molk. He was a good deal 
perturbed at the turn things had taken in Tehran. His 
school has been closed for the past few days, the
school masters being keen sympathisers with the Majlis 
and business generally is in a state of 
suspense....there was some excitement at Birjand when 
the news of the Shah's coup arrived. The artillery
men made some threats of attacking the school-masters 
and other sympathisers with the Majlis, but the Shokat 
on hearing of it, sent for the Yawar (colonel) and
threatened him. He also took the precaution of 
picketing the streets.... the Shokat received a 
telegram from the Shah ordering him to imprison or
execute disaffected persons."(1)
In Tehran, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Hesam ad-Doleh II offered the
Shah a bribe of tumans 30,000 for the Governorship of Qaenat,
but Amir Shokat al-Molk was made to understand that he could
(2 ^retain it for 25 to 30 thousand tumans. v J The latter 
refused to pay the bribe and he was dismissed from his 
Governorship. The British intervened immediately and saved 
his position. The British Consul for Sistan and Qaen reports 
in his confidential diary No. 32, for the week ending 1st 
August 1908:
"The Shokat sent the Mustofi to thank Mr. Howson for 
the intervention of H.M's Legation on his behalf."
Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk was in fact advised 
by the British Consul not to pay the Shah the bribe that was
(1) Confidential Diary No. 27, of Major Kennion, for the week ending 27th June 1908, FO 248/941.
(2) Confidential Diary No. 29, for the week ending 11th July 1908, FO 248/941.
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required of him. Amir Hesam ad-Doleh II continued with his
bid for the Governorship of Qaenat in Tehran. Amir Shokat
al-Molk was advised by his agent in Tehran to extend a bribe
of tens of thousands of tumans to the Shah and to the War and
Interior Ministers to maintain his position. He refused to
do so, and the clergies of Birjand prepared a petition asking
that Amir Shokat al-Molk should be r e t a i n e d . A  similar
petition was also sent to the Shah by the people of 
{2 ^Birjand.v 1 Meanwhile, Amir Shokat al-Molk telegraphed his 
agent to present to the Shah that since his father's death, 
he had paid, in addition to revenue, over tumans 200,000 all 
of which had been borrowed from Russian and British banks, 
and had served the country faithfully and had preserved peace 
while "the people under him were contented and happy, and 
foreign representatives were also pleased with him. He was 
surprised at being threatened with the loss of his 
Governorship unless he paid a large sum, because Amir Heshmat 
al-Molk offered a large sum as bribe". He then continued 
asking "if this was to be the reward of loyal service?"
As the situation worsened, the British decided to seize the 
opportunity and strengthen Amir Shokat al-Molk's friendship. 
The British Consul for Sistan and Qaenat asserts:
"... as matters now stand, if the Shokat is left to 
fight his own battle alone, it is likely that he will 
succeed in retaining the Governorship for the present, 
by practically ruining himself by bribery. In this 
case he will have little to thank us for, and it would 
not be surprising, if, when he saw that he had 
everything to fear from the Shah (with whom in the 
popular estimation the Russians are identified) and 
nothing to hope from us, his feelings underwent a 
change. In any case there would be no certainty that 
after he had been squeezed dry, he would not be thrown 
over in favour of the first applicant with money. It 
is thus very important that we should not only assist
(1) Confidential Diary No. 34, of Major Kennion, dated 15th August 1908, FO 248/941,
(2) Confidential Diary No. 35 of H.B.M.'s Consul, dated 22nd August 1908, FO 248/941.
(3) Confidential Diary No. 34, op. cit.
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the Shokat to retain the Governorship, but enable him 
to do so as cheaply as p o s s i b l e 1)
By early September that year (1908) news of Amir Hesam
ad-Doleh's success in Tehran of being given the Governorship
of Qaenat for a bribe of 59,000 tumans, which was loaned from
(2 )the Russian bank,v ' reached Birjand. This amazingly high 
level of bribery, reflecting the depth and the extent of 
corruption of Qajar rule in Iran, was verified by several 
different sources at the time. The British Legation even 
managed to obtain the details of this bribery. According to 
the Confidential Diary of British Consul for Sistan and 
Qaenat, Amir Hesam ad-Doleh had paid tumans 18,000 in cash, 
the remainder being guaranteed by the Russian bank. The 
money given and guaranteed was distributed in the following 
order:
1- The Shah, 35,000
2- The Minister of Interior,10,000
3- Amir Bahador (War Minister), 5,000
(3 ^4- The smaller people, 9,000 altogether' '
The rate of bribery had, by then, increased substantially. A 
major factor for this unbelievable rate of bribes must have 
been the fact that the Royal Court and other officials 
realised that the British and the Russians were competing 
seriously over the issue of Governorship of Sistan and 
Qaenat, each determined to secure the position for its 
respective friend by sacrificing huge sums. Amir Shokat 
al-Molk was advised by his own men to bid for a higher amount 
to retain the Governorship. The British realised that if 
this was done the blackmailing would go on indefinitely.
(1) Confidential Diary No. 36, of Major Kennion, dated 29th August 1908, FO 248/941.
(2) Confidential Diary No. 37, of Major Kennion, dated 5th September 1908, FO 248/941.
(3) Confidential Diary No. 38, of Major Kennion, dated 12th September 1908, FO 248/941.
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Amir Shokat al-Molk did not bid and received, on 21 September 
that year, a telegram from Prime Minister Moshir ad-Doleh, 
informing him that he was dismissed from his hereditary 
position. Amir Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk was made Deputy 
Governor of Sistan and Qaenat, on behalf of his father, Amir 
Ali-Akbar Khan Hesam ad-Doleh II. The father, at this
time, was officially given the title "Hesam ad-Doleh" and his 
old title "Heshmat al-Molk" was officially given to his son 
Amir Masum Khan.
It is noteworthy that the Russian Consul received the news of
Amir Heshmat al-Molk's appointment, three days before Amir
(2)Shokat al-Molk received his marching orders.v * Amir
Shokat al-Molk offered, at that late stage, a bribe of tumans
30,000 to reverse the orders, but he could not raise the
money. He asked the authorities in Tehran for the
appointment of an official to adjudicate between him and his
brother Amir Hesam ad-Doleh in the matter of the family
(3)estate.' ' Meanwhile, the French Government sent him a 
glittering ornament with a document which was an order of the 
third class of the "Dragon d' Annam", through the Foreign 
Ministry. The order was sent, apparently in appreciation of 
Shokat al-Molk having once entertained a French official, 
probably an indication of a French interest in opening a 
representation in the region through the friendship and 
favour of the Amir. He received the order just after being 
dismissed from the Governorship of Qaenat.
The British Consul in Sistan and Qaenat, having advised Amir 
Shokat al-Molk not to pay heavy bribes to the Shah and his 
ministers to retain his Governorship with the assurances that 
the British Legation in Tehran would not let him to be 
dismissed, felt that the British would lose prestige with
(1) Confidential Diary No. 40, of Major Kennion, H.B.M.'s Consul for Sistan and Kain, for the
week ending 26th September 1908, FO 248/941.
(2) Confidential Diary No. 40, Major Kennion, dated 26th September 1908, FO 248/941.
(3) Ibid.
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Amir Shokat al-Molk and the population if the Amir's position
was not restored. He, therefore, argued, in a long report to
the Legation in Tehran, that it was in the interest of the
British if Governorship was returned to Amir Shokat
(1 )al-Molk.v ' The deposed Amir, in the meantime, informed
the British vice-consul in Birjand that he was prepared to
make terms with Amirs Hesam ad-Doleh and Heshmat al-Molk, on
the condition that they accepted the late Amir Shokat
al-Molk's will as a valid instrument, and that if Amir Hesam
ad-Doleh insisted on a division of the property without
reference to the will, he would agree provided that his
original portion, inherited from his father and squandered by
the late Shokat al-Molk I, during the present Shokat
(2 )al-Molk's minority remained intact.v J An agreement was 
concluded on that basis on 24th December 1908.Amir Shokat
al-Molk's fortune was to change soon, as Mohammad-Ali Shah 
was toppled by the constitutionalists on 5th July 1909. The 
confidential diary of Sistan for the week ending 4th
September 1909, reports the following, under entry for 1st
Septemberi
"Mr. Howson wires he has received information that the 
Shokat ol-Molk has been appointed Governor of Kain but 
that the news has not been made public yet. The
Shokat, after taking over charge, has been instructed 
to recover from the Bissam(3) all the revenue 
collected by him and to send him and his son, the 
Heshmat-al-Molk, to Sistan."(4)
Amir Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk, deposed as Deputy Governor 
of Qaenat, refused to leave the district and by 
mid-September, his reluctance in leaving Qaenat was about to 
end in a clash between his men and those of his uncle, Amir
(1) Major Kennion's Defence No. 39, Confidential, Sistan 13th November 1908, FO 248/941.
(2) In the event of the death of Amir Alam Khan III, Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II
was a minor, and was brought up by his elder brother, Amir Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk I.
(3) “Hesam od-Doleh“ the new title of Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Heshmat ol-Molk.
(4) Supplement to the Confidential Diary of Sistan, No. 34, of H.B.M.'s Consul for the week
ending 4th September 1909, FO 248/971.
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Shokat al-Molk. "This affair has come to a head during the 
week. The Heshmat had contrived to delay his departure from 
Birjand by a number of pretexts and excuses, and aided at one 
time by the Russian Consul and latterly by a medical 
certificate from the Russian doctor, affairs were getting 
distinctly strained towards the end and local feeling was 
running very high. One or two assaults were made by the 
Heshmat's followers on persons of the opposite party and it 
looked as if business was bound to end in a free fight. 
Fortunately, however, Baron Cherkasoff has latterly been 
acting in concert with Mr. Howson and the two between them 
have succeeded in impressing upon the Heshmat the error and 
folly of his ways, and he has now, though with the greatest 
reluctance, consented to depart on the 6th December. The 
Shokat al-Molk's position throughout has been a rather 
difficult one as he naturally hesitates to use force with a 
man who is his relative and who only recently was Deputy 
Governor of the province. But during this last week he has 
written officially to the Russian Consul and to Mr. Howson to 
notify them that he soon will be compelled to take definite 
action himself. Such a course would undoubtedly have meant 
bloodshed and it is fortunate that the necessity has been 
averted...."  ^^
This turn of event, at the same time, was a victory for the 
British in their rivalries with the Russians in Sistan and 
Qaenat. The deposed Amir regretted his friendship with the 
Russians as is indicated by the British Consul for Sistan and 
Qaen:
"...the Deputy Governor says the Hesam ad-Doleh has written
to the Mostofi that he was deceived by the Russians, that
they are pressing him for money now, at this critical moment,
and that he is very sorry now that he gave up the friendship
( 2  'Iof the British for that of the Russians."v J
(1) Confidential Diary of Major U.F. O'Connor, H.B.M.'s Consul for Sistan and Qaenat, for the 
week ending 11th September 1909, FO 248/ 971.
(2) Supplement to Sistan Confidential Diary No. 40, for the week ending 16th October 1909, FO 
248/971.
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Amir Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk defied all orders, and 
remained in Qaenat for a long period of time. A series of 
raids against towns and villages of Qaenat by the Baluchi 
tribes took place in the meantime. These raids were blamed 
on Amir Heshmat al-Molk by the British, on the basis that 
certain Baluchi Sardars were his maternal relatives. The new 
British Consul for Sistan and Qaenat asserts in the 
confidential diary No. 46:
"....Hashmat ul-Molk, Deputy Governor of Sistan, 
could, I think, be a strong man but Is Indolently 
Inclined. He is a Baluch from his mother's side and 
therefore has many characteristics of that race. 
Since my arrival in Seistan, I have found him very 
friendly to meet and I am more than inclined to think 
that he wishes to make advances with the Baluch tribes 
in the neighbourhood. His ambition to become Governor 
of the Kainat makes him, I am afraid, use this 
influence against the Shaukat ul-Molk..."(*)
Interviewed by this author, on Wednesday November 14th 1990, 
Amir Hussein Khan Khozeimeh Alam, son of Amir Masum Khan, 
then, Heshmat al-Molk III (later, Hesam ad-Doleh III)/ 
dismissed the accusation stating:
"The Baluchis were, at the time, using the opportunity 
of general state of confusion befallen on the province 
as a result of constant change of administration. The 
Baluchis had always had their own interests in Sistan 
and Qaen. Some of them could have been angered over 
the dismissal from the Governorship of Qaenat of my 
father who was a close relative of their chief and 
they saw Governorship of both Sistan and Qaenat as his 
rightful entitlement. Baluchi raids were not, 
however, the only raids on Qaenat at the time. There 
were raids by the Afghani tribes on the province, 
because of the same state of confusion in the region."
Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam's statement can be verified 
by the fact that there are reports, in the British Consuls’ 
diaries of Afghan raids on Qaenat in the same period when 
Baluchi raids were taking place. Amir Masum Khan Heshmat 
al-Molk's statement to the British and Russian Consuls, at
(1) Sistan Confidential Diary No. 46 of Major F. McConaghey, 26th November 1910, FO 248/1002.
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the time, that "he had received instruction from Tehran to 
proceed against the (Baluchi) robbers and to recover the 
stolen property" and adding that "it was practically 
impossible to corner these nomads in their own hills", ^ 
does not seem to have convinced the British and the 
Russians. The Russians, wishing to bridge the gap between 
themselves and Amir Shokat al-Molk, found this situation a 
good opportunity for trying to win over his friendship and 
co-operation. The Russian Consul in Sistan, Baron 
Tchorkassov, wrote a letter to Amir Shokat al-Molk II, on 12 
March 1911, stating:
"X beg to remind your excellency of the extent and 
heartiness of my friendship towards you. I have for a 
long time awaited a fit opportunity to prove it. Now, 
the lawless doings of Heshmat ul-Mulk, his secret 
instigation and other actions causing mischief and 
damage to your province passed all bounds and I and 
the British Consul cannot restrain ourselves and are 
prepared to assist you in any way possible..."(2)
This whole affair drove Amir Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk II 
further away from the British and the Russians. Not only did 
his relations with the foreign powers never recover 
adequately, but he gradually developed an anti-foreign 
policy. The British also never trusted him again and showed 
their distrust to his son, Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam, 
as the latter remembers. The British, in the meantime, 
endeavoured in Tehran to obtain Amir Heshmat al-Molk's 
dismissal from the Governorship of Sistan:
"H.B.M.1 s Minister has telegraphed to inform me that 
the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs has promised 
to arrange the recall of Heshmat ul-Mulk as soon as 
possible. This is good news..."(3)
(1) Sistan Confidential Diary No. 9, of Major W.F. O'Connor, H.B.M.'s consul for Sistan and
Kain, for the week ending 4th March 1911, p.3, FO 248/1034
(2) Translation of a Letter from Baron Tchorkassov to H.E. Shaukat-ul-Mulk..,. dated 12th March
1911, Sistan Diary for week ending 18th March 1911, FO 248/1034.
(3) Confidential Diary No. 13, of Major O'Connor, H.B.M.'s Consul for Sistan and Kain, for the
week ending 1st ApriL 1911, FO 248/1034.
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The British, by then, were thoroughly disappointed with Amir
Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk, while not thoroughly happy with 
%
Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk either, describing the 
former as "ignorant" and the latter as "a weak man". The 
confidential diary of the British Consulate in Sistan 
asserts:
"The Shokat-ul-Hulk. An amiable but very weak man. 
Whilst the social relations between him and the 
Consulate are excellent, I find that in any official
matters he is a broken reed - easily swayed by bad
counsels. ..the Heshmat-ul-Mulk. Nephew of the 
Shokat-ul-Mulk. A very ignorant, bigoted,
self-conceited man. Whilst far more capable than the
Shokat-ul-Mulk, he is a far greater blackguard and 
stops at nothing which he thinks may further his own 
interests. At one time a protege of the Russians he 
is now, I believe, thoroughly anti-foreign..."(1)
The continued dispute between the two Khozeimeh Amirs
together with general confusion, resulting from the repeated
raids on Qaenat by the Baluchi and Afghani tribes, created an
atmosphere of uncertainty in the district. The Government in
Tehran assigned a Haji Nasir as-Saltaneh as "Sarhad-Dar" or
frontier-keeper, as an authority, temporarily representing
Central Government in that frontier district to restore
order. After a year of efforts, he failed to bring about
peace in the Khozeimeh Amirdom. Consequently, he recommended
the dismissal of the hereditary Governors of both Sistan and 
(2)Qaenat,v ' to be replaced by a fresh man from elsewhere to
be in charge of both provinces. He, in the meantime, put a
number of other people in charge of the revenue, the army,
and the justice affairs, as Government officials. These
measures made Amir Shokat al-Molk telegraph Tehran resigning
/ 3 \
from the Governorships } His resignation was not 
accepted. Both the British and the Russians representations 
in Tehran supported his views. Meanwhile, Amir Shokat
(1) Confidential Diary, No. 18, of Major O'Connor, H.B.M.'s Consul for Sistan and Qaenat, for
the week ending May 3rd, 1911, p. 2, FO 248/1034.
(2) Confidential Diary of Major O'Connor, No. 13, week ending 30th March 1912, FO 248/1056.
(3) Sistan Diary No. 28, of Captain Hunter, week ending 13th July 1912, FO 248/1056.
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al-Molk reconciled with his nephew, Amir Masum Khan Heshmat
al-Molk, on the occasion of the latter's marriage when the
former gave him an expensive present and entertained him
{1 ^lavishly for his wedding. v } This time Amir Masum Khan 
married the daughter of Mirza Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Rafiei, 
son of Mirza Rafi Khan, the Khan of Sunni-Khaneh, who was 
mother to Amir Alam Khan Khozeimeh, Amir Masum Khan's younger 
son. A year later, in August 1913, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Hesam 
ad-Doleh II, his son, Amir Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk, and
Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk received telegrams from the 
Ministry of Interior and from the President of the Majlis, 
insisting on their attendance in Tehran. Amir Ali-Akbar Khan 
Hesam al-Molk was too old to travel, but the other two obeyed
the instruction only after receiving assurances from the
British and Russian Consuls that their absence from the 
Amirdom would not work against their positions. Major 
Prideaux of the British Consulate of Sistan indicates:
"It is now practically settled that Shokat ol-Mulk 
will start on the 8th September and Heshmat-ul-Mulk a 
day or two later. The former refused to travel with 
the latter, telling me that he was afraid of being 
murdered...Shokat ol-Mulk has received from me a 
letter of assurance that he will not be detained in 
Tehran more than a month against his will, and that he 
will not be forced personally into a court of law by 
either Treasurer-General or Yamin-i-Nizam, a relation 
by marriage, who claim properties in Birjand from
him.(2) "Heshmat-ul-Mulk has informed Shokat that
he is going under a guarantee from the Russian Consul 
who assures him that directly he leaves Kainat his 
person and property will be safe we hardly believe 
that Heshmat will go to Tehran, but he tells me that 
he is taking proofs with him that will confound some
of my friends. I believe he means to institute that
my predecessors in the consulate and the political
agent, Chagai, are the real instigators of the Baluch 
raids. Baron Tchorkassov and Heshmat-ul-Mulk have 
dined with each other eight times during Ramadan. It 
will be interesting to see the results of their 
collaboration."(2)
(1) Confidential Diary of Captain J.B.D. Hunter, H.B.M.'s ConsuL for Sistan and Qaenat, No. 37,
for the week ending 14th September 1912, p.2, FO 248/1056.
(2) For the text of the document, see Appendix I.
(3) Confidential Consular Diary of Major F.B. Prideaux, H.B.M.'s Consul for Sistan and Qaen, No.
36, for the week ending 30 August 1913, FO 248/1071.
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However, the British Consulate issued a warning to the three 
Amirs that if they disobeyed the orders from Tehran, "worse 
things would befall the family" This warning made Amir
Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk claim that the summon was related 
to some kind of British intrigue in Tehran. He wrote to the 
British Consul enquiring:
"Seeing that the authorities have ordered me to
present myself at Tehran and I do not know at all the
cause and reason of my having been summoned, I request 
firstly that you very kindly will write me what you 
know regarding this. Secondly, Please say if after my 
arrival at Tehran I shall receive assistance and help 
in my affairs from the British Legation and yourself. 
Thirdly, please write whether you yourself, during the 
period of your stay in this province have ever 
observed (God forbid), disrespect and anything but
devotion and sincerity from me to yourself, or
anything peculiar or contrary to the usages required 
for the maintenance of proper friendly 
relations.” (2)
The British Consul, replying to this letter, stated:
"....You have undoubtedly been summoned to Tehran at 
the instance of the British Legation to answer for the 
losses which have occurred to British subjects at the 
hands of Baluch, Afghan and Sistan robbers during your 
incumbency of the Government of Sistan as the Deputy
Governor of your father His Excellency  the extent
of our claims is about tumans 26,500, and in addition
as a sign of the displeasure of His Britannic
Majesty's Government at your neglect and disregard for 
British interests, the Persian Government have been 
requested to prohibit you from returning to the 
vicinity of Qaen and Sistan for some time to come... I 
feel sure that you will be acting wisely by going to 
Tehran and your compliance with the orders of your
Government will certainly be a source of pleasure both 
to the Cabinet and to His Britannic Majesty's
Minister."(2)
(1) Confidential Diary of Major Prideaux, No. 31, for the week ending 2nd August 1913, FO
248/1071.
(2) From Amir Masum Khan to Major Prideaux, dated Sistan 7th September 1913, FO 248/1071. For
the text of the original letter, see Appendix II.
(3) From Major Prideaux to Amir Masum Khan, dated Sistan 9th September 1913, FO 248/1071. For
the text of the original Letter, see Appendix III,
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Meanwhile, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Hesam ad-Doleh II, Heshmat
al-Molk II, died at 6 p.m., on 22nd of January 1915.
His elder son, Amir Mohammad-Reza Khan Samsam ad-Doleh, was
still Deputy Governor of Sistan, whereas his fourth son, Amir
Masum Khan Heshmat al-Molk III, kept away from Sistan and
Qaenat, but inherited the father's title "Hesam ad-Doleh".
At the same time, a concerted smear campaign against Amir
Shokat al-Molk, then Amir of Qaenat and Sistan, began in
Tehran. The first of a series of newspaper articles accusing
(2 \him of all manner of swindles appeared in January 1915.v ' 
These accusations soon continued to take a political shape
and the Amir was soon to be accused of being an Anglophile 
and working for the interests of the British.
Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh still stranded in Tehran,
wrote to Amir Shokat al-Molk on 6th January 1915, asking him 
to intervene with the British to allow him to return home:
" if you liked, you could at once express your
real wish in two words to them and the affair would be 
settled and finished. The thing which keeps me
convinced in this opinion is that I have had many 
verbal conversations with the Minister and Mr.
Churchill and it has always happened that all their
remarks have ended with recommendations for the
success of your Governorship and they have never laid 
any stress on the claims of their subjects..." (2)
Meanwhile, interviewed by this author, on June 26 th 1991, 
Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam said the following as being 
the reasons for his father being kept in Tehran for six 
months:
"In Tehran, my father went to see Ein ad Doleh (the 
Prime Minister). When he wanted to leave the building 
the officer on the post prevented his exit. He was 
kept in the Golestan Palace for six months. The
(1) Confidential Sistan Diary No. 4, for the week ending 23rd January 1915, FO 248/1116.
(2) Confidential Sistan Diary No. 4, for the week ending 23rd January 1915, FO 248/1116.
(3) Confidential Sistan Diary of Major Prideaux, No. 4, 23rd January 1915, FO 248/1116.
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reason for this detention was said to have been his 
opposition to the English. After six months, Ein 
ad-Doleh arranged reconciliation between him and
British diplomats, and he, therefore, was able to 
return. The reason for his opposition to the English 
was that he (Hesam ad-Doleh III) protested against
hoisting the Union Jack on the grounds of their
consulate instead of hoisting it above the building, 
and the English, for their part, accused him of
inciting and supporting Baluchi raids on Qaenat."
While in Tehran, Amir Hesam ad-Doleh employed all his energy
and influence, not only to return to his inherited seat of
Governorship of Sistan, but also to secure for himself the
Governorship of Qaenat. As Amir Shokat al-Molk felt the
danger of Amir Hesam ad-Doleh's presence in Tehran was
becoming more harmful than his presence in the Amirdom, asked
the British to make it possible for him to return to 
(1}Birjand.' ’ Meanwhile, reports began to emerge that Amir 
Hesam ad-Doleh was being considered for the Governorship of 
Tabas:
"J have heard from His Majesty's Consul-General, 
Meshed, that this young man is likely to get the 
Governorship of Tabas. Our Governor, Shaukat al-Molk, 
tells me that he will be pleased if the report is 
true, as his nephew will get occupation, and he is 
capable of doing more mischief whether he stays in 
Tehran or returns to Birjand as a private 
individual."(2)
A new development began to take shape in the meantime, which 
disturbed Amir Shokat al-Molk's so-called special relations 
with the British. A group of Germans entered the Khozeimeh 
Amirdom, seemingly enroute to Afghanistan. The British 
Consulate was determined to detain them for interrogation to 
find out the exact purpose of their mission. Amir Shokat 
al-Molk refused to cooperate with the British in that 
enterprise, arguing that his country was neutral in the
(1) From Amir Hesam ad-Doleh to Amir Shokat al-Molk, Tehran 6th January 1915, FO 248/1116.
(2) Telegraph from Major Prideaux, H.B.M.'s Consul for Sistan and Qaenat, to British Legation at 
Tehran, No. 24, dated 24th January 1915, FO 248/1116.
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on-going world war. Reporting the matter to his Government, 
British Consul at Sistan indicated:
"...I shall try to intercept them with the assistance 
of Afghan camel-men whom I can arm, if they hurry 
through this province. The Governor is really afraid 
of acting in an un-neutral manner, and is awaiting 
instructions for which he has telegraphed, from 
Tehran.(1)
"....on the 25th July the long expected telegram for 
the Governor from the Minister of the Interior 
arrived. It was to the effect that he was to preserve 
strict neutrality 1
...on the 27th I made a final appeal to the Governor 
to take strong action against the Germans and he said 
he would certainly decide on his course of action 
after one more reference to Tehran.
"....At 1 a. m. on the 30th July I was woke up by the 
Deputy Governor, who informed me that His Excellency 
had at last been ordered by the Foreign Minister to 
arrest the Germans and disarm their SAWARS.(2) At 
the same time His Excellency had heard that a force of 
cossacks was within 16 miles of Kain and would 
doubtless have attacked the Germans before a force 
from Birjand could appear on the scene.
"...I thought the Birjand force should await further 
news, and be employed in arresting the Germans if they 
should vacate Kain and make for Birjand or the 
frontier before the Russians arrived. On the 31st 
July we heard that the Russians had reached Kain at 3 
a.m. They exchanged some shots with the Germans over 
the gardens, And one Cossack was wounded. At six a.m. 
the Germans disappeared! it is rumoured that they flew 
off in a balloon but it is not known how the 
Bakhtyaris went!"(3)
Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh III was, at this time, given 
the Governorship of the frontier state of Tabas and his elder 
half-brother who was serving as deputy Governor of Sistan 
received a telegram from the central Government ordering him 
to "supply 50 infantry men and 20 camel Sawars for service at 
Gonabad, under his brother. The men were to be paid from
(1) Confidential Diary of Sistan and Kain Consulate, No. 27 for the week ending 3rd July 1915,
FO 248/1116.
(2) Cavalry-men.
(3) Confidential Sistan Diary No. 31 for week ending 31st July 1915, FO 248/1116.
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Sistan r e v e n u e " . B y  September 11th 1915, Amir Hesam
ad-Doleh's Governorship was not confirmed as a bribe of 3000
tumans was demanded of him. He asked his uncle Amir Shokat
/ o \
al-Molk to lend him the money. v 1 The appointment of this
Amir was eventually finalised for the districts of Khoaf and
Gonabad in early November that year.^ ) Amir Shokat
al-Molk, still at odds with the British and Russians on the
question of neutrality between them and the German emissaries
in the district, began his efforts to patch up the
differences: "On the 11th December 1915 Shokat-al-Molk called
(4 )upon Mr Newv } and showed him a telegram from Farman Farma 
which, apparently and according to his statement had been 
received the previous day, and announcing that friendly 
relations had been established with the British and Russian 
governments and instructing the Governor to help the 
British.^ ^ )
Amir Shokat al-Molk decided to ignore the telegraph arguing 
that he could not trust its authenticity as it was received 
through the Indo-European telegraph line. He, thus, decided 
to uphold the policy of neutrality that his country had 
adopted in the World War I. The British had by then changed
heart once again, and decided to remove Amir Shokat al-Molk
from the Governorship, replacing him with Amir Masum Khan 
Hesam ad-Doleh. The British Consul-General at Meshed 
telegraphed the British Legation at Tehran stating:
"X have the worst opinion of Shaukat's loyalty. His 
sympathies may be anti-Russian rather than 
anti-British, but I believe that he has helped and is 
willing to help Germans against both of us.
(1) Confidential Sistan Diary No. 36, for the week ending 4th September 1915, FO 248/1116.
(2) Confidential Sistan Diary No. 37, for the week ending 11th September 1915, FO 248/1116.
(3) Confidential Sistan Diary No. 45, for the week ending 6th November 1915, FO 248/1116.
(4) British Vice-Consul at Birjand.
(5) Confidential Sistan Diary No. 50 for the week ending 11th December 1915, for the text of 
this telegram, see Appendix IV.
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"I do not think an outsider could be placed in Sistan, 
Kain, or in either owing to tribal feeling. Shaukat's 
influence in Sistan is I believe small and dislikes 
it, so that if it is intended to punish him it might 
be well to send him there. Hisam's influence however 
extends to Sistan as well as to Kainat and whatever 
his character may be he will probably assist us at the 
present time in return for appointment and with 
example of Shaukat's downfall before him. Without
knowing anything of proposal he has intimated he is 
prepared to help us, signed Haig."(l)
This was done and Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh was
appointed as Governor of Sistan and Qaenat which was the 
fulfilment of his lifetime ambition, whereas Amir Ebrahim 
Khan Shokat al-Molk was exiled from Birjand to Tehran. In 
February 1916, while out of the Amirdom, he was rumoured to 
be contemplating joining the Ottomans, but it was proved to 
be wrong. With his dismissal, however, Amir Mohammad-Reza
Khan, resigned from Deputy Governorship of Sistan. His
brother, Amir Masum Khan Hesam ad-Doleh accepted his
resignation and tried to replace him by an outsider. 
Reporting these rumours, British Consul for Sistan states:
"It is rumoured here that Hisam-ud-Doleh contemplates sending
Sartip Zabiullah Khan, the worthless but comparatively
harmless, local Cavalry Commander, back to Sistan as Deputy
Governor. I have already informed His Majesty's Minister
that I would like to have Rukn-ul-Wizarah, the outgoing
Kargozar, confirmed in this appointment of which he has been
< 2 \
holding charge since last February."'* 1
Meanwhile, the British found the exiled Amir Shokat al-Molk's 
presence in Tehran unsatisfactory. The British Consul at 
Sistan recommended the Amir to be expelled from Tehran, 
because: "It seems desirable that Shaukat-ul-Mulk should be
expelled from Tehran as quickly as possible, if we are not to
(1) Telegram from H.B.H.'s ConsuL-GeneraL, Mashhad, to H.B.M.‘s Legation, Tehran, No. 1, dated 
Mashhad 3rd January 1916, FO 248/1151.
(2) Confidential Sistan Diary No. 28, for the week ending 8th July 1916, FO 248/1151.
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lose Hisam ud-Duleh's confidence in our ability and 
inclination to retain him in office".
On the other hand, the press campaign against Amir Shokat
al-Molk, trying to deform his character, began once again in
Tehran at the same time. Mirza Ahmad Khan Naraghi, who used
to be Governor of the Shokatiyeh School (the school
established by Amir Shokat al-Molk in Birjand on his own
expenses) and later dismissed for his unsuitable conducts,
waged this campaign against the exiled Amir in his newspaper
"Shahab-e Saqeb" accusing him of being an Anglophile. He was
arrested in April 1916 by the Russians at Kashan and the
British claimed that the arrest took place at their
/ 2)
instigation. v • Still in exile, a son was born to the
Amir's wife on 22nd April 1916, who subsequently died. 
Another development was the death of Molla Mohammad Mehdi, 
chief Mojtahed of Sistan who was involved in local politics 
on the side of Amir Shokat al-Molk when relations between the 
latter and the British were good:
"Mullah Muhammad Mehdi died on the 30th January 1916. Of
late years he has been on quite friendly terms with the 
Consulate. He secretly held a considerable number of shares 
in the Imperial Bank of Persia. His estate is believed to be 
worth 100, 000 tumans."^  5
In August 1916 Rokn ad-Doleh received a telegram from Tehran,
appointing him as Deputy Governor of Sistan the way the
British Consul at Sistan had asked the British Legation at
(4)Tehran to support his appointment to the post.v •
(1) Confidential Sistan Diary No. 18, for the week ending 18th April 1916, FO 248/1151.
(2) Mashhad Confidential Diary, April 1916, p. 2. FO 248/1151.
(3) Mashhad Confidential Diary, April 1916, FO 248/1151.
(4) Confidential Consulate Diary of Mashhad, April 1916, FO 248/1151.
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Amir Shokat al-Molk's movements in exile were monitored by 
the British who gradually concluded that he was a 
Germanophile. His nephew and rival, Amir Hesam ad-Doleh did 
his best to deepen the British distrust of the exiled Amir: 
"Hisam ud-Dauleh has heard from his Tehran Agent that Shaukat 
ul-Mulk had recently accompanied Mr. Churchill to Lar for a 
few days. On his return, when he learnt that the Turkish 
force was between Hamadan & Kazerin, he was so glad that he 
almost proceeded to join it. This last item of news seems 
significant when compared with the Meshed Diary information 
of September 2nd..."^^
Amir Shokat al-Molk however, returned to his Amirdom after 
about two years in exile. The British, by then, realised 
that he was neither Germanophile nor Anglophile All that 
concerned him was preservation of his country's declared 
policy of neutrality in the war. The British, thus, decided 
to make good with him by presenting the Amir with a Humobile:
"With reference to your telegram No, 509-S., dated 
3rd May 1920, I have the honour to inform you that the 
Humobile car was duly presented to His Excellency 
Shaukat-ul-Mulk in Birjand. "His Excellency desires
me to convey to the Government of India his gratitude 
for this gift..."(2)
Amir Shokat al-Molk continued his Governorship of Qaenat and
Sistan until 1935. On September 24, 1935, he resigned from
the Governorship, dividing it into two separate Governorships
of Qaenat and Sistan, between his two nephews. Amir Masum
Khan Hesam ad-Doleh, his old rival, was given the
Governorship of Qaenat, and Amir Mohammad-Reza Khan Samsam
ad-Doleh, who had served as Deputy Governor of Sistan for
(3 \
many years, was given the Governorship of Sistan.v '
(1) Confidential Diary of Sistan ConsuLate No. 39, week ending 16th September 16, FO 248/1151.
(2) From H.B.H.'s Consul for Sistan and Kain, T.V. Brenan, to the Secretary to the Government of 
India in the Foreign and Political Department, dated Simla 24th July 1920, FO 248/1314.
(3) Meshed Political Diary of British Consulate-General, 24 September 1935, FO 371/19421.
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Amir Shokat al-Molk died in December 1944, at the time when 
Soviet Union's "forward policy" was taking shape in Iran. 
Soon after the Amir's death, the Tudeh (Communist)Party opened 
its branch in Birjand and began a retaliatory stance against 
his family accusing Amir Shokat al-Molk as an Anglophile. 
This was to serve two purposes; one was retaliation against 
the late Amir's non-conciliatory policy of the previous
decades towards Russia, and later Soviet, designs in East 
Iran; two, the Amir and his family were wealthy landlords, 
representing the bourgeois of the district on the one hand,
and respect for him and his family on the other, would
prevent spread of pro-Soviet party's influence in the 
district. Hence, the allegation against Amir Shokat al-Molk, 
of being Anglophile, initiated earlier by other adversaries 
of the family, was propagated more forcefully and extensively 
in Iran. Paragraphs 137 and 138 of British Consul's diary of 
18th July 1945 notes:
"137_. The Hizb-i-Tudeh came officially to birth on 
the 21st June when the local leader, Amiri inf­
ormed the Governor (1) in writing of the formation of a 
Birjand branch of the party. Next day Amiri had a 
long private interview with the Governor, a mild 
inexperienced young man put in by the late Shaukat to 
obey orders. At this meeting Amiri is believed to have 
hinted at "strong measures" if the Governor put any 
obstacles in the way of the Hizb. On the 12th July,
the Tudeh committee invited all the officials, 
notables, and general public to a tea party to 
celebrate the birth of Imam Hussain (this was a move 
to conciliate the religious elements). None of the 
higher officials or representatives of the Alam and 
Khozeimeh families (to which Shaukat belonged) 
attended, but over 500 other Birjandis did and the 
function seems to have been a success.
"138. H.B.M.'s Consul-General's impression after a 
week in Birjand is that the Shaukat's sudden death 
could not have been worse timed. It came just when 
the new Soviet "forward policy" was taking shape all 
over Persia as a result of the oil concessions 
crisis. The Shokat's son and heir, Amir Asadollah 
Alam, is a fine character and a worthy successor to 
his father in whose place in the Qainat he undoubtedly 
intends to fill to the best of his ability. But the 
funeral obsequies and the necessity for him to secure 
his position with the Shah and cabinet at Tehran kept
(1) Now an administrative appointee, not related to the traditional Amirdom.
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him away from the province during five of the eight 
months following his father's death and he has only 
just (July 9th) returned permanently to Birjand with 
his wife and infant daughter.- Meanwhile the 
disaffected elements and would be quislings have made 
hay while the sun shone, assisted by the blunderings 
of the well-meaning but weak little Governor. 
Hitherto at Birjand itself, 31 of local Tudeh members 
and 16 sympathisers who may or may not be members have 
been identified. ... As may be expected from the above 
analysis, the party is one of discontented bourgeois, 
not proletarians. The unifying motive is jealousy of 
the Alam and Khozeima families and of the rich and 
successful Agha Sipahri, hereditary Mirakhor or Master 
of the Horse to the Shaukat whose business affairs he 
used to manage. The Hizb-i Tudeh has declared war on 
the Alam family and Sipahri by publishing violent 
articles against them in the Tudeh press of Tehran and 
Meshed and attacking them publicly from the platform 
at Birjand itself. It remains to be seen whether, in 
the absence of Red Army Tommy - Gunners, the movement 
will make further progress now that Asadollah Alam is 
back in the home of his father."(1)
CONCLUSION
The Khozeimeh Amirdom's foreign relations were, in reality, 
limited to the 19th and early 20th centuries. These relations 
were largely restricted to those with the two rival foreign 
powers of the time, the British and the Russians, later the 
Soviets. Internally, conflicts between the Khozeimeh Amirs 
on the one hand, and Anglo-Russian rivalries in eastern parts 
of Iran, on the other, were the main determining factors, 
shaping these relations. The Anglo-Soviet rivalries in 
Eastern Iran entered a new phase in the 1930s and 1940s. The 
Soviet Consulate at Zabul was closed in 1930 by the order of 
Reza Shah whose officials argued that there was no reason for 
a Soviet Consulate in Sistan as no Soviet nationals resided 
in that district. A consulate agent was however kept in the 
region (in Zahedan) by the Soviets. In August 1946 Sardar 
Mohammad-Reza Khan Pordeli, Shah-Qoli Khan, and Agha Ebrahim 
Sharifi organised a petition, asking for the Soviet Consulate
(1) Secret and Confidential Meshed Diary No. 9, of British ConsuLate-General, dated 18th July 
1945, FO 371/45475.
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to be reopened in Sistan, and took it to Tehran, but the
(1)demand was turned down.' * A year earlier, the Tudeh 
(Communist) Party, directly supported by the Soviets, opened 
its branch in Birjand (June 1946) and very soon took over the 
task of rivalries with the British. The following report by 
the British Consul at Zahedan is probably the best example of 
Tudeh Party branch's new role in Qaenat and Sistan districts:
"On evening of August 5th party to Governor and 
notables was given in British Consulate. Local Tudeh 
received instructions from Tehran to give opposition 
entertainment at same time but was poorly 
attended."(2)
The Soviets, at this time, were still firmly established in 
northern Iranian provinces, including Khorasan. Late in June 
1945, the Soviet Consul-General at Mashhad made a tour of 
Qaenat, Sistan and Zahedan. The British Consul-General's 
confidential diary No. 9, reporting on the Soviet Consul - 
General's tour, states:
"H.B.M.'s Consul - General who happened to arrive at 
Birjand the day after his Soviet colleague passed 
through, learned from the Governor that M. Abramov 
had displayed great interest (i) in the condition of 
the labourers in the carpet factories (ii) in the 
personalities of sitting Deputy, Munsif, and rival 
candidates for the next elections and (Hi) in the 
numbers and leaders of the newly formed local branch 
of the Hizb-i-Tudeh."(3)
This massive upsurge of Soviet interest and activities in 
Eastern Iran was a local manifestation of Soviet Union's new 
"forward policy" taking shape all over Iran as a result of 
the oil concession crisis of 1945. A concession for oil 
exploration in Northern Iran promised to the Soviets, by 
Prime Minister Qavam as-Saltaneh in return for the withdrawal 
of Soviet forces from Azarbaijan. The withdrawal of Soviet
(1) Savingram from H.B.M.‘s Consul-Zahedan to H.M.'s Consul-General. Meshed, No. 295, dated 22nd
August 1946, FO 371/52707.
(2) Savingram No. 281, from H.B.M.'s Consul-Zahedan to H.M. Consul-General, Meshed, 18th August
1946, FO 371/52756.
(3) Political Diary No. 9, of British Consul-General, secret and confidential, Meshed, 18th
July 1945, FO 371/45475.
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forces was completed, but oil concession was not ratified by 
the Iranian Majlis. The Soviet-backed Tudeh party's branch 
at Birjand entered the local politics vigorously from the 
beginning, strongly opposing the British and the Khozeimeh 
family, supporting all those opposed to them, landlords and 
peasants alike. Thus, the old Anglo-Russian rivalries in 
Eastern Iran took a new turn, this time the Tudeh party 
acting on behalf of Soviet Union and the Khozeimeh family and 
its influence in the district, the main target. This turn of 
events gradually changed the political atmosphere, shaping 
the old rivalries into new domestic politics of the district 
which was a local model of what was happening in Iran as a 
whole. At the same time, local disenchantments and 
dissatisfactions translated themselves into the membership of 
or sympathy for Tudeh party. Hence, many of nobilities of 
the old order, including the Qajar princes who were deprived 
of their power and privileges by Reza Shah were to be found 
amongst the early Tudehs.
In Sistan also, it was no surprise that Tudeh sympathies came 
from the normally unlikely candidates, from the Government 
officials, from landlords and local headmen, and from 
merchants and clerics. A telegram from the British Consul at 
Zahedan to the British Consulate-General at Mashhad contains 
the names of a number of Sistani local dignitaries as 
sympathisers of the Soviet-backed Tudeh party's Birjand 
branch. The document indicates:
"Governor has also recommended the removal of the following, 
known for their Tudeh sympathies:
Officials:
Jalaludin Firoz, Rais-i-Adlieh
Agha Faizhid, Registration officer
Dr. Kalhudi, Medical officer
Agha Ashari, Director, posts and telegraphs
Sargourd Safapour, Frontier officer
Agha Malik Kiyani, Public Prosecutor
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Non-Officials:
1) Shah Quli Khan,
2) Mohammad Reza Khan Purdeli (once exiled from Sistan 
by late Shah),
3) Agha Sharifi,
4) Agha Mirza Abbas Qaimi"^^
Of the above named, two are of greater interest here, as they
played a leading role in political activities, generally
directed against the influence of the Khozeimeh family in
Qaenat and Sistan* They are Sardar Mohammad-Reza Khan
Pordeli, a leading landlord of Sistan, and Agha Sharifi, an
active cleric of Sistan. Sardar Mohammad-Reza Khan Pordeli,
once described in the Confidential Diary of the British
Consulate-General at Mashhad, as "one of the disgruntled
/ 2 \
Sardars and landowners of Sistan whom Konopatkinv ; has
(3 ^taken under his wing"v ' was exiled from Sistan in the time 
of Reza Shah Pahlavi, for having taken a large number of 
camels and other live stocks in a raid on Afghanistan 
territories. He was exiled as a result of a strong protest 
from the Afghan Government which, if not responded to 
favourably would harm relations between the two countries at 
the time of negotiations for boundary settlement of 1935 
which secured half of the Hirmand waters for the Iranian 
Sistan.
In 1945, when Reza Shah's strong rule in Iran had been 
succeeded by the weak Governments of his son, and while the 
Soviets still maintained their power and influence in 
Khorasan, Sardar Mohammad Reza Khan Pordeli's men carried 
another raid on Afghanistan and took 900 camels. The Afghan
(1) Savingram, secret, from H.M. Consul-Zahedan, to H.M. Consul-General, Meshed, No. 281, dated 
8th August 1946, FO 371/52707.
(2) Soviet Consular Agent at Sistan.
(3) Secret Diary of British Consulate-General, No. 37-1/1, Meshed, dated 15th May 1945, FO 
371/52707.
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Government complained to the Iranian Government. No action 
was taken against him, because of the political atmosphere in 
the country. Any action against this Sardar would only cause 
agitations on the grounds that Soviet and Tudeh supporters 
were being victimised. This was at least the reason for the 
lack of action against him, provided by British Consul:
".... unfortunately through lack of initiative of the 
Firmandar(1) no action was taken. If action were 
taken now there would be howls from certain quarters 
' ’ ' ’ ' victimised because he was friendly
Agha Ebrahim Sharifi was a cleric of Sistan whose interest in 
politics was, apparently, a late development. A memorandum 
from the British vice-Consul at Zahedan describes him as: 
"...has interested himself in politics only very recently, 
although it has been known for some time that the Russian
Consular Agent has been making approaches to him through Shah 
Quli Khan. Since the selfish aims which induced Agha Sharifi 
to take this step have by no means been achieved yet, a few 
details may be of interest. He is the son of Agha Mod, Ali 
Shariati, who, like his brother Sheikh Haji Reza, was a firm 
friend of this Consulate in the days before Reza Shah 
Pahlavi. In 1943 Ibrahim Sharifi proceeded on pilgrimage to
Kerbala, and on return, immediately started to intrigue with
a view to capturing the position of leading Mujtahid in Zabul 
from Agha Sadar. The latter1s position is very strong 
because, apart from being a sayyed, he is himself a big 
landlord, and accordingly has the support of the late
Shaukat-ul-Mulk1s family and of the Sardars on both counts. 
In 1944 Ibrahim Sharifi launched a public subscription for 
opening a religious school, to which K.S. Bashirullah 
contributed Ts. 10,000/. Insufficient money was collected
and the project was scaled down to the construction of an
(1) Governor.
(2) Secret and Confidential Diary No. 37-1/1, of British Consulate-GeneraL, dated Meshed, 15th 
May 1946, p. 4, FO 371/52707.
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Hussainia."^^ The report goes on indicating that Agha 
Sadar the Mojtahed started construction of a larger
Hosseiniyeh to which Amir Shokat al-Molk's son, Amir 
Asadollah Khan Alam, contributed noticeably. This move was 
interpreted as support of the Khozeimeh (Alam) family for 
Agha Sadar and it is not improbable that it added to the 
failure of Agha Sharifi's religious competition against Agha 
Sadar and induced him to embark on his adventure in politics 
on the opposition to the Khozeimeh family. The election 
campaign of 194 6 resulted in disagreements between those
supporting the family and the official candidate, and those 
supported by the Soviet Consulate Agent and Tudeh party. The 
election campaign turned ugly as several Government officials 
were killed in a riot instigated by Sardar Mohammad-Reza Khan 
and Agha Sharifi who was the unofficial candidate.
Interviewed by this author on Wednesday 2nd January 1991,
Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam stated:
"Agha Ebrahim Sharifi signed on the back of the holy
Qoran for me, at the time, in promise that he had no
role in instigating the riot."
This incident was the manifestation of the kind of political 
atmosphere created in Qaenat and Sistan by the long-standing 
rivalries between the British and the Soviet Consulates, 
often involving local affairs. Memories of this political 
atmosphere still lingers on in the region and there are still 
those who remember the days that the pro-Soviet feelings were 
translated into anti-Khozeimeh family activities or vice 
versa, with the mysterious "Dast-e Englis" or the English 
hand always colouring the background of all stories.
(1) Confidential Memorandum No. 19-S/9(c). From H.M.'s Vice-Consul, Zabul/Zahedan; to H.M.'s 
Consul, Zahedan, dated 25th February 1946, FO 371/52756.
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Amir Mohammad-Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk 
flanked by the British (left) and Russian (right) 
diplomatic missions at Birjand in early 20th Century, 
before the advent of the Pahlavi regime.
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Appendix II
The original text of a telegram from the Ministry of the 
Interior to Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II, instructing 
the latter to assist the British by arresting German 
emissaries travelling through his Amirdom to Afghanistan, 
dated 25th July 1915, FO 248/1116.
C H A P T E R  I V
THE PARTITIONING OF KHORASAN 
A STUDY OF BACKGROUND TO THE EMERGENCE OF 
EASTERN IRANIAN BOUNDARIES
INTRODUCTION
Since this thesis is aimed at a study of the evolution of 
Eastern Iranian boundaries with special reference to the 
boundaries of Sistan, and since the partitioning of Sistan in 
1872 was justified on the merits of political developments of 
the post-Nader Shah period in Khorasan, no positive 
assessment of the evolution of these boundaries can scape an 
adequate study of the said developments. In other words, the 
partitioning of Sistan was, in reality, but an aftermath of 
the partitioning of Khorasan in the preceding two decades or 
so: a better understanding of the circumstances leading to
the partitioning of Khorasan is closely examined.
It seems only appropriate to open this section with a 
quotation from Lord George N. Curzon whose works on Iran and 
Afghanistan are regarded as of the most authoritative. He 
asserts:
"Persia cannot forget that what is now Western 
Afghanistan has through the greater part of history 
been Eastern Khorasan, that Herat has been habitually 
ruled by persian sovereigns, viceroys governors, or 
vassals, that it is inhabited by people of Persian 
rather than Afghan traditions and sympathies, and that 
it is severed by no physical or ethnographical barrier 
from Meshed...."(1)
The Afghan historians have in the past century or so,
endeavoured to present a different picture of this
situation. A historical picture in which Iran and
Afghanistan emerge as two different political entities, busy
(2)colonising each other since the dawn of man's history.' '
(1) Curzon, George N. <1892), "Persia and the Persian Question", Vol. II, p.586.
(2) See for example; Ghobar, Mir G. Mohammad (1965), "Afghanistan Dar Masir-e Tarikh", published
in Kabul.
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Yet, the fact that remains is that Iran's Eastern flanks 
have, for the best part of the past 25 centuries, included 
some central and most western parts of the modern countries 
of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
As from the second half of the 18th century, when British 
Indian power began to consolidate its influence in the 
largest parts of south and central Asia, other European 
powers, mainly France and Russia, extended the sphere of 
their geopolitical aspirations eastward and continued their 
rivalries with the British all over Asia. Iranian power was, 
at this period in time, on the decline following the 
assassination of Nader Shah Afshar in June 1747, and the 
chaos that it caused. The power and influence of British 
India was, by contrast, on the rise. To counter the 
influence of the rival powers, British India began to create 
a buffer zone between itself, Iran and Russia, the former 
suspected, throughout the Qajar period (1779 - 1924) of being 
influenced by the French and Russians. Hence, the Eastern 
Iranian frontiers became the subject of a series of changes 
and modifications, shifting from the Easternmost part of 
Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchistan to the central parts of 
these three extensive provinces and resulting in the creation 
of Afghanistan and the British Baluchistan (Kalat, later 
Pakistan). The study of these changes and modifications 
constitutes the discussion in this chapter.
THE PARTITIONING OF KHORASAN AND CREATION OF AFGHANISTAN
Having almost completed his long and arduous campaign of 
unifying Iran, Nader Shah Afshar was assassinated in the 
middle of the nigh on June 19th 1747, after a brief struggle 
with his assassins. The next morning the whole camp was in 
chaos, most leaders took their contingents and headed towards 
their own districts. The Afghan and Uzbak contingents held 
together, under the command of Nour Mohammad, seconded by 
Ahmad Khan Abdali. Both these two men, loyal to the memory 
of their late sovereign, took up arms and prevented the 
pillage of the royal tents. This act of loyalty would not,
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in any way, suggest that the Afghans were, by then, 
considering themselves as being people of a different country.
In a decree issued on 16 Shawal 1167 (1753) Ahmad Shah does not even mention 
the name "afghanistan". Instead, he speaks of hope that he would "God willing ... 
bring under dontrol the whole of Iran ...". (1).
Having found themselves outnumbered by the rest of the Naderi 
forces, however, the Afghan commanders led their troops in 
their fateful march towards the east. On their arrival in 
Qandehar, the leaders of the Afghan tribes decided to go 
their own way by choosing their own king and creating their 
own kingdom. They selected Ahmad Khan Abdali of the Durrani 
tribe for the post, giving him the title "Shah" of 
Afghanistan,^^ Thus, the kingdom of Afghanistan was born 
under the rule of its first Shah, Ahmad Abdali "Durrani". <3)
{ I ) Ahmnd Shah Durrani's Farman (decree) of 16 Shawal 1167 ( 1753 ), as appeared in " Fnrhnng-e Irnn-Zamin", 
pcrsn in  puh licn lion , Tehran 1958, p p . 161 163.
(2) G.P, Tate, an authority on Afghanistan history describes this development in the
following terms:
"Sabir Shah who had followed Ahmad to the camp, rejoined him on the way eastwards. 
This person was one of those wandering and semi-insane fakirs (very common even in the 
present day), whose incoherent utterances, and irresponsible actions are regarded stiLL 
with awe by superstitious persons, as inspired by the Almighty.
"Nur Muhammad was an eccentric and irritable person who owed his promotion to Nadir 
Shah, but he was unpopular with the Abdalis whom he commanded. As long as they were on the 
march the authority of their commander was regarded, but when Kandahar was reached in
safety, Nur Muhammad was set on one side.
"The leaders of the tribes, such as Haji Jamal Khan, the Barakzai, Muhabat Khan 
Popalzai, Musa Dungi the famous Ishakzai chief, Nur Mohammad, Alizai, Nasr-llLlah Khan, the 
Nurzai Sardar and others, met in solemn conclave at the Shrine of Surkh Sher Baba. They 
were quite unanimous that it was very expedient that they should have a king to manage 
their affairs, for the times were troublous and there were persons on alL sides asserting 
their claims to independence. The question to be decided was who should be king. Not one 
of these powerful chiefs would acknowledge the superiority of the claims or his peers. 
Ahmad Khan by virtue of his rank and family was present at the debates, and Sabir Shah's 
calling also made him welcome. He cut short the discussion by producing a tiny sheaf of 
wheat, and placing it in Ahmad Khan's turban, declared that no one in that assembLy was so
fit for the kingship as Ahmad Khan, the flower of the Duranis. The words and act of the
eccentric fakir were regarded by all as a happy solution of the difficulty. Probably, 
also, they were regarded as a manifestation of the Divine will revealed through the holy 
man to the assembled chiefs. The scene was the shrine of a well known saint, who might be 
regarded therefore as being interested in the debate." Tate, G.P., op. cit. above, pp.68 - 9.
(3) The first revolt of the Abdalis of Afghanistan against the Iranian Governorship of their
district took pLace at the time of Shah Abbas the Great (Safavid) in late 17th century. 
The Government at Isfahan commissioned Gorgin Khan, Vali of Gorgestan (Georgia) as 
Governor of Qandehar (1692) who brought the unrest under control by expelling the Abdali 
leaders.
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The name "Afghanistan” was, according to some historians, 
invented in the 16th century by the Moghul Empire of India, 
as a convenient term referring to the districts and
dependencies of Kabul. The term had existed in the older 
chronicles, first used in the Ghaznavid writings of the 13th 
century, when the term was applied to the mountain and 
cultivable tracts which were the Afridis and Vaziris. Sir
Percy Sykes asserts that General Houtrum Schindler believed 
that the Afghans were termed "Aghvans" in the Safavid
times
The country which emerged in mid-18th century was largely the 
home of three distinct races
(i) The Hazaras located mostly to the west of the road 
from Qandehar to Kabul, who are mostly of 
Mongolian origin.
(ii) Tajiks, who include most of the settled
population. They are agriculturalists with 
Persian as their native language. They are the 
descendants of the ancient race, who had migrated 
from Central Asia to Iran. Tate describes them 
as: one people and in all probability they
represent the original Iranian or Aryan race, 
among whom Zoroaster published his doctrine; among 
whom the Greek colonists of Alexander 
settled....^  ^
(iii) The Afghans who are nomadic by origin, and 
consider themselves as warriors. They are said to 
be Pathans, the name of the people mentioned by 
writers of antiquity. Afghan is applied to the 
tribes collectively, and also to the pastoral 
nomads among them.
(1) Sykes, Sir Percy (1902), ‘Ten Thousand Miles in Persia", footnote to page 364.
(2) Tate, G . P . ,  M R A S ,  F R G S ,  ’The Kingdom of Afghanistan*, Delhi, reprinted 1973, P. 4
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The history of Afghanistan is practically the story of two 
great confederacies led by the Durranis and Ghelzais, both of 
which have ruled the territories of Afghanistan from time to 
time.
THE PARTITIONING OF KHORASAN
Greater Khorasan had, until the assassination of Nader Shah 
in 1747, been united. It included the cities and districts 
of Mashhad, Nishabur, Herat, Quchan, Bokhara, Samarquand, 
Marv, Farah, Qandehar, Qohestan which was later renamed as 
Qaenat.
Of Nader Shah's successors, nobles and generals, Ahmad Khan 
Abdali and Amir Alam Khan Khozeimeh were concerned that 
Khorasan's unity should remain intact in the wake of their 
sovereign's assassination, each one of them for a different 
reason. Ahmad Khan Abdali, (by then "Ahmad Shah Durrani"), 
the first ruler of the new kingdom of Afghanistan, wanted the 
entire Khorasan to be affiliated to his new kingdom, probably 
to be extended later to include the rest of Iran, thus, 
reviving Nader Shah's empire. Whereas Amir Alam Khan 
Khozeimeh wanted to maintain the entire Khorasan as a part of 
Iran, preferably under his own rule.
It was for the attainment of this goal that Amir Alam Khan 
attacked Mashhad soon after Nader Shah's assassination and 
subdued Shahrokh Mirza, Nader Shah's grandson, who was 
installed on the Naderi throne by some of the generals. The 
Amir despatched, hurriedly, a troop to Herat, where his 
brother, Amir Masum Khan Khozeimeh succeeded in capturing the
city and its dependencies, albeit this victory was very short
(1)lived.' ' This event led to Amir Khan and Bohlul Khan, 
Shahrokh Mirza's men in Herat, writing to Ahmad Shah at 
Qandehar, informing him of the state of confusion in Herat. 
This news was received by Ahmad Shah with delight. He 
marched his troops of twenty thousand men on Herat in the
(1) See Chapter II for details.
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spring of 1749, where he met Herati citizens' resistance. 
The city was finally opened and he marched on Mashhad where 
he restored Shahrokh Mirza on the throne, who, in turn, 
acknowledged the Afghan s u z e r a i n t y . B y  so doing, 
Shahrokh Mirza lost the legitimacy inherent in the tradition 
of the Iranian monarchy. In the eyes of the contestants for 
the leadership of Iran (i.e. Amir Alam Khan Khozeimeh, 
Mohammad Hassan Khan Qajar and Karim Khan Zand) Shahrokh was 
no longer fit to rule as he had acknowledged suzerainty of a 
foreign sovereign. As a result, Shahrokh himself paved the 
way for his adversaries, Khozeimeh Amir and Qajar Khan, to do 
away with his rule in Khorasan.
Following these developments, Ahmad Shah Durrani captured
considerable parts of what is now the Iranian half of
Khorasan. Amir Alam Khan marched on Mashhad in 1748,
dethroned Shahrokh Mirza for the second time, captured
territories to the north and east of Mashhad as far as
Quchan, and marched on Nishabur. His capture of Nishabur was
yet to be completed when news of Ahmad Shah's forces' arrival
in Mashhad reached him. He had prepared to meet Ahmad Shah's
challenge and defeated some of the advance parties of the
Afghan troops, when the Khorasani Kurdish contingency of his
forces deserted him and by so doing, instigated a mass
desertion. Amir Alam Khan was left alone and was
(2)subsequently killed .v 7
Ahmad Shah's expedition in Khorasan was not to last long, 
events in the east, especially in relation to India, drew his 
attention away from Khorsan. The blind Shahrokh Mirza, 
reinstated by Ahmad Shah, was left in charge of the province 
where his rule continued for approximately half a century. 
Meanwhile, Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar had taken over from his 
father, Mohammad Hassan Khan, the task of contesting for the
(1) Sykes, Sir Percy M. {1915), “History of Persia", VoL, II, pp. 370 - 71 - 72.
(2) For more details on these events and relevant historical sources, see Chapter II,
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leadership of Iran. He arrived in Khorasan in 1795 and 
overthrew Shahrokh Mirza, thus, putting a final end to the 
weak and corrupt rule of the grandson of Nader Shah, who had 
in 174 8 accepted the suzerainty of the Afghan ruler. The 
rest of Iran was, at this period in time, ruled by Karim Khan 
Zand (1747 - 1799) except the northern parts of the country 
which were under the control of the Qajar family. Shahrokh
Mirza still possessed many of the priceless jewels that Nader
Shah had brought from India. Some of his collection,
including the renowned Kuh-e Nour diamond had been taken from 
him by Ahmad Shah Durrani, and the rest, including the 
Darya-ye Nour diamond, were seized by Agha Mohammad Khan 
Qajar who considered them as the property of the Iranian
crown, and have remained so to this date.^1^
Agha Mohammad Khan had turned to Khorasan after achieving 
paramouncy over the rest of Iran by defeating the heroic Lotf 
Ali Khan Zand and after subduing the rebels in Gorjestan 
(Georgia).
Ahmad Shah Durrani died in 17 73 and with his death was gone
Shahrokh Mirza's adherence to the Durrani suzerainty. On his
arrival in Khorasan, Agha Mohammad Khan was greeted by the
local chiefs and vassal rulers, including Amir Ali Khan
Khozeimeh of Qaenat who submitted to the Qajar Shah. Nader
Mirza, son of Shahrokh Mirza sent his brothers to Herat and
he himself followed them shortly, leaving his old blind and
feeble father behind to make his own submission to the
founder of the Qajar dynasty in Iran. Having completed the
task of returning Khorasan to Iranian sovereignty, Agha
(2)Mohammad Khan returned to Tehran' 1 taking with him
(3 \Shahrokh Mirza Afshar who died on the way in 1796 . v 1
(1) The Famous piece of diamond, Kuhe Nour, eventuaLLy found its way to Great Britain and is now
part of the British Crown Jewels.
(Z) Tehran was, at this time, chosen by Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar to be the new capitaL of Iran.
(3) Watson, Robert Grant (1866), "History of Persia, p. 96.
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In his book "The Kingdom of Afghanistan", G.P. Tate claims 
that at the time of Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar, which coincided 
with the demise of Ahmad Shah Durrani' s kingdom all over 
Afghanistan, his former realm divided into three 
principalities (Kabul, Herat and Qandehar), Iran recognised 
the state of Afghanistan. The reason given in support of 
this claim is Agha Mohammad Khan's decision in sending, in 
1796, Hassan Khan Qaraguzlu to the court of Shah Zaman, the 
ruler of Kabul. To substantiate this theory, Tate provides a 
caption from Tarikh-e Sultani, a Persian chronicle of 
historical events of the early Qajar period. This historical 
document is quoted by Tate as stating:
"He was accorded a gracious reception, and a money 
present, robes and a charger were bestowed on him; and 
permission was given him to return to Meshed. Kado 
Khan Barakzai accompanied the Persian Ambassador as 
the Afghan Envoy, to the court of the Kajar 
Prince."(1)
Though the true nature of the dependencies of Kabul, Herat 
and Qandehar to Iran had always been a matter of great 
ambiguity, sending emissaries back and forth between the 
central Government of Iran and the rulers of these 
principalities had never amounted to the recognition of their 
independence. Whereas sending emissaries back and forth 
between Iran and Kabul, Herat, Qandehar and other Central 
Asian dependencies of Iran had been an ongoing practice since 
the time of the Safavid Shahs, It is not clear as to how Tate 
found this particular emissary being an Ambassador conveying 
Iran's recognition of the State of Afghanistan. Moreover, 
while the kingdom created by Ahmad Shah Durrani was divided 
into three principalities in the wake of his death, and thus, 
the state of Afghanistan had all but disappeared, Iran could 
not recognise "the state of Afghanistan" by sending an 
emissary to the principality of Kabul. Furthermore, Iran's 
so-called recognition of Kabul as the "State of Afghanistan"
(1) Tate, G.P., op. cit., p.6.
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without the Afghan principalities of Herat and Qandehar being 
part of it sounds more like wishful thinking on the part of 
Tate than a logical action on the part of Iran or any other 
country.
In Khorasan, however, Nader Mirza, son of Shahrokh Mirza and
great grandson of Nader Shah Afshar, hearing of Agha Mohammad
Khan's assassination in July 1797, left Kabul, and having put
together some troops, returned to Mashhad and took possession
of the city and declared himself as the rightful heir to the
Naderi throne. In Tehran, Fath-Ali Shah Qajar had succeeded
his uncle Agha Mohammad Khan on 28th July 1797. He warned
Nader Mirza of the consequence of his actions which was
heeded by the latter. Some Afghan historians view Nader
Mirza’s claim in Mashhad as being the rightful heir to the
throne of Nader Shah of Iran as yet another manifestation of
/1 \
Afghanistan's resumption of sovereignty over Khorasan.' 1 
These writers do not, of course, see it as their
responsibility to specify as to how the rebellion in Khorasan 
of the great grandson of the Iranian sovereign Nader Ashar
claiming to be the rightful heir to the Naderi throne, would 
constitute the resumption of Afghanistan's sovereignty over 
the Iranian province of Khorasan.
Fath-Ali Shah, however, marched on Mashhad and recovered all 
towns and cities of the province. Nader Mirza was seized by 
the inhabitants of Mashhad after he had desecrated the Holy 
Shrine of Imam Reza and had slain with his own hand an
ayatollah. He was subsequently put to death.' ;
{1) See for example, Ghobar, op. cit.
(2) Afshar Yazdi, Dr. Mahmud (1980) "Afghan Nameh", Vol. II p. 26. This author indicates that
when Fath-Ali Shah finished off Nader Mirza's rebellion by putting him to death, exclaimed
that a parallel vengeance had taken pLace. What he meant was that his great grandfather was 
killed by Nader Mirza's great grandfather, Nader Shah Afshar, and now, Nader Shah's great 
grandson is killed by Fath-Ali Shah, the great grandson of Fath-Ali Khan.
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THE BRITISH INTEREST - A NEW DIMENSION
A new dimension was added to this general state of affairs in 
the region where there was the westwardly expanding political 
and strategic interests of the British Indian Empire.
As from the early 19th century, Britain began to view the 
principalities of Afghanistan and to some extent, Iran, as 
vulnerable gateways through which attacks could take place by 
either France or Russia or possibly the two of them together 
with Iran, against its possessions in India. Both France and 
Russia had realised that although it was difficult, if not 
impossible to challenge British supremacy at sea, it would be 
easily possible by land through Afghanistan. An additional 
source of anxiety for the British, was the active efforts of 
French diplomacy in Iran^^ as well as all over Asia. A 
French mission, led by Monsieur Olivier arrived in Tehran in 
1795 seeking friendship and alliance. The British found the 
activities of Napoleon's representatives in the east,
especially in Iran, for the purpose of contracting alliances, 
hostile to its position in India. At the same time,
Shah-Zaman ruler of Kabul, was posing serious threats to the
stability of India and the position of the British India 
Company.(2)
This whole situation provoked British reaction which
manifested itself in two different ways:
(1) Iranian Foreign Ministry Collection of Documents = Ahdnameh-haye Tarikhi hereafter referred
to as the “Green Book", Tehran 1971, p. 91.
(2) Tate, G.P., op. cit., p. 105. He describes this situation as follows:
“An invasion of Hindustan (the country to the south of the Sutlej) would have thrown the
whole country into a condition of anarchy. The Muhammadans looked to the Durani king as
their deliverer and hoped for the restoration of the House of Timur through Afghan 
intervention in the affairs of Hindustan. The partisans of Shah Zaman had set on foot 
intrigues in many parts of India. The Rohillas took up arms. Every folLower of Islam 
anxiously looked for the coming of the champion of IsLam. Dissensions among the 
Mahrattas had drawn their forces to the south; and they were dismayed at the prospect and 
looked for help to the British. The attitude of the Sadozai king had compelled the 
authorities in Calcutta to assemble an army at Anupshahr; and to raise new regiments and 
the 4th Bengal Light Cavalry; and the 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th regiments of Bengal 
Infantry had been raised in 1796.“
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1. To counter the weight of the French in Iran by 
endeavouring to seal treaties of friendship and alliance 
with the Iranians.
2. To expand their influence throughout the countries of 
Afghanistan and to bring all three Afghan principalities 
under an effective political control.
In the first instance, Mirza Mehdi-Ali Khan, an officer of
the East India Company at Bushehr, was sent to Tehran in 1799
to prepare the ground for the launch of British diplomacy in
Iran. The following year, Captain John Malcolm, envoy of the
viceroy of India arrived in Tehran. He gave Fath-Ali Shah
two diamonds each worth fifty thousand rupees, and succeeded
in signing two treaties with Haji Ebrahim Khan, Fath-Ali
Shah's Prime Minister in January 1801; one on trade and the
other political. The political treaty was signed in five
articles which, not only ended the activities of the French
in Iran, but guaranteed an Iranian invasion of Afghanistan if
(1)the Afghans threatened India.v * This treaty realised the
ostensible object of Malcolm's mission which was to instigate
Fath-Ali Shah to move an army upon Herat so as to divert
Shah-Zaman from his threatened invasion of India. The
Iranian move, which was motivated by the domestic situations
in Herat and by the question of its loyalty to Iran, had
(2)already been made before John Malcolm appeared in Tehran.v ;
When Fath-Ali Shah sought British assistance in 1804 in the 
war with the Russians, the British declined, arguing that the 
war had been started by Prince Abbas Mirza, the Crown Prince 
of Iran. Fath-Ali Shah wrote to Napoleon asking him to renew 
the old friendship. Napoleon's personal secretary, Monsieur 
Joubert was sent to Tehran in 1805 where he prepared a new 
treaty which was signed at Finken Stain in the Spring of
(1) Political Treaty with EngLand, Green Book, op. cit., p. 91
(2) Bilgrami, Asghar H. (1972) “Afghanistan and British India", New Delhi, p. 19.
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(1)1807' J by Mirza Mohammad Khan Qazvini on the part of Iran 
and Bernard Maret on behalf of France.
This treaty provided for general Gardan, Napoleon's adjudant
to arrive in Tehran as French Ambassador, with a group of
officers and engineers who started their task of training and
equipping Iranian troops. General Gardan was also assigned
to conclude a defence treaty with the Iranian Government.
However, as Napoleon disregarded the question of the war
between Iran and the Russians in his meeting of Tilsit with
the Tzar of Russia in 1808, when the two European powers
(2 )agreed on cooperation against Britain,v ' Fath-Ali Shah 
lost hope with the French.
The Russo-French agreement of Tilsit, on the other hand, 
raised anxieties in London and Bombay of a new and more 
powerful threat to the British India possessions. These 
anxieties led the British Indian authorities to attempt once 
again to secure the friendship of Iran and preclude her from 
joining the dangerous combination of the two European powers 
in the wake of peace between Iran and Russia. Sir Harford 
Jones was sent to Tehran in 1809 for the purpose. Later that 
year, he signed a provisional treaty with the court of the 
Qajar Shah, according to which the Franco-Iranian treaty of 
Finken Stain was declared null and void. A loan of 200,000 
tumans was extended to the Iranian Government by the British 
Government of India which also undertook to prepare and train
/ 3 \
Iranian troops for the defence of the Iranian realms.v 1 
The British Government ratified this treaty in 1810 and 
assigned Sir Gore Ousely as London's Ambassador to Tehran who 
prepared a new treaty to be signed between London and 
Tehran. Meanwhile, the British India Government, anxious of 
the situation arising from the possibility of a combined 
Franco-Russian threat to India, and probably uncertain that
(1) The Green Book, (Iranian Foreign Ministry Document Collection) p. 70).
(2) The Green Book, op. cit., p. 71.
(3) The Green Book, op. cit., p. 73.
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the direct diplomacy of London in Tehran would pay enough 
attention to this situation, sent Sir John Malcolm back to 
Tehran to secure Iran's cooperation in that regard. Fath-Ali 
Shah refused to see him. His rivalries with Sir Gore Ousely 
resulted in his return from Iran in the Summer of 1810.
Sir Gore Ousely signed the 1812 treaty of friendship with
Iran and mediated between Tehran and Moscow which resulted in
the conclusion of the treaty of Golestan in 1813, whereby
/
Iran lost many of her north-western provinces to Russia.' 1
The British connection with Iran, however, had an objective 
of providing additional security to India against a French 
threat and from a renewed threat from the Russians via Iran.
The second British reaction to this situation concerned her 
relations with Afghanistan. The principality of Kabul and 
other parts of Afghanistan had gone through a long period of 
chaos and disintegration in the wake of Shah-Zaman's 
deposition in 1803. Two years earlier, Shah-Mahmud, brother 
of Shah-Zaman revolted against the latter in 1801 when Zaman 
was still threatening India. Mahmud declared himself as 
King. The city of Herat and its dependencies were, at this 
time, tributaries of Iran. The per annum taxes paid to the 
treasury of Tehran was one million rupees and fifty thousand 
ass-load (Kharvar) of grain.
When Agha Mohammad Khan, founder of the Qajar dynasty marched 
troops to Khorasan to put an end to Shahrokh Mirza' s 
obedience to Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Governor of Herat 
declared his allegiance to Agha Mohammad Khan and the 
Government of Iran. He made the official speech at the
(1) The Green Book, op. cit., pp. 7 3 - 4 .
(3) The Green Book, op. cit., p. 73.
(3) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 395.
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public prayer (Khotbeh) in the name of the Shah of Iran and 
reinstated the payment of annual taxes to the treasury at 
Tehran.^^
Shah-Mahmud, meanwhile, succeeded in dethroning his brother,
Shah-Zaman in 1803 after the countenance offered to him by
the Shah of Iran (Fath-Ali Shah). Mahmud appointed Prince
Firouz ad-Din as Governor of Herat, who in turn, appointed
Shah-Mahmud's son, Prince Kameran, as Governor of Farah, a
dependency of Herat. Shah-Mahmud was dethroned in 1804, by
(2 \Shah-Shoja, and escaped to Iran a year later.v 1 At the 
same time, Firouz ad-Din, sent troops to capture Ghurian in 
accordance with a pre-arrangement with the Iranian Deputy 
Governor of the district who surrendered the town in the
event. This move was not only viewed in Tehran as a 
violation of Iran's sovereignty in the Eastern provinces but 
also signified Firouz ad-Din's rebellion against Iran's 
sovereignty of Herat. Iranian troops defeated Firouz
ad-Din's forces in Ghurian and Mohammad Vali Khan, the
Governor General of Khorasan, marched on Herat to punish
Firouz ad-Din for his breach of faith and to collect the 
tribute which had been in arrears for two years. The city of 
Herat was invested in 1810. Firouz ad-Din apologised for his 
conducts and sent his son Malek Hussein Mirza to stay in Iran 
(Tehran or Mashhad) as a guarantee of his good faith in the 
future. He also sent to the treasury at Tehran the tributes 
in arrears with the promise of discharging the taxes 
punctually in future. Six years later, he revolted against 
Herat's dependency on Iran (1816) and invaded the district of 
Ghurian. This time Prince Hassan-Ali Mirza Shoja 
as-Saltaneh, the new Governor General of Khorasan recovered 
Herat and not only did he collect from Firouz ad-Din the 
tributes in arrears, but an extra fifty thousand tumans as 
punishment. He was obliged to guarantee punctual payments of 
the annual tribute, to read the Khotbeh in the name of
(1) Mahmud, Mahmud, *Tarikh-e Ravabet-e Siasi-e Iran-o Englis Dar Qarn-e Nuzdahom", Vol. II, 
Tehran 1950, p. 870.
(3) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 395.
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Fath-Ali Shah, and to make the coinage in the name of the 
Iranian sovereign.^ ^
In Kabul, unlike his brother Shah-Mahmud who was faithful to
Iran, and whom he had dethroned in 1804, Shah-Shoja was
wholly reliant on the British from whom he received many
valuable gifts. The British envoy, Mount Stewart Elphinson,
had signed a treaty with him on June 17, 1809 whereby
Shah-Shoja undertook on behalf of all Afghans, to prevent any
(2 )attack on India from the north-west of that country.' '
This agreement did not survive for long, as Shah-Shoja was
dethroned in the same year. Shah-Mahmud's struggles against
Shah-Shoja brought much chaos to the countries of
Afghanistan. Shah-Mahmud eventually succeeded in settling in
Herat with his son Prince Kameran with the consent of
Tehran. Chaos in Kabul and Qandehar deepened as Shah-Shoja
was recalled in 1817 by Sardar Mohammad Azim Khan to become
"Shah of Afghanistan" in the principality of Qandehar, Other
Sardars, namely Yar Mohammad Khan and Dust Mohammad Khan
called Ayub Saduzai as "Shah of Afghanistan" in Kabul. This
chaotic state of affairs worsened as Sardar Mohammad Azim
Khan fought Shah-Shoja, the so-called monarch he himself
selected for Afghanistan. Shah-Shoja was defeated and forced
out of Qandehar. Dust Mohammad Khan and his brothers divided
the principalities of Kabul and Qandehar amongst themselves.
Dust Mohammad became the ruler of Kabul and his brother,
(3 )Kohandel Khan became the ruler of Qandehar.v '
In Herat, Shah-Mahmud and his son Prince Kameran, the last of
the Abdalis, fell out and fought a number of times against
one another (1820 - 1821) until the people of Herat mediated
between them and arranged for Mahmud to remain King, and
(4)Kameran as his Prime Minister in charge of affairs.' y
(1) Mokhber, Mohandes Mohammad-ALi (1945), “Marzhaye Iran", Tehran, p. 24.
(2) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 396.
(3) Ghobar, op. cit., pp. 397 - 8.
(4) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 403.
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Firouz ad-Din had already escaped to Mashhad when Shah-Mahmud 
arrived in Herat in 1818. He had taken refuge with the 
Governor General of Khorasan.
British direct diplomacy in Afghanistan, by this time, 
succeeded in establishing a considerable degree of influence, 
especially in the principality of Kabul.
In Iran, a series of events further provoked the geopolitical 
apprehension of the British concerning the situation in 
Central Asia. Iran fought another war with Russia which 
resulted in the conclusion of the disastrous treaty of 
Turkmanchai in 1828 with the mediation of Sir John MacDonald 
Kinner, British envoy in Tehran.^^ The treaty of 
Turkmanchai, signed on February 21, 1828, granted the
Russians the right of capitulation, excluding Russian 
subjects from prosecution under the Iranian laws.v ' 
Although the British and other foreign subjects were later on 
granted the same right, the sudden expansion of Russian 
influence in Iran after the Turkmanchai gave rise to the 
British anxieties of a Russian threat via Iran to their 
possessions in India, bringing the strategic importance of 
Herat to their attention more than ever before. The 
following are examples of the views expressed confidentially 
to the British Government by British diplomats in Iran:
"The key of all Afghanistan towards the north is 
Herat; and although I can have no right to press my 
personal opinions upon your lordship after having 
already stated them, and although I must necessarily
(1) Under article 3 of Golestan Treaty of 1813, Iran lost to Russia the cities and dependencies 
of Karabakh (Gharabagh), Ganjeh, Shakki, Shirvan, Gobbeh, Darband, Baku, Daghestan, 
Gorjestan (Georgia), Shureh-Gel, Achuqbash, Kurieh, MankerbeL etc. - Article 3, Treaty of 
GoLestan, The Green Book, op. cit., p. 128.
Under article 3 of the treaty of Turkmanchai of 1828, Iran lost to Russia the principalities 
of Armenia and Nakhjavan - ArticLe 3, Treaty of Turkmanchai, The Green Book, op. cit., p. 
131.
(2) Capitulation continued in Iran until it was abolished by Reza Shah in 1929.
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be ignorant of the many important considerations not 
immediately connected with this question which must 
influence the policy of her Majesty's Government, 
still I cannot refrain from saying a few words more 
regarding the importance of preserving the 
independence of Herat.
"I have already informed your lordship publicly, that 
the country between the frontiers of Persia and India 
is far more productive than I had imagined it to be; 
and I can assure your lordship that there is no 
impediment, either from the physical features of the 
country or from the deficiency of supplies, to the 
march of a large army from the frontiers of Georgia to 
Kandahar, or, as I believe, to the Indus.
"There is therefore, my lord, no security for India in 
the nature of the country through which an army would 
have to pass to invade it from this side.
"On the contrary, the whole line is peculiarly 
favourable for such an enterprise; and I am the more 
anxious to state this opinion clearly, because it is 
at variance with my previous belief, and with 
statements which I may have previously hazarded, 
relying on more imperfect information."(l)
The anxiety over a Russian design on Herat and eventually, 
India, was further stimulated by the arrival in Herat of 
Count Simonich, the Russian envoy at Tehran, with the 
Iranians in 1838: HIt is currently reported and believed
here, though I cannot say on what grounds, that there is a 
secret arrangement between Persia and Russia to exchange 
Herat for some of the districts beyond the Arras which 
formerly belonged to Persia. This report was first mentioned 
to me at Teheran in March last; but I then paid no attention 
to it, because I could not see how Russia was to get at 
Herat, and I still am inclined to regard it as probably 
unfounded, though Count Simonich certainly threatened 
Mahommed Ameen, a servant of Yar Mahommed Khan (who was sent 
with a message from his master to the Persian camp) that if 
Herat did not surrender to the Shah, he would march a Russian 
army against it.M^ ^
(1) Extracts of a Letter from Sir John McNeill to Viscount Palmerston, dated Mashhad, June 25, 
1938, Blue Book, pp. 131 - 2 FO 539/1 - 10 (Microfilm), pp. 131 - 3.
(2) Ibid.
316
In a letter to Sir John McNeil, British Minister 
Plenipotentiary at Tehran, Secretary to the Government of 
India states:
"The political interests of Great Britain and of
British India are even more concerned that their 
commercial interests in the exemption of the countries 
between India and Persia from foreign aggression from 
the westward. There is too much reason to apprehend
that Persia, under its present sovereign, has evinced 
an unprecedented degree of subserviency to Russian 
counsels.... The pertinacity with which Persian
Government has persisted in this design.f1) is
of itself a sufficient ground for apprehending the
existence of some ulterior and unfriendly design 
towards our interests."(2)
The theory of a Russian threat to the British possessions in
India via Iran and Afghanistan had become so realistic in the
eyes of the British that fortification of the countries of
Afghanistan against this threat, not only becomes the
cornerstone of the foreign policy concerns of British India
in Asia, but it became a kind of universal obsession amongst
British politicians, diplomats and military officers alike.
Captain Hunt, for example, writing on the "Persian Campaign"
in which he himself fought, argues: "the Kingdom of
Afghanistan, as most of our readers know, has long formed the
great bulwark of British India upon the Asiatic side. It was
the high road to conquest in India for many ages, until the
English and other nations approached the coveted possession
from the sea. The chief passes of this barrier land admit of
easy access from the Persian dominions, and Russia is fully
aware that while this state is preserved in its integrity it
must prove an obstacle to the accomplishment of her designs
against India. Hence her efforts have been to produce
complications in that quarter, and these have frequently been
(3)crowned with success."' 1
(1) Referring to the siege of Herat by the Iranian forces in 1837.
(2) Extracts of a letter from Hr Macnoughten to Hr McNeill, dated Fort Uilliam, November 21, 
1838, “Correspondence reLating to the Affairs of Persia and Afghanistan" section B, p. 2, FO 
539/1 - 10 (microfilm).
(3) Hunt, Captain G.H. (1858), ‘The Persian Campaign", Outram & Havelock's London, pp. 84 - 5.
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This apprehension of Iranian and Russian designs on the
countries of Afghanistan and India was further aggravated by
an approach made by Iran, to Sardar Kohundil Khan of
Qandehar, who had renewed his predecessors' loyalty to the
Iranian Government. A treaty was signed in 1838 between
Mohammad Shah Qajar of Iran and Sardar Kohundil Khan of
Qandehar whereby, the ruler of Qandehar engaged his
principality to renew its historical dependency to Iran in
return for Iranian protection.^1  ^ The Shah also, according
to article 1 of the treaty was to bestow the principality of
Herat onto the rulers of Qandehar "as a reward for their
faithful services performed to him since his accession to the
(2)throne of Persia".' * This treaty was apparently signed by 
Count Simonich, the Russian Minister plenipotentiary at 
Tehran as the guarantor on his own behalf ^ + ^ as 
representative of the Government of Russia. Nevertheless, 
the British found this whole affair as yet more proof of a 
Perso-Russian design on the countries of Afghanistan and on 
India. This suspicion provoked great alarm among the British 
as Sir John McNeil described in a despatch dated August 1st 
1838s
"....if the treaty has really been guaranteed by 
Russia, and not by Count Simonich, personally, Russia 
becomes by it indisputable mistress of the destinies, 
political and commercial, of all Central Asia; for 
Great Britain, having been forced back to the Indus, 
Khiva and Bakhara must submit if they are attacked; 
while Persia and Afghanistan will already be entirely 
at her disposal. "(3)
(1) See Appendix I for text,
(2) The only copy of this treaty this author has come across was cited in GeneraL Perrier's 
book. The treaty has no date and shows the signature of Major H.C. Rawlinson as the 
translator of the document. Ferrier, General J.P., 'Caravan Journeys and Wandering in 
Persia, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Baloochistan*, London 1857, pp. 508 - 9.
(3) From Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston, dated Camp near Tehran, August 1, 1838, No. 39,
Vol. 10 part 1, section A, p. 1, FO 539/1 - 10 (microfiLm).
{+} See text, Appendix I.
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The British, observing these developments in the countries of 
Afghanistan with dismay as they could no longer rely upon the
ability of the Afghan chiefs to play the role of a barrier,
separating India from the potential threat of the west and
north-west, decided to apply the policy of direct 
intervention in Afghanistan in order to prevent the danger of 
a Russo-Iranian threat there.
Meanwhile, Prince Kameran, Tehran's appointed Governor of
Herat, styled himself in 1829 as "Shah" of that
principality^) and began a series of raids and incursions
against Iranian territories, especially in Sistan. These
acts of rebellion angered the Central Government in Tehran,
which was already agitated by the rebellion and lawlessness
taking place in Marv, Khiveh and Bokhara, the countries of
Turkmans and Uzbeks who "had then continued depredations in
(2 \Asterabad and the neighbouring districts". v 1
The Iranian Government prepared two expeditions in 1836; one 
against Herat and the other against Marv, Khiveh and Bokhara, 
which was to proceed to the north-east after Herat was 
subdued. The expedition against Herat began its march in 
1837. Prince Kameran, seeing no hope of assistance from any 
quarter, turned to Sir John McNeil, British Minister at 
Tehran, for help. McNeil protested against the action of the 
Iranian Government knowing full well that Tehran's action 
against the rebellion of one of its own appointed Governors 
of the dependent principalities was provoked by the Governor 
himself. In a despatch, dated Tehran, February 24, 1837, Sir 
John McNeil says:
"Putting aside the claims of Persia to the sovereignty 
of Herat, founded on ancient rights and on the 
professions of allegiance to the Crown of Persia which 
have been made at various times by Prince Kamran; and 
regarding the question as one between two independent 
Sovereigns, I am inclined to believe that the 
Government of Herat, will be found to have been the 
aggressor.
(1) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 404.
(2) Hunt, op. cit., p. 92.
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"On the death of Abbas Meerza, when the present Shah 
returned from his unsuccessful expedition against 
Herat, negotiations were entered into, which 
terminated in the conclusion of an agreement for the 
cessation of hostilities between the parties and the 
demarcation of a line of boundary. From that time up 
to the present moment, Persia has committed no act of 
hostility against the Affghans, but on the death of 
the late Shah, concluding no doubt that Persia would 
be thrown into great confusion, the Government of 
Herat made predatory incursions into the Persian 
territories, in concert with the Turcomans and 
Hazarehs and captured the subjects of Persia, for the 
purpose of selling them as slaves. This system of 
warfare has from that time been carried on without 
intermission by the Affghans of Herat, and Persia has 
not retaliated these acts of aggression by any hostile 
measure, unless the public annunciation of its 
intention to attack Herat should be regarded as such.
"Under these circumstances, there cannot, I think, be 
a doubt that the Shah is fully justified in making war 
on Prince Kamran: and though the capture of Herat by 
Persia would certainly be an evil of great magnitude, 
we could not wonder if the Shah were to disregard our 
remonstrances, and to assert his right to make war on 
an enemy who has given him the greatest provocation, 
and whom he may regard himself as bound in duty to his 
subjects to punish, or even to put down. I therefore 
doubt whether the measures proposed by the Government 
of India would have the desired effect."(l)
Whilst the Iranian expedition against Herat was in progress, 
a Herati envoy, Fateh-Mohammad Khan arrived in Tehran on the 
intervention of Prince Asef ad-Doleh, commander of Iran's 
expeditionary force and Governor General of Khorasan. The 
Iranian Government demanded that Herat should submit and send 
a personality of some significance to remain in Tehran 
assuring guarantee of their submission. In reply, 
Yar-Mohammad Khan, Vazir (administrator) of Herat, wrote to 
the Iranian Government submitting to the demands for 
submission and sending an agent to stay in Tehran as 
guarantee of their submission. Yar-Mohammad Khan's proposals 
were as follows:
(1) Extracts from Hr. McNeiLl‘s despatch to Viscount Palmerston, dated Tehran, Feb. 24, 1837, 
No. 13, p. 3, FO 539/1 - 10 (microfiLm).
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1st Point, - There is to be a cessation of war and of 
marauding; the capture and sale of prisoners are to be
utterly abolished.
2nd Point. - Should the King of Kings intend to 
undertake a military expedition against Toorkistan, and 
should he require troops from Shah Kamran, the latter is to 
supply troops to the extent of his ability, and they shall 
accompany the Governor of Khorassan on any expedition against 
Toorkistan. Should troops be required on the frontiers of 
Azerbijan, Shah Kamran shall furnish them in such number as 
may at the time be practicable, and shall not withhold them.
3rd Point. - A sum of money in the shape of tribute
shall be paid annually, at the festival of Noorooz, to the 
Persian Government.
4th Point. - Merchants from every quarter who shall
arrive in the territories of Herat and its dependencies, are
to receive full protection, and suffer no injury in person or 
property.
5th Point. - One person, who shall be a descendant of 
Shah Kamran, and some other persons who shall be relations of 
Vizier Yar Mahomed Khan, and of Sheer Mahomed Khan, shall 
reside for two years at Meshed as hostages. When the period 
of two years has elapsed, if the Ministers of Herat shall 
have performed the foregoing engagements, and shall have 
committed no infraction, the above hostages shall be 
despatched to Herat, and shall not be detained more than two 
years. Should any infraction of the above engagements have 
been committed, the hostages are to be retained until the 
time of their fulfilment.
6th Point. - A Vakeel or Agent from Shah Kamran shall 
always reside at the Court of the King of Kings.
(1) Extracts from enclosure 1 in No. 3 of despatch by Hr HcNeill to the British Government, 
dated Camp Tehran, July 1837, FO 539/1 - 10 (microfilm).
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In return for the renewal of Herat's submission to the 
central Government of Iran, Yar-Mohammad Khan proposed the 
following engagements from the Government in Tehran:
"1st Point. - The King of Kings of Persia shall 
consider Shah Kamran as his brother, and treat him with 
regard.
"2nd Point. - The Ministers of the King of Kings 
of Persia shall not interfere in any manner whatever in 
the succession of the posterity of Shah Kamran. 
Whichever of the Descendants of Shah Kamran shall
succeed him in his Government and titles, and shall 
fulfil the engagements that have been here contracted; 
it is stipulated on the part of the King of Kings of 
Persia that these engagements shall continue in full 
force, and shall no undergo any alteration.
"3rd Point. - Troops are not to be sent into the 
territories in the possession of Shah Kamran; war and 
marauding are to cease; and the capture and sale of 
prisoners are to be entirely abolished. The Government 
of the King of Kings of Persia is not to interfere in 
any manner whatever in the internal affairs of the
territories in the possession of Shah Kamran: and to
enable the Government of Herat to fulfil its 
engagements, the internal management of these
territories is to be entirely under the control of the
Government of Herat.
"4th Point. - The English Government shall be 
mediators between the Persian and Herat Governments; 
and if there should be any infraction of these 
engagements by either party, it shall employ every 
exertion to obtain their fulfilment."(l)
Notwithstanding the fact that Yar-Mohammad Khan's despatch to 
Tehran indicated clearly Herat's agreement to the revival of 
its dependency and loyalty to the Central Government of Iran 
by accepting to pay its annual taxes to Tehran and to send a 
number of high placed individuals to stay in Mashhad as 
guarantee for Herat's adherence to the terms of its 
submission to the dependency, its terms and conditions did 
not satisfy the Iranian Government, especially in that it 
fell short of other customary undertakings for submission 
such as coining the money in the name of the Iranian monarch 
and having the prayer (khotbeh) made in the name of the Shah 
of Shahs of all Iran. Thus, Prime Minister Haji Mirza Aghasi
(1) Ibid.
322
wrote in reply to the Heratis, the terms and conditions that 
were, from his point of view, appropriate for submission. 
The first two points of his memorandum, dated 14th of Rabee 
al-Aval 1253 (July 1837) reads:
"THE first point is that war, marauding, and the 
capture of prisoners shall cease. - As all these 
things are opposed to obedience, it is evident that 
they will, as a matter of course cease, when Prince 
Kamran acknowledges subjection to Persia. He who is 
obedient must be obedient under every circumstance.
"Second Point. - As Herat with its dependencies 
is one of the provinces of Persia, whenever the 
exigencies of the State require troops to be 
despatched in any direction, Herat, like the other 
provinces of the kingdom, must furnish troops and 
provision.
"Throughout the propositions of Futteh Mahomed 
Khan, the designation applied to Prince Kamran, is 
Kamran Shah. This is precisely the point which is the 
cause of the movement of troops, that these 
pretensions may be destroyed. Two kings cannot dwell 
in one kingdom. The title of Feridoon Meerza, the 
Governor General of Pars, which is ten times as large 
as Herat, is Ameerzadeh, son of a prince (not 
prince.) This phrase conveys the impression of 
disobedience and refractoriness, and the remedy is to 
cease to employ such expressions."(1)
(For complete text, see Appendix II)
Although Prince Kameran Mirza was referred to in Yar-Mohammad
Khan's letter as "Shah Kameran" and true that in his reply to
Herat's propositions, Haji Mirza Aghasi demands the title
"Shah" to be abandoned by Prince Kameran, the fact is that
use of such titles by a vassal king in the traditional
Iranian political organisation did not contradict the
dependency of that vassal kingdom to Iran. In a letter
addressed to Mohammad Shah Qajar in March 1840 by
"Shah-Kameran", for instance, he declares himself to be the
(2)"faithful servant of the Shahanshah (King of Kings)".' '
(1) Extracts from the translation of a memorandum by Haji Hirza Aghasi in reply to Yar Hohammad 
Khan's proposals, enclosure 3 in No. 3 of Hr. McNeill's despatch to Viscount Palmerston, 
dated July 1837, pp. 11 - 12, FO 539/1 - 10 (microfilm).
(2) Ferrier, General Joseph Pierre, "Caravan Journeys and Wandering in Persia, Afghanistan, 
Turkistan and Baloochistan", London 1857, p. 160.
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While this debate was going on between Tehran and Herat, 
however, the expedition against Herat was in progress and 
Herat was put under siege by the forces despatched by 
Tehran. Seeing no hope of assistance from any quarter, 
Prince Kameran Mirza pleaded with Mr. John (later Sir John) 
McNeil - British Minister at Tehran since 1836 - for help, 
Mr McNeil protested against Mohammad Shah Qajar's military 
undertaking against the rebels in a dependent principality of 
Iran, in spite of his own expressed view that the Central 
Government of Iran had every right to do so in response to 
Kameran Mirza's behaviour. He left Tehran in the Spring of 
1838, suspending Anglo-Iranian relations in protest because 
he believed that Iran's possession of Herat was an evil 
against the interests of the British.^
In a despatch to Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minster in 
London, McNeil strongly advised the British Government to 
intervene in this affair in support of rebellious Kameran 
Mirza, arguing:
11Captain Vicovich continues to remain at Cabul, and I 
learn from Captain Burnes1s communications that the 
success of his negotiations there will in a great 
measure depend on the failure of the Shah's enterprise 
against Herat. At Kandahar our position is even more 
precarious; and I have the honour to enclose a 
translation of a draft of a treaty between the Shah 
and the Chief of Kandahar, which it is proposed to 
conclude by the mediation and under the guarantee of 
Russia, and which has for its object to unite Herat 
and Kandahar under a chief, who shall be nominally 
subject to Persia, but actually under the protection 
of Russia. I am unable to inform your Lordship what 
progress has been made towards the conclusion of this 
treaty, or what view the Shah may have taken of the 
position, in respect to these countries, in which, by 
this arrangement, he would be placed; but the treaty 
is said to have been signed by Kohundil Khan, and I am 
not without any serious apprehensions that, even 
before the fall of Herat, Kohundil Khan may be induced 
to co-operate with the Shah; while, in the event of 
Herat's being reduced, I cannot doubt that the Chief 
of Kandahar will consider it to be for his advantage 
to connect himself with Persia and Russia rather than 
with England.
(1) Majmueh-e Ahdnameh-haye Tarikhi, the Green Book, op. cit., p. 74.
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"T therefore continue to be of opinion that the 
fall of Herat would destroy our position in 
Afghanistan, and place all, or nearly all, that 
country under the influence or authority of Russia and 
Persia.
"I need not repeat to your Lordship my opinion as 
to the effect which such a state of things would 
necessarily have on the internal tranquility and 
security of British India; and I cannot conceive that 
any treaty can bind as to permit the prosecution of 
schemes which threaten the stability of the British 
empire in the East."(^)
In an earlier despatch, Mr. McNeil argued:
"The pretensions of Persia to the sovereignty of 
Affghanistan appeared to me to be such, as we were 
neither called upon by a sense of justice, nor 
permitted by a due regard to our ovn security, to 
sanction or allow. I thought I could show from our 
Treaty with Persia, that the Affghans were looked upon 
by the Persian Government itself, at the time when 
that Treaty was signed, as an independent nation; 
while the fact of our having concluded a Treaty of 
defensive alliance with their Sovereign, in 1809, 
precluded the possibility, so long as they preserved 
their actual independence, of our being called upon to 
acknowledge them to be subjects of Persia.(2)
Thus convinced that Iran's undertaking against rebellious
Kameran Mirza at Herat would seriously jeopardise vital
British interests, Lord Palmerston and the Governor General
(3)of India, Lord Auckland,v ’ informed the British public 
that it was imperative to defend Herat against Iran.
Meanwhile, a young English officer, named Eldred Pottinger, 
who had lived among the Heratis for sometime, supposedly on 
his own initiative, as a Moslem darvish, was encouraging the 
Heratis against Iran.
(1) Extract of letter from Hr. McNeill to Viscount PaLmerston Dated Camp before Herat, April 
11th, 1838, p. 85 FO 539/1 - 10 (microfilm).
(2) Extracts of letter from Hr. McNeilL to Lord Palmerston, dated Camp near Tehran, June 30, 
1837, FO 539/1 - 10 (microfilm),
(3) Lord Auckland had replaced Lord William Bentinch in March 1837 as Governor General of 
India.
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The siege of Herat began on November 23, 1837 and lasted for
(1 )several months. v 1 Most of the Afghan dignitaries were in
favour of Iran's action in Herat: Dust Mohammad Khan, Amir of
Kabul had practically encouraged Mohammad Shah to invest
Herat. Omar Khan son of Kohand£l Khan, Amir of Qandehar,
joined the Iranians in their military action against Herat.
Shams ad-Din Khan, an associate of Prince Kameran saw to the
food requirements of the Iranians. Even Jalal ad-Din, son of
(2 \Prince Kameran fought on the side of the Iranians.v 1
The British observers of the time, viewed the historical 
dependency of the Afghan chiefs on the Iranian Government in 
different lights, interpreting it variably to suit various 
arguments. Captain Hunt, for instance, blames these chiefs' 
dependency on Iran, on the inadequacy of British policies:
"The total neglect with which the British Government 
had hitherto treated these Afghan chiefs, - had led
them to regard England with feelings of jealousy 
rather than of attachment; and had induced them to 
seek, in alliances with Persia and Russia, protection 
against the dangers with which they believed 
themselves to be threatened from the East. The chief 
of Cabul sent accredited agents almost simultaneously 
to the courts of Tehran and St. Petersburg, soliciting 
from both assistance against the Seiks. The chiefs of 
Candahar also sent agents into Persia; but as the 
greatest danger which they apprehended was from the 
power of Kamran, prince of Herat, their chief object 
was to concert with Persia a combined attack for the 
destruction of that power."(3)
This argument fundamentally contradicts the fact that the 
Afghan chiefs had traditionally been dependants of the 
Iranian Government, a historical fact attested by masses of 
documents, including a letter sent to Mohammad Shah Qajar, at 
the time of Captain Hunt, by Dust Mohammad Khan Chief or Amir 
of Kabul, in reply to a letter from the former assuring him 
of the kindness of the Iranian Government. In his letter, 
Dust Mohammad Khan asserted:
(1) The Length of the siege has been reported variably by various historians, ranging between 3
to 10 months.
(2) Ghobar, op. cit., pp. 404 - 5.
(3) Hunt, Capt. G.H., op cit., p. 138.
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in the past years and in the olden times, the 
chiefs of this dynasty considered their country and 
Governments dependants of the mighty Government late 
Shahanshah (King of Kings), and from their heart, not 
in the form of lip service, joined that Government of 
universal proportions...."(*)
As dependants of Iran, these chiefs would naturally align 
themselves with Tehran in the situation of uncertainties, 
unless planed for cecession which was the case with Prince 
Kameran Mirza of Herat at the time.
With the direct and indirect assistance provided by the
British, Herat however, withstood the siege for several
months. The British Government of India despatched from
Bombay a naval task force which attacked Iran's southern
provinces on the Persian Gulf. Sir John McNeil sent in July
1838 written message to Mohammad Shah informing him of the
British action in the Persian Gulf and warned him of the
consequences of his Government's undertaking against Herat.
Apart from all else, McNeil argued in this message that the
Iranian enterprise in Herat was being "totally incompatible
with the spirit and intention of the alliance which (had)
(2 ^been established between Great Britain and Persia".' 1 
McNeil1 s reference in this regard is not clear as to which 
treaty or engagement would support his claim. There was no 
instance in any of the treaties signed prior to these events 
between Great Britain and Iran that would support Mr McNeil's 
aforementioned argument. Articles 2 and 3 of the political 
treaty of January 1801, speaks of the Iranian Government 
discouraging the Afghan King (Shah Shoja) from his possible 
designs against India, while article 4 speaks of British 
military support for the Iranian Government in the event of
(1) Extracts of Letter from Dust Mohammad Khan to Mohammad Shah, FO 248/162, 170969, This 
Letter has no date, but it is a repLy to Mohammad Shah's Letter dated Rabi aL-AwaL 1270 
(1854).
(2) Extracts of written message delivered by Lieut. CoLoneL Stoddart to the Shah, enclosure 1 in 
No. 32, July 1838, FO 539/1 - 10 (microfilm).
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an attack against Iran by the Afghan King^1  ^ which was the 
case with Prince Kameran, regarded by the British 
persistently as an Afghan King, in his attack on the Iranian 
territories as was mentioned in Mr. McNeil's despatch of 
February 24th, 1 8 3 7 quoted earlier.
Moreover, article IX of the Anglo-Iranian treaty of November 
25, 1814, in fact prevents the British from interfering in
any incident between Iran and the Afghans unless asked to do 
so. This article reads:
"If war should be declared between the Afghans and 
Persians, the English Government shall not interfere 
with either party, unless their mediation to effect a 
peace shall be solicited by both parties."(3)
The forces despatched from Bombay, under the command of
14)Colonel Shariff,' 1 landed on Iran's island of Kharg in the 
Persian Gulf. This measure proved to be effective as the 
Shah's Government appeared to be aware of the greater 
importance of the Iranian possessions in the Persian Gulf 
compared with the dependencies in Afghanistan. The British 
had already begun spreading their influence around the 
Persian Gulf. A series of treaties had been signed, as from 
182 0, with the chiefs of the tribes of the lower Gulf, the 
traditional Iranian sphere of influence.(5) The position 
in the Persian Gulf was viewed in Tehran as more vulnerable 
than that in the Eastern borderlands, thus, the Iranian 
Government decided to abandon its undertaking in Herat by
(1) Political treaty with England, Green Book, op. cit., p. 91
(2) Ibid
<3) Extracts of the Persian text of the treaty as appears in the Green Book, op. cit., pp. 91 -
126. This treaty was signed by Henry ALLis, British Minister at Tehran. John McNeilL was,
at the time, secretary to the British Legation and replaced ALLis as Minister in 1836.
(4) See; Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz (1970) "Emirates of the Persian Gulf", Tehran, Ataei Press,
text in Persian.
(5) Ibid.
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complying with the terms of McNeil's message. In a letter to 
the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, McNeil informed him;
"All my arrangements had been made for marching 
to-day towards the Turkish frontier, when yesterday 
afternoon a messenger arrived from Colonel Stoddart 
with letters informing me that the Shah had given a 
favorable answer to the message of which that Officer 
was the bearer. His Majesty had given a verbal 
promise to comply with the demands of the British 
Government, and a letter from Meerza Ali, the Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, of which I have the 
honour to inclose a translation, conveys to me, on the 
part of His Majesty, an unconditional written promise 
to the same effect.
"I learn from Teheran, that an intimation of 
these His Majesty' s intentions has been made to the 
official authorities there, and His Excellency the 
Ameer Nizam (Mirza Taghi Khan Amir Kabir, then known 
as 'Amir Nezam') called upon me this morning to inform 
me, that he had been specially instructed by the Shah 
to induce me to suspend the prosecution of my journey 
and not to leave the Persian t e r r i t o r y (*)
The Iranian Government, thus decided to lift the siege and to 
withdraw its forces from Herat without punishing its 
rebellious ruler. The Iranians subsequently made some 
considerable concessions in order to satisfy the British. 
These concessions included relinquishing Iran's rights to the 
district of Ghurian, south of Herat and north of Sistan. 
Article 2 of Haji Mirza Aghasi's letter to Viscount 
Palmerston states;
"On the 5th of this month of Rajab (15th of 
September), orders have been issued to His Excellency 
the Ausef od-Dowleh, Governor of Khorasan, that he 
shall give up Ghurian, and deliver it to the Afghans 
after the arrival of the English Ambassador, who is to 
come here."(2)
Enclosure number 2 of this despatch was the English text of a 
decree from Mohammad Shah to the Governor General of 
Khorasan, dated 15th September 1839, ordering him;
{1) From McNeiLL to Viscount Palmerston, No. 49, dated Sept. 11, 1838, FO 539/1 - 10
(microti Lm).
(2) Extracts of the letter of 15th September 1839, from Haji Mirza Aghasi to Viscount
Palmerston, FO 539/1 - 10 (microfilm).
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"AS the English Government has requested the 
Persian Government that we should give up the Fort of 
Ghorian, in consideration of the friendship between 
the two exalted States, the wish of that Government 
has been honoured by our acceptance; and your 
Excellency, our honoured Uncle, is therefore ordered, 
in compliance with the wishes of the English 
Government, to give up that Fort and deliver it to the 
Affghans, after the arrival at our sublime court of 
the English Ambassador.
"Our honoured Uncle will therefore comply with 
these commands, stable as fate.
"This command is imperative,"(1)
DIRECT DIPLOMACY IN AFGHANISTAN
The whole episode of the siege of Herat, however, increased 
the urgency for the British to expand their influence in the 
countries of Afghanistan. Still wary of the possibility of 
some Russian designs on the countries of Afghanistan, Lord 
Auckland, Governor General of India, sent a mission, for the 
expansion of commerce, to Afghanistan. This mission 
contacted the Amir of Kabul. When the mission reached 
Peshawar, a letter from W.H. MacNaghton, Secretary to the 
Indian Government, to the mission, turned it into a purely 
political mission.
Dust Mohammad Khan, Amir of Kabul, received the mission with 
the kind of enthusiasm which did not last long. His 
brothers, the rulers of Qandehar, had already aligned 
themselves with the Iranians and their treaty with Iran 
greatly troubled the British, especially that article 2 of 
the treaty put the Sardars of Qandehar in possession of 
Herat. This article reads:
"We, (the Shah), have given the territory of
Kandahar, and the territory of Herat with their
dependencies to the Sirdars, with the exception of 
Shekkiwan, and the territory beyond it, (towards 
Persia), and so long as they shall not have committed 
any act of opposition (or hostility), these
(1) Enclosure 2 of the above document.
(2) From Macnoughten to Burnes, dated 11 September 1837, FO 539/1 - 10 (microfilm).
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territories shall be in their possession, and in that 
of their heirs; and if they should commit any act of 
opposition (or hostility), the circumstances shall 
first be communicated to the Sirdars, when if they 
rectify the error (or make reparation) it is well; but 
if they do not, then they shall be dealt with in 
• ' ■ ‘ 1 T Government (of Persia)
This undertaking on the part of the Iranian Government to the
Sardars of Qandehar remained as a source of discomfort to the
British who considered that "no state of affairs in Central
Asia more favourable to the interest of British India, than
the (then) division of power among the several rulers of
(2 )Afghanistan".'' ' Moreover, the British resolved to bring
the entire countries of Afghanistan under their influence.
They reached understanding with Shah Shoja (al-Molk) Abdali
and the Governor of Sekuheh, both of whom facilitated the
British invasion of Afghanistan in 1839 with a force of 
/ 3 \
45,000 strong,v } and established their influence as far 
north as the southern slopes of Hindukush. In the western 
parts of the countries of Afghanistan, Vazir Yar-Mohammad 
Khan, by then the Governor of Herat, soon forced Lieutenant 
Pottinger out of Herat and made overtures to the Iranian 
Government in March 1839 and to the chiefs of Qandehar, to 
cooperate with him against Shah-Shoja and his British 
supporters.
The rapid progress of the British forces in the countries of
Afghanistan and the inactivity of the Iranians, however,
prevented realisation of Yar-Mohammad Khan's dream of
cooperation against them. "Qandehar was occupied shortly and
Yar Mohammad Khan was among the first to congratulate Shah
(4)Shoja on the occasion".v J
(1) Extracts of the EngLish translation of the treaty, enclosure 1 of McNeill's despatch No. 39
of August 1838 to Viscount Palmerston FO 539/1 - 10.
(2) Extracts of a Letter from Mr. Macnoughten to Captain Burnes, dated November 1837, FO 539/1 -
10 (microfiLm).
<3) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 446.
(4) Ferrier, op. cit., p. 526.
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The British finally concluded a series of treaties with the 
chiefs of Qandehar and Herat in 1839, thus recognising these 
Iranian dependencies as independent principalities.^^
DIRECT RIVALRIES BETWEEN IRAN AND 
BRITAIN IN THE EASTERN TERRITORIES
The British military expedition in Afghanistan and the 
treaties that they signed with the principalities of Herat
and Qandehar, near the border areas of Iran, which placed
British India as the guarantor of independence of these
principalities, brought Iran and Britain face to face in 
those areas. It was as from the beginning of the 1840's that 
the two powers began to push the frontiers between them back 
and forth, a political process which eventually resulted in 
the formation of the Iran-Afghanistan boundaries.
Early in January 1840 the British Government demanded
restoration of Ghurian to Herat. In reply, the Iranian Prime
Minister informed Lieutenant Colonel J. Shell, British Charge
d'Affairs at Erzeum that Prince Kameran, former sovereign of
Herat, so recognised by British India, had declared himself
to be the faithful servant of the Shahanshah, that, "he
merely tolerated the presence of the English envoy for
expediency, although he was by no means niggardly in the
expenditure of money, jewels, &c and that his (Prince
(2 \Kameran’s) hopes were in the asylum of Islam".' * Upon 
receiving the news of this letter and overtures made to Iran 
by Vazir Yar-Mohammad Khan the new ruler of Herat, the 
British began to strengthen their position in Herat and other 
principalities close to the Iranian frontiers. Within a
short period of time between 1839 and 1840, the British 
reoccupied Kalat, negotiated and brought under their control 
the principality of Khiveh, while Dust Mohammad Khan, Amir of 
Kabul, had also surrendered his principality to the British
(1) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 448,
(2) Ferrier, op. cit.. Appendix F, p. 528.
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(1)without any resistance.v ' Accompanied by 150 members of 
his family and relations and servants, Dust Mohammad Khan 
went to live in India.
On their way back from Afghanistan, the British Indian forces 
annexed the district of Sind and Punjab. This new 
territorial addition brought the British Indians on the 
borders of Iran:
"The battle of Miani(^) (1843) and Guzerat(^) 
(1848) were significant political events, for the 
conquest of Sind and the annexation of the Ponjab 
carried our whole frontier beyond the Indus, or to a 
line reaching from Peshawar on the north to Karachi on 
the south. Afghanistan and Baluchistan, thus became 
contiguous state to British India; and this contiguity 
of territorial possession could not fail to provoke, 
at least in some material respects, identity of 
interest " (4)
The British Government sent Sir John McNeil back to Iran in 
1841 to restore political relations with the Court of Qajar. 
The countries of Afghanistan were in turmoil and the British 
had strengthened their positions in the strategic points near 
the Iranian frontiers, including Girishk and Hirmand 
districts: During the British occupation of Afghanistan, the 
maintenance of Girishk was always considered an important 
object, as it not only defended the high road, and offered 
security to travellers, but presented a good military point 
against Herat. When the Afghan troubles. broke out in 
November, 1841, the Governor of Herat being at that time 
unfriendly to the British, it was of particular importance to 
the British to maintain Girishk, and with this view Major 
Rawlinson, then political agent at Kandahar, was anxious not
(1) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 448.
(2) Hianeh.
(3) Gujerat.
(4) Goldsmid, Sir F. (1876), "Eastern Persia", Vol. 1, pp. IX - X introduction.
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only to retain on the Helmund the regiment to whose care the 
fortress was entrusted, but to strengthen the position with 
reinforcements from the Kandahar garrison.
A SUMMARY OF EVENTS LEADING TO IRAN'S OCCUPATION OF HERAT
In Herat, Yar-Mohammad Khan revolted against Prince Kameran 
in 1839 and took his place as the ruler of the principality. 
He informed Tehran of his loyalty and thereupon ventured on 
capturing Ghurian (1840) and forced Meimaneh and Hazareh to 
become tributaries of Herat. It was in 1841 when 
Yar-Mohammad Khan expelled Major Todd from Herat, and began a 
life of independence with loyalty to Tehran.
In 1847 when Hassan Khan Salar and Jafar Khan revolted in
Mashhad and Sarakhs against Hamzeh Mirza Asef ad-Doleh, Young
Naser ad-Din Shah's uncle and Governor General of Khorasan,
the latter asked for Yar-Mohammad Khan's assistance. He
despatched troops to Mashhad where the Heratis succeeded in
freeing Hamzeh Mirza and took him to Herat. The Governor
General remained in Herat for about three months, during
which time, Prince Morad Mirza, another uncle of Naser ad-Din
Shah, put down the revolt. Yar-Mohammad Khan was rewarded by
Naser ad-Din Shah for his services by investing upon him the
title "Zahir ad-Doleh" literally meaning "supporter of the
Government". This title came to Yar-Mohammad Khan in the
form of a farman accompanied with four cannons as a present
/ 2 \
from the Shah.' 1 Having received the Shah's farman, 
Yar-Mohammad Khan officially restored Herat's traditional 
position as a principality dependent of Iran. A document 
prepared by the Iranian officials for circulation in Europe 
reads:
"Yar-Mohammad Khan, of Herat, came against the 
Salar.... and aided the Persians, performing every 
service to the Persian Government in the siege of 
Meshed. He provided horsemen, collected stores and 
did everything in his power without hesitation. His
(1) Ferrier, op. cit., p. 311, footnote.
(2) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 409.
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presents and letters to the Shah constantly reached 
Tehran; and, In return, farmans and dresses of honour 
were sent to him from the Shah, the same as to former 
Governors of Herat. He coined the money in Herat in 
the name of the Shah of Persia, and he considered 
Herat as a portion of the Persian dominions."(1)
In 1850, the Sardars of Qandehar, allies of Iran according to
the treaty of 1273 (1856) signed between them and the
12\Government of Naser ad-Din Shah,v } revolted against
Yar-Mohammad Khan. Sardar Shir-Ali Khan, son of Mehr-Del
Khan, advanced as far as Lash which was then a dependency of
Herat. Mohammad-Sadeq Khan, son of Kohandel Khan, occupied
Chokhansur, and later entered Girishk. Yar-Mohammad Khan's
forces pushed Shir-Ali Khan out of Lash, and defeated Ahmad
Khan Eshaqzaei, another Sardar of the district. He invited
the defeated Sardars to unite with him, but before making any
progress in this venture, he died (1850). Yar-Mohammad
Khan's son, Saeed-Mohammad Khan, Governor of Lash and Jowain,
succeeded him, and immediately declared loyalty to the
Central Government of Iran by writing to the Shah. Having
been named Governor of Herat in the place of his father by
the Shah, and having received his dress of honour, he
continued to serve like his father, and never made the
slightest objection to send offerings to the Shah, to cause
the "Khotbeh" (prayer) to be made in the Shah's name, or to
do all that was necessary as a Governor and loyal servant.
His brother, Mahommed Sadeq Khan, was sent by him to Tehran
/ 3 \
to attend upon and serve the Shah.v f
{1) Extracts of clause 9 of the translation of paper drawn by the Iranian Ministers for publication
in Europe, doc. 2, enclosure 1 of Mr. Murray's despatch to Earl of CLarendon, dated Tabrees, 
January 22, 1856, p. 3, British Documents of Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the 
Foreign Office Confidential Print, part 1, from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World 
War, section B, the Near and Middle East, 1856 - 1914, edited by David GiLiard, Vol. 10, Persia, 
1856 - 1885, University Publications of America 1984, hereafter referred to as the “F.O, Book 
of Documents on Persia, 1856 - 1885*. The actual Foreign office reference numbers for these 
documents at P.R.O. are from: FO 60/207 to FO 60/227.
(2) For text see: the Green Book, op. cit., pp. 180 - 1.
(3) F.O. Book of Documents on Persia, op. cit.
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Shortly after this development, Mohammad Sadiq Khan, son of 
Sardar Koh^jndgl Khan of Qandehar entered Herat to take 
Saeed-Mohammad Khan's place, on the pretension that the 
people of Herat wanted him to do so. Saeed-Mohammad Khan 
asked for help from Tehran. Iranian troops, commanded by 
Abbas-Qoli Khan, entered Herat and occupied the citadel of 
the city in April 1852, leaving some of the Iranian troops at 
Ghurian, later reinforced by Sam Khan Ilkhani of Daregaz. 
Sam Khan was recalled in January 1853, but Abbas-Qoli Khan 
remained in Herat as Vizir to Saeed-Mohammad Khan. The 
Qandehar Sardars had also left Herat, on the understanding 
that they were allies of Iran and had no business in Herat 
whilst the Iranian forces were there and continued their 
protection of the principality.
Apprehensive of the deepening dependence of Herat and the
Qandeharies on Iran, the British Minister at Tehran, Colonel
Sheil did all he could to mobilise his Government to put an
end to this process. In a letter to the Sadr Azam (Prime
{1)Minister) Mirza Agha Khan Nouri' • of Iran, Sheil warned 
him of the consequences of Iran’s interference" in Herat. An 
Iranian document states:
"....  every day he had some occupation and worked for
the Persian Ministers. Finding that his object could 
not be attained by these means, he wrote something 
plausible to his Government, and the British Ministers 
suspended all intercourse with Shffee Khan, the 
Persian Charge d'Affairs in London, and distinctly 
informed that functionary that until the Persian 
Ministers settled the affair of Herat with Colonel 
Sheilf relations would not be resumed with him."(2)
An agreement, concluded on January 25, 1853, restricted both 
Governments of Iran and Britain from interfering in the 
affairs of Herat. Nevertheless, it somewhat clearly
(1) Mirza Agha Khan Etemad ad-DoLeh Sadr Azam Nauri was Prime Minister from 1851 to 1857.
(2) Extracts of cLause 10, doc. 2, enclosure 1, F.O., Book of Documents on Persia, January 22, 
1856.
336
recognised the dependency of Herat on Iran. Paragraph 2 of 
the section on the engagements of the Iranian Government 
reads:
"The Persian Government also engages to abstain from 
all interference whatsoever in the internal affairs of 
Herat, likewise in (regard to) occupation or taking 
possession or assuming the sovereignty or Government, 
except that the same amount of interference which took 
place between the two in the time of the late, 
Zuheer-ood~Dowlah, Yar Mohammed Khan, is to exist as 
formerly. . . . 1 (1)
The British Government, in return, undertook:
"Jf any foreign power, such as the Afghans, or others, 
should wish to interfere, and take possession of Herat 
territory, or its dependencies, and the Persian 
Ministers should request the British Ministers to 
prevent them by friendly means, and by advice from 
doing so, they will not object to do so,..."(2)
Meanwhile, Saeed-Mohammad Khan, Governor of Herat, was 
overthrown in 1855 by his deputy, Nayeb Isa Khan, who claimed 
to have represented the will of the people of Herat for 
Saeed-Mohammad Khan's removal from the office. The latter 
was, by then, tainted with insanity.
Nayeb Isa Khan sent for Prince Yusof Abdali, grandson of 
Prince Firouz ad-Din in Mashhad, to come and claim the seat 
of authority in Herat. He entered the city on 15th September 
1855 as the new ruler. Saeed-Mohammad Khan, the rightful 
ruler of Herat was subsequently murdered and Haji Kheirollah, 
the only Sardar who dared to defend Saeed-Mohammad Khan, was 
mortally wounded.
The Nayeb and the Prince extracted some of the wealth of
(3)Yar-Mohammad Khan and his son from the Alakaozais.v } All
(1) Extracts of AngLo-Iranian agreement of 1853, F.O, Book of Documents on Persia, op. cit., 
doc. 210, enclosure in doc 209, pp. 161 - 2.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Tate, op. cit., p. 158.
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these events took place under the watchful eyes of the 
Iranians who were neither consulted in advance of these 
doings nor were extended a message of loyalty by the new
rulers, a right for Iran which had been recognised by the
British in the 1853 agreement (see previous page).
Herat ’ s seat of authority was usurped by the Nayeb and the
Prince who had also murdered the overthrown ruler and 
confiscated the private properties of the murdered ruler's 
family. This lawlessness, together with the general chaos 
that they brought to the principality, forced the Shah's 
Prime Minister, Sadr Azam Nouri, to amass troops under the 
command of his uncle Hessam ad-Doleh Morad Mirza, Governor 
General of Khorasan.
THE CAPTURE OF HERAT
The Iranian troops' mission was to reduce Herat and avenge 
the murder of Saeed-Mohammad Khan, and to bring back order to 
the principality. Nayeb Isa sought assistance from Amir Dust 
Mohammad Khan, Amir of Kabul, who had, with the help of the 
British, made a come-back on the scene of Afghan politics. 
The Amir of Kabul shunned any assistance and, like his 
Qandehari brothers, cousins and nephews, refused to meddle 
with Iran's "internal affairs". The Nayeb was, thus, left 
with no alternative but to send Prince Yusof to Prince Morad 
Mirza as a guarantee of loyalty, promising to make up for his 
conduct. The Prince was taken to Tehran where he was tried 
and executed for having murdered Saeed-Mohammad Khan. The 
siege of the city of Herat which began in April 1856, 
nonetheless, continued. The British Ministers at Tehran, Ch. 
A. Murray, had departed from Tehran on December 5th 1855, as 
a result of misunderstandings with the Iranian officials. 
Mirza Shafi,^  ^ Iran's Charge d ’Affairs in London was 
informed that relations between the two Governments were
(1) A great grandfather of this author.
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Two views of the walls around the city of Herat in the late 
nineteenth century, as appeared in "the Indian Borderland 
1880-1990" by Colonel Sir T Hungerford Haldich, London 1901, 
pp. 140-1
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(1 \suspended.' ’ The Iranian forces, however, succeeded in
capturing Herat on 25th of Safar 1273 AH (1856). An Iranian
12 \poet' ' marked this date in the following words:
"As seventy three was added to a thousand and two, it 
marked the date of the capturing of Herat,"
At this time, Amir Dust Mohammad Khan of Kabul had expanded
his dominions almost all over Afghanistan. He had taken
(3 \possession of Qandehar from his nephews in August 1855,' '
and Herat was the only district (of the present country of
Afghanistan) which was left outside his newly expanded 
kingdom. As the Iranian forces entered Herat, the Khans and 
tribal chiefs of the entire region went to Prince Morad Mirza 
Hessam as-Saltaneh declaring their allegiance to the 
Government of Iran. These whole events apparently disturbed 
Dust Mohammad Khan who was endeavouring to revive Ahmad Shah 
Durrani's dominion as the country of Afghanistan. The 
developments in Herat came as a blow to his designs and drew 
him ever closer to the British who were also perturbed by 
these events.
In connection with these events, the Foreign Office's 
confidential documents contain messages to the British from a 
certain "Essan Khan" asking them to intervene in Herat. This 
name does not appear in the local documents and is unfamiliar 
in local custom. The only likelihood that this author can 
see is that the messages came from Nayeb Isa Khan and that 
the officers of the British Indian diplomatic services had 
misinterpreted the name. This assumption is further 
strengthened by the fact that Nayeb Isa Khan's name also does 
not appear in the said documents. Nayeb Isa Khan, according 
to these documents, sent a petition to Mr Murray pledging 
himself, the principality and the people of Herat to the
(1) The Green Book, op. cit., p. 75.
(2) Mirza Shafa,
(3) Tate. op. cit., p. 158.
340
British, asking them to take over his principality. In a 
letter sent to the Earl of Clarendon, through Mr. Murray, he 
asserts:
".... J swear by God, who has no equal, and by all the 
inspired writings of the prophets (on whom be peace) 
which have been handed down to us, especially by Koran 
and Mohammad, I swear that the entire control of the 
city, the country, servants, and subjects, with all 
authority that is exercised, shall be with the 
Government (of Britain): and this your slave, now
ruler of Herat, does hereby accept and adopt of his 
own free will and pleasure, the service of the state, 
which he will perform in all sincerity, truthfulness, 
and devotion, and he will delegate to the Government 
everything he now possesses, land, countries, servants 
and subjects, with full authority over them, and God 
willing, he will never act contrary thereto. The 
proof of this compact and agreement is, that whatever 
gentleman comes on the part of the state, he shall at 
once be installed and have at his disposal the country 
and people...."(*)
Nayeb Isa Khan's double dealing must have become clear to the
Iranians and thus he was assassinated on his way back from
the Iranian camp outside the city of Herat. The Iranians
appointed Soltan Ahmad Khan, son of Mohammad Azim Khan, who
had turned against Dust Mohammad Khan of Kabul, his own
father-in-law, as the new Governor of Herat. He immediately
assumed the title "Shah of Herat as was customary of Herat
leadership at the time. He made coinage and Khotbeh in the
(2)name of Naser ad-Din Shah Qajar "Shahanshah" of Iran.v '
The Iranians, on the other hand, suspected that Dust Mohammad
Khan must have taken Qandehar with the help of the British
and at their instigation, and that he intended to take Herat
(3)as well.v J In their correspondence with the Iranians and
(1) Extracts of statements made by Essan Khan's messengers to the British authorities, dated
August 12, 1856, F.O. Book of Documents on Persia, doc. 155, enclosure in doc. 154, pp. 126 - 
7.
(2) Extracts of paper drawn by Persian Ministers, F.O. Book of Documents, op. cit., p. 3.
(3) Ibid.
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the intermediatories, the British Indians denied having 
anything to do either with Dust Mohammad Khan's annexation of 
Qandehar, or with his designs on Herat. Nevertheless, the 
remaining documents of correspondence between the British 
diplomats and military officers and the British Government 
personnel suggest otherwise. In a despatch to London, Sir 
Justin Sheil expresses delight that Dust Mohammad Khan had 
occupied Qandehar. He asserts:
"The proposition of the Persian Government to evacuate 
or retire from Herat on condition that Dust Mahommed 
should restore Candahar to Kohandil Khan's family, and 
engage to abstain from aggression on Herat, seems to 
me wholly inadmissible. For what it amount to but 
that on committing a deliberate breach of faith, 
instead of punishment, Persia receives a reward for 
her perfidy. Candehar has escaped from the control of
Persia, and should be preserved from again falling
under it. " (1)
Furthermore, when Mohammad Sadiq Khan, son of Dust Mohammad
(2)Khan took Farah, a dependency of Herat,' 1 not only did the
British not protest against the move but were thinking of
paving the way for the success of Dust Mohammad Khan's 
designs on Herat. In a despatch to the Chief Commissioner 
for Punjab, Lieutenant Colonel Edwards pointed out:
"J asked if it were possible for Essan Khan to come to 
any understanding with the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. 
They (the Afghan envoys) said 'yes' if any English 
officer came between and settled the terms.... If the 
British Government ordered Essan Khan to hold Herat 
under the Ameer of Cabul, paying yearly tribute of 
camels and horses as an acknowledgement of 
dependency."(3)
(1) Extracts of Sir Justin Sheil‘s despatch to M. Hamond, dated Dec. 18, 1856, doc. 209, F.O. 
Book of Documents on Persia, op. cit., p. 160.
(2) From Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon, dated Jan. 18, 1857, F.O. Book of 
Documents on Persia, op. cit., doc 234, p. 181.
(3) Clause 14 of despatch of Lieu. - ColoneL Edwards to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner 
for the Punjab, dated Huzara, September 18, 1856, F.O. Book of Documents on Persia, doc. 189, 
p. 147.
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All these, not only contradicted the obligations suggested in
the Iranian Government's contracted engagement, relative to
Herat in January 1853, whereby the British Government
accepted to "prevent, by friendly means, foreign powers, such
as the Afghans, or others" from "interfere, and take
possession of the Herat territory, or its dependencies"^^
but also were contradictory to the terms of clause 3 of the
same document of the testimonies of envoys of Essan Khan (Isa
Khan) which declared "Persia, Khiva, Bokhara, and
(2 )Afghanistan" as enemies of Herat.v 1
The British Government, however, declared war on Iran on
(3 )November 1st, 1856v ; over the question of Herat. British 
forces, commanded by General Sir James Outram, occupied a 
number of Iranian ports and islands in the Persian Gulf and 
informed the Iranians of their conditions for peace. The 
British conditions contained mainly withdrawal, on the part 
of Iran, not only of all military forces from Herat and 
dependencies, but also of all claims to Herat and what was 
then termed as the countries of Afghanistan. The Russians, 
suspected of mobilising to support Iran, were pacified:
"Ife learn with satisfaction that our principal 
conditions are considered reasonable by the Russian 
Government. You will inform them that we think it 
better to settle the whole at once, as subsequent 
negotiations might lead to fresh disagreement.
We cannot stop the expedition, which by this time must 
have occupied points in the Persian territory; but as 
we have no wish to press too severely on Persiaf its 
operations shall not be extended while there is any 
hope of our conditions being accepted."(4)
(1) Extracts of Engagement Contracted by the Persian Government, reLative to Herat, dated
January 25, 1853, F.O. Book of Documents on Persia, doc. 210, p. 162.
(2) See: Essan Khan's message to the British authorities, dated 12th of August 1856, F.O. Book
of Documents on Persia, doc. 155, enclosure in doc. 154, pp. 126 - 7.
(3) Tate, op. cit., p. 212.
(4) Extracts of Letter from the Earl of Clarendon to Lord Uodehouse, dated F.O. December 25,
1856, doc. 217, F.O. Book of Documents on Persia p.165.
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Meanwhile, the British began openly disregarding Iran's 
historical interest in Herat by claiming that the action in 
Herat was a display of an intention of threat against 
Qandehar and other areas occupied by Amir Dust Mohammad Khan 
of Kabul. Not only did the British not raise objections, as
was promised in the last paragraph of the 1853 engagements of
the Iranian Government that the British also accepted, to 
Dust Mohammad Khan's occupation of Qandehar and Farah, but 
they signed an agreement with him on 6th January 1857, 
whereby they allied themselves with him and undertook to pay 
him monthly as long as the latter kept the Iranians busy in 
war:
"Whereas the Shah of Persia contrary to his engagement 
with the British Government, has taken possession of 
Herat, and has manifested an intention to interfere in 
the present possession of Ameer Dost Mohammad Khan,
and there is now war between the British and Persian 
Governments, therefore the Honourable East India 
Company, to aid Ameer Dost Mohammad Khan to defend and
maintain his present possessions in Balkh, Cabool and
Candahar against Persia, hereby agrees out of
friendship to give the said Ameer one lakh of
Company's Rupees monthly during the war with
Persia,...."(1)
Amir Dust Mohammad Khan signed this agreement with the
British, against Iran, in direct contravention of the fact
/2 \
attested by himself in a letter to the Shah of Iran' ' that 
not only Herat and Qandehar, but also his own principality of
/ 3 \
Kabul had been dependencies of Iran; J
British forces, however, occupied the Iranian 
island of Khark in the Persian Gulf on December 4th, 1856; 
British Indian troops disembarked at Bandar Abbas on December 
9th; the Iranians were dislodged from Bushehr on January 
27th, 1857; General Sir James Outram landed at Bandar Abbas,
(1) Tate, op. cit., p. 212.
(2) The original. Persian text of this Letter and a number of reLevant Letters do not have any
detectabLe dates. The enclosure to the despatch to James Murrat by Secretary to the Gov. of
India, dated Feb. 25, 1856, FO 248/16.
(3) Ibid.
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and on February 8, 1857 Iranian forces were defeated at
Borazjan on March 26; and Khorramshahr (then Mohammareh) was
occupied by the British f o r c e s . T h i s  military
expedition, once again, made the Iranian Government give up
Herat, as Tehran seems to have been aware of the supreme
importance of Iran's position in the Persian Gulf, compared
with the possession on the border areas of Afghanistan. At
the same time, London "looked on the Indian Government's
expedition of the entire Iranian coasts and islands of the
(2)Persian Gulf with discomfort".' J The British, therefore,
were said to have made overtures to Napoleon III of France
who had also been approached by the Iranians. As a result of
mediation by the French Government, a treaty of 15 articles
was signed in Paris on March 4, 1857. The Iranians,
submitted to the conditions laid down by the British, and
Farrokh Khan Amin al-Molk, the Iranian Ambassador
extraordinary to Paris, signed with R.H. Henry Richard
Charles Baron Cowley, British Ambassador extraordinary to
Paris. Article 5 of this agreement dealt with the withdrawal
of the Iranian forces from Herat and the adjacent
(3)districtsv * - (for the full text of the treaty, see
Appendix III). Article 6 of the treaty compels Iran to 
relinquish all her rights and claims in connection with Herat 
and the "countries of Afghanistan". Furthermore, the Iranian 
Government undertook other concessions, including the 
recognition of Herat's independence and never to attack or 
interfere with the independence of the state of Herat and 
other principalities of Afghanistan. This treaty was 
ratified at Baghdad on May 2, 1857.
As the Eastern Iranian frontiers shifted, therefore, to the 
territories to the west of Herat, Ghurian and Farah, and as 
boundary delimitation was next on the agenda of British
(1) Tate, op. cit., p. 212.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Treaty of Peace between her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, F.O. 60/403, No. xc/69020, p.2, see Appendix
III.
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Iranian diplomatic mission to the 
peace conference with Britain - Paris - March 1857
Ambassador Extraordinary Farrokh Khan Amin al-Molk 
seated. Third from right standing is Mirza Malkam Khan 
Nezam ad-Doleh who, as acting Foreign Minister in 1873, 
signed General Goldsmid's Sistan Boundary Arbitration 
awards.
(Photograph as appeared in Rahavard quarterly 
Persian Publication,
No.23, Summer of 1990 Los Angeles, US, p.340)
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Illu stra ted  L o u d e n  \ en's. 14 Fcorujrv 1S5”
(Queen Victoria found Farrokh Khan 
"a fine looking man")
A Persian miniature of Farrokh Khan Amin al-Molk (later 
Amin ad-Doleh) as appeared in illustrated London News, 14
February 1857, and reappeared in Denis Wright's "The 
Persians Among the British."
With the Permission of Sir Denis Wright
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Indian political designs concerning these areas, article 6 of 
the 1857 peace treaty of Paris provided for the British to be 
party to such boundary arrangements between Iran and 
Afghanistan. The third paragraph of article 6 of this treaty 
made it clear that:
"In case of differences arising between the Government 
of Persia and the countries of Herat and Afghanistan, 
the Persian Government engages to refer them for 
adjustment to the friendly offices of the British 
Government and not to take up arms unless those 
friendly offices fail of effect."(1)
Despite these developments, Sardar Sultan Ahmad Shah, King of 
Herat, appointed by Iranian central authorities in 1856,^  
not only continued in this capacity until 1863, but remained 
loyal to Iran in spite of the terms of the first paragraph of 
article 6 of the 1857 peace treaty which engaged Iran not to:
"....demand from the Chiefs of Herat, or of the 
countries of Afghanistan, any marks of obedience, such 
as the coinage or 'Khootbeh', or tribute."(3)
There is no evidence suggesting that Iran asked Herat to 
remain loyal to the Central Government at Tehran or to pay 
annual tribute. Sardar Sultan Ahmad Shah of Herat himself 
continued his own and his principality's loyalty to Iran even 
after the signing of the 1857 peace treaty of Paris between 
the British and the Iranians which effectively declared Herat 
a principality independent of both Iran and Afghanistan. 
This was not what Amir Dust Mohammad Khan of Kabul desired. 
Having established himself firmly in Qandehar and having 
seized Herat's dependency of Farah, Dust Mohammad Khan 
ordered Sardar Mohammad Sharif, his Governor of Farah, to 
march his troops northwards. Herat's dependencies of Ghurian 
and Sagher were seized in 1860. Sardar Sultan Ahmad Shah, 
for his part, moved troops southward and recaptured Farah
(1) Extracts of third paragraph of article 6 of 1856 treaty of Paris, Ibid.
(2) See previous pages.
(3) First paragraph of the 1957 peace treaty, see appendix IV for text.
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itself in 1861. This measure provided Dust Mohammad Khan
with the necessary pretext for action against Herat. On 28th
June 1862, intelligence received in Tehran that Amir Dust
Mohammad Khan had reached Qandehar, with the aim of marching
on Herat. The Iranian Government informed the British
Ambassador, in accordance with the last paragraph of article
6 of the 1857 peace treaty that Sardar Amin Khan and Sardar
Sharif Khan had invested Farah on behalf of Dust Mohammad
Khan, and asked for British^ intervention. The British
remained inactive on the subject. Farah fell on 8th July
that year, and Dust Mohammad Khan marched on Herat. He
(2 ^captured Sabzevar (now of Afghanistan) on 22nd July.v '
Herat was put under siege immediately, which continued for
(3)several months.v ' During the siege of the city of Herat, 
Sultan Ahmad Shah's wife, Amir Dust Mohammad Khan's daughter, 
died (January 1863). Shortly after her death, Sultan Ahmad 
Shah himself passed away (April 1863). The defence of the 
city was continued by Sultan Ahmad Shah's son, Sardar 
Shahnavaz Khan, a grandson of Dust Mohammad Khan. The 
grandson's resistance against the grandfather's tightening 
siege of the city proved ineffective, and Dust Mohammad Khan 
entered Herat shortly afterwards.
The Iranian Government's appeal to the British Government was 
to assist Sardar Shahnavaz Khan by lifting the siege of 
Herat. Mr Eastwick was assigned by the British Legation of 
Tehran, to see to the matter. He was made Her Majesty's
<1) Engagements of British Government under articLe 6 of of 1857 treaty: FO 60/403, pp. 8 - 9 .
“The British Government, on their part, engage at all times to exert their influence 
with the State of Afghanistan to prevent any cause of umbrage being given by them, or 
by any of them, to the Persian Government; and the British Government, when appealed 
to by the Persian Government, in the event of difficulties arising, wiLL use their 
best endeavours to compose such differences in a manner just and honourable to 
Persia."
(2) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 587.
(3) G.P. Tate asserts that the City of Herat was invested by Amir Dust Mohammad Khan on 27th of
July 1862 which cannot be correct as Dust Mohammad Khan died in June 1863 only a week after 
capturing Herat. 7
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Charge d'Affairs at Herat, but was directed to return to
Tehran empty handed. Dust Mohammad Khan thus invested Herat
and fulfilled his dream of creating the kingdom of
Afghanistan within the territories now known as the country
of Afghanistan. His joy was but short-lived, and he died on
(1)the 19th June 1863,v ' only a week or two after capturing 
Herat.
CONCLUSION
The political and military paralysis of the Iranian
Government, resulting from the terms of the 1857 peace treaty
of Paris, allowed finalisation of the partitioning of
Khorasan, and paved the way for the creation of the Kingdom
(2 \of Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah Durrani' J had in the second 
half of the eighteenth century created the kingdom of 
Afghanistan, but it collapsed shortly after his death in 
1772, for it did not have the necessary geographical, 
historical and cultural substances which could keep Herat and 
Qandehar in a lasting union with Kabul and other areas of 
diversified spatial structures of human societies. Herat, 
for instance was more a Khorasani environment than anything 
else, and as Lord Curzon asserted, it was a geographical, 
historical and cultural extension of Mashhad rather than 
being Afghan. Dust Mohammad Khan succeeded in the second 
half of the nineteenth century in recreating the Kingdom of 
Afghanistan with the direct assistance of the British Indians 
when it was necessary, such as in the case of capturing 
Qandehar, and with British India's inactivity when it 
mattered, such as in the case of the annexation of Herat. 
This whole process was entirely in contradiction with the 
aforementioned British claims that Iran had territorial 
designs against the countries of Afghanistan and that Dust 
Mohammad Khan did not have any designs on Qandehar and
(1) Ghobar, op. cit., p. 589,
(2) Ahmad Shah Durrani, born 1722, died 1772.
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Herat. The country of Afghanistan was thus created to suit 
the strategic desires of India in relations with Iran and 
Russia. The clamour intensifying in the British empire in 
the 1830's, 1840's and 1850's of a possible joint
Russo-Iranian design or Russian design against India through 
Iran has never been substantiated properly, except for the 
enthusiastic geopolitical and strategic assumption of Sir 
John McNeil and Sir Justin Sheil. The following indications 
prove this view:
1. There is not any evidence in the existing documents both 
in English and Persian, remotely suggesting that there 
was an understanding between Iran and Russia concerning 
India or the Iranians wanting to transform the 
traditional semi-independent principalities of Herat and 
Qandehar into annexed territories of Iran.
2. Iran had suffered two major humiliations at the hands of 
the Russians by the signing of the treaties of Golestan 
(1813) and Turkmanchai (1828) and the power and
influence of the House of Qajar was in sharp decline. 
In a state as feeble as Iran was under the Qajars, 
especially after 1828, it would be more like a miracle 
for Iran to have had any designs against any
neighbouring territory, let alone threatening the
possessions of a great power in India.
3. Although the British had quite correctly assumed that a 
"weak" Iran would make it possible for the Russians to 
gain prominent influence in that country which could be 
used in threatening India, it should be noted that
considering her deep distrust of both major powers 
(Britain and Russia), especially after the treaty of 
Turkmanchai 1828, it would be highly unlikely that Iran 
would join Russia in a far-reaching strategic plan 
against British India.
Contrary to these realities, Sir John McNeil's strategic 
assessments of Herat and the so-called countries of
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Afghanistan were adopted by the British. Yet, there are 
indications that London remained somewhat uneasy on the 
question of denying Iran completely of her rights in Herat:
"Persian claims to Herat were of long standing. It 
had been the capital of Eastern Khorasan and 
geographically was not separated by any natural 
barrier from Mashhad."(1)
This is an echo of the statement made earlier by Lord Curzon
on the fact that Herat had been a historical part of Iran's
{2 \Eastern Khorasan.1 1 Yet convinced of the vitality of Sir 
John McNeil's strategic assessments, Lord Curzon, like most 
other officers and diplomats serving in India, was critical 
of the London Government's repeated proposal of returning 
Herat to Iran:
"Lord Beconsfleld after the war of 1878 committed the 
Inexplicable error of proposing once again to hand 
over Herat....'Key of India' to Persia to the tender 
mercies of the Czar."(3)
The British in the meantime, began consolidating their 
position in Kalat of Baluchistan, another historical 
dependency of Iran, where the two sides disputed almost every 
village, every hamlet and every piece of land in a vast 
stretch of territory. This development, together with the 
expansionist drives of Dust Mohammad Khan's successor, Shir 
Ali Khan (a British protected individual) in Sistan and areas 
to the west of Ghurian and Farah, narrowed down the corridor 
of land in which political push by the two powers (Iran and 
British India) against one another took place, to a stretch 
beginning from Quetta Bay to the south, to Central Khorasan 
to the north, and set the grounds for the emergence of the 
Eastern Iranian boundaries.
(1) Persian Frontiers, Section on boundaries with Afghanistan, RRX/7/i, FO 371/40219, p. 2.
(2) See introduction and relevant reference.
(3) Curzon, George N, op. cit., p. 586.
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Appendix I
Copy of the Draft of a Treaty sealed by Kohundil Khan^+^
Proposed terms of a Treaty between His Majesty Mohammed Shah 
and Kohundil Khan, Sirdar of Kandahar, under the sealed 
guarantee of the Russian Ambassador at Tehran.
I, as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government at 
the Court of Persia, guarantee the fulfilment of the
following conditions of treaty between His Majesty Mohammed 
Shah and the Sirdar of Kandahar
1st. The Principality of Herat is to be bestowed by the
Shah on the rulers of Kandahar, as a reward for their
faithful services performed to him since his accession to the 
throne of Persia.
2nd. The territories and tribes at present subject to 
the Sirdars of Kandahar to be preserved to them free of
violence, injury or confiscation.
3rd. The Persian Government in no way to amalgamate 
with their own subjects any of the Afghan tribes, great or 
small, or to employ them upon service unconnected with their 
own affairs; and all business relative to the Afghan states 
to be submitted by the Persian Government to the rulers of 
Kandahar.
4th. The Prince Kameran and his Minister Yar Mohammad 
Khan to be excluded from all participation in the councils of 
Persia.
5th. Should any hostile movement be made against 
Kandahar by Shooja-ool-Molk, the English, or the Ameer of
Cabul, aid to be afforded by the Shah to the Sirdars.
6th. In the event of the sons or brothers of Kohundil 
Khan coming with an auxiliary force to the royal camp, no
violence or injury to be in any way offered to the persons or
property of them or their followers, and none of them to be
detained as hostages, with the exception of a single son of
Kohundil Khan's, who will always remain in the service of the 
Shah.
7th. A contingent of twelve thousand horse and twelve 
guns to be supplied by the Kandaharees to garrison Herat,
receiving pay and rations from them, and to assist the Shah 
on occasion of service.
8th. On the arrival of treaty duly ratified at Kandahar,
Mahommad Omar Khan to be immediately dispatched to the royal
presence.
(+) This is the only copy of the treaty that this author cited in General Ferrier's Book 
‘Caravan Journeys and Wandering in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Baloochistan", London 
1857, pp. 508 - 9.
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9 th. After the presentation of this Prince, the 
necessary money for the outfit of the horse and artillery to 
be made over by the Persian Government to the Sirdars of 
Kandahar; Sirdar Mehrdil Khan to be then sent with a thousand 
horse to the royal camp. This Prince being presented, and 
mutual confidence being established between the Shah and the 
Sirdars, no other demand to be made upon the Kandaharees by 
the Persian Government than that of military service. Should 
Mohammed Shah fail to fulfil any of these several conditions, 
or depart in any way from the stipulations, I as Minister 
Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government, becoming myself 
responsible, will oblige him, in whatever way may be 
necessary, to act fully up to the terms and conditions of the 
treaty. This Memorandum is framed as draft of the proposed 
terms of treaty.
True Translation
(Signed) H.C. RAWLINSON, Major.
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Appendix II
Text of the Memorandum of Haji Mirza Aghasi, in reply to
Yar-Mohammad Khan's proposals, sent to the British Prime 
(+)Minister' '
"The first point is that war, marauding and the capture 
of prisoners shall cease. - As all these things are opposed 
to obedience, it is evident that they will, as a matter of 
course cease, when Prince Kameran acknowledges subjection to 
Persia. He who is obedient must be obedient under every 
circumstance.
Second point - As Herat with its dependencies is one of 
the provinces of Persia, whenever the exigences of the state 
require troops to be despatched in any direction, Herat, like 
other provinces of the kingdom must furnish troops and 
provisions.
Throughout the propositions of Futteh Mahomed Khan, the 
designation applied to Prince Kameran is Kameran Shah. This 
is precisely the point which is the cause of the movement of 
troops, that these pretensions may be destroyed. Two kings 
cannot dwell in one kingdom. The title of Feridoon Meerza, 
the Governor General of Fars, which is ten times as large as 
Herat, is Ameerzadeh, son of a prince, (not prince) . This 
phrase conveys the impression of disobedience and
refractoriness, and the remedy is to cease to employ such 
expressions.
In regard to the first proposition of the engagements by 
Persia, that the King of Kings of Iran shall treat Prince
Kameran as his brother. - The treatment of the King, the 
Asylum of the Faith, to Feridoon Mirza, (the King of Persia's 
brother) is that of master to his servant. Let Prince 
Kameran be like Feridoon Meerza,, for higher expectations
would be presumptuous. It might indeed be proposed that he 
should be treated with more favour than His Majesty's 
brother; but no one can aspire to be regarded as brother to 
the King of Kings; for all are devoted servants of the Great 
King.
Third Point. - That tribute shall be paid annually at 
the Noorooz. He who is obedient must of course pay tribute 
and taxes; He must read the Khootbeh (prayers which imply 
royalty) , and strike the coin in the name of the king, the 
Asylum of the Faith (King of Persia); and he must, at all 
times, and on all occasions, acknowledge his obedience and 
subjection; and he must avoid the inconsistency of
{+) Enclosure 3 in No. 3 of Hr HcNeiLL's despatch to Viscount Palmerston, dated July 1837, pp. 
11 - 12, FO 539/1 - 10 (microfilm).
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endeavouring to form a Treaty as if Persia and Herat were two 
separate kingdoms.
Fourth Point. - The protection of merchants - This 
clause resembles the preceding, for the greater question 
includes minor points. - The line of conduct for a person
under subjection is this: he must protect the Ryots and
merchants of the country entrusted to his charge; and if any 
property is destroyed, he must make good the loss; all 
persons who travel in this country must enjby perfect 
security in the same manner as existed in the time of the 
Seffavean kings, (may God have mercy on them), nor must there 
be any occasion for their feeling alarm or taking precautions 
for their safety.
Fifth Point. - Regarding hostages; hostages selected 
from the principle persons of Herat and its dependencies, 
must come and reside at Meshed, and when perfect confidence 
has been acquired of the submission and subjection of Herat, 
they will of course obtain leave to depart (nay, Herat itself 
may become a place for securing other hostages); but two 
persons or five persons as hostages will not be sufficient.
Persian Government will not interfere in the affairs of 
Herat, and any deviation from this course will be contrary to 
royal justice; but if otherwise, beyond a doubt changes and 
alterations will be introduced, and the severest punishments 
will be inflicted on the people of that country.
In regard to the third proposition; why should military 
expeditions be undertaken against a country which has
acknowledged its subjection? Troops are sent against the
rebellious and refactory - not the submissive and obedient. 
Who would seek to inflict evil on his own dominions?
In regard to the fourth proposition, - the British 
Government, from the friendship subsisting between both 
states, is always listened to, whenever it gives counsel to 
Persia and its provinces. After the acknowledgement of
subjection by the people of Herat, and the performance of 
service, then whatever the British Government recommends, 
shall be without doubt assented to.
The language which Futteh Mahomad Khan held to Your 
Excellency, varied exceedingly from the letters which Yar 
Mahomad Khan (Vizier of Herat) addressed to the 
Ausef-ud-Dowleh, and which your excellency has perused and 
taken a copy of; the propositions have no connection with 
that document; therefore no confidence is to be placed in the 
declarations of Futteh Mahomad Khan; and if any discussion
were to take place, no reliance could be held in his 
assertions.
Undoubtedly Your Excellency has heard the complaints 
against the Affghans which have been forwarded to this 
Court. Recently, too, the nobles and priesthood of 
Khorassan, for instance such persons as this Meerza Eskeree, 
the chief priest, and Haji Meerza Moosa Khan, and foreigners 
and natives, have made representations on this subject. I 
have sent these representations to Your Excellency; and, 
after perusal, I beg you to give me your opinion on the 
answer that ought to be written, and on the course that it is 
incumbent on His Majesty to adopt under such circumstances.
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In truth it would be contrary to manliness to suffer such 
proceedings with patience. I need give no further trouble.
14th of Rebee-oll-eevel, 1253 
Translated by 
(signed) J SHEIL,
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Appendix III
Treaty of Peace between Her Majesty the Queen of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty 
the Shah of Persia. (•*•) ( + ^
*****************
Signed, in the English and Persian Languages, at 
Paris, March 4, 1857
[Ratifications exchanged at Baghdad, May 2, 1857]
IN THE NAME OF GOD THE ALMIGHTY, THE ALL-MERCIFUL.
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty, whose Standard is the 
Sun, the Sacred, the August, the Great Monarch, the absolute 
King of Kings of all states of Persia, being both equally and 
sincerely animate by a desire to put a stop to the evils of 
war which is contrary to their friendly wishes and 
dispositions, and to re-establish on a solid basis the 
relations of amity which had so long existed between the two 
exalted states, by means of a peace calculated for their 
mutual advantage and benefit, have appointed as their 
Plenipotentiaries, for carrying into effect this desired 
object, the following, that is to say:
Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Henry Richard 
Charles, Baron Cowley, a Peer of the United Kingdom, a Member 
of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight Grand 
Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Her Majesty's 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to his Majesty 
the Emperor of the French, &c.,&c.,&c.;
And His Majesty the Shah of Persia, His Excellency the 
Abode of Greatness, the Favourite of the King, Ferokh Khan, 
Amen Olmolk, the Great Ambassador of the Mighty State of 
Persia, the Possessor of the Royal Portrait, and of the Blue 
Cordon, the Bearer of the Diamond studded Girdle, &c.,&c.,&c.;
Who, having exhibited and exchanged full powers, and 
found them to be in due form, have agreed upon and concluded 
the following Articles:-
(1) Afghanistan is spelled in the text of this document as -Affghanistan" 
(+> F.O. 60/403, pp. 8 - 9 .
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ARTICLE I.
From the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the 
present Treaty, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship 
between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, on the one part, and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, 
on the other, as likewise between their respective
successors, dominions, and subjects.
ARTICLE II.
Peace being happily concluded between Their said 
Majesties, it is hereby agreed that the forces of Her Majesty
the Queen shall evacuate the Persian territory, subject to
conditions and stipulations hereafter specified.
ARTICLE III.
The High Contracting Parties stipulate that all
prisoners taken during the war by either belligerent shall be 
immediately liberated.
ARTICLE IV.
His Majesty the Shah of Persia engages, immediately on 
the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty, to publish a 
full and complete amnesty, absolving all Persian subjects who 
may have in any way compromised by their intercourse with the 
British forces during the war, from any responsibility for 
their conduct in that respect, so that no persons, of 
whatever degree, shall be exposed to vexation, persecution, 
or punishment, on that account.
ARTICLE V.
His Majesty the Shah of Persia engages further to take 
immediate measures for withdrawing from the territory and 
city of Herat, and from every other part of Affghanistan, the 
Persian troops and authorities now stationed therein: such
withdrawal to be effected within three months from the date 
of exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty.
ARTICLE VI.
His Majesty the Shah of Persia agrees to relinquish all 
claims to sovereignty over the territory and city of Herat 
and the countries of Affghanistan, and never to demand from 
the Chiefs of Herat, or of the countries of Affghanistan, any 
marks of obedience, such as the coinage, or "khotbeh" or 
tribute.
His Majesty further engages to abstain hereafter from 
all interference with the internal affairs of Affghanistan. 
His Majesty promises to recognize the independence of Herat, 
and of the whole of Af fghanistan, and never to attempt to 
interfere with the independence of those States.
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In case of differences arising between the Government of 
Persia and the countries of Herat and Affghanistan, the 
Persian Government engages to refer them for adjustment to 
the friendly offices of the British Government, and not to 
take up arms unless these friendly offices fail of effect.
The British Government, on their part, engage at all 
times to exert their influence with the States of 
Affghanistan, to prevent the cause of umbrage being given by 
them, or by any of them, to the Persian Government; and the 
British Government, when appealed to by the Persian 
Government, in the event of difficulties arising, will use 
their best endeavours to compose such differences in a manner 
just and honourable to Persia.
ARTICLE VII.
In case of any violation of the Persian frontier by any 
of the States referred to above, the Persian Government shall 
have the right, if due satisfaction is not given, to 
undertake military operations for the repression and 
punishment of the aggressors; but it is distinctly understood 
and agreed to, that any military force of the Shah which may 
cross the frontier for the aforementioned purpose, shall 
retire within its own territory as soon as its object is 
accomplished, and that the exercise of the above-mentioned 
right is not to be made a pretext for the permanent 
occupation by Persia, or for the annexation to the Persian 
dominions, of any town or portion of the said States.
ARTICLE VIII.
The Persian Government engages to set at liberty without 
ransom, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications 
of this Treaty, all prisoners taken during the operations of 
the Persian troops in Affghanistan, and all Affghans who may 
be detained either as hostages or as captives on political 
grounds in any part of the Persian dominions shall, in like 
manner, be set free; provided that the Affghans on their part 
are set at liberty, without ransom, the Persian prisoners and 
captives who are in the power of the Affghans.
commissioners on the part of the two Contracting Powers 
shall;, if necessary, be named to carry out the provisions of 
this Article.
ARTICLE IX.
The High Contracting Parties engage that, in the 
establishment and recognition of Consuls-General, Consuls, 
Vice-Consuls, and consular Agents, each shall be placed in 
the dominions of the other on the footing of the most 
favoured nation and that the treatment of their respective 
subjects and their trade, shall also, in every respect, be 
placed on the footing of the treatment of the subjects and 
commerce of the most favoured nation.
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ARTICLE X.
Immediately after the ratifications of this Treaty have 
been exchanged, the British Mission shall return to Tehran, 
where the Persian Government agrees to receive it with the 
apologies and ceremonies specified in the separate Note 
signed this day by the Plenipotentiaries of the High 
Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE XI.
The Persian Government engages, within three months 
after the return of the British Mission to Tehran, to appoint 
a Commissioner, who, in conjunction with a Commissioner to be 
appointed by the British Government, shall examine into and 
decide upon the pecuniary claims of all British subjects upon 
the Government of Persia, and shall pay such of these claims 
as may be pronounced just, either in one sum or by 
instalments, within a period not exceeding one year from the 
date of the award of the Commissioners. And the same 
Commissioners shall examine into and decide upon the claims 
on the Persian Government of all Persian subjects, or the 
subjects of other Powers, who, up to the period of the 
departure of the British Mission from Tehran, were under 
British protection, which they have not since renounced.
ARTICLE XII.
Saving the provision in the later part preceding 
Article, the British Government will renounce the right of 
protecting hereafter any Persian subject not actually in the 
employment of the British mission, or of British 
Consuls-General, Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents, 
provided that no such right is accorded to, or exercised by , 
any other foreign powers; but in this, as in all other 
respects, the British Government requires, and the Persian 
Government engages, that the same privileges and immunities 
shall in Persia be conferred upon, and shall be enjoyed by, 
the British Government, it servants and its subjects, and 
that the same respect and consideration shall be shown for 
them, and shall be enjoyed by them, as are conferred upon and 
enjoyed by, and shown to, the most favoured foreign 
Government, its servants and subjects.
ARTICLE XIII.
The High Contracting Parties hereby renew the Agreement 
entered into by them in the month of August 1851 (Shawal 
1267), for the suppression of the slave trade in the Persian 
Gulf, and engage further that the said agreement shall 
continue in force after the date at which it expires, that 
is, after the month of August 1862, for the further space of 
ten years, and for so long afterwards as neither of the High 
Contracting Parties shall, by a formal declaration, annul it? 
such declaration not to take effect until one year after it 
is made.
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ARTICLE XIV.
Immediately on the exchange of the ratifications of this
Treaty, the British troops will desist from all further acts
of hostility against Persia; and the British Government 
engages, further, that as soon as the stipulations in regard 
to the evacuation, by Persian troops, of Herat and the 
Affghan territories, as well as in regard to the reception of
the British Mission at Tehran, shall have been carried into
full effect, the British troops shall, without delay, be 
withdrawn from all ports, places, and islands belonging to 
Persia; but the British Government engages that, during this 
interval nothing shall be designedly done by the Commander of 
the British troops to weaken the allegiance of the Persian 
subjects towards the Shah, which allegiance it is, on the 
contrary, their earnest desire to confirm; and, further, the 
British Government engages that, as far as possible, the 
subjects of Persia will be secured against inconvenience from 
the presence of the British troops, and that all supplies 
which may be required for the use of these troops, which the 
Persian Government engages to direct its authorities to 
assist them in procuring, shall be paid for, at the fair 
market-price, by the British Commissariat, immediately on 
delivery.
ARTICLE XV.
The present treaty shall be ratified, and the 
ratifications exchange at Baghdad in the space of three 
months, or sooner if possible.
In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have 
signed the same, and have affixed thereto the deal of their 
arms.
Done at Paris, in quadruplicate, this fourth day of the 
month of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight 
hundred and fifty seven.
(Signed) COWLEY 
FEROKH (in Persian).
C H A P T E R  V
EMERGENCE OF EASTERN IRANIAN BOUNDARIES =
KHORASAN AND BALUCHISTAN
INTRODUCTION
As discussed in the previous chapter, Herat's occupation in 
186 3, by Dust Mohammad Khan, finalised the partitioning of 
Khorasan. The Afghan encroachment into Iranian territories 
did not, however, stop at that. These encroachments 
continued in various forms of direct military operations and 
tribal raids. Amir Dust Mohammad Khan was succeeded in 1863 
by his son Amir Shir-Ali Khan who almost immediately after 
acceding to power, resumed expansionist activities in the 
territories well beyond the western districts of Herat and 
Qandehar, particularly in the Sistan district.
Meanwhile, the British forces, returning from their Afghan 
expedition, captured Sind and Punjab in two battles: Mianeh
in 1843 and Gujerat in 1848. The annexation of these two 
countries pushed British India's frontiers westwards to a 
line reaching from Pishavar, on the north, and Karachi, on 
the south. Baluchistan thus became contiguous to British 
India and the Indian frontiers were put on the doorstep of 
Iran. By the late 1860s, the British Indians began to 
implement a project of telegraph lines between India and 
Great Britain which was scheduled to pass through southern 
Baluchistan (Makran) and the Persian Gulf.
These two developments necessitated the establishment of 
clearly defined boundaries of a European nature between Iran 
and Afghanistan; in the Khorasan and Sistan regions and 
between Iran and British India in the Baluchistan region. Of 
these three sections (Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchistan) the 
Sistan boundaries' delimitation (the middle section) consumed 
the longest time with the most arduous of efforts. As they
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involved the complicated issue of Hirmand river, the study of 
their emergence and evolution deserves more elaboration in 
separate chapters which comprises the core chapters of
this thesis (see next three chapters). The Khorasan and 
Baluchistan boundaries (northern and southern sections) form 
the longest stretch of the frontiers of Eastern Iran, and a 
summary study of their emergence and evolution will 
undoubtedly assist in a better appreciation of the emergence 
and evolution of the middle section of the boundaries of 
Eastern Iran. This chapter, therefore, falls into two 
sections; the first section examining the evolution of the 
northern section; and the second, studying the southern 
section of the Eastern Iranian boundaries.
SECTION I: KHORASAN BOUNDARIES
Following Herat's secession in 1857 and its occupation in 
186 3 by Amir Dust Mohammad Khan of Afghanistan which 
finalised the partitioning of Khorasan, the frontier between 
what was left of Khorasan and the kingdom of Afghanistan was 
put to the west of Herat, Ghurian and Farah. This frontier 
is 337 miles in length, in addition to the length of Hari-rud 
which forms the northern most part of the border line between 
Iran and Afghanistan. These boundaries are situated between 
35° and 37' and 31° and 50' latitude, ^ ^  running through 
rivers, mountains and deserts in an almost north-south 
direction.
Although Herat was captured by Dust Mohammad Khan of Kabul, 
founder of the Barakzai dynasty of the newly formed kingdom 
of Afghanistan, the frontiers between the province of 
Khorasan of Iran and the Afghan province of Herat remained 
undefined. Consequently, disputes and affrays between the 
two countries continued to intensify to the extent that
(1) Mokhber, Mohammad-ALi (1945), “Marzhay-e Iran“, p. 27.
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defining a clear boundary line in the central sections of old 
Khorasan became a necessity.
Not only did Dust Mohammad Khan's successor, Shir Ali
Khan, do nothing to put an end to Iran's suspicions of his
dynasty's expansionist designs against Iranian
territories,but also indulged in military operations in the
vicinity of Sistan, giving rise to Iran's anxieties of his
intentions. The Iranian Government informed the British
Minister at Tehran in December 187 8, that the Amir of
Afghanistan had assembled 20 regiments of foot and horsemen
with 50 guns at Herat with the intention of attacking 
{ 1)Sistan.' J Having informed the British of this, the
Iranian Government enquired if their intervention, under
clause 6 of the 1857 treaty of Paris could be counted on.
While referring the Iranian Government's enquiry to the
British Government in London, the Governor General of India
claimed that Calcutta was not aware of any ill intentions
against Iranian territories on the part of the Afghan
(2)Amir.v ; Notwithstanding British Indian officials'
apparent lack of interest in Iran's grievances of the conduct 
of the Afghan Amir, political disputes, as well as local 
raids, and counter raids intensified in the border areas of 
Hashtadan and Qaenat. The disputes and affrays in the said 
border areas became so serious that they necessitated 
arbitration and boundary delimitation.
HASHTADAN ARBITRATION AND MACLEAN'S LINE
The district of the Hashtadan Plain forms the eastern and 
greater portion of a tract, the north-western portion of 
which forms part of the Iranian district of Bakharz. Karat,
(1) Extracts of telegraph to the British Government from Governor General of India, dated
January 24, 1878, F060/417.
<2) Extracts of teLegraph to the British Government from Governor General of India, dated
January 24, 1878, F060/417.
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Farzaneh, Raona and Garna were, at the time of arbitration of 
the 1880s, included in the sub-division known as "Payin 
Velayat" or lower Bakharz. ^ The Hashtadan Valley,
according to General MacLean's memorandum of July 1891,^^ 
was bounded on the north by the Sanideh Hills which the 
Afghans call Kuh-e Darband; on the south by the Kuh-e 
Gedayaneh; on the east by the Sang-e Dokhtar and Yal-e Khar 
ranges, and on the west by the watershed between Hashtadan 
qanats and the streams flowing into Iranian territory.
The valley is about 24 miles in length, and its greatest
breadth from the Dahaneh-e Shurab to the crest of the Kuh-e
Gedayaneh, is about 16 miles. The valley consists of three
(3 )distinct regions:' ;
1. The Shurab basin, around the head of which lie the 
traces of former habitation and cultivation.
2. A belt of level steppes which surrounds the Shurab basin
on three sides, and has no visible signs of surface
drainage.
3. An outer slope at the foot of the hills and drainage of 
which is, for the most part, lost in the steppe, and 
does not appear to reach the Shurab except that from the 
Sanjideh and perhaps some from the Sang-e Dokhtar during 
heavy rain.
The Shurab has six principal tributaries which unite before 
leaving the valley by the Dahaneh-e Shurab. Thence it takes 
the name of Qaleh Kala which to the point of junction with 
Hari-rud near Tuman Agha, forms what was then the 
acknowledged boundary between Iran and Afghanistan. There
(1) Part 1 of General MacLean's memorandum of 14th Pecember 1889, F060/538-/ p. 10 of 279.
279.
<2) Memorandum of General MacLean, dated Mashed 6th July 1891, pp. 310 - 405, F06Q/538 ■
(3) Ibid.
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are ruins of several villages in Hashtadan Plain, which had 
been deserted for generations. There were also the remains 
of 39 qanats, at the time of arbitration, in the valley, all 
of which were out of repair and dry. The number of 
Hashtadan1 s qanats in the olden times are said to have been 
eighty (Hashtad) and this is where the name "Hashtadan" comes 
from. The Governor General of Khorasan undertook in April 
1885 to clear out and repair some of these qanats. The work 
was interrupted by the Afghans who destroyed the plants and 
tools of the Iranian labourers.^1) This incident brought 
the two Governments in direct dispute. Both Iran and 
Afghanistan approached the Government of British India 
requesting their intervention.
THE MACLEAN ARBITRATION OF HASHTADAN PLAIN
The Government of British India decided in 1886 to depute
Brigadier General C.S. MacLean, British Consul General at
Mashhad, to arbitrate between Iran and Afghanistan in the
disputed Hashtadan Plain. The investigation work was delayed
for various reasons. By late April 1888 General MacLean
began his works in Hashtadan. Iran was represented in the
arbitration commission by Mirza Moheb-Ali Khan Nezam al-Molk, 
{2)the Kargozarv } of Khorasan, and accompanied by engineers;
his son Mirza Jahangir Khan, and General Mirza Mohammad Ali
(3 ^Khan as professional advisor.v * Afghanistan was 
represented by General Qotb ad-Din accompanied by a number of 
lawyers and tribal chiefs from Herat, one of whom was Mirza 
Mohammad Omar who was sent specially by the Amir of
/ 4 \
Afghanistan to keep a check on the Afghan Commissioner.' '
(1) The Persian written claims, enclosed in MacLean's memorandum of 14th December 1889, FO 
60/538, p.11 of 280.
(2) ‘Kargozar" was, in Qajar administration, the representative of Foreign Ministry in the
provincial centres where there was a foreign consulate.
(3) Mokhber, op. cit., p.29.
(4) From Brigadier General MacLean to Secretary to the Government of India Foreign Department,
dated Camp Hashtadan 29th April 1888, FO 60/538, p.120
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Before leaving for Hashtadan, General MacLean asked both
Iranian and Afghan representatives to submit to him their
written claims. In their initial claims, the Afghans wished
to restrict the investigation to lands of Kolukh, Pardeh and
H a s h t a d a n . B u t  as the arbitration commission met on
30th of April 1888, and the Iranian representative claimed
the whole of Hashtadan valley and lands up to Sang-e Dokhtar,
the Afghan representative changed his mind instantly and
claimed Farzaneh, Garmab and places situated well within
/ 2 i
Iran's undisputed territories.' * Apart from these kinds 
of conducts, the greatest handicap for the investigation to 
come to a fair and just conclusion was that Hashtadan was 
virtually uninhabited at the time of arbitration. The 
testimonies of the population of a district disputed between 
two or more states, are the best indication in determining 
the fact.
The population of Hashtadan had left the plain probably more 
than a century before the arbitration investigation began. 
In the first memorandum on Hashtadan, General MacLean remarks:
I have heard from both Persians and Afghans a story 
which I think accounts for the sudden disappearance of 
the Hashtadan people, better than any other theory 
hitherto suggested, I first heard it at Karat and 
afterwards at Farzana, and from several respectable 
Afghans. About one hundred years ago or more, an 
epidemic throat disease swept over eastern Khorasan, 
and part of Herat, and carried off the greater portion 
of the population. It was particularly severe in 
Hashtadan, Darband, and Kafir Kala, which were 
abandoned by the inhabitants, en mass, and of the 
survivors many never returned."(3)
In the absence of local testimonial, the arbitrator had to 
consider, for the most part, on determining the history of 
the former population's allegiance to either Governments of
(1) From the Viceroy and Governor General of India to the Amir of Afghanistan, dated SimLa 7th
September 1888, FO 60/538.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Extract of General MacLean's Memorandum of 14th December 1889, op. cit., p. 11 of 280 FO
60/538.
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(1)Iran and Afghanistan. v ' The arbitration also had to rely
on the evidence provided by the two sides. Both the Iranian
and Afghan representatives supplied General MacLean with
their written claims, accompanied by eleven and ten documents
of proof respectively. In his memorandum of 14th December
1889, General MacLean provides a list of the summary of the
eleven documents supplied by the Iranian representative, at
the end of each section of which, he registered his own
evaluation of the documents, rejecting almost all of them.
When it came to the ten documents supplied by the Afghan
side, he enclosed all of them in their original form without
registering an opinion of his own on the validity of the said 
I o \documents.v •
As time went by and both representatives of Iran and 
Afghanistan were not forthcoming in a compromise for the 
settlement of the dispute, the Viceroy of India wrote to the 
Amir of Afghanistan, asking him to advise his representative 
to give up unjustifiable claims on places within Iranian 
possession:
"J rely upon General MacLean having accurately defined 
the doubtful territory, and it seems to me necessary 
if the dispute is to be settled that both sides should 
agree to his definition. I therefore ask Your 
Highness to accept these limits, and to instruct your 
officials to withdraw their claim to Farazna, Garmab, 
and other places outside them. I am communicating 
with Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran and asking him 
to obtain the consent of the Persian Government also.
J would only add that Your Highness may be sure that 
your interests will be fully considered by General 
MacLean, and I have no doubt that, provided the 
enquiry is confined within the boundaries described, 
he will soon be in a position to submit his award for 
my orders, in accordance with the terms agreed to by 
Your Highness and the Persian Government(*)
As for the Iranians, General MacLean found an opportunity to 
meet Naser ad-Din Shah (1848 - 1896) in the United Kingdom
(1) Ibid, pp. 10 - 12 of 279 - 295.
(2) Ibid, pp. 279 - 295.
(3) Extract of letter from H.E. the Viceroy and Governor General of India to H.H. Amir of 
Afghanistan, dated Simla 7th September 1888, F06Q/538, p.123.
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during the latter's visit of July 1889 . It was in this 
meeting that General MacLean must have concluded that the 
Court of Qajar was very ignorant of the question in dispute 
and its importance for Iran. The Shah decided, at the 
conclusion of this meeting, that "the Afghans were nothing", 
but he would give them the whole of Hashtadan plain with all 
its qanats, other water resources, agricultural lands and 
whatever of the population therein, only because of "the 
feelings of friendship (he) entertained towards the English 
Government
As a result of this incomprehensible generosity, the whole of 
Hashtadan was given to the Afghans save for the barren 
Hashtadan Hill. Furthermore, in order to keep his own nation 
oblivious of his generosity, the Qajar Shah requested that 
the new maps should have the word "Hashtadan" marked on the 
Iranian side of the border line:
"Hashtadan. Shah accepts General MacLean1s 
proposal provided the Hashtadan Hill under two acres 
is included in Persian territory, and the word 
'Hashtadan' is marked on the Persian side of the map. 
This General MacLean thinks may he accepted. Shah 
says that there is no further neutral territory, and 
that he hopes no further question of frontier may 
arise.
"I think that General MacLean deserves very great 
credit for the care and ability with which he has 
conducted this b u s i n e s s (2)
This development, however, enabled MacLean to delimit 103 
miles of Khorasan boundaries between Iran and Afghanistan. 
He surveyed and delineated the boundaries from Hashtadan 
Plain, some 60 miles to the west of the city of Herat, to 
Zolfaghar Pass where the Iran-Afghanistan and Russian 
frontiers met. General MacLean's line consists of 39 turning 
points which leaves the entire plain on the Afghan side, with
(1) For the full text of General MacLean's notes on his interview with the Shah (baser ad-Din
Shah) of Iran, see Appendix I.
(2) TeLegram dated the 7th December 1889, from Sir H. Drummond Wolff, H.B. Majesty1 Minister at
Tehran to Viceroy, Calcutta, FO 60/538 , p. 275.
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the Hashtadan Hill on the Iranian side (see MacLean’s map of 
Hashtadan boundary, figure I).
General MacLean's description of the boundary line on the map 
is briefly as follows:
"The line commences at the northern point of the
Kuh-i-Kadanna, passes round the heads of the southern 
group of Kanats, so as to include these in Afghan
territory, and up to the head of the short Kanat 
immediately north of the Hashtadan mound. It then 
passes round the Hashtadan mound, leaving the mound on 
the Persian side of the line. Thence across to the
foot of the Hills, and thence due north to the crest 
of the Sanjitti range. The line then follows the 
crest of the range eastward to the crest of the Hills 
on the northern side of the Dahna-i-Shorab, and thence 
in a straight line to a point on the left bank of the 
Kali-i-Kala 300 yards below the place where the old 
canal takes off towards Kafir Kala. The line then
follows the Kali-i-Kala up to the Hari-rud." )
The proposed settlement of the Hashtadan boundary dispute was
reported to the Iranian and Afghan Governments through the
Viceroyalty of India in 1890. In his letter of 29th
September 1890 to the Amir of Afghanistan, the Viceroy of
India presses him for his announcement of the acceptance of
the proposed settlement. The letter states: "Your Excellency
also, who has given directions and instructions to Colonel
MacLean on this subject, no doubt will be pleased to send
(necessary) instructions to the said officer. The Governor
of Herat will be in communication and correspondence with the
said officer, in this matter, to the end of the time of the
(2 \completion of this work."' '
General MacLean was immediately assigned to carry out the 
demarcation work of the Hashtadan boundary. He concluded 
this task by July 1891 and submitted a copy of the synopsis 
together with its map of the line (see figure II) to the 
British Indian Government. The Viceroyalty submitted a copy
(1) Extract of Memorandum of 6th July 1891, FO Press - No. 575 - 29 - 3 - 90 - 44, FO 60/538,
p. 2 of 310.
(2) Extract of Letter from H.H. the Amir of Afghanistan to H.E. the Viceroy, dated 18th October
1890, FO 60/538 - P- 3 of 343.
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Figure I
Illustration of Hashtadan Boundary by 
General MacLean Arbitration(+)
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Figure II
The Hashtadan and Hirirud Boundaries of Northern Khorasan 
According to General MacLean's arbitration of 1891.
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of MacLean's report to the Amir of Afghanistan who also 
accepted it with much delight. In a letter to the Viceroy of 
India, the Amir of Afghanistan asserted:
"The friendly endeavours of the High officials of 
the illustrious (British) Government in gaining this 
object and bringing it to a conclusion, have given me 
a great deal of pleasure. But my desire, in 
accordance with the wishes of all the people of 
Afghanistan, is that a writing, under the signature 
and seal of His Majesty the Shah of Persia, may be 
obtained about the settlement of this dispute and the 
demarcation of the limits, and the (fixing of the) 
line of partition and distribution, which have been 
accomplished between the Governments of Persia and 
Afghanistan, with the testimony and attestation of the 
high officials of the illustrious British Government, 
so that it may remain as a document with the Afghan 
Government, and that a writing, under my signature and 
seal, may be prepared and written, so that it may
remain, as a document and 'Sanad' with the Persian
Government. Then at no time will quarrel and
disputation arise between the servants of these two 
Governments, about the lands which have been
demarcated; and the people of Afghanistan will acquire 
a strong confidence by becoming aware that the friend 
of the Afghan Government, viz, the illustrious British 
Government, has, in demarcating the limits between our 
territory and that of Persia, displayed in a kind and 
friendly manner the excellence of his good intentions; 
and that by the acquisition of the writings of the 
Governments of Persia and Afghanistan, and by their 
existence in the hands of both sides, there will never 
arise any cause for any quarrel and strife.
"Further, may the days of (Your Excellency's) 
honour and glory continue permanent 1"(^)
International reflections on Naser ad-Din Shah's 
incomprehensible generosity in giving the Hashtadan Plain to 
the Afghans, out of his "friendly feelings" towards the 
British Government were no less than a disgrace to the 
Iranian leadership. The Russians, for instance, claimed now 
that the Iranian territories are, in effect, up for the loot, 
Hashtadan should be given to them. In a message to Amin 
as-Sultan, the Iranian Prime Minister, the Russian Charge 
d'Affairs stated that in view of the circumstances Hashtadan 
was virtually given to the British. The French similarly 
demanded that the Iranian island of Khark be given to them:
(1) Ibid.
374
"Russian Charge d'Affairs sent violent message to 
Amin-es-Sultan, complaining that the Island of Kharaj 
in Persian Gulf had been ceded to England, and that 
Persian territory at Hashtadan had been surrendered to 
Afghanistan, but virtually to us.
"His excellency replied that first charge was 
entirely unfounded, and made out that General 
MacLean's decision in fact gave Persia some Afghan 
possessions. Russian Charge d'Affairs now declares 
himself satisfied at arrangement.
"French Charge d'Affairs informs me that if the 
island had been surrendered to England, he should have 
been obliged to protest, as he declares it really 
belongs to France, having been ceded in 1835. " (1)
What has happened in Hashtadan was indeed no less than openly 
ceding Iranian territories to Afghanistan. Not only were the 
Russians and the French aware of this, hut in his own 
memorandum of 14th December 1889, General MacLean states 
openly that:
"It will be noticed that the Afghans bring 
forward no proof of their having actually occupied 
Hashtadan either before or after Ahmed Shah's time. 
The leaves of the Herat revenue record they allude to 
have no date, and, therefore, even if genuine, give no 
indication of the period during which Kulukh Pardai 
paid revenue to Herat."(2)
(For the boundary line, see figure II)
QAENAT BOUNDARY ARBITRATION AND ALTAY'S LINE
General MacLean's arbitration of 103 miles of Khorasan 
boundaries left the remaining 2 34 miles of Iran-Afghanistan 
boundaries of the Khorasan district of Qaenat undefined.
The areas of the undefined frontiers with Afghanistan began 
from the hamlet of Musa Abad, south-east of MacLean's pillar
(1) From Sir H. Drummond Wolff, H.B. Majesty's Minister at Tehran, to the Viceroy CaLcutta, 
dated 9th December 1889, FO 60/538 ; p. 1 of 275.
(2) Extract of Memorandum dated 14th December 1889, FO 60/538, p. 14 of 281.
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No.39, running through the salt lake (Namakzar), to east of 
Qaenat, ending in the start of McMahon's line of 1905 at 
Kuh-e Malek Siah which is the beginning of the Sistan 
boundary. A number of areas in this stretch of frontier were 
in dispute between Iran and Afghanistan. Moreover, the long 
lasting raids on Iranian settlements by Afghan elements 
increased noticeably. The Afghan tribes had for centuries
raided Iranian towns and villages. Writing in 1857, General 
Ferrier asserts: "It is only five or six years since
Kerim-dad Khan (Chief of Hazarah Tribes) followed the noble 
profession of pillage: he plundered caravans, and extended
his forays to the south of Persia in the district of Ghain, 
where he sacked the villages and carried off the people to 
sell them to the Uzbeks. His depredations were so frequent, 
and gave rise to so many complaints, that Assef Doulet sent 
to Yar Mohammad Khan and informed him that, as he seemed
unable to keep his own vassal in order, he should chastise 
himself as the head of an army.
Reports and confidential diaries of British Consulates at 
Mashhad, Birjand and Sistan contains a large number of 
instances where Afghan raids on the towns and villages of 
Khorasan, Qaenat and Sistan which increased in their 
frequency as from the beginning of the twentieth century. To 
illustrate this problem, some instances of these incidents 
follow:
November 1913
"(a) A resident of Nozad, a village about 50 miles 
east of Birjand, has come into Vice-Consulate 
Dispensary, suffering from a bullet wound and a sword
cut. His story is that he was attacked by two Afghans
who entered his house at night, asking for 
hospitality, and then attempted to kidnap his wife....
"(b) Nine Afghans attacked a small village near 
Bamrud, and carried off eleven camels."(2)
(1) Ferrier, General J.P., op. cit., pp. 191 - 2.
(2) Confidential Diary of H.B. Majesty's Consulate for Sistan and Kain, No. 48 for the week 
ending 29.11.1913, FO 248/10761 •
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September 1915
"A caravan of 50 camels was recently taking grain from 
Sistan to Duroh. There were 9 Durohis in charge with 
6 Baluch camelmen. 20 Afghan horsemen suddenly
appeared from across the border near Isparan, while 
some of Durohis were lagging behindf and drove off the 
whole caravan. It is said that the Afghans were 
regular soldiers."(1)
December 1915
1-"Fourteen donkeys of Awaz have been carried into 
Afghanistan by three robbers. They were carrying wood 
for the Customs Director.(2)
2-"A party of Afghans have carried off 50 camels and 
two flocks of goats and sheep from Gulwarda, 16 miles 
east of Awaz."ft)
July 1920
"Afghan raids - Trade caravan of twenty-five donkeys
with all loads raided and carried off evening 15th 
July at Mian Bazar between Hurmuk and Duzdab. Local 
levies are in pursuit."(4)
November 1929
"Afghan raids into the Qaenat have been numerous and 
the inhabitants are considerably perturbed, and are
demanding arms for their defence,"(*)
March 1930
"A caravan of thirty camels vas attacked near
Sufaidabad about March 10. The raiders appear to have
fled to Afghanistan."(&)
(1) Confidential Diary of H.B. Majesty's Consulate for Sistan and Kain, No. 36 for the week
ending 4th September 1915, FO 248/1116 .
(2) Confidential Diary of H.B. Majesty's Consulate for Sistan and Kain, No. 47 for the week
ending 4th December 1915, FO 248/1116 .
(3) Confidential Diary of H.B. Majesty's Consulate for Sistan and Kain, No. 50 for the week
ending 11th December 1915, FO 248/1116 .
(4) Telegrams from Captain T.V. Brenan, H.B. Majesty's ConsuL for Sistan and Kain to the
Government of India, dated 17th July 1920, FO 371/4926 , p. 171.
(5) Sistan and Kain Diary for October - November 1929, FO 371/14526, p. 3 of 208. 3 of 208.
(6) Confidential Diary of H.B. Majesty's Consulate General at Mashed, for March 1930, FO
371/19421, p. 2 of 155.
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September 1935
"According to reports received in Meshed, bands of 15 
to 20 raiders are continually crossing the Afghan 
frontier near Karizand raiding Iranian villages, the 
strength of the Road Guards post at Kariz has 
accordingly been increased by 30 men."(l)
The list can go on to include a great number of similar 
instances of Afghan elements' raids into Iran. These cross 
border raids came to a head in late 1934 when Afghan 
tribesmen who had previously entered Iran and decided to 
return to Afghanistan causing considerable damage to lives 
and properties in the border area of Zurabad on the 
instigation of local Afghan officials. Reuter reporting from 
Tehran described the incident as follows:
"Teheran 16th December, 1934
A party of Afghans consisting of prominent 
persons and military officers entered Persian 
territory via Zorabad, plundered 25 villages, murdered 
3 road guards and took away 2,000 Persians as 
prisoners with a large quantity of arms. The loss 
following on this incident is estimated at £50,000 
sterling. Because of this incident the Persian press 
is bitterly attacking the Afghan Government."(2)
This report, though proved to be exaggerated in the case of
2000 people being taken prisoner and was thought to have been
the number of tribesmen crossing the border, caused an uproar
in Iran. Iranian authorities formally protested to the
Afghan Government who, in return, invited Iranian
representatives to jointly inspect the site of the 
(3}incident' ' in order to prove that no incident of the kind 
reported had happened. The press in Afghanistan, in the 
meantime, denied the whole thing and the Afghan Ambassador to
(1) Political Diary of H.B. Majesty’s Consulate General at Mashed for September 1935, FO
371/19421 , p. 4 of 193. >f 193.
(2) Enclosure No. 1, to Kabul despatch No. 147, dated the 27th December 1934, FO 371/19408,
p. 192.
(3) Enclosure No. 2 to Kabul despatch No. 149, dated the 27th December 1934, FO 371/19408,
p. 195.
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Tehran carried a campaign of smear among foreign diplomatic
representatives in a communique in Tehran against the
(1)Iranians as a nation.v ' The joint commission eventually-
concluded that the Zurabad incident took place without the
knowledge of the Afghan Government, but had been provoked by
Afghan Tribal leaders and a number of other Afghan subjects.
The Afghan Government subsequently undertook to punish the
offenders and to compensate for the losses occurred and to
(2)return the stolen goods,v ; Notwithstanding the terms of
this joint communique which implies that neither the Afghan
Government nor any Afghan Government official had been
directly or indirectly involved in this incident, British
observers in the region were aware that: "For a long time it
has been the policy of the Naib Salar of Herat to locate the
toughest elements in the province on the frontier, these
consist of well-armed tribes of nomads who with their flocks
and camels are not confined to any one area and at the same
time are in a position to raid with impunity in any direction
(3 )having no immovable property which can be threatened."v '
Apart from cross-border incidents of the above nature, the 
Afghans began a series of claims against the Iranian 
territorial possessions as from 1931, and began interfering 
with the border arrangements. In a telegram to the Indian 
Government, for instance, the British Consul General at 
Mashhad indicates:
"....a boundary pillar on Bakharz frontier, recently 
removed by Afghans, has been replaced by Persian 
troops. Both sides have increased the frontier posts 
and relations are strained."(4)
(1) British Legation, Tehran despatch No. 114, dated 9th March 1935, FO 371/19408, p, 248.
(2) See text of agreement between the two officials of the two sides, dated 24th January 1935,
enclosure to Kabul despatch No. 35, dated the 20th March 1935, FO 371/19408, pp. 1 & 2 of 255.
(3) CLause 2 of Confidential report of H.B. Majesty's Consul General at Mashed, dated 9th December
1934, FO 371/19408, p. 222.
(4) Telegram from Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated SimLa 19th July 1932, FO
371/16279.
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In addition to these activities, the Afghan authorities 
claimed the village of Musa Abad, south-west of pillar 39 of 
General MacLean's line, arguing that Musa Abad had been given 
to the Afghans by MacLean boundary award of 1891. In 1903 a 
party of Afghan soldiers visited Musa Abad,^1  ^ in direct 
contravention of MacLean's award which invited both Iran and 
Afghanistan to observe a status quo in the tracts to the 
south of pillar 39 of Hashtadan boundary, and in violation of 
the fact that Musa Abad was the property of Mohammad Sadiq, 
an Iranian subject and Deputy Governor of the Iranian 
district of Bakharz.
A report prepared for the Government of British India in 
April 1904 by Captain C.B. Winter, H.B. Majesty's Consul at 
Torbat-e Heidariyeh, identifies instances of Afghan 
encroachments at Musa Abad. This report asserts:
"On the 28th instantf I started from Khushkabad 
and rode first to Ayubi. At Ayubi there is a small 
tower and spring, which is about two miles from 
Khushkabad. I then rode towards Musabad, and was told 
by my guide that, as the post there was in the hands of 
the Afghans, it would be necessary to proceed 
cautiously. When I came in sight of the post, I sent 
my guide and clerk on ahead, and remained on a hill to 
watch their movements through my glasses. I instructed 
them to ride slowly towards the post and have a good 
look round, and to ask any Pathans they met if there 
would be any objection to my riding round the post. J 
could myself see the post quite easily, but to avoid 
any possibility of complications, I did not approach 
any closer. There is a large encampment close to the 
post. My clerk and guide were received politely, and 
welcomed and given a liquid which was called tea. It 
appears that about 9 years ago, Muhammad Saddik, the 
Deputy Governor of Bakharz, built a small fort at 
Musabad, in order to establish his claim to the land 
and make use of the existing 'Mares' or 'Manat'. About 
a year later, and when the crops were being reaped, 
some Afghans came and turned the Persians out of the 
fort. From that time the Afghans have been in 
possession. In the old fort, now not used, there are 
30 houses, 14 of these are in ruins, the remainder
(1) From British Legation at Kabul to Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, No, 348 (E), 
dated 23rd September 1932, FO 371/16279.
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being used for godowns for bhoosa, &c. About 7 months 
ago, the Afghans erected a post there, consisting of a 
tower, two godowns and stables surrounded by a wall; 
the post measures about 50' by 18'. The post is in 
charge of one Alam Khan, Babakzai; he and about 25 
families live in small temporary huts about 200 yards 
to the north-east of the post. No land is being 
cultivated, as there is not sufficient water. Men are, 
however, now engaged in enlarging the Kanat, and the 
Afghans state that they intend to cultivate the land. 
As the account obtained from the Afghans, agrees with 
the account obtained from Persian sources, it may be 
taken as correct....
"Ayubi and Khushkabad are in the hands of the 
Persians, and Musabad in the possession of the 
Afghans."(1)
Forwarding this report to the Government of India, the 
British Consul General in Khorasan concluded:
"I have no recent papers of this case here 
subsequent to General MacLean's final report, dated 
6th July 1891, on the Hashtadan demarcation. The file 
was sent to Captain Winter, and has not yet been 
received back. But from the position of boundary 
pillar No. 39 of General MacLean's settlement, and 
from paragraph 12 of his report, Musabad would 
certainly appear to belong to Persia."(2)
Notwithstanding these facts, the Afghans continued
interfering with the affairs of this Iranian territory. The 
Iranian Kargozar of Torbat Heydoriyeh reported to Tehran 
in 1904 for instance that "an Afghan official has visited 
Khushabeh from Ghorian, and has told the people that
Khushabeh belonged to the Afghans: also that an Afghan
(1) Extract of Captain Winter's report on Afghan encroachments at Musa-Abad, enclosed in
Colonel Hinchin's confidential despatch No. 20, to Secretary to the Government of India, 
dated Meshed 21st May 1904 FO 60/711, pp. 1 - 2.
(2) Clause 4 of Colonel Minchin's Confidential despatch to the Secretary to the Government of 
India, in the Foreign Department, No, 20, dated Meshed 21st May 1904, FO 60/711, p. 1.
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official from Ghurian visits Musabad, Khushabeh and 
Kuh-e-Sang-e-Dokhtar twice a week; and if he sees Persian 
flocks grazing there, prevents them from grazing.
In his despatch of 8th September 1904 to the British 
Government, the British Minister at Tehran reporting on his 
meeting with Moshir ad-Doleh, the Iranian Prime Minister, 
indicated:
"I at the same time informed His Highness (Grand 
Vizier) of the representations which the Government of 
India had made at Kabul respecting the encroachments 
at Musabad which the Persian Government has of late 
been again making complaints. The Mushir-ed-Dowleh 
states that the Afghans have encroached not merely at 
Musabad, but at a place in its vicinity named ”Ayubi” 
respecting which I have so far no information."(2)
The Afghan Government asked the British at Kabul in September
1932, "whether the Government of India could give the Afghan
(3)Government any information and documentary evidence"v ' 
proving that Musa Abad was given to Afghanistan by MacLean1s 
Hashtadan awards.
The two sides (Iran and Afghanistan) had by this time started
negotiations on these boundaries and related issues, and the
Afghan Government had asked once again if the British
Government could supply them with documentary evidence
supporting their claims, whilst they had in their possession
copies of General MacLean's award in which the demarcated
boundaries are described as starting from the northern point
of the Koh-i Kadana (Kuh-e Gedaianeh), passes round the heads
(4 \
of the southern group of kanats. . .v } This description of
(1) Enclosure in despatch No, 168 of British Legation at Tehran to the Foreign Office, dated 8th
September 1904, FO 60/711, p, 22.
(2) From A.H. Hardinge of British Legation at Tehran to the Marquis of Lansdowne, No. 168, dated
8th September 1904, FO 60/711, pp. 2 2 - 3 .
(3) From British Legation at KahuL to Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, No. 348 <E),
dated 23rd September 1932, F0 371/16279.
(4) See Memorandum of 6th July 1891 of General MacLean, No. 575 - 29 - 3 - 90 - 44, F0 60/538, p.
2 of 310.
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the southern end of MacLean's Line, clearly leaves out Musa 
Abad to the south-west of Kuh-e Gedayaneh and pillar 39 which 
is the last pillar of MacLean's Line, south of Hashtadan 
Plain. Furthermore, the Afghan Government put the above 
request to the Government of British India knowing that they 
had in 1897 asked the Viceroyalty of India the same question, 
even trying to accuse the British and Iranian Governments of 
having, one way or another, considered Musa Abad as an Afghan 
possession. The Amir of Afghanistan had asked at that time:
"Again Musabad is not a disputed tract. It is 
manifestly a tract, within the limits of the 
God-granted kingdom, so much so that, in the boundary 
settlement of the outskirts of Hashtadan, this valley 
has been included in the jurisdiction of Afghanistan, 
and the boundary line and the marks of the (boundary) 
pillars are visible there. For many years past a 
border guard of this Government has been located at 
that place and been keeping a watch there. In the map 
acknowledged by the Russian Government, which is now 
lying before me, this place has been shown as a part 
of Afghanistan, and the Persian Government too has 
never considered and do not consider it to be a 
disputed tract between the two Governments."(^)
To this, the Viceroy of India replied:
"I am not aware to what map Your Highness refers 
as 'the map acknowledged by the Russian Government'. 
The boundary settlement mentioned by Your Highness is 
no doubt that undertaken by General MacLean, the final 
settlement of which was communicated to Your Highness 
in Lord Lansdowne's letter of December 17th, 1891.
General MacLean's labours, however, were confined 
within certain specified limits, i.e. on the north, 
the Sanjiti range: on the east, the Sang-i-Dukhtar and 
the Kuh-i-Yalkhar; on the south, the Kadaoneh range; 
and on the west, a line running from the 
Kuh-i-Kadaoneh close to and round the heads of the 
Kanats which irrigate, the lands of Hashtadan, Kulukh 
and Pardeh to the Sanjiti range. But, as I am 
informed, the Persian Government, equally with Your 
Highness, maintain their claim to the Musabad lands, 
though, since the conclusion of the Hashtadan 
demarcation, they have not actively pushed their
(1) Extract of Letter from H.E. Viceroy and Governor General of India to H.H. The Amir of 
Afghanistan quoting passages of a Letter from the Latter, dated Simla July 1897, FO 371/19^08< 
pp. 230 - 1.
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claim, and have in this acted in conformity with an 
arrangement made at the time with General MacLean that 
they would preserve the status q u o  in the disputed 
tract. I trust that your officers will abstain from 
taking any steps which might lead the Persians to 
press their claims and perhaps disturb the peace of 
the frontier which has happily remained for so long 
unbroken. " )
The Afghan Government's question of September 1932, had a 
similar reply from the British Indian authorities. This time 
the Government of India refers to another similar question 
put to the British by the Afghans in 1903. On that occasion, 
Lord Curzon had made it clear to the Afghans that Musa Abad 
did not belong to them.^^
The Afghans nevertheless continued claiming not only Musa 
Abad, but also the district of Yazdan, further south of Musa 
Abad, the Namakzar (Salt Lake) and Chekab, all in Iranian 
possession.
THE ALTAY ARBITRATION
As the dispute intensified, both Governments agreed on the 
8th of March 1934, under article 10 of the Iran-Afghanistan 
treaty of 1921, to go to arbitration. This time the Turks 
were asked to arbitrate. The Turkish Government agreed in 
March 1934 and General Fakhred-Din Altay was assigned to lead 
the arbitral team. It was arranged for the two sides to the 
dispute to submit their written claims to the arbitration 
commission through the Turkish Government before October that 
year. The commission was given an audience by Reza Shah 
Pahlavi at Amol of Mazandaran in October 1934 and then 
visited the area in dispute for a preliminary survey and
(1) Ibid.
(2) From Metcalfe of the Indian Government to H. Majesty's Envoy and Minister at the Court of
Afghanistan, No. D. 4777-F/32, dated New Delhi the 21st November 1932, F0371/16279,
pp. 3 7 7 - 8 .
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proceeded from there to Kabul on the 12 of November 1934. 
The commission returned to the frontier, for further 
investigations on 22nd November that year.^^
Among General Altay's arbitration team was one Colonel Zia 
Bey whom, the British diplomats at Kabul recognised as having 
been an old friend of senior Afghan officers s
"Colonel Zia Bey, who was in Kabul a dozen years ago 
as a member of Jemal Pash'a Military Mission and 
trained the locally famous formation known as the 
'Qita Namuna', was described to me as the chief of 
Fahrettin Pash's staff. He was enthusiastically 
welcomed as an old friend by the more senior of the 
Afghan Military Officers, with whom he was frequently 
in close conversation."(2)
The Iranians, in the meantime, began a noticeable military
movement in the eastern areas of the country despatching
troops to the frontier in the neighbourhood of Torbat-e Jam 
( 3  ^and Khaf.v 1 These movements of troops were not directly 
attributed to the border dispute considerations, but 
presented clear indications of Iran's determination that 
unlike the past experiences, this time the matter of boundary 
disputes would be treated seriously:
"A European here - who is by no means a fool - 
attended the Firdausi Celebrations at Meshed where, he 
tells me, he came into touch with several young 
Persian military officers. He gained the impression 
that they were very proud of their army, confident of 
its efficiency, and anxious to test this in practice.
One of them said to him 'we have finished with all 
nonsense on the Afghan frontier and can give them two 
kicks for each kick they give u s '."(4)
(1) Afghanistan Annual. Confidential Report for the year 1934, No. 1358/-1358/97, KabuL February
22 1935, FO 371/19423 , p. 41.
(2) Clause 4 of Despatch from His Majesty's Minister, KabuL, to His Majesty's Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, London No. 141, dated the 13th (received 18th) December 1934, ) FO
371/19408 , p. 173.
(3) Confidential report of British Consulate General, dated Mashed, 9th December 1934, FO
371/19408 , pp. 2 2 2 - 3 - 4 .
(4) From R.R. Maconachie, British Legation at Kabul to V.A.L. Mallet, British Legation at
Tehran, dated 11th December 1934, FO 371/19408 , pp. 182 - 3.
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The Iranian Government, however, appointed Mehdi Farrokh
(Motasam as-Saltaneh) as the Iranian Commissioner aided by a
(1}group of twenty experts' J and the Afghan Government 
assigned the Governor of Herat, Abd ar-Rahim Khan Nayeb Salar 
to lead the Afghan delegation to the border arbitration 
commission.
The arbitration commission spent three weeks at Mashhad and 
returned to Ghurian on the 29 th December 1934 for further 
local investigations, only to meet again with the 
representatives of Iran and Afghanistan on 18th of January
1935 for the final study and exchange of documents related to
the two sides' claims. From Ghurian, the arbitration 
commission proceeded to inspect the frontier from the Afghan 
side, because it was impossible to do so (for reasons not 
stated) from the Iranian side. This arrangement was hailed 
with delight by the Afghan delegation.
The commission inspected the disputed boundary as far south
as Siah Kulv and on January 17th returned to Herat. The
Iranian delegation who had not been with the commission
during these proceedings also arrived in Herat on the same
day. The next day General Altay addressed both delegations
at a joint sitting and some brief deliberations 
(2 )followed.v • The Turkish Commissioner left for his
country. Disturbances occurred a few days later around the 
Salt Lake (Namakzar) area. The Iranians began to compile 
documentary evidence supporting their claim:
"It is learnt at Birjand that the local Governor 
received instructions to produce documents which would 
be of use to prove that the Salat Desert pastures, an 
area claimed both by the Persians and the Afghans, have 
long been held by the Persian nomadic tribes of the 
frontier. The Governor at Birjand summoned the headmen 
of the tribe and it is alleged to have required them to 
fabricate ante dated documents to show that they had 
inherited the lands and had been in the habit of buying
(1) Mokhber, op. cit., p. 32.
(2) From British Legation Kabul to British Legation Tehran, dated 11th December 1934, FO
371/19408 - , pp. 182 - 3.
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and selling the same among themselves for years 
past."t1)
The renewed conflict and protestations by both sides caused 
delay in the announcement of final awards. A British 
diplomat in Turkey reported to his Government:
"Wuri Pasha tells me that Turkish Mission under 
General Fahrettin which was sent to compose 
Persian-Afghan frontier dispute has been unable to 
find any solution acceptable to both parties and finds 
it quite impossible to make sense of their respective 
arguments.
"He had been told that in these circumstances 
Turkish Government have decided to withdraw their 
mission unless Persian and Afghan Governments both 
express simultaneous acceptance in advance and abide 
by an award which Turkish mission would make without 
further discussion."(2)
These assurances were given to the Turkish Government by both
sides and the Turkish Government finally delivered on the
15th May 1935 to the Iranian and Afghan Ambassadors at Ankara
the arbitral awards prepared by General A l t a y w h i c h  was
written in Turkish. The bill prepared on the basis of this
award, was passed by the Iranian Majlis on the 6th of October 
1 4 \
1935v ' and a joint Iranian-Afghan Commission of 
demarcation was formed immediately to erect the necessary 
boundary posts.
(1) Clause 2 of H.B. Majesty's Consulate General of Khorasan and Sistan Confidential Diary for 
January 1935, FO 371/19421 , p. 3 of 142.
(2) Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 457, dated Angora, 1st January 1935, FO 371/19408 , p. 179.
(3) From British Embassy at Ankara to the Foreign Office, dated Angora May 22, 1935, FO
371/19408 . , p. 261.
<4) British Legation at Tehran, Despatch No. 447, dated Tehran 18th of October 1935, FO
371/19408 , p. 271.
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THE OUTSTANDING POINTS OF ALTAY'S AWARD
1-Musa Abad
Musa Abad, at the time of arbitration, was a hamlet of three
mud houses and a spring of fresh water. The Afghan guards
had occupied the largest of the three houses, and the other
two were occupied by another Afghan. The water consumed at
Musa Abad was from a qanat which brought the water from the
spring situated more than a kilometre to the north of the
(1)hamlet.v } There were also other springs to the south-east
of the hamlet, near the winter headquarters of some nomadic
Afghan tribes. The qanat had been reconstructed by Amir
Mohammad Reza Khan Khozeimeh who was, at the time, Amir of
( 2 \Sistan on behalf of the Khozeimeh familyv 1 and he was the 
owner of the qanat and the irrigated lands at Musa Abad. 
Though the hamlet of Musa Abad itself was under the 
occupation of the Afghan subjects, Iran did not recognise 
this occupation and had repeatedly protested against it. The 
Afghans produced documents in rejection of the Iranian 
claims. The Altay award asserts that these documents were 
from the British in which the British Government had 
repeatedly emphasised that a status quo should be maintained 
at Musa Abad. These documents showed that no right to 
ownership of the hamlet and its water was given to the 
Afghans by any one. The award asserted specifically that the 
water which keeps the district alive and irrigates the land 
in the vicinity undoubtedly belongs to Iran.
"Therefore, and according to these reasons, I have 
decided to divide the Musa Abad district into two 
sections: giving Iran the lands situated therein and
two of the mud-houses, and giving the winter quarter 
of the tribes on the opposite side and the springs to 
the Afghans."(3)
<1) This author has come across the Persian version of General ALtayls arbitration award in 
Mohammad All Mokhber's *Marzhay-e Iran", pubLished in Tehran 1945, pp. 31 - 52.
(2) Altay's award, op. cit., p. 41.
<3) ALtay’s Arbitration Award, Mokhber, op. cit., pp. 4 1 - 2
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Thus, regardless of the fact that Musa Abad was the personal 
property of an Iranian subject and that it is situated tens 
of miles to the west of the MacLean1s border mark 39, General 
Altay began his line by sharply turning to the west so that 
he could give half of Musa Abad district to the Afghans - 
(see section 1 of figure III).
2-The Namakzar (Salt Lake^
From Musa Abad to the north of Namakzar, General Altay put 
border marks (numbers 40 to 51). From this point the 
boundary line follows the Rud-e Sargardan riverbed for about 
10 kilometres until it reaches the point where the new 
channel of the river branches out from the old channel. 
Border mark 52 was put there. From this point the border 
line follows the old channel of Rud-e Sargardan for about 10 
kilometres (north-west to south-west), leaving the Afghan 
Siah Kadu to Afghanistan, and the Iranian Siah Kadu to Iran. 
This line continues to the northern coasts of the Salt Lake 
where border mark 53 is put.^ ^
General Altay continued his line southwardly dividing the 
Salt Lake into two, giving the eastern half to Afghanistan 
and the western half to Iran - (see section 2 of figure III) 
- solely on the basis of a document provided by the Iranians 
expressing their consent to the use of the salt of the lake 
by the Afghans.
3-Yazdan
Yazdan, at the time of arbitration, was a small village of a
few inhabitants with an agricultural field, a Gendarmerie and
(2 )a Custom Office, all belonging to Iran. ' ' The village and 
its lands were owned by Amir Mohammad Reza Khan Khozeimeh and 
Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam. Twelve kilometres to the 
south of Yazdan is situated the small village of Kabudeh. 
This village was also inhabited by a few families with 
agricultural land, all of which also belonged to Iran. The
(1) Altay's Arbitration Award, Mokhber, op, cit., p. 43,
(2) Altay's Arbitration Award, Mokhber, op. cit., p. 44.
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village of Kabudeh, its lands and qanats were owned by Amir 
Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam who had reconstructed an old qanat 
for the village. He had also constructed a qanat at a nearby 
cultivable land and named it "Taher Abad" after his daughter 
Tahereh. ^
Between Yazdan and Kabudeh was situated the Nazar Khan field 
which belonged to an Afghan subject and there were places 
around Nazar Khan which were used by some Afghans during the
/ 2 1winter months.v *
The Afghans claimed all these places arguing that the 
Iranians had occupied them during the chaos that had existed 
in Afghanistan in the preceding years. The Iranians produced 
documents proving that these districts belonged to Iran in 
olden times. The arbitration rejected all documented claims, 
recognised the existing possessions and the fact that neither 
had the Iranians produced any document proving their protests 
against the Afghan occupation of Nazar Khan, nor had the 
Afghans been able to produce any document proving that they 
had protested Iran's occupation of Yazdan and Kabudeh.^ 
Thus, the arbitrator decided to give Iran the villages of 
Yazdan and Kabudeh, and to give Afghanistan the Nzar Khan 
field, situated between the former two - {see section 3 in 
figure III)♦
4-Chekab
The border line, from Kabudeh follows as far as Kuh-e Rigu
where border mark No. 72 was placed. Thence the line turns
and follows a gentle north-west south-easterly direction as
far as Kuh-e Kharmageh where border mark 80 was placed.
General Altay named this mountain after himself and refers to
(A \it, in his award, as Kuh-e Altay.' ; To the south of this
(1) Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam interviewed by the author in London, January 5th 1992.
(2) Altay Arbitration Award, Mokhber, op. cit., p. 44.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Altay Arbitration Award, Mokhber, op. cit., p. 48.
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point General Altay did not take into consideration the 
ownership of the hamlet of Chekab which was the property of 
Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk Khozeimeh (later Mr. Alam), 
Amir of Qaenat. He refers to this place and his decision 
regarding this place as follows:
"Notwithstanding that a humble cottage and some fields 
were (watered) by the Asperan spring which are said to 
belong to an Iranian, they were given to Afghanistan. 
The said Iranian could not be found and, on the other 
hand, this was not a sufficient reason to change the 
geographical direction of the frontier line. 
Moreover, further investigation proved that they 
belonged to an Afghan. Here, there is a peak upon 
which border mark 83 is placed...."(1)
Writing on the status of Asperan in 1912, Captain Hunter of 
the British Consulate at Sistan indicates:
"Some 8 or 10 years ago Ali and his father Mahomed, 
Afghan refugees, (and reputed robbers), cultivated a 
little land from the Asperan water in company with a 
man of Duroh named Akbar (a Mulla Ali). The latter 
sold his share of the Karez to Kat Khuda Hamaza and 
Ali Morad (Tuni) of Seistan, for Karans 400j - some 7 
years ago. The latter worked the Karez for some 
months with Ali and then having a dispute with him 
abandoned it. In 1908, Said Khan (Mamasseni), 
employed by the Seistani Consulate as Levy Jamadar, 
petitioned the Shaukat-ul-Mulk for the grant to him of 
the Asperan Karez. As Ali was paying no revenue, the 
Governor agreed to the grant on the condition of Said 
Khan maintaining there a post of Baluch to guard the 
frontier. Asperan, it should be noted, is situated on 
the direct route from Seistan to Kain that passes 
through a corner of Jowain to the north of the 
Hamun-i-Sabari and robberies were frequent.
"When this grant was made, objection was raised by the 
Safaris of Neh, the old ruling family of this bluk, on 
the ground that they held documents (Mahr-namas) 
proving them to be the owners of Asperan as well as of 
Surtigh, Khoja do Chahi and other Karezes in the 
Duroh-Lahnu district. Their claim as regards Asperan 
seems to have been accepted, as they executed a deed 
making over their rights to the Shaukat-ul-Mulk as 
Pish kash.(2) (There were other points regarding
(1) Ibid.
(2) Present.
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the Neh revenue at the same time.) The man Ali, who
had been evicted, was given in exchange another
property in the Duroh district called Mahi Rud and he 
executed a formal agreement accepting the exchange.
Katkhuda Hamza and Ali Morad do not seem to have put
in a claim. Khoja Jan Muhammad of Duroh raised an 
objection to Asperan being given to Said Khan, as he 
claimed Asperan as his private property."(1)
It is noteworthy that all the places named in this quotation 
were acknowledged as Iranian territories at the time, 
belonging to Amir Shokat al-Molk II. .
Altay even does not name the place in his award. The place 
was in fact a hamlet with few inhabitants and a number of 
agricultural lands named Chekab. Interviewed by this’ author 
on 5th January 1992, Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam stated;
"Chekab was owned by my father's uncle and my 
father-in-law Amir Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk, then 
Amir of Qaenat and Sistan. Though his ownership of 
the hamlet and its fields and springs were
established, the arbitrator decided to give them to 
Afghanistan solely on the basis of the testimony given 
by Amir Shokat al-Mblk's Mobasher (local 
representative) who was an Afghan and hoped to own 
them if given to Afghanistan. But Amir Shokat al-Molk 
continued ownership of Chekab for a few years."
Monsef is the only source which deals with this subject in 
more details. In his book he asserts;
"Amir Shokat al-Molk's continued enforcement of 
ownership of Chekab, eventually led to a protest from 
the Afghan Government.... (Reza Shah) summoned the 
Amir and after a lengthy discussion, ordered him....
Chekab if the Afghans purchased his
(See section 4 in figure III)
(1) Extract from the Consular Report by Captain Hunter of her Britannic Majesty's Sistan
Consulate, dated 19th August 1912, FO 248/921 , p. 15.
(2) Monsef, Mohammad Ali (1972), "Amir Shokat al-MoLk" Tehran, pp. 193 - 4.
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From Asperan the border line continues in a north to south 
direction as far as Siah Kuh which is the beginning of the 
McMahon line of the Sistan boundary. The border mark No. 87 
which is the final border mark of Altay's line, is placed at 
the highest peak of this mountain.
SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ON ALTAY'S AWARD
The British diplomats in Kabul, acknowledge that the Afghans 
concluded, at the time that Altay's award favoured Iran;
"The impression left on a reader of the award who had 
not visited the area is that when, as in the case of 
the village of Musabad, the arbiter had to make a 
difficult decision he was inclined to favour Iran. 
This appears certainly to have been the impression in 
Kabul where the award was coldly received. It was, 
however, recognised that there were no grounds for 
challenging a decision which had been very carefully 
worked out and which settled finally the demarcation 
of a frontier line through a country too barren to be 
worth quarrelling about."(2)
This is undoubtedly an over statement. The fact that Altay, 
like his predecessors, allocated a number of Iranian 
possessions to the Afghans, was later acknowledged privately 
even by the Afghans themselves as shall be discussed.
The Iranian possessions given to Afghanistan by Altay's award 
are;
1. Musa Abad district - Though he himself confessed Iran's 
ownership of the lands and Iran's possession of the 
district, Altay divided the district between Iran and 
Afghanistan, regardless of the fact that this district 
was situated behind the final point of MacLean's line, 
well within Iran.
(1) Altay Arbitration Award, Mokhber, op. cit., p. 49.
(2) Afghanistan Confidential Annual Report 1935, from Lieutenant Colonel Fraser-Tyler to Mr 
Eden, No. 31, dated Kabul March 7 1936, FO 371/19423 , p. 48.
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2. Namakzar - Though he himself confesses to Iran's 
ownership and actual possession of this district, and in 
spite of the fact that he had denied in an interview in 
January 19 35 that the Afghans had any right to it - (see
appendix II) - General Altay divided the district into
two halves on the basis of a document produced by the 
Iranians whereby the Afghans were allowed, out of 
humanitarian concerns, to use the salt of the lake. If
the Afghans truly needed to have access to this salt
lake in addition to another salt lake that exists within 
their territories to the south of Herat, the arbitration 
officer should put the border line on the eastern 
margins of the lake; on the slopes of Kuh-e Shantigh and 
Zanglab, not the Rud-e Sargardan riverbeds which, 
necessitate the partitioning of the Iranian possessions 
at the Namakzar, an undertaking exactly to the 
expectations of the Afghans. This is to say that the 
arbitrator ignored Iran's rights and possessions and her 
claims in these tracts and based his award of Namakzar 
solely on what was desired and claimed by the Afghans. 
An enclosure in the despatch of the British Consul for 
Sistan and Qaen of December 1904 states:
"(a) Persian claim. The frontier line runs post No.
39 along the crest of the Simtik mountain to a 
point south of Musabad, the source of a stream 
now dry, and down this stream to the northern 
shore of the Namaksar Lake, dividing the lake by 
an imaginary line to the opposite bank.
"(b) Afghan claim. The frontier runs from pillar No.
39 along the northern bank of the Sargardan River 
to Musabad, and thence down the same stream to 
the Lake Namaksar. The Kashif-ul -Mulk adds that 
both Afghans and Persians collect salt from the 
Namaksar Lake on their respective sides."(1)
3. The Iranian delegation had proved to the arbitration
commission that the larger parts of the Namakzar were
(2 )swamps and useless.v 1 Nevertheless, the arbitrator
(1) Extract of an enclosure in the despatch from H. Dobbs to the Government of India, dated 2nd 
December 1904, FO 60/711, p. 2.
(2) Mokhber, op. cit., p. 50. Mokhber was the engineer officer of the Iranian delegation in the 
arbitration commission.
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gave Afghanistan half of the Namakzar which happened to 
be the better half and as a result, most of what was 
given to Iran in the Namakzar was the useless swamp.
4. "Though Iran's possession of Yazdan and Kabudeh and her 
ownership of the districts of Yazdah and Kabudeh were 
established, the arbitrator, in order to give the Nazar 
Khan field to Afghanistan, designed the border line in a 
way which put Yazdan in an entanglement, rendering the 
whole district useless both militarily and in terms of 
agricultural activities.
5. "Although Iran’s possession of Chekab and her ownership 
of the village and the district were established, the 
arbitrator gave it to Afghanistan solely because he 
wanted his border line to maintain its straight north- 
southerly direction and because the arbitrator "could 
not find the Iranian owner of the district" and accepted 
the testimony of the Mobasher (an Afghan) without even 
mentioning Amir Shokat al-Molk's Mobasher the man was.
There are a number of theories as to the reason for Altay's 
awards so obviously favouring Afghanistan. One such theory 
is that he inspected the frontier areas only from the Afghan 
side without the presence of the Iranian delegation which 
proved to be instrumental in his appreciation of the Afghan 
arguments and claims better than those of the Iranians. 
Another theory is that General Altay's assistant's (Colonel 
Zia Bay) close friendship and constant contacts with the 
Afghan military officers led the arbitration to favour 
Afghanistan.
In a letter dated 20th November 1989, Abdol-Hdssein Meftah, a 
veteran Iranian diplomat, who has since passed away, 
explained a different theory to this author which is quite 
popular amongst the older generation of Iranian diplomats:
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" Mr Mojtahed-Zadeh, once in Ankara, I met Feiz Mohammed Khan, 
Afghan Ambassador, who was Afghanistanf s foreign minister at the 
time of Altay arbitration of 1935. He told me privately.
"Mr Meftah, I know that the arbitration was received 
in Iran with a stern face (Reza Shah and Forooghi were 
both very angry), but whose fault was it? It was the 
fault of the Iranian Government for sending a mentally 
unbalanced person as head of the commission,"
These words shocked me, and I kept staring at him in 
surprise. He continued:
"Mr Meftah, don't be surprised; I will just tell you a 
little about his behaviour and leave it to your 
judgement. This man used to get up at each meeting, 
and while keeping his hands behind his back and 
walking up and down like a teacher in a classroom, 
spell out French words and expressions, suffering from 
a superiority complex, in such a manner that both of 
us, General Altay and I, were totally nervous. When 
you send such an impolite and unbalanced person to 
such an important job, what do you expect?"
This theory is quite popular amongst the older generation of 
Iranian diplomats, but others who served in the Iranian 
Government and are more familiar with the overall view of 
Iran's relations with Afghanistan dismiss this theory. Dr. 
Ali-Naghi Alikhani, a former Minister of the Iranian 
Government told this author on March 18th, 1991:
"Though there is no doubt about Farrokh's irrational 
behaviour, it is not easy to believe that a boundary 
arbitrator would base his decision of creating 
permanent frontiers between two or more countries on 
such petty considerations as disliking the behaviour 
of a colleague. If Altay's arbitration favoured 
Afghanistan, the reason must be sought elsewhere."
Mr. Meftah's letter, nevertheless, indicates that top Afghan 
officials admitted privately that Altay's arbitration award 
favoured Afghanistan at the expense of loss of territories to 
Iran.
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However, the joint Iranian-Afghan Demarcation Commission was 
set up immediately after the official announcement of Altay's 
awards in May 1935. This Commission completed the 
demarcation works along the whole of the 234 miles of the 
Altay line by early 1936.
Finally, it is worth observing that the boundary demarcation, 
though reducing cross-border raids on the Iranian villages, 
did not put an end to the problem. The following reports are 
two examples of the continued problem.
1. "I have received report that on 20th November at
mile 48 on the road North of ZAHIDAN two lorries
carrying tea to ZABUL were attacked by 8 armed 
Ismailzai Afghans from ZIRREH who killed a Persian 
Captain, wounded two other passengers and drove one of 
the lorries to the Afghan frontier where they removed 
25 cases of tea. They were taking off tyres also when 
a pursuit party from HORMUK came up and they escaped 
across the border.
"Presume you heard of this serious raid. Please 
telegraph news of any further raids on the road 
immediately to the Vice-Consul at BIRJAND AND myself 
and send by bag details of post-inspections and any
action taken by you since 1st July in pursuance of
instructions received last February, vide my 
demi-official Q.8 dated 8th April to CAROE copy of
which I gave you on 16th April."(1)
2. "On May 1st British military engineers truck
coming from Kerman was fired on ten miles from 
Zahidan. Persian officer and his wife both passengers 
were wounded, the truck got through to Zahidan.
"On May 2nd large party of armed Baluch from
Afghanistan, who had lifted 150 camels south of
Birjand were intercepted by gendarmerie and armed 
locals at Baluchab 14 miles north of [5 groups 
undec,]. Three raiders were killed, two wounded, one 
armed local killed, all camels recovered, rest of the 
gang escaped during the night."(2)
(1) Telegram from British Consul General to the Government of India, dated Meshed 5.12.1942, No. 
279, FO 248/1413 ■
(2) Telegram from British Consul General to Foreign Office, dated Meshed 5th May 1944, FO
371/40184 -
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SECTION II; THE PARTITIONING OF BALUCHISTAN AND 
FRONTIERS WITH BRITISH INDIA
INTRODUCTION
The Safavid Empire of Iran (1501 - 1731) succeeded in
reviving the traditional political union of Iran 
approximately within the frontiers of the pre-Islamic 
empires. Baluchistan district - from river Hirmand to the 
coasts of the Indian Ocean, and from Indus to Kerman - was 
under Iranian sovereignty throughout the Safavid era. The 
rise to power of Nader Shah Afshar in the 1730' s put an end 
to about ten years of confusion that had occurred resulting 
from the Afghan rebellion of 1722 and guaranteed 
Baluchistan's return to Iranian sovereignty after a brief 
period of turmoil. When in 1730 (1143 H.) Nader Shah (then 
Nader Qoli), engaged in subduing a revolt in Herat at the 
outset of his career, sent Mohammad Momen Beik Marvi to 
Abdullah Khan, leader of Brahui Baluch and Governor of 
Baluchistan, for assistance. Abdullah Khan was preparing for 
this task when war broke out between him and the Governor of 
Sind, during which he was killed. His sons, Amir Mohabat and 
Amir Iltiaz (Emtiaz), wrote to Nader informing him of the 
incident. Nader Shah bestowed the Governorship of 
Baluchistan upon Amir Mohabat, the elder son of Abdullah Khan 
(1736) .
Having completed his Indian expedition, Nader Shah ordered
the south-western sections of the province of Sind to be
/1 \
included in the Governorate of Baluchistan.' }
During the period when Iran was leaderless following Nader 
Shah's assassination in 1747, Nassir Khan, the youngest son 
of Abdullah Khan, who had served Nader Shah in his Indian 
expedition, seized power in Kalat, and accepted the 
suzerainty of Amir Alam Khan I, the Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat
(1) Mokhber, op. cit., p. 53.
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and Sistan who had expanded his dominion to include 
Baluchistan in the wake of Nader Shah's assassination.^1  ^
Immediately after the murder of Amir Alam Khan which took 
place shortly afterwards, Nassir Khan aligned himself with 
Ahmad Shah Durrani who had founded the first kingdom of 
Afghanistan. On the death of Ahmad Shah in 17 72, Nassir Khan 
claimed independence and began expanding his own dominion 
within Iran:
"The army of Kelat marched through Mekran as far 
as Kusserkund and Dizzuk. The latter provinces were 
not permanently retained, and eventually were 
re-occupied by Persia. Punjgur and Kolwah were 
attached to the Upper Provinces, and Mekran began to 
assume the political aspect it exhibits at the present 
time. 1 (2)
Iran was, at this time, in a state of confusion, suffering 
from armed conflicts between the houses of Qajar led by Agha 
Mohammad Khan, founder of the dynasty, and Zand led by 
Lotf-Ali Khan who had succeeded Karim Khan Zand.
Nassir Khan died in 17 95 and on his death, the Gitchkis took
advantage of the confusion at Kalat to shake off the Kalat
{3 \yoke. They were reduced again in 1831 by Mehrab Khan.v ;
By the turn of the nineteenth century the Qajars had 
established themselves firmly in control of Iran. Claims of 
sovereignty to the whole of Baluchistan was revived by 
Mohammad Shah Qajar (1834 - 47), and Bampur was taken from
(1) See Chapter II The Khozeimeh Amirs.
(2) Extracts of a document on the history of Baluchistan which exists in the Public Record
Office, FO 60/385 , p. 61 of 60.
(3) Same document, op. cit., p. 62.
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the rebellious chiefs in 1 8 3 4 . The newly appointed
Governor of Kerman, Ibrahim Khan, subsequently recovered Geh,
(21Qasreqand, Dizzak, Bahu and Sarbaz.v 1 Esfandak and Chabar
(Chahbahar) were recovered in 1872. Chahbahar had hitherto
been held by the Arabs of Muscat for a brief period of time,
administering the port and its surrounding district on behalf
(3)of the Iranian Government.' } The Qajars, nevertheless, 
failed not only in recovering all of the lost possessions of 
Iran in Baluchistan, but also in defining a clear framework 
within which relationships with the autonomous chiefs of the 
peripheral districts of the country would be governed. They 
also failed in defining any comprehensible frontier limits 
around the country.
"In accordance with the customary policy, neither 
Persian Officers nor Persian troops were placed in
charge of these districts. So long as their own
Chiefs satisfied the demands of Persia, they were left 
unmolested. The districts of Geh, Kusserkund and Baho 
Dustyari are under the charge of a Gitchki Chief, 
named Mir Abdullah, who is Naib on the part of Persia, 
and acts under the orders of Ihbrahim Khan, the
Persian Governor of Bampur, who, in his turn, is
subordinate to the Wukil-ul-Mulk of Kerman. 
Subordinate to Mir Abdullah are the Judgal Chiefs of 
Baho and Dustyari, Mahomed Ali and Din Mahomed. The 
remaining Persian Districts are also governed by
Beluch Chiefs, who render account of the revenue to 
Ibrahim Khan."(4)
(1) (2) The dates given here are disputable:
“‘It is well worthy of remark that Hr Badger, speaking of Mir Abdullah of Geh, mentions 
that he "became tributary to Persia about 12 years ago (1849), and stiLl professes (1861) 
to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Shah.’ This assertion, not given as mere hearsay
but the result of carefuL inquiry, agrees well with that of.....
“Nao HulL, who makes the capture of Bampur by the Persians to have been in about 1845, and
the subsequent invasion of Geh and Kussurkund some few years later, or in about 1849"
(Letter of the Acting Secretary to Government, Bombay, No. 9 of 3rd June 1861, F06Q/385, 
p. 25 of 42).
(3) Reverand, G.P. Badger to the Government of Bombay, No. 10, dated June 5th, 1861, F060/385 -
(4) Extract of a document on the history of Baluchistan, op. cit., p. 62 FO 60/385
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Thus, at the time of boundary delimitation in the district of 
Baluchistan (1870), it had become clear that the eastern half 
of Makran and Baluchistan had fallen to the share of the 
autonomy of Kalat which had accepted British protection and 
suzerainty, and the western half had returned to Iran.
British influence in Baluchistan and Sistan began as from the 
turn of the nineteenth century. Realising the importance of 
Bulan Pass to the security of India, the British during their 
expedition to Afghanistan, sent troops to Kalat to punish 
Mehrab Khan who had caused them much trouble. Kalat was 
reduced and the Khan killed during the war. Two years later, 
the Baluchis revolted against the British and fought against 
them, which resulted in their submission to the rule of 
Nassir Khan II.*
Having annexed Sind in 1843 and Pan jab (Punjab) in 1848,
British influence in Baluchistan expanded. In 1854 they
signed an agreement with Nassir Khan whereby the British
undertook to pay him annually in return for his acceptance of
(becoming a British protectorate.v } Nassir Khan II died in 
1857 and was succeeded by his brother, Mir Khodadad who 
adhered to the said agreement with the British in return for 
the annual payment to be doubled. These events resulted in 
bringing Iran and Britain face to face in Baluchistan and 
caused friction between the two powers. Expressions of the 
desire by the British to extend their telegraph line westward 
from Gwader to the Straits of Hormuz at Jask deepened these 
frictions and necessitated a well defined boundary between 
the two powers. Coinciding with these developments was 
friction between Iran and the newly revived state of 
Afghanistan over the province of Sistan. Amir Shir Ali Khan 
of Afghanistan had asked the British to intervene on behalf
(1) Mokhber, op. cit., p. 54.
(2) Ibid.
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of his Government,^ ) offering arbitration between the two
i 2 \countries which was accepted.v '
THE GQLDSMID LINE OF IRANO-KALAT BOUNDARIES
In 1870, it was agreed to settle the disputed frontiers of
Iran and Afghanistan through British arbitration, but the
Afghans informed the British that the arbitration should be
postponed for a year or so owing to the internal problems of
(3)that country.' '
The Iranian Government appointed Mirza Masum Ansari, an
intelligent and alert officer of the Foreign Ministry, as the
Iranian Commissioner, to cooperate with General Frederick
Goldsmid, head of the British telegraph wire construction in
southern Baluchistan, who was assigned by the Government of
British India to lead the arbitration team to Sistan and 
f 4)Baluchistan.v } His assignment was the result of
persistence on the part of the British Indian Government that
the Amir of Afghanistan "will naturally expect that
arbitrator of Sistan boundary be appointed by Indian 
(5)Government".v J
The fact that the Amir of Afghanistan had, in 1870, requested 
British intervention in his border dispute with Iran, was no
(1) From Colonel F.R. Pollock to the Secretary to the Indian Government, dated Peshawar 17th
June 1870, FO 60/386 , p. 206.
(2) See next chapter. ALso, see letter from Secretary to the Government of India to Secretary
to the Government of Punjab, dated SitnLa 8th Sep. 1870, No. 1613, FO 60/386 , p.
382.
(3) From H.H. Amir of Afghanistan to the Governor General of India, dated 8th October 1870, FO
60/386, ', p. 462.
(4) Telegram from Secretary of State to Viceroy of India, dated 19th May 1870, FO 60/386,
p. 249, section 182.
(5) Extract of telegram from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State, dated 14th May 1870, No.
784p, FO 60/386, p. 249, section 182.
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more than an opportunity for the British of India to define a 
border line in Baluchistan which was long desired:
"The India Office (5th May 1869) sent to Foreign 
Office, for opinion, copy of Indian letter No, 85, 
dated 16th March, containing the suggestion that 
Persia should be urged to agree to negotiations for 
satisfactory adjustment of its eastern frontier."(1)
And:
"They showed that Colonel Goldsmid had, in 1864, made 
just such a preliminary enquiry as was recommended by 
Mr. Alison."ft)
However, as delimitation of Irano-Afghanistan boundaries in 
Sistan was delayed, Colonel Goldsmid was instructed to 
proceed with the delimitation of Baluchistan boundaries, 
Goldsmid, by this time, promoted to the rank of Major 
General, proposed in a letter to the Governor of Bombay,
/ 3 \
dated 28th November 1870, v ' to proceed from Bampur to the 
most north-easterly point practicable on the Baluchistan 
frontier, proceeding thence southward to the s e a . T h i s  
proposal was agreed to by the Government of India who had 
actually undertook to advise Goldsmid as to where precisely 
the Baluchistan boundary should be defined. In his letter to 
General Goldsmid, secretary to the Government of India, the 
Foreign Office advised him:
"3. You will observe that the Secretary of State 
has approved the suggestion that the boundary 
described in your memorandum of 28th April 1869 should 
form the basis of your operations, with such deviation 
as your personal inspection may show to be desirable. 
Presuming that you will strike the boundary somewhere 
in the neighbourhood of Jalk, the line proposed, if
(1) F060/387, p. 14 of 60.
(2) Extract of brief history of Baluchistan dispute, for the year 1869, FO 60/387, p.
15 of 61.
(3) Confidential Letter from C.U. Aitchison, Secretary to the Government of India, to Major
General Goldsmid, dated Fort William 24th January 1871, No. 169P, F0 60/387, p. 158.
(4) Ibid.
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eventually adoptedf will reach the sea immediately to 
the west of the Drabol Hill in the centre of the 
Gwetter Bay, and will leave on the west Jalk, Dizzuk, 
Sirbaz, Peshin, and Baho; and on the east Kohuk, 
Punjgoor, Kej, Toomp, Nussirabad, and Mund. The main 
object to be attained is the definition of the western 
boundary of Khelat and its dependencies of Kej, &c., 
beyond which it is not supposed that the Persians have 
valid claims. A very liberal view may therefore be 
taken of Persian claims to the west of that line; but 
deviations to the eastward should not be agreed to 
unless they rest on substantial grounds, such as 
Treaty, possession, the wishes of the local Chiefs, or 
obvious advantage.
"4 From Jalk northward the boundary shown in 
your memorandum is an imaginary line drawn across the 
desert to Seistan. In respect to any such line as you 
may suggest to your fellow-Commissioners, great 
caution will be requisite. The point where the 
prolongation of the boundary joins the cultivated 
lands on the left bank of the Helmund will naturally 
be the point from which the Seistan boundary will 
start. On this subject I enclose, for your 
information, copy of a despatch, No. 41, dated 7th 
July 1879, addressed by the Government of India to the 
Secretary of State. If the dotted line shown on your 
map as the suggested boundary be prolonged, it will 
strike the Helmund somewhere in the neighbourhood of 
Buggutser, or, at any rate, much further up the river 
than the highest point to which the Persian Government 
have any pretensions. Very great caution, therefore, 
must be exercised, and if any desert line be suggested 
at all, it should be such that the Seistan boundary 
may form the the natural continuation of it. The most
desirable course would be to leave the desert line
undetermined till its other terminus on the Seistan 
side can be definitely settled. It can really be of 
little importance what course the line takes between 
the termini; and probably the straight line will meet
the wishes of all parties. On this point His
Excellency in Council will be glad if you will submit 
your views in a Special Report."(1)
The unfavourable desires of the Indian Government towards 
Iran's rights of sovereignty in the Iranian section of 
Baluchistan was further demonstrated in clause 8 of the same 
letter:
(1) Clauses 3 and 4 of Aitchison's Letter to Goldsmid, dated Fort William 24th January 1871, FO 
60/387, p. 158.
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"8. His Excellency in Council does not think it 
desirable that the question of the Persian claims to 
Charbar and Gwadur should be taken up. It would be 
impossible, indeed, for such a question to be settled 
by a Commission on which the Muscat Government is not 
represented. In the unlikely event, therefore, of 
Persia pressing the consideration of her claims to 
these two sea-ports, or Khelat claiming Gwadur, you 
will content yourself with recording fully the grounds 
on which the claims rest, and will inform the 
Commissioners that no opinion can be given on the 
subject except after communication with the Government 
of Muscat."M )
With regard to the position of Chahbahar and Gwater, the
Indian Government, knowing that these places were held by the
Muscatis on a lease agreement with Iran which in no way
12)contradicted Iran's sovereignty,' ' doubted Iran's rights 
of sovereignty over them.
The first dispute between the two commissioners, however, 
occurred before the actual commencement of the surveying of 
the frontiers. The initial dispute was on the introduction 
of Faquir Mohammad Khan, a well known British protege, as 
Commissioner representing the Khan of Kalat. The Iranian 
Commissioner argued that the boundary commission was there 
only to survey and draw up a map of the frontier areas for 
the diplomats of Iran and Britain to negotiate in Tehran for 
settlement, not to carry out boundary adjudication that would 
necessitate participation of a Kalati representative. This 
argument was based on the text of the letter in which the 
Iranian Foreign Minister informed the British of Iran's 
agreement to their proposal on boundary delimitation. He 
states:
"The said Commissioners will be at liberty to 
proceed from thence (Seistan) and draw up a map of 
Persia's possessions in Beloochistan and those of the 
Khan and Khelat with their boundaries, and bring the 
same with themselves to Teheran. That question will 
be then justly decided with the knowledge of the
(1) Ibid.
(2) Reverand Badger to the Government of Bombay, No. 10, dated June 5th 1861, FO 60/385 *
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British Government, but it is hereby agreed upon that 
the boundaries in Seistan are to be looked to first 
and before those of Beloochistan."()
The problem was solved as a result of the British 
Government's use of influence in Tehran which secured an 
order from the Iranian Foreign Minister to Mirza Masum Khan 
instructing him to "accept Kalat commissioner if all 
right."(^)
Before settlement of this problem was finalised, another 
problem of a much greater magnitude threatened the mission. 
This time, the Iranian Government brought to the attention of 
the British Minister at Tehran on the 5th of March that 
according to reports which had been received from the Iranian 
Commissioner, General Goldsmid had undertaken a series of 
proceedings which were damaging to the rights of Iran in the 
disputed areas and were provocative:
"The Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 5th 
instant, communicated to me a message from the king 
respecting the alleged proceedings of General 
Goldsmid, our Commissioner for inquiring into the 
matter of the Perso-Khelat frontier. The King, he 
said complained of General Goldsmid's proceedings as 
one-sided, and calculated to create disorder within 
the Persian frontier possessions. According to the 
reports received from the Persian Commissioner, 
General Goldsmid had openly declared places avowedly 
Persian to belong to Khelat, and had unsettled men's 
minds by enquiring about the right of Persia to other 
places already in her possession, and indisputably 
belonging to her. Another subject of complaint was 
that of the tumultuous demonstrations on the part of 
the Khelat authorities, and the expedition of troops 
with drums, trumpets, &c., from Gwadur into the Kedj
territory at the instigation of the British 
authorities. His Majesty, the Minister observed, was 
so offended at these proceedings, that he would
(1) Extract of translation of memorandum from Mirza Saeed Khan, Iran's Foreign Minister, dated
Tehran 24th July 1870, FO 60/386, p. 431.
(2) Telegram from the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Iranian Commissioner, repeated 
in Mr. Alison's telegram to Goldsmid, dated Tehran the 2nd of March 1871, FO 60/390^
p. 4.
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consider himself justified in recalling his 
Commissioner, His sole object with regard to the 
disputed Perso-Khelat frontier was that the 
Commissioners should conduct an inquiry into the 
matter in an orderly and a quiet way, draw up a map of 
that frontier line, and bring it to Teheran, where the 
subject would be settled between the Persian and 
British Governments."(1)
In his despatch No. 67 to the Secretary of State for India, 
dated 18th March 1871, General Goldsmid accused Mirza Masum 
Khan of similar undertakings and suggested: "The whole action
of the Persian Commissioner leads me to the thankless 
conclusion that an enquiry such as contemplated by Her
Majesty’s Government cannot now be carried out on the
Perso-Baluch Frontier unless under diplomatic influence at 
Tehran."^  ^
(For more details on the grievances of the 
two Commissioners see Appendix III)
These differences between the Iranian Commissioner, Mirza 
Masum Khan, supported by Ibrahim Khan, Governor of Bampur, 
and British Commissioner, General Goldsmid, supported by the 
Khan of Kalat, stemmed principally from Mirza Masum Khan's 
distrust of the British Commissioner's true intentions. In a 
despatch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mirza Masum Khan
indicated: ".... Since all intentions of the said officer
(Goldsmid) can be seen in his notes (to me), I will stop at
sending the collection of (notes) questions and answers
between myself and the English Officer and will dare 
adding.... that this Officer has no other intention but 
supporting and strengthening the Khan of Kalat and obtaining 
documentary evidence to prove that Kaj, Tump, and.... belong
(1) Extract of letter from C. Alison, H.B. Majesty’s Minister at Tehran to Right Hon’ble the
Earl Granville, dated Tehran 9th March 1871, No. 22, FO 60/390/ p. 57.
(2) Extract of clause 12 of despatch No. 67, from Major General Goldsmid to His Grace the Duke of
Argyll, dated Camp Gwadur 18th March 1871, FO 60/388f p. 5.
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to the (Said) Khan. He is very annoyed with this humble
servant (of yours) because of lack of cooperation in 
furthering the intentions of the said Officer on my 
part."^1)
As the differences intensified between the two commissioners, 
both Governments of Britain and Iran advised their respective 
Commissioners to cooperate with each other. The British 
Minister at Tehran telegraphed General Goldsmid advising him:
"PERSIAN Government has sent in a series of 
complaints about your alleged unfair proceedings 
towards Persia; of the warlike demonstrations made on 
part of Khelat, Sc. His Majesty wishes the enquiry to 
be orderly and quietly conducted, and that you and 
colleague should prepare a map for subsequent 
settlement of frontier question here. I have 
telegraphed Home that an open statement of opinion, if 
adverse to Persian pretensions, might have an 
unfavourable effect on pending inquiry about Seistan. 
Details by messengers."(*)
The Iranian Foreign Minister similarly telegraphed Mirza 
Masum Khan stating:
"Your telegram received. Your co-operation with 
British Commissioner approved. Act according to your 
instructions. It is moreover by Royal orders notified 
to you that in inspecting places attached to frontier 
line, in making necessary enquiries, and in collecting 
information you are to co-operate with General Goldsmid 
without taking steps for deciding the question of the 
boundary. You will each prepare your own maps, and you 
will each bring your maps with the notes you have made 
to Teheran, so that the question may be decided by the 
Persian and English Governments. Accept Khelat 
Commissioner if all right; if not suitable, do not take 
armed force with you. Inform me of details of both 
cases. "(3)
(1) From Mirza Masum Khan to Mirza Saeed Khan, dated 29 Safar 1288 19th May 1871, document 93 of
the "Yeksad Sanad-e Tarikhi“, by Ebrahira Safaii, Tehran, March 1974.
(2) From Mr ALison to General Goldsmid, dated Tehran 8th March 1871, FO 60/1390, p. 3 of 58,
(3) From Foreign Minister to Mirza Masum Khan as contained in Mr Alison's telegram to GoLdsmid,
dated 3rd March 1871, FO 60/388, pp. 11 - 12.
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The two Commissioners continued with the task of surveying 
the frontier areas without tensions between them subsiding.
Cooperation between the two Commissioners were, however, 
limited to the exchange of some notes. General Goldsmid 
assigned Captain Lovett the Engineer of his commission to 
survey and draw up the map of the border areas. Writing to 
the Iranian Commissioner on 7th February 1871, General 
Goldsmid informed the former that Captain Lovett had prepared 
a map of the frontier areas which did not include Kuhak and 
Esfandak districts in the Iranian side of the border - (see 
Lovett's map, figure IV). Writing to Mirza Masum Khan, 
Goldsmid asserted:
".... as the claim made by Persia to Kuhak and 
Isfunder have not been accepted by the other side and 
as they have several witnesses on their side ready, I 
think it advisable that this matter should be at once 
enquired into...."(1)
The Iranian Commissioner protested against the suggestion. 
In his reply, Mirza Masum Khan asserted that:
"Captain Lovett brought over a sheet of paper to 
my tent, enquired about several places from the 
Surteep Ibrahim Khan, and made notes on the same 
paper. He asked - 'have these places paid revenue to 
Persia or not?' Ibrahim Khan answered - 'YesI' and 
the collectors and officers of those places are now 
present with me. Captain Lovett asked concerning Kedj 
and Punjgoor. Ibrahim Khan said - 'For three or four 
years the inhabitants of those places have failed in 
paying the revenue, and I have always wished to go and 
punish them and take the revenue, but the Persian 
Government, I know not for what reason, has not 
allowed me.' And with regard to what you have written 
about Kohuk and Isfunder, that the other side say that 
those placed do not belong to Persia, and that they 
have several witnesses to prove their right of 
possession, and that you think this should be 
immediately enquired into, and therefore wish that I 
should come over to your tent, and that this should be 
settled with the Khelat Commissioner. First, Kohuk 
and Isfunder are dependencies of Dizzuk, and have no
(1) From General Goldsmid to Mirza Masum Khan Ansari, dated Bampoor 7th February 1871, FO 60/388, 
p. 23.
ELUCH
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Map showing Irano-Kalat frontiers, accompanying General 
Goldsmid's report to Mr Alison, dated Golhak July 21, 1871,
FO 60/389 , p. 36.
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connection (or nothing to do) with the enquiry you are 
appointed for; secondly, the Khelat Commissioners have 
been specially appointed to discuss the question of 
the frontier of Kedj and its dependencies. What right 
have they to make a claim on Dizzuk and its 
dependencies that they should waste your time and 
delay us in these useless matters?"(1)
Having disputed Goldsmid's method of determining sovereignty
of Iran and Kalat in the disputed areas, Mirza Masum Khan
kept aloof. General Goldsmid nevertheless, continued with
his work without Mirza Masum Khan's cooperation. He
completed his task and telegraphed the British Minister at
Tehran on April 19th, suggesting that his map and his
(2)findings be put forward for discussion in Tehran.v ' This 
happened exactly as was suggested by General Goldsmid, and 
the Iranian Government accepted on 23rd August that boundary 
awards should be conducted on the basis of Goldsmid's 
one-sided findings and his map, in spite of writing to the 
British Minister at Tehran a week earlier expressing regrets 
for the way General Goldsmid had conducted the survey of the 
border areas. The Iranian Foreign Minister writing to the 
British Minister at Tehran on that occasion, indicated:
"The copy of the correspondence between His
Excellency General Goldsmid and Mirza Maasum Khan, 
Commissioners of the British and Persian Governments, 
which was forwarded in a memorandum from the Mission, 
has been read by this Department and submitted to His 
Majesty the Shah.
"From that correspondence, that which strikes the
mind most as being strange, and which has caused
regret to His Majesty, is the fact that the British
Commissioner (while) at Bumpur, and before proceeding 
with the Persian Commissioner, conformably to the 
arrangement made between this Department and Her 
Britannic Majesty's Legation, to Gwadur and Kedj, and 
(before) they collected information and drew a correct 
map, repeatedly in his letters regarded the port of 
Gwadur as belonging to the Arabs, and Kedj to the Khan
(1) From Mirza Masum Khan to General Goldsmid, dated Bampoor 8th February 1871, FO 60/388,
p. 23.
(2) From General Goldsmid to Mr. Alison, dated 17th April 1871, FO 60/390 -
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of Khelat, and he made the Persian Commissioner's 
going to those Districts dependent upon the 
possibility of his doing so and upon permission being 
obtained from the agent of the Khan of Khelat."(1)
The Iranian Government not only accepted Goldsmid's map as
the basis for discussion, but actually limited the discussion
to one meeting between the Iranian Foreign Minister and the
British Minister at Tehran accompanied by General Goldsmid,
and without the participation of Mirza Masum Khan, who had
(2 \reportedly fallen ill.v '
The boundary line suggested by Goldsmid, and referred to the
Shah for his opinion, was partly modified by the Shah who
included in the Iranian side of the border line: Kuhak in the
north, and lands comprising within Nahang and Dasht rivers -
(3 \from Mond to the sea, abandoning Gwadur Bay and Kaj. v 1 
Finding the Iranians quite serious on the question of Kuhak, 
General Goldsmid advised the Indian Government that Kuhak 
should be given to Iran. He asserted:
"&re might, perhaps, settle question by giving 
Kohuk to Persia on grounds of doubtful possession and 
non-payment of revenue, maintaining rest of line as 
indicated on Lovett's map. In such case might 
engineer officer be detailed to meet Harrison and 
Chief from both sides to mark off boundary in minute 
detail? Full proposal by post."(4)
This advice was not taken on board and the British Minister 
at Tehran officially informed the Iranian Foreign Minister in 
a memorandum on 1st of September 1871 of the boundaries
(1) Extract of Memorandum from Mirza Saeed Khan to C. Alison, H.B. Majesty’s Minister at Tehran,
dated 17th August 1871, FO 60/391, p. 33,
(2) From Alison, Tehran, to Viceroy, Simla, dated 18th July 1871, FO 60/390, p. 101.
(3) From Goldsmid to Foreign Secretary, Simla dated Tehran 14th August 1871, FO 60/390 •
(4) Ibid.
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delineated in Baluchistan, from Guater as far north as Jalq, 
in accordance with Goldsmid's map and his findings. The 
memorandum outlined:
"The undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the 
Court of Persia, acting on the part of his Government, 
has the honor to submit, for the approval of His 
Majesty the Shah, a map in which the boundary line 
between the territories possessed in Beloochistan by 
Persia, and the territories forming the exclusive 
property of the independent State of Khelat, is 
delineated.
"This line may be thus described: Commencing from 
the northernmost point, or that which is furthest from 
the sea, the territory of Khelat is bounded to the 
west by the large Persian District of Dizzuk, which is 
composed of many Dehs or minor Districts, those on the 
frontier being Jalk and Kallegan. Below these two 
last-named is the small District of Kohuk, which, 
together with Punjgur, comprising Parum and other 
dependencies, is on the Khelat side of the frontier, 
while on the Persian side is Bampusht.
"Below Punjgur, the frontier, possessions of 
Khelat to the sea are Boleida, including Zamiran and 
other dependencies, Mund and Dusht. Within the 
Persian line of frontier are the villages or tracts 
belonging to Sirbaz and Bahu Dustyari. The boundary 
of Dusht is marked by a long line drawn through the 
Drabol hill situated between the Rivers Bahu and 
Dusht, to the sea in the Bay of Gwuttur.
"To summarise: Punjgur and Parum and other
dependencies with Kohuk; Boleida, including Zamiran 
and other dependencies; Mund, including Tump, 
Nasserabad, Kedj, and all Districts, dehs and 
dependencies to the eastward; Dusht with its 
dependencies as far as the sea: these names exhibit
the line of actual possession of Khelat, that is to 
say, all tracts to the east of the frontier of actual 
Persian possession, which frontier comprises Dizzuk 
and Bampusht, Sirbaz and Peshin, Bahu and 
Dustyari."(1)
Replying to this memorandum, the Iranian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs stated his Government's official line in the manner 
that expressed their acceptance of the delimitation without 
satisfaction. This letter asserted:
(1) Extract of Memorandum from C. Alison to the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 
Gulhak the 1st September 1871, FO 60/391, pp. 1 - 2 of 37.
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"In obedience to His Majesty' s orders I beg, in 
reply, most respectfully to state that the Persian 
Government, notwithstanding the clear right which it 
considered itself to have over Beloochistan, simply 
out of regard for the wishes of Her Britannic 
Majesty's Government that this question should be 
brought to a satisfactory conclusion by the definition 
of a boundary line, has hereby accepted Your 
Excellency's letter and the map."(l)
Notwithstanding the official acceptance of Goldsmid's Line in 
Baluchistan, the Iranian authorities informed the British 
Minister at Tehran unofficially that Kuhak and parts of 
Mashkil Valley should go to Iran. These demands soon proved 
that a final agreement of these boundaries was impossible and 
the question of Kuhak and Mashkil Valley remained, only to be 
settled later.
Immediately after the delineation tasks were completed and 
Goldsmid departed from Iran, Ibrahim Khan, Governor of 
Bampur, captured Kuhak and other parts of the Mashkil Valley.
General Goldsmid's Line was, however, inspected in 1875 for 
the purpose of demarcation, by Colonel St. John and Mirza Ali 
Ashraf Khan.^^
THE HOLDICH LINE OF IRANO-KHARAN BOUNDARY
Whilst the limits of Iranian possessions in Baluchistan
were defined by Goldsmid's Line of 1871, drawn from the coast 
of Gwater Bay northwards as far as Jalq, Kuhak and Esfandak 
remained out in the cold. The Iranian Government, though 
accepting in principle the Goldsmid Line, did not agree with 
his decision on the northern sections of the line. The final
(1) From Mirza Saeed Khan, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr Alison, dated 14th
September 1871, FO 60/391, p. 2 of 37.
(2) From Mr. Durand to British Government, dated Gulhek (near Tehran) JuLy 12, 1895, FO 60/627,
p. 4.
416
agreement, therefore, left Kuhak, Esfandak and Mashkil Valley 
with a long stretch of frontier to the River Hirmand, 
including in all 300 miles of frontier, undefined and mostly 
unmapped. These points of undefined frontiers are determined 
by the following passages in General Goldsmid's award of 
Sistan and Makran boundaries:
"Sistan. - 'The main bed of the Helmand therefore 
below Kohuk should be the eastern boundary of Persian 
Sistan, and the line of frontier from Kohak to the 
hills south of the Sistan desert should be so drawn as 
to include within the Afghan limits all cultivation on 
the banks of the river from the Band upwards. The 
Malik Siah Koh, on the chain of hills separating the 
Sistan from the Karman desert, appears a fitting 
point. '
"Mekran. - 'Commencing from the northernmost
point or that which is furthest from the sea, the 
territory of Kalat is bounded to the west by the large 
Persian district of Dizzuk, which is composed of many 
dehs, or minor districts, those on the frontier being 
Jalk and Kalagan. Below these two last named is the 
small district of Kohuk, whichf together with Panjgur, 
comprising Parum and other dependencies, is on the 
Kalat side of the frontier, while on the Persian side 
is Bampusht. 1" )
The decision to leave areas to the north of Jalq undefined by 
Goldsmid's Makran Commission was due to the fact that Azad 
Khan, chief of Kharan, considered himself and his dominion to 
be independent of that of the Khan of Kalat. The following 
is an authoritative statement on this point:
"As regards Punjgur, and indeed all his lands 
except Kharan, Azad Khan has, I am to remark, always 
been considered a feudatory of that State (i.e., 
Kalat); but as regards Kharan, the Government has left 
his allegiance to Kalat or Cabul an open 
question."\2)
(1) Boundary between Persia and North-west Baluchistan, Confidential Foreign Office Document,
dated 19th September 1893, FO 60/627, p. 1.
(2) Extract from Letter from Foreign Secretary to General Goldsmid, dated 26th May 1871,
enclosure 12 to Government of India Secret letter No. 61 dated 26th September 1871, quoted in 
Boundary between Persia, op. cit., dated 19th September 1893, FO 60/627 •
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In 1884, however, Azad Khan, under Sir Robert Sandeman's
auspices, obtained a reconciliation with the Khan of Kalat, 
as one of his Sardars. Previous to this, he had written to 
the Amir of Afghanistan to ask if there was any objection in 
Kabul to his submitting to the British Government. Seeing
his own power and the survival of a united Afghanistan
largely dependent on the geostrategic considerations of the 
British Government in Central Asia and South-West Asia, the
Amir of Afghanistan gave his consent ^ ^  to Kharan's
submission to Kalat and the British Indian Government which 
was, by this time, in direct control of the whole of eastern 
Baluchistan including Kalat. The Iranians, at this time,
reasserted their control of Kuhak which motivated the British 
authorities to seek delimitation of boundaries in these
frontier areas to contain Iran's encroachments into Kharan. 
There were a number of other reasons for the British to
enforce boundary lines in the tracts to the north of Jalq and 
Mashkil river as outlined by Captain Macdonald in a 
memorandum on this subject:
" (i) It will put a stop to intrigue between Persia and 
Kharan for the possession of Mashkel, and prevent 
Persian aggression not only in Mashkel but at Kohuk. 
(ii) It will enable us to settle definitely the 
relations between the Reki chief of Mashkel and Sir 
Naoroz Khan, and thus enable us to interpose a 
trustworthy barrier between Kharan and Persia. (Hi) 
It will reassure the people and the rulers of Mekran, 
and convince them that we have not lost interest in 
them, and that we do not intend to let them be 
absorbed by Persia or Kharan. (fv) ft will 
indirectly tend to check the growth of the Naushirwani 
power. (v) It will serve as a countermove to Russia, 
and will show the people (and this is of the very 
greatest importance) that we have not abandoned the 
field to Russia, and do not fear her."(2)
It is noteworthy that Captain Macdonald's reference under 
clause (v) is to the newly established Russian Consulate at
(1) Boundary between Persian and North-west Baluchistan, a Foreign Office document, dated 19th 
September 1893, FO 60/627, p. 4.
(2) Memorandum of Captain F.W.P. Macdonald of Indian Staff, dated London 15th August 1893, FO
60/627, p. 17.
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Qaen where the British had previously established one of 
their own.
However, on the subject of Kuhak not being an Iranian 
possession, Mr. Durand, the British Minister at Tehran, put 
the following argument to the British authorities:
"....the district has never been acknowledged to 
Persian territory as Your Highness has been led to 
believe.
"To recapitulate.
"1) There have been disputes between the frontier 
authorities of Persia and India about the Mashkil or 
Mashkhok district.
"2) In November last H.M. the Shah agreed to send a 
Persian official to enquire into the matter in 
conjunction with a British officer.
"3) The Persian official did not go, and the British 
officer had to go by himself.
"4) When I asked the Persian Government to restrain 
its frontier authorities from aggression on the 
disputed tract pending the joining enquiry to which it 
had agreed, the Persian Government refused to do so.
"5) It based its refusal, a refusal of a most 
peremptory nature, upon the assertion that the 
disputed district had been distinctly acknowledged in 
maps drawn up after demarcation to belong to Persia.
"6) That assertion proves to be incorrect. " )
Mr Durand's last remark that the assertion of the claim by 
the Iranian Government that Kuhak was included in Iranian 
territory on the map drawn up after demarcation work being 
incorrect does not correspond adequately with the fact that 
indeed Kuhak, Esffandak and areas to the west of the river 
Mashkil were included in the Iranian side of the boundary - 
(see the demarcation map of 1875, figure V).
(1) Extract of letter from H.M. Durand to the British Indian Government, dated Gulhek July 12, 
1895, FO 60/627, p. 5.
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By December 1895, however,the two powers decided to demarcate
tracts between Jalq and Sistan territory. An agreement
was signed in Tehran between the Prime Minister of Iran and
the British Legation at Tehran allowing the demarcation of
these boundaries to proceed. ^ ^  The British had by this
time resolved that more than twenty years of Iranian
possession of Kuhak and Esfandak was too long a period of
(21time to be easily ignored.^ }
The actual delimitation of these boundaries was agreed by the 
two parties in Tehran on the basis of Colonel T.H. Holdich' s 
final report on the proceedings of the Irano-Baluchistan 
Frontier Delimitation Commission, the details of which 
appears in their agreement in Tehran 27th December 1895 
allowing their representatives to carry out demarcation of 
the boundary - (see text of this agreement in Appendix IV).
Colonel Holdich and his Iranian counterpart completed the
task of demarcation by late March and signed on the 24th
March 1896 an agreement on the completion of demarcation
which was submitted to their respective Governments in early
April 1896, finalising the boundary settlement of northern 
(3)Baluchistan.v 1 This boundary recognised Kuhak, Esfandak 
and areas to the west of Mashkil river as Iranian 
possessions. The demarcation report which was submitted by 
Holdich to his Government described the boundary as:
"Commencing from the Mashkel river it is defined 
by the bed of that river from pillar 1 to pillar 2. 
Pillar 1 is placed on a conspicuous hill on the left 
or north bank of the river, about a mile and a half 
below the junction of the Gazbastan stream with the 
Mashkel, and almost immediately south of Kohak Fort.
(1) See the text of agreement, dated Tehran December 27, 1895, FO 60/627 - 169881 in 3 pages.
(2) From the Viceroy to Her Majesty's Government, dated 16th December 1895, FO 6D/627 -
(3) From Colonel T.H. Holdich, H.B. Majesty's Commissioner for the delimitation of Perso-Baluch 
Frontier, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Camp 
Panjgur the 5th April 1896, No. 34, FO 60/627 -
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Figure V
Colonel Holdich's map of delimitation of 
Northern Baluchistan Boundaries, FO 60/388, p
253
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"Pillar 2 is built on a well marked hill on the 
right or south bank of the Mashkel river about 6 miles 
above the junction of the Mashked and the Rakshan 
rivers. From pillar 2 the boundary runs in a 
north-westerly direction to a conspicuous peak on the 
subsidiary range which runs from the Tank-i-Grawag to 
the Siahan. The peak is marked by pillar 3. From 
pillar 3 it follows the watershed of this subsidiary 
range to its junction with that of the Siahan Koh and 
thence it is defined westward by the main watershed of 
the Siahan range to a point about 4 miles east of the 
pass called Bonsar or Sharindor, on the main road 
connecting Isfandak with Jalk. At this point, which 
is marked by pillar 4, a subsidiary watershed or spur 
runs northward, along which the boundary extends, 
leaving all drainage into the cultivated tracts of 
Kalagan on the Persian side. The boundary is here 
marked by a conspicuous peak, distinguished by a 
natural bluff resembling a tower on its summit. From 
this peak 5, it is carried to pillar 6, which is 
placed on the main road leading a little south of east 
from the village of Kaladen towards the Mashkel 
river. Pillar 6 is 4 miles from the village of 
Kaladen. From pillar 6 the boundary runs direct to 
pillar 7 on the main road connecting Jalk with 
Ladgasht and Mashkel at 12 miles from Zarat-i-Pir-Omar 
at Jalk.
"From pillar 7 the boundary is carried in a 
northerly direction by a straight line to pillar 8.
"Pillar 8 is placed on the road connecting the 
date groves of Ladgasht with those of Muksokhta or 
Muksotag, and it is erected at a distance of 3 miles 
from the southern edge of the Muksotag grove, so as to 
divide the southern group of date groves, including 
Ladgasht and Kalag, from the northern group, which 
includes Muksotag, Gorani and others.
"Ladgasht, with its date groves, becomes the 
property of Kalat, and Gorani with its date groves, 
has been allotted to Persia, on the understanding that 
the frontier governors of the Persian Government in 
future becomes responsible for the conduct of the 
Damani cultivators of these groves.
"From pillar 8 of the boundary runs 14 miles 
nearly north to pillar 9 at the south-eastern edge of 
the Kindi date grove, and thence in the same direction 
for 3h miles to the north-eastern edge of the same 
grove of Kindi, where pillar 10 is erected.
"From pillar 10 the boundary runs 11 miles a 
little south of west, so as to clear the northern edge 
of the Kindi date grove, to pillar 11.
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Baluchistan Boundaries, Goldsmid's Delimitation of 1871. 
Italconsult, Local Chart, scale 1:1,000,000, published by 
USAF Aeronautical, Jan. 1958.
Gwador
FIGURE VII
Baluchistan Boundaries, Holdich Delimitation of 1896, 
Italconsult, Local Chart, scale 1:1,000,000, published by 
USAF Aeronautical, January 1958.
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"Pillar 11 is on the edge of the right bank of 
the Talab watercourses, and about 1 mile east of the 
northern end of the Gorani date groves.
"From pillar 11 northwards the Talab river 
becomes the boundary to its junction with the Mirjawa 
river. From the point of junction it is carried by a 
straight line to the nearest point on the watershed of 
the Mirjawa range, which limits the drainage into the 
Mirjawa river on the north.
"Thence it follows the main watershed northward 
to the highest point of the Kacha Koh.
"From the highest point of the Kacha Koh the line 
is carried straight to the highest point of the Malik 
Siah Koh."t1)
The boundary settlement though it recognised such places as 
Kuhak, Kenarbasteh, Esfandak and areas to the west of Mashkil 
river, long in actual possession of Iran as Iranian 
properties, deprived Iran of most of the Mashkil district and 
most importantly, the Mirjaveh town and district and its 
strategic points, The British authorities were aware of 
Iran's losses in this settlement as Durand stated in his 
letter of January 20th 1896 to the Marquis of Salisbury:
"I now enclose a copy of the convention with attached 
memorandum and map. Your Lordship will see that the 
convention secures for Kelat considerably better terms 
than the Government of India was willing to accept. I 
thought it desirable to keep something in hand for 
future exchange or concession. Our Commissioners will 
now be in a good position for they can make 
considerable concessions to Persia if they should wish 
to do so, while still reserving to Kelat all that the 
Government of India thinks necessary. At present 
however the Persian Government is quite satisfied with 
its bargain, though this involves the abandonment of 
the whole or almost the whole of the Mashkel district, 
to which I referred in my despatch No. 60 of the 7th 
of July 1895." (2)
(1) Colonel HoLdich's report to the Government of India on demarcation of Iran's boundaries in 
the north of Baluchistan, dated 5th April 1896, FO 60/627f pp. 1 - 2 .
(2) From Durand to Marquis of Salisbury, dated Tehran January 20th, 1896, No. 5, FO 60/627 -
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Finally, it is noteworthy that in 1900 the interests of the 
Khan of Kalat in the Nushki district were bought by 
Government of India( ) in spite of Kalat itself being a 
British protectorate.
THE 1905 SETTLEMENT
When settling the boundary to the north of Jalq, Colonel 
Holdich based his information on a map which the British 
claimed to have proved, by subsequent investigations, to be 
wrong. When the British authorities realised this, they 
discovered if they were to demarcate the boundaries on the 
basis of his map, the result would very likely bring their 
Padaha post well within Iranian territory. The British
authorities, therefore, assigned Captain Webb Ware to survey 
the areas concerned and prepare a report on the actuality of 
the boundary line. This he did in 1902 and the map he
prepared put Mirjaveh in British Indian territory - (see
figure VIII)* This action agitated the Iranians and friction 
occurred between the two powers. In a lengthy memorandum in 
November 1904, Colonel McMahon, British Arbitration 
Commissioner for Sistan boundary, proposed a new line to be 
imposed upon the Iranians which he alluded to as "the red
line" as opposed to that of Holdich1 s "blue line". In his 
memorandum, Colonel McMahon proposed:
"To continue the boundary line along the 
watershed of all the hills north of Kacha Kohf 
draining eastwards into British territory, would 
necessitate a line from peak 7033 (near Bagaiwad pass) 
stretching far westwards to the crest of the Buzaf, 
Lakshak and Wawaila Ranges. This would bring the 
Persian routes from Seistan to Bampur, Ladis and Jalk, 
via Duzdab, within our territory and would naturally 
be strongly objected to by the P e r s i a n s (2)
(1) Sykes, Major Percy, (1902), "Ten Thousand Miles in Persia", London 1902, p. 358.
(2) cLause 14 of McMahon's memorandum. No 2540, dated Camp Kohak the 5th November 1904, FO 
60/712, p. 3.
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McMahon's proposed red line was rejected by the British
Government on the advice of the British Minister at Tehran
who believed that they could not ever induce the Iranian
/1 \
Government to accept it.v } He suggested that:
"My idea would be to suggest to them that, if
they behaved well as regards Seistan affairs, i.e., 
settled the case of the Hashmat-ul~Mulk and grain 
export questions to our satisfaction, we should be
prepared, as the Shah found in the presence of the 
Mission a source of anxiety, to withdraw it without 
exposing them and us to trouble and expense of a
Mirjawa delimitation by it. We would leave them 
Mirjawa itself, keeping Padaha ourselves, and treating 
the intervening stream as the boundary, and erecting a 
boundary pillar between Robat and Koh-i-Malik Siah to 
mark the boundary on the road. We should, however, 
ask for a definite agreement that we should be 
permitted to obtain supplies from Mirjawa and
Duzdab."(2)
The case of Heshmat al-Molk, referred to in this document, 
was that Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Khozeimeh Heshmat al-Molk, Amir 
of Sistan, allegedly supported by the Russians, had enforced 
an order prohibiting exports of supplies to the British 
Indian frontiers. In a despatch to the Indian Government in 
February 1902, the British Vice-Consul for Sistan and Qaen 
reported:
"Before leaving Seistan Mons. Molitor visited the 
Amir Hashmat-ul-Mulk and reminded him of the order 
prohibiting the export of supplies to our frontier. A 
few days later I visited the Amir, who told me that 
Mr. Miller had also been to visit him to impress on 
him the existence of this order and to warn him that 
it was his duty to punish Katkhaudas of villages who 
disobeyed it. The Amir added that Mr. Miller had also 
remarked, 'If you cannot look after your frontier 
yourself, you know that some one else will have to do 
it for you.' The Amir regarded this an indication of 
Mr Miller's future designs with regard to our border. 
On the subject of supplies the Amir said that an order 
prohibiting their export did exist; but that an
(1) From Sir A. Hardinge, H.B. Majesty's Minister at Tehran to Foreign Secretary, telegram No.
5, dated 9th January 1905, FO 60/712 -
(2) Ibid.
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Figure VII%
Captain Webb Ware's proposed line of 1902, 
giving Mirjaveh, old and new, to Britain. FO 60/712.
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exception had always been made in the case of our 
thanas on the trade route, as the provisions were 
required not for purposes of trade but as a means of 
sustenance for the garrison. After his visit to the 
Amir Mr. Miller summoned the Quarantine Doctor and 
instigated him to seize the opportunity of visiting 
our frontier, remarking that I could not move from 
here to interfere with him. The Quarantine Doctor 
actually left Seistan in the direction of our 
frontier, but returned after he had got as far as 
Lutuk."(1)
A year later Amir Heshmat al-Molk's position as Governor of
Sistan was threatened, not only by his younger brother, Amir
Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II Khozeimeh, Amir of Qaenat who
had lost all powers, but also by Moazez al-Molk who was then
acting as the Governor of Qaenat. Amir Heshmat al-Molk,
therefore, decided in the face of these threats to his
12  ’Iposition, to throw in his lot with the British' ; and thus
protected British lives and property in a disturbance which
took place in Sistan against the British in July 1903. This
undertaking resulted in the Russian Consul for Sistan
undertaking "to get the Amir Hashmat-ul-Mulk dismissed for
his action in protecting British property and
i n t e r e s t ^ ^  The British, finding the dismissal of the
Amir a grave injury to their prestige vis-a-vis the Russians
/ 4 \
in Eastern Iran,v ' instructed their Minister at Tehran, 
Sir A. Hardinge, to conclude with the Iranian Government an 
agreement of status quo in the frontier to the north of 
Holdich line's pillar No.11, in return for Amir Heshmat 
al-Molk remaining in his position as Governor of Sistan. The
(1) Clause 4 of despatch No. 331, from Major R.A.E. Benn, H.B. Majesty’s Vice-Consul for Sistan
and Kain, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, dated Sistan 23rd 
February 1902, FO 60/712t p. 2.
(2) Notes by Major Benn, dated 21st May 1903.
(3) H. Dobbs, Consul for Sistan, to the Indian Government, 7th July 1903.
(4) Ibid.
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agreement, signed on the 13th of March 1905 though
securing the post at Kila Sefid for the British, left
Holdich's blue line delimited on the Talab water course which
left both Old and New Mirjaveh to Iran - (for the text of the
agreement see Appendix V) . The Governments of Britain and
Iran agreed to the survey and delimitation of the section of
the boundary from the neighbourhood of Mirjaveh to Kuh-e
Malek Siah. This undertaking produced no other results but
(2 \mapping the frontiers.v ' In 1938-9, similar agreements 
were reached between the two Governments which proved
fruitless also.
In 1948, British Baluchistan lost its identity with Great 
Britain and was brought under the jurisdiction of the newly 
created state of Pakistan.
On August 13th 1950 the Daily Ettelaat of Tehran reported 
that the Governments of Iran and Pakistan had agreed to
/ 3 \
demarcate the Mirjaveh-Malek Siah Kuh boundary.v } The
British Government supplied the Government of Pakistan with
all documents relevant to this portion of the Irano-Pakistan 
(4)boundary.v 1 In spite of the fact that Pakistan continued 
negotiations with Iran on demarcation of these areas of the 
two countries' frontiers, parts of their common borders still 
remain to be demarcated in full and final settlement.
(1) From Mr. Cook to the Foreign Office, 1st Sept. 1950, FO 371/82332A, No. 4170/1, p. 2.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Extract of “Ittelaat" of 13th August, 1950, FO 371/82332A.
(4) From L. Barnett of Foreign Office to C.E. Diggines of Commonwealth Relations Office, dated
11th August 1950, FO 371/82332A (EP1081/3).
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CONCLUSION
The southern (Baluchistan) section of the eastern Iranian 
boundaries was one of the early examples of modern European 
concept of boundary which happened to be administered in the 
orient. Not only did the British have a clear idea of the 
legal and geographical implications of implementation of 
these modern concepts, but they evidently had a well thought 
out agenda regarding Baluchistan territories and boundaries 
and effectively decided in advance where the boundary line 
should be placed. In fact, General Sir Frederick Goldsmid's 
mission of 1870-71 was not to "arbitrate" border differences 
in Baluchistan, but to implement the detailed plan of border 
limits of Baluchistan as was outlined to him in January 1871 
by the Government of India (see text of the relevant 
communication). By contrast, the Iranians, like all other 
peoples of the orient, were totally ignorant of the modern 
European concepts of boundary and their legal and 
geographical implications. Furthermore, it proved in 
practice that translation of the ancient oriental tradition 
of sovereignty and suzerainty over dependent principalities 
and dependencies into modern European legal forms was 
impossible. The result was whenever the British argued for 
total separation from Iran of these dependencies and 
dependent principalities, the Iranians failed to prove it 
otherwise.
Above all these was the irresponsible manner in which the 
Court of Qajar, particularly the person of Naser ad-Din Shah 
Qajar, approached methods of territorial divisions and 
boundary settlements. Not only did Naser ad-Din Shah present 
the district of Hashtadan to the Afghans out of his "feelings 
of friendship towards the British Government", but his 
Government did not feel responsible enough to follow the 
terms of their own agreement of 1870 with the British on the 
methods and terms of reference of boundary settlement. The 
complaints and notifications of Mirza Masum Khan, their own 
representative commissioner, fell on deaf ears, and instead
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of "surveying border areas" together with the Iranian 
Commissioner and preparing maps of the area "to be discussed 
in Tehran" between competent authorities of the two sides for 
a just and proper settlement, General Goldsmid delineated the 
boundary line in accordance with the instruction he had 
received from India and without the participation of the 
Iranian Commissioner in the process of that task.
Not only did the Government of Naser ad-Din not object to 
these irregularities; not only did they not consult their own 
Commissioner; and not only did they accept Goldsmid's 
one-sided so-called "arbitral opinion", but they also limited 
their "discussions" on the results of the survey of border 
areas, to one meeting between the Foreign Minister of Iran 
and the British Minister at Tehran, accompanied by General 
Goldsmid. His maps and suggestions were accepted immediately 
and without objection. Only when the results were referred 
to Naser ad-Din Shah for final ratification, did the Shah ask 
for the Kuhak district to be included in Iranian territory.
The final result of all these and the subsequent Baluchistan 
arbitrations was so one-sided and the British gained for the 
Khans of Kharan so much of undisputed Iranian territories 
that they decided they had enough additional territories in 
their hands "for future exchange and concessions" to trade 
off with the Iranians for other concessions (see letter of 
20th January 1896 exchanged between British authorities)• 
This trade off deal in fact took place at least on one 
occasion in 1905 whereby the Mirjaveh district was returned 
to Iran in return for a concession from the Iranian 
Government by securing the position of Amir Heshmat al-Molk 
Ali-Akbar Khan Khozeimeh, Amir of Sistan.
This whole practice of boundary delimitation was no more than 
a game of political geography played by the European rules 
and in the British court. It was the first example of 
boundary settlement in eastern Iranian borderlands only to be 
followed by a series of other boundary settlements in
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Baluchistan, Sistan and Khorasan, more or less in the same 
fashion. In other words, Goldsmid's boundary settlement of 
southern Baluchistan left a precedence which became an 
example for the settlement of other boundaries on the eastern 
flanks of Iran.
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Appendix I
Notes of Brigadier-General MacLean1s interview with the
Shah at Brighton.
•k'k'k-kitifk-kjfk-k-k
The first remark the Shah made to me on the evening of 
my arrival at Brighton was "Have you brought the map of 
Hashtadan?" I replied, "Yes."
On Sunday afternoon (28th July) the Shah sent for me.
On being shown into the room His Majesty caused all 
other persons to go out, and carefully examined the map. He 
said that he desired me to speak to him, not as the Shah, but 
as if he were an ordinary individual. He asked me to mark 
distinctly in red the direction of the line of frontier, as 
suggested by the proposals for a compromise. This I did. He 
then asked me to point out the provinces of Herat, Khaf, 
Bakharz, and Jam. When this was done, he suddenly asked me 
to whom Hashtadun belonged. I replied that this was the very 
point under dispute. He then pressed me to give him my own 
opinion on the subject, which he said he would keep quite 
secret. I said that as far as I could judge Persia had lost 
Hashtadun when Ahmad Shah conquered Eastern Khorassan and 
there is nothing to show that she has since regained it.
On the other hand, although the Afghans do not appear to 
have occupied the valley for about 50 or 60 years, they have 
always opposed its attempted occupation by Persia. I pointed 
out that for at least a generation it had been a rendezvous 
of Turkoman raiders, which His Majesty admitted.
He then asked on what principle the basis for a 
compromise rested. I replied that it rested on a division of 
the old water canals (kanats), of which the northern and 
southern (sic ? central) groups would fall to Persia, the 
southern to Afghanistan. The Persians would then be able, if 
so inclined, to apply their share of the water, after 
cleaning out the kanats, to the irrigation of the old 
cultivated lands falling to them, while the Afghans would 
have water for the irrigation of the Kafir Kala and Darband 
lands, below the Darband defile.
The professed wishes of both parties would then be met.
His Majesty examined the line marking the heads of the 
kanats, and putting his finger on Kafir Kala and Darband 
asked to whom they belonged. I replied, "To Afghanistan. " 
His Majesty seemed quite pleased to see that the actual piece 
of land where the Persians commenced digging would, by the 
compromise, fall to Persia.
He then asked where the boundary in that quarter was, 
and I pointed out the Kali Kala, which in answer to further 
inquiries, I said joined the Heri-Rud near Toman Agha.
He then asked to whom the country south of the Hashtadun 
valley belonged, pointing to the direction of Khurhaba. I
( + ) FO 60/538 f pp. 1 - 2 of 158.
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replied that my orders were to confine my inquiries to 
Hashtadun, but that I knew that the Afghans claimed a share 
of the Nimak Sar salt lake, from which both Persians and 
Afghans draw supplies of salt.
His Majesty then called for a German map of Persia and 
Afghanistan, on rather a small scale, and seemed surprised at 
the comparatively small space occupied by Hashtadun.
He then said that the map I had did not show the
relative position of Hashtadun with regard to the
neighbouring Afghan and Persian districts with sufficient
clearness, and that X must provide myself with another map 
which I should show him at Tehran, ten days after his return 
there. He said that I must not go to Mashad before coming to 
Tehran,
He would, he said, like to consult the Nazim-ul-Mulk
(the Persian Agent who met me at Hashtadun) before coming to 
any decision; after that he would do what was right. He said 
that he looked upon the Afghans as nothing, and were it not 
for the feelings of friendship he entertained towards the 
English Government, he would give them nothing. However, he 
desired to please the English Government in the matter.
Prince Malcom Khan was present during the greater part 
of the interview and was desired by the Shah to go at once to 
Sir H.D. Wolff to communicate the decision he had arrived at
[signed] C.S. MacLean, Brigadier-General.
St. Andrews,
1st August 1889.
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Appendix II
Report from British Legation at Tehran to the 
British Foreign Office, 
dated Tehran January 10th 1935 
(FO 371/1940)/ PP- 208 - 209
Sir,
I have the honour to inform you that the vernacular 
press has published an account of an interview given by
General Fahrettin Pasha, head of the Turkish Mission of 
Arbitration in the Perso-Afghan frontier dispute, to the 
Meshed paper "Bahar"
2. General Fahrettin Pasha stated that the Mission had 
visited and studied the frontier along a length of three
hundred kilometres where delimitation had not yet been
carried out, and had determined "convincing limits" which 
would be officially notified to the two parties in the near 
future.
3. The General added that, in determining the frontier 
line, three points had been taken into consideration.
(1) The need of both parties to have access to
the Salt Lake;
(2) The need of Afghan tribes to make use in the
winter of wells situated on the frontier; and
(3) The necessity of securing Persian villages
and agricultural districts against encroachments 
by such Afghan tribes, when they were forced to 
descend from the mountains in search of water.
While the Afghans had no right to the Salt Lake, they enjoyed 
access to it by virtue of an established local custom, which 
the Mission had decided not to disturb in view of the real 
need of the tribes.
4. The General denied that there had been serious 
conflict over the Musabad area (please see my telegram No. 
180). This area, he said, was not capable of being 
cultivated but it was of importance in that on its Northern 
edge, it contained a source of fresh water, used for drinking 
purposes, while on the Southern edge there was a salty spring 
which was used by the Afghans for watering their cattle.
5. The General concluded by denying that there would be 
any modification of the delimitation carried out by General 
MacLean, since this would be a breach of the Perso-Afghan 
Agreement of March 7th last.
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6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign 
Secretary to the Government of India (No. 2) and to His 
Majesty's Minister at Kabul (No. 5 M).
I have the honour to be with the highest respect,
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Appendix III
No. 1 - Complaints made by General Goldsmid of 
Mirza Masum Khan's conduct.
■k-k-k'ie'k-tfk'k-k'k'k'k
No. 61, dated Camp Gwadur, 10th March 1871.
From - MAJOR GENERAL F.J. GOLDSMID, on Special Mission. 
To - CHARLES ALISON, Esq., C.B., Her Majesty's Minister,
Teheran.
LATE last night your Excellency1s cipher telegram reached 
me. Its purport calls for a brief statement on my part, 
though such statement be little more than recapitulation.
1. I had supposed the Commission to which I had been 
appointed one to determine a boundary between Persian 
Beloochistan and Khelat, and had purposed proceeding with the 
other Commissioners engaged from the extreme north of the 
existing frontier to the sea, taking claims and verifying 
status as we went along. The Persian Commissioner, on 
opening discussion at Bampoor, would have nothing to say to 
such enquiry, but urged enquiry into Persian claim upon 
Kedj-Mekran only. I endeavoured to meet his view so far as 
to adjourn our meeting to the Kedj-Mekran Frontier at 
Peshin. This would not, however, suit him when the time for 
moving approached. He withdrew his consent to attend the 
Peshin Conference, either because he could not attend with an 
armed force, or because he objected to admit an existing 
frontier as a basis of procedure. Had I considered myself
merely commissioned to work out a practical result, I should, 
under the circumstances, have proceeded to Jalk and the upper 
frontier as originally intended. But as joint Commissioner I 
had no course open but to seek a convenient station for 
reporting proceedings and awaiting the instructions which 
Mirza Maasum Khan had sought from his own Government; 
accordingly, I removed to Gwadur, the Persian Commissioner
remaining, at least for the moment, at Bampoor. In this case 
I think it will be allowed that I have myself cause for
complaint.
2. The Khelat Commissioners came to Bampoor to meet the 
Persian and British Commissioner. Their followers, though
numerous, presented no unusual number, and were quiet and 
orderly. The presence of the British Political Agent in 
their camp was a guarantee for good behaviour. Yet the 
Persian Commissioner, who had expressed his opinion in 
writing that the arrival of the Khelat deputation need not 
interfere with the even course of our proceedings, made their 
presence and the presence of the British Agent in their camp
(+) FO 60/388, pp. 10 - 11 of 102.
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the ground of complaint. So strong, indeed, were the 
expressions of feelings on this head, that I felt it a duty, 
much to my inconvenience and I fear to the delay of the 
boundary work, to remove the ostensible cause of annoyance. 
Here also the right of complaint rests, I am of opinion, with 
myself.
3. The Persian Commissioner at one of our latest interviews 
assured me spontaneously and with seeming earnestness that he 
had no complaint whatever to make against myself or any 
member of my staff, and that, though he might search for 
cause of complaint in such respect, he could find none. Now 
in the face of these assurances, he appears to have furnished 
material for a series of complaints against me on the part of 
the Persian Government, often as he has said that his spoken 
words were to count for nothing, I could scarcely believe 
that he would carry out this remarkable principle so keenly, 
as he must have done in the present instance.
I have a word to add in conclusion. Though not aware of 
the nature of the complaints noted in the telegrams under 
acknowledgement, nor of the necessity of vindicating my 
character of such a charge as "unfairness," I cannot tax my 
conscience with any deviation from a strictly impartial 
course throughout the present enquiry, and I am convinced 
that a correct apprehension of the state of the case is only 
wanting to save your Excellency much further trouble and 
reference.
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No.2 - Complaints made by Mirza Masum Khan of
General Goldsmid's conduct, as reiterated
in the Memorandum of the
(+ ^Iranian Foreign Minister' }
Translation of a memorandum received from the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, - dated the 8th March 1871
NEWS received from Beloochistan and Kerman.
From Ispahan the British Commissioner, by telegraph and
by Captain Lovett, of the Engineers, sent instructions to the 
British officers, who were at Gwadur and Khelat, that, on the 
approach of the two Commissioners, they should proceed with
guns and troops to Kedj and Mekran, and give out that the
Persian Government have sent a Commissioner in order to make 
over to the Khan of Khelat their territory in Beloochistan.
When the Commissioners left Kerman, the others having 
collected about 300 soldiers and horsemen from Kedj and 
Mekran came towards Kasr-i-kend, Pesheen, and Serbaz, places 
which specially belong to, and are in possession of, Persia. 
It is evident to what degree such injurious proceedings on 
their part, in countries possessed by Persia, must affect the 
minds of the lower classes of (our) subjects, and how 
incompatible they are with the present state of good order.
On the day of the Commissioner's arrival at Bampur, 
Faquir Mahomed Khan, commissioner of the Khan of Khelat, with 
other agents of his, together with Mr. Harrison, Political 
Agent of the British Government, escorted by 300 soldiers and 
horsemen, arrived at Bampur. Now, this style of proceeding 
is contrary to the instructions of the Commissions and to the 
maintenance of the frontiers possessed by Persia. The 
British Commissioner proposed to the Persian one to proceed 
towards Pesheen in Mekran, and there to hold a conference and 
discuss with the Khelat Commissioners the arguments bearing 
upon Persia's territorial rights in that question, though not 
the slightest doubt existed as to Kedj and Mekran being in 
the possession of, and specially belonging to, Persia. If 
the object of the conference is to establish Persia's 
ownership of Mekran, that point is already clearly shown, 
for, in order to establish a person's proprietorship no proof 
could be better than that of possession, and everybody knows 
that Pesheen, and equally so the whole of Mekran and Kedj, 
are territories in the possession of Persia. In every part 
of Mekran there are deputies and agents appointed by the 
Governmens of Kerman and Beloochistan.
(+) FO 60/390 , pp. 2 - 3 of 58.
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A communication on the part of the British Commissioner 
was made to the Persian, that Kedj is in the possession of 
the Khan of Khelat, and that he has a garrison there. The 
fact is, that Sirdar Faquir Mahomed Khan and Mollah Ata 
Mahomed, agents of the Khan of Khelat, have brought 400 or 
500 troops and two guns into the Kedj territory, which 
clearly belongs to Persia; such communications prove, 
therefore, that the aforesaid (British) Commissioner is 
protecting and upholding the Khan of Khelat, which is 
altogether inconsistent with the British Government's 
principle of arbitration.
He, Moreover, told the Persian Commission that, if he 
would not discuss with the Khan of Khelat at Pesheen in his 
presence, he would telegraph to His Excellency the (British) 
Minister. How could I enter into a discussion respecting a 
district which clearly belongs to Persia? What sort of a 
proposal is this that he makes to the Persian Commissioner? 
The Commissioners ought, in pursuance of the arrangement made 
by the Foreign Office and the Mission, to define upon a map 
the frontiers which lie between the Beloochistan territory 
held by Persia and that in the possession of Khelat, and to 
take that map to Teheran, so that the matter may be settled 
with the knowledge of the Foreign Office and the Mission. 
The Persian Commissioner has all along fully co-operated with 
the British Commissioner.
The British Commissioner says that General Ibrahim Khan 
should not accompany (the Commissioner). The Khelat agents 
came to Bumpur with horsemen and soldiers and four or five 
Generals. The Persian Commissioner is unable to dispense 
with Ibrahim Khan, who is acquainted with the country, and 
proceed with his own inexperienced attendants to the end of 
Kedj to inspect and define the frontiers. both Ibrahim Khan 
and the Governor of Kerman have shown the greatest kindness 
and respect towards the British Commissioner. Under these 
circumstances, the said Commissioner's present attitude can 
only show a wish to protect the Khan of Khelat.
The British Government, merely out of friendship and a 
spirit of justice, have sent a Special Commissioner to 
arbitrate. But they could never have wished that he should 
collect around him all the British Agents from Bushire, 
Gwadur, and Khelat; that he should invite to so distant a 
place as Bampur is, from Kedj and Mekram, the Chiefs (Khans) 
of Khelat; that he should, by presents and spending money, 
render Persian subjects desirous of submitting themselves to 
the Khan of Khelat, and that they should enter Persian 
territory with such a party.
The British Commissioner has telegraphed to his 
Excellency the (British) Minister the Persian Commissioner's 
refusal to consent to the conference. The British 
Commissioner's object in wishing to convene the conference 
being to investigate the positions of Koohek and Spendar, and 
other places, and those villages being dependent on Dizzek,
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and forming a portion of Persia, such a conference was not 
necessary.
The British Commissioner takes no steps as regards the 
drawing up of a map and the inspection of the proper places. 
He says that an English engineer officer has already 
completed the map of Kedj and Mekran, and that he should go 
with a Persian engineer to make a map from Jaluk and Dizzek 
to the sea shore. Now the Commissioners ought to inspect all 
these places and draw maps thereof. So every proposal made 
than an engineer officer should be sent together with a 
Persian engineer to draw maps of Mekran, Kedj, and other 
places, the British Commissioner replies that he cannot ask 
that a Persian surveyor should enter the Khelat territory, 
but he promises that the English surveyor will bring to me 
the maps of any country that may be required.
In an inspection by the Commissioners and the drawing up 
of maps were not necessary, why should the Persian Government 
have considered it proper to depute a Commissioner and a 
Surveyor? How is it that he (the British Commissioner) 
should have invited the Khelat Agents with such a party to 
come to Persian territory which is not meant for inspection, 
and that the Persian Commissioner and Surveyor should not 
proceed to places which clearly belong to Persia or even to 
the Khan of Khelat.
Translated by______
W J DICKSON
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Appendix IV
Agreement between Iran and Britain on Demarcation of the 
Northern Section of Iran's Boundaries in Baluchistan.^
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Memorandum attached to the map 
supplied to the Commissioners for 
the demarcation of the Perso-Kelat 
• frontier from the neighbourhood of 
Kohuk to Koh Malik Siah.
The point from which the boundary- 
line will start is a point on the 
Mashkil river about a mile and a
quarter north of the junction of
the Mashkil with the small stream 
which takes its rise in the 
Segarkand hill.
Thence the line will be continued 
along the Mashkil river northwards 
to a point about six miles short, 
that is to the west, or south west, 
of the junction of the Bakhshan and 
Mashkil rivers.
From thence it will run
approximately west along the
southern slopes of the Sianeh Koh 
till it joins Sir F. Goldsmid's 
line of demarcation, giving Kohuk, 
Konarbasta and Ispandak to Persia.
(+) Agreement dated 27th December 181895, FO 60/627, pp. 8 - 9
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The line will then run northwards 
to the west of the prominent hill 
overhanging the Bonsar pass.
After passing through the Sianeh 
Koh, the line will be drawn in the 
direction indicated on the sketch 
map, that is, to the East of the 
minor districts of Kallegan and 
Jalk, which, with all the villages 
belonging to them, will be left to 
Persia.
From Jalk the line will be drawn to 
Koh Malik Siah, leaving on the East 
certain groups of date groves,
among which are Ladgasht and Kalag.
Such information as is available 
tends to show that the country
North of Jalk is mainly desert.
The commissioners will effect a 
settlement on this section on the 
basis that Persia should receive
approximately as much territory as 
will be left to the west of a line 
drawn straight from Jalk to Koh
Malik Siah.
(Sd.) December 27 1895 
Sadr I Azam.
H.M. Durand.
U \ y . ,
• »
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Appendix V
Anglo-Iranian agreement on Mirjaveh district of
I + 1Northern Baluchistan.v *
.r~3 v /  ju-'v
AGREEMENT
/ */ /  ^ - ,
/*•</* tj - 4 ^
f - - Between the Governments of H.M. the
King of Great Britain Dominions 
*/ beyond the seas, Defender of the
Faith, Emperor of India; and H.M. 
the Shahinshah of Persia for the 
settlement of certain outstanding 
* ) , '*'*/%• questions on the frontier of Persia
and India.
l- . . r -  * ' - *
H.E. the Mushir ad Dowleh, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of H.M. the 
Shah of Persia and Sir A. Hardinge
> y  ^ K.C.S. H.B.M. Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary at 
* - * "" Tehran, duly authorised thereto by
their respective Governments have 
V  concluded the following agreement.
I. H.B.M. Government withdraw the
*
claim to the ownership of Mirjawar 
p put forward on its behalf in the
^ yy". y m ^ year 1902 when a Persian Custom
ifiJi House was first established at that
place. The Persian Government on 
its side undertakes to permit the 
British outpost at Padaha to 
* " procure using buckets or waterskins
(+) FO 60/728, 5-2030. e. 2, pp. 2 - 3 - 4.
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' Cj c> >/1 s> (7 Us b if j i C/1
*\ m "* a* ** i*
jf|l
0,py,‘i y^U'S’V ^ from the wells or tank situated
for the purpose) the supply of 
water which may be necessary for it
at
or near Mirjawar.
j* •=■ * . V  - » x. / 2. The two Governments agree by
Y-Jh 1 ^ < V  i j ^ 1 <>?/'>■> _ . . ..• • L/ , - . ^ common consent to abandon the
further examination by a special 
commission of their frontier line 
in this region which was proposed 
on behalf of H.R.H. Government in
J / y m Sir A Hardinge' s note to the Mushir
isUSisfsiy ~ ' o d  Dowleh dated 6 April, 1902 and
accepted by H.E. in his note to Sir 
S y A . Hardinge of May 14, 1902. This
jabs} * / — ' f r o n t i e r  shall be definitely
*4 4 * 44 '' " settled in accordance with the
. * agreement of 1896 and no further
&}'/ t-* ' * ‘irii/, ' claim shall be made in respect of
^ t mV  • f ~ 3. With a view to the increase of
friendly relations the Persian 
Government will permit the 
14^  ~ . . inhabitants of the frontier
villages of Mirjawar, Ladis and 
r, ~  ^ Duzdab to sell supplies, should
<■-' , . aA(1, ~ u., . they be willing to do so, (the
7LS • " m , j i 7//
wi fv1-' y W annual amount of seven hundred
- - - * trip • • ♦
Tabriz Kharwars of grain) to the
*
y  " neighbouring British outposts of
. . J A ** ,  the Indian side of the frontier,
and will also allow the 
^  unrestricted export of fifteen
(s vC* hundred Tabriz Kharwars of grain
U j!9y and fifty Tabriz Kharwars of ghee
* - 4 * annually from Siestan for the use
u of the British frontier station of
" y» y  V . * Rabat Killah and other stations
along the Nushki route. All the
446
if ' t y  „
exports of grain and ghee will be
t ~ * liable to the payment of the
4 * - y I . • - * . * *  customs duty levied on those of the
most favoured nation. It is
understood that this provision
'J i J" .  ^ *y applies to nominal years and that
the British Government will not
demand the specified export of 
grain from one of the localities
f / t f u X s J I  mentioned when such locality can be 
 ^ " clearly shown to be suffering from
- , " - * , ♦/ actual famine owing to destruction
of its crops by locusts, blight, or 
other exceptional visitation.
^  /*V * 'J * • -
1 I Done at Tehran on the 13th day of 
" * May in the year 1905
i* y- * j  *m * t/ /
Seal (sdO  Arthur Hardinge
k ~ ^ £m ^  ^ ^   ^ ^  * ) m /
tg i i j f  M i S f f J v j j i  &If /
V
7
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C H A P T E R  V I
EVOLUTION OF SISTAN BOUNDARY - PART I 
THE GOLDSMID ARBITRATION
INTRODUCTION - A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The province now known as Sistan had throughout the history 
been named variably: Sakestan, Nimrouz, Zabolestan, Zarang,
etc., and it formed the 14th Satrapy of the Achaemenian 
Empire (559 - 330 BC), and formed part of the Kust of East 
under the Sassanid Empire (AD 224-651). In the post-Islamic 
era, Sistan became a major centre of struggle for the revival 
of Iranianism (see introductory chapter on the Evolution of 
State and Boundary in Iran). Many movements began from 
Sistan and engulfed the entire Iranian Plateau. The 
Saffarids of Sistan were the first dynasty to throw off the 
yoke of Abbasid Caliphate. The subsequent dynasties have 
always made a point of including Khorasan and Sistan within 
the countries of Iran. Throughout the Safavid Empire (1501 - 
1730) Sistan formed the Eastern province of Iran and Nader 
Shah Afshar (17 30 - 1747) included Sistan in his Empire
almost at the outset of his career after a negligible period 
of approximately eight years after the Afghan uprising.
Following Afshar Shah's assassination in 1747, Iran fell into 
chaos and Ahmad Khan Durrani (Abdali), who founded the 
Saduzaei Kingdom of Afghanistan, used the opportunity of Iran 
being leaderless and occupied the greater part of this 
province after defeating Amir Alam Khan I, the Khozeimeh Amir 
of Qaenat who had in 1747 included the whole of Sistan, 
Khorasan and Baluchistan in his dominion (see chapter II on 
Khozeimeh Amirs). From the year 1749, eastern parts of 
Sistan remained under the occupation of Ahmad Shah of 
Afghanistan until his death in 1772, a mere 23 years in all.
The Kingdom of Saduzaei in Afghanistan, created by the force 
of arm, fell into chaos in the wake of Ahmad Shah’s death 
while chaos in Iran was still prevailing as a result of the
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continued armed struggle of Agha-Mohammad Khan Qajar against 
Lotf-Ali Khan Zand and a number of other rebellious chiefs 
around the country who began a life of independence as there 
was no apparent leader in Iran to whom the customary 
proceedings of allegiance could be practised. Sistan was 
ruled, in this period, by the Baluchi chiefs and by Bahram 
Khan of the Keyani family, descendants of the legendary 
ancient Iranian dynasty of Keyanian. They accepted in a 
chaotic manner, the nominal suzeranity of Ahmad Shah 
Durrani's successor, Teimur, who used force against them. 
There was no one in Iran to protect them.
It was under Fath-Ali Shah, nephew and successor of
Agha-Mohammad Khan Qajar, that the whole of Sistan,
Baluchistan and Khorasan was recovered between 1810 and
1840. Since then, Iranian Governments never allowed an
interval to elapse without reasserting Iran's sovereignty
over Sistan. By the time of the Anglo-Iranian war which was
concluded by the treaty of Paris, March 1857, both Herat and
Qandehar laid claims on sections of Sistan. Sardar Ali Khan
Sarandi of Sekuheh, the hereditary chief of Sistan, who had
(1)in 1853 officially declared allegiance to Iran, ’ felt 
threatened by the claims from Herat and Qandehar and
personally went to Tehran where he was officially appointed 
the Governor of the province and married a cousin of Naser 
ad-Din Shah. This move, once again, stimulated the well 
known British Indian Officers' strategic apprehension that 
Iran or the feeble Government of Qajar would, in conjunction 
with Russia, pose a threat to the security of a powerful 
British Indian Empire if Sistan was to remain as a province 
of Iran. Colonel Taylor, British Commissioner in Herat, 
claimed in a letter to Lord Canning: "Should Persia be
permitted to continue the exercise of her influence in 
Sistan, she may have it in her power to propagate falsehood 
to the prejudice of India and, being so near the frontier of 
the latter, they could be freely circulated. On the other 
hand, if Sistan were the instrument of a friendly power, she
(1) “Persian Frontiers", a Document prepared for the British Indian Government, No. RRX/7/i, FO 
371/40219, p. 10.
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might when occasion required, be made to inflict very serious 
injury to the commerce of Persia by disturbing her 
south-eastern frontier and plundering all her c a r a v a n s ^ ^
It was rumoured at the time that Ali Khan Sarbandi was to 
return to Sistan with two regiments of regular infantry and a 
few field guns, together with able men from Sistan.
Before even the Afghan chiefs heard of this rumour, the
British Minister at Tehran, James Murrey, addressed the
Iranian Prime Minister on the 5th of May 1858, saying that he
hoped the rumour of that intention was incorrect "as the
occupation of Sistan", he added, "which is part of
Afghanistan, by Persian troops would be a direct violation of
i 2)the treaty of Paris".' ' The Iranian Prime Minister 
replied on the 13th May 1858:
"The Persian ministers have always considered, 
and do now consider, that Seistan, ah antiqua, has 
formed an integral part of the Persian territory, and 
it is at the present time in the possession of the 
Persian Government, on whose part it is therefore not 
necessary that troops or soldiers should be sent, or a 
new occupation of the place effected."(3)
This statement naturally did not satisfy British
authorities of India who wished to strengthen the western 
flanks of their buffer state of Afghanistan: and James Murrey 
replied to the Iranian Prime Minister on the 15th of May 1858 
by writing a letter to him which began with the following 
claims on behalf of the Afghan chiefs:
(1) From Colonel Taylor to Lord Conning, dated 2nd February 1858, repeated in H.L.Wynne's
account of History of Sistan and Lash-Jowain, FQ 60/ 386, p. 18.
(2) H.L, Wynne's Account of the History of Sistan and Lash-Jowain, op. cit., p. 20.
(3) H. Leopoer Wynne's account of the History of Sistan and Lash-Jowain, prepared for the
British Indian Government, dated July 6, 1870, FO 60/386 / p. 20.
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"The British Government cannot admit the
correctness of this view, which is indeed
contradicted, not only by the political history of
Seistan, but also by its geographical position, which 
is represented in every existing map, possessing any 
claim to authority, as forming part of
Afghanistan," (1)
James Murrey's letter was concluded by the following threat 
on behalf of the British Government:
"....it is my duty to inform your Highness that, 
if the Persian Government were to send troops into 
Seistan, a Province which is much nearer to Candahar, 
the centre of Afghanistan, and to the British 
Frontier, than Herat itself, Her Majesty's Government 
would consider such a step as being a direct violation 
of the treaty of Paris." t^ )
Sardar Ali Khan, however, returned to Sistan with an escort
of 300 cavalry men and two field guns, and was murdered in
October 1858 by his own nephew, Taj Mohammad Khan, an
ex-chief in the province of Sistan. Taj Mohammad Khan, too,
declared his allegiance to the Government of Iran after a
while, and declared himself as being an Iranian 
I 3}subject.v } Before Taj Mohammad Khan's declaration of 
allegiance to Iran, the Iranian Government decided to send 
military forces to Sistan to punish those involved in the 
murder of Sardar Ali Khan. In a letter of reply to a letter 
from Mr Doria, the new British Minister at Tehran, who asked 
what was the purpose of the Iranian Government in wanting to 
send troops to Sistan, the Iranian Sadr-e Azam (Prime 
Minister) stated that the Shah intended to issue orders to 
the Governors of Qaen and Kerman to hold in readiness a 
number of troops to march on Sistan for the punishment of Taj 
Mohammad Khan and all concerned in the assassination of 
Sardar Ali Khan, in the event of the people of Sistan
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid., p.21
(3) “Persian Frontiers", op. cit., p. 10.
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refusing to deliver over to the Persian Government the 
perpetrator of the murder
The Sadr-e Azam was once again reminded that the British 
Government considered Sistan as belonging to Afghanistan, a 
country which was not in existence at the time. In spite of 
British India's insistence that Sistan was a part of 
Afghanistan, Taj Mohammad Khan declared his own and his 
governorate of Sistan's allegiance to Iran. In a letter to 
the Indian Government, Mr Doria, British Minister at Tehran 
wrote on 30th March 1859:
"two persons were introduced by the deputy master 
of ceremonies bearing a tray, upon which were some 
gold coins. A long letter was then read aloud, 
pretended to have been written by the ruler of 
Seistan, making protestations of fidelity and 
obedience as subjects to the king. The coins on the 
tray were Shahee Ashrefees struck in His Majesty's 
name in Seistan."(2)
Having been convinced of the Iranian Government's 
determination with regard to the prosecution of their ancient 
rights to the sovereignty of Sistan, the British Indians 
found it wise to acknowledge these rights. In his brief 
"history of Sistan and Lash-Jowain", prepared for the British 
Foreign Office in 1870, H L Wynne Asserts:
"When* the papers were communicated to the India 
Office, Mr Eastwick$ drew up a precis showing that 
Persia was not so undoubtedly in the wrong, as had 
been hitherto held, in the assertion of her claim on 
Seistan.
"Lord Stanley endorsed his memorandum with the 
following remarks:-
"The general conclusions from the facts noted on 
the preceding memorandum appear to be that Seistan has 
been for ages, and from a period even antecedent to 
the dawn of history down to the death of Nadir Shah in 
1747, an integral portion of the Persian Empire.
(1) "History of Sistan and Lash-Jowain", op, cit., p. 22.
(2) "History of Sistan and Lash Jowain", op cit,, p. 23
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"Jt further appears that Seistan can be in no 
sense included in Afghanistan, being inhabited by 
different people, who are, for the most part, Sheahs 
like the Persians, and not Sunnis like the Afghans, 
who speak a different language from the Afghans, and 
who have never yielded more than a nominal obedience 
to the Afghan rulers, except to Ahmed Shah, and that 
only for a period so short as would not invalidate the 
claim of sovereignty on the part of Persia, - a claim 
based on the two titles recognised by international 
law, viz,, first occupancy and uninterrupted 
possession."(*)
* Mr Thomson's account in Mr Alison's letter to 
Government of India, 27th December 1867.
# See Mr Eastwick to Mr Alison, 18th December 1862.
EVENTS LEADING TO THE PARTITIONING OF SISTAN 
AND BOUNDARY ARBITRATION
Dust Mohammad Khan, Amir of Kabul, marched in July 1861 a 
sizeable army on the semi-independent principality of 
Quandehar, which was traditionally but vaguely a dependency 
of Iran save for the duration of Afghanistan's consolidated 
monarchy of Ahmad Shah (1749-1772). This development 
disturbed the Iranians who were convinced that Dust Mohammad 
Khan's plan was to take Farah, Herat and eventually Sistan. 
Farah was also captured shortly after. In a letter to the 
Government of Great Britain, the British Minister at Tehran 
wrote that the Court of Qajar was disturbed by news that 
Mohammad Sharif Khan, son of Dust Mohammad and Governor of 
Farah, was, under the pretext of punishing certain Baluchis 
who had plundered Qandehari territory, contemplating an 
attack on Sistan and that the British Government cannot, in 
justice, expect Iran to submit quietly to the invasion of 
Sistan.^  ^
(1) Ibid, p.22
(2) From Hr. Alison, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran to Lord CLarendon, dated May 
20th 1861, repeated in Wynne's report on Sistan, FO 6D/ 386, p. 25 of 227.
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British Government must have been aware of Dust Mohammad 
Khan and his son's plan for Sistan. Kabul Diary of the
British Legation, of 28th April 1861, indicates that Sharif 
Khan was contemplating this step. A servant of Taj Mohammad 
Khan of Sistan brought the news to Mashhad, and said that 
Sharif Khan had first of all taken Rudbar which belonged to 
the Baluch, and had then advanced on Jahan Abad, in Sistan, 
capturing it also. The Governor General of Khorasan wrote to 
the Governors of Sistan telling them to be firm in 
maintaining their position until news came from Tehran.
Having the experience of Herat in the back of their minds, 
Iranian authorities appeared to have resolved to go about 
solving the problem of Sistan in accordance with treaties and 
documents exchanged between Iran and Britain and in 
accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty of 1857, in 
order to avoid any situation that could lead to the British 
declaring war on Iran in support of the Afghans, as happened 
in the case of Herat.
Notwithstanding repeated appeals by the Iranian authorities, 
including the Shah himself, to the British to use their 
influence with Dust Mohammad Khan and his lot, in accordance 
with article 6 of Paris treaty of 1857, and prevent them from
invading Iranian territories, the British preferred to remain
inactive in the dispute.
The last paragraph of article 6 of Paris treaty of peace of 
1857 that the Iranians were referring to in their plea to the 
British asserts:
"The British Government, on their part, engage at 
all times to exert their influence with the States of 
Afghanistan, to prevent any cause of uxobrage being
given by them, or by any of them, to the Persian 
Government, when appealed to by the Persian
Government, in the event of difficulties arising, will
<1) Confidential Diary of Kabul, repeated in the "History of Sistan and Lash Jowein", dated 28th 
April 1861, F060/386 , p. 25 of 227.
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use their best endeavours to compose such differences 
in a manner just and honourable to Persia."(1)
Meanwhile, Dust Mohammad Khan captured Farah as well as
Qandehar and put Herat under siege in July 1862. With the
capture of Qandehar and Farah, Dust Mohammad Khan effectively
captured important places in Sistan, such as Chokhansur,
Qaleh Fath and Qaleh Nad-e Ali, which had in the previous
times been taken by the autonomous principality of Qandehar
whose rulers, Kohandel Khan and his sons had declared their
(2 )dependency on Iran.v ' As Dust Mohammad Khan's son
captured Jahan Abad in the Hirmand Delta, the province of
Sistan became partitioned in effect. The British Government,
however, after some enquiries made by way of correspondence
with Dust Mohammad Khan, concluded that the Barakzaei Amir of
Kabul had no intention of crossing to the Iranian frontier
(3)and to carry his war into the Iranian dominion. v * This
statement of view was made at the time when Dust Mohammad
Khan's son had occupied Jahan Abad an undisputed Iranian town
in Sistan. To justify this conclusion, the British Indians
decided to change their stance by denying once again that
Sistan belonged to Iran. This changed attitude would make it
possible for the British not to consider Dust Mohammad Khan's
encroachment in Sistan as "crossing Iranian frontiers and
(4)taking his war into Iran". v 1 The new British policy was 
spelled out to the Iranian envoy to the Ottoman court by the 
British Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell:
"With the above despatch was sent a copy of Lord 
Russell's despatch to Mr Alison, dated 25th September 
1862, giving an account of His Lordship's inteinriew
(1) Extract of article 6 of treaty of peace between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, Paris, March 4, 1857, FO 
60/403 t pp. 8 - 9 .
(2) See chapter IV on the Partitioning of Khorasan and the Question of Herat.
(3) From India to the Foreign Office, dated 11th August 1862, repeated in the History of Sistan
and Lash Jowain, op. cit., pp. 36 - 7.
(4) From India Office to the Foreign Office., op. cit., p. 37.
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with the Persian envoy to the Porte. The envoy 
contended that, under the treaty of 1857, Great 
Britain was bound to remove all causes of outrage and 
dispute between Persia and Afghanistan. No, said Lord 
Russell, not to remove them, but to endeavour to 
compose such differences, and Mr Alison had already 
been requested to use his good offices for this 
purpose.
The envoy then said that -
"if we did not choose to interdict to Dost 
Mahommed Khan the siege of Herat, the Persian 
Government hoped we would allow them to use their own 
forces to prevent the capture of Herat.
"Lord Russell replied, it would not be just to 
say the ruler of Herat may attack Dost Mahommed as 
much as he pleases, but Dost Mahommed shall not be at 
liberty to attack Herat in his turn. If Dost Mahommed 
should get possession of Herat and assume an attitude 
threatening to Persia, then certainly Persia, subject 
to the provisions of the treaty, might take up arms to 
defend herself against aggression on the part of Dost 
Mahommed."(!)
By July 1863, less than a month after Dust Mohammad Khan's
death, his son and successor, Shir Ali Khan, despatched his
younger brother, Mohammad Amin Khan, at the head of an Afghan
force against Sistan. The Iranian Foreign Minister for 27
12)years, Mirza Saeed Khan,v ' met Mr Thomson, Her Britannic 
Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and informed him that: the 
expedition had been ordered by Dost Mahommed Khan, but that 
it had been subsequently relinquished in consequence of that 
Chief's death. Mirza Saeed Khan added, that the Afghans were 
certain, sooner or later, to renew this project and to 
attempt the occupation of Sistan; but that the Iranian 
Government considered that country to belong to the Iranian 
dominions, of which it formed an integral part, and that they 
would not hesitate for a moment, should Afghan troops enter 
Sistan, but would at once despatch a force to resist any such
(1) H,L. Wynne, History of Sistan and Lash-Jot/ain, op. cit., pp. 37 - 8.
(2) Mirza Saeed Khan's granddaughter, Mrs. Saeed-Ansari (Fotuhi-Mozafarian) informed this author
in February 1992 that her grandfather's duration of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lasted for 27
years.
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aggressive movement. In answer to my remark that the 
sovereignty of Iran over Sistan had never been recognised by 
the British Government, Mirza Saeed Khan stated that this was 
because there being no mention of Sistan in the treaty with
England. Iran would not forego her claims in the matter, but
would maintain her right to that province even should 
hostilities with the Afghans ensue.
The Iranian Government subsequently pleaded with the British 
Government that: since the occupation of Chokhansur, Qaleh
Fath, Nad-e Ali and Jahan Abad had practically partitioned 
Sistan and as there was no reason to believe that the 
Afghans' push into Sistan would not go further, if the 
British did not act to stop them, should, at least, 
acknowledge Iran's rights of self-defence in accordance with 
the provisions of article 7 of the Anglo-Iranian treaty of 
1857.
Article 7 of Paris treaty of 1857 which the Iranians were 
referring to in their plea with the British Government
asserted:
"Jn case of any violation of the Persian frontier 
by any of the states referred to above (Kabul, Herat 
and Qandehar) the Persian Government shall have the 
right, if due satisfaction is not given, to undertake 
military operation for the repression and punishment 
of the aggressors; but it is distinctly understood and 
agreed to, that any military force of the Shah which 
may cross the frontier for the above mentioned
purpose, shall retire within its own territory as soon 
as its object is accomplished, and that the exercise 
of the above mentioned right is not to be made a 
pretext for the permanent occupation by Persia, or for 
the annexation to the Persian dominions of any town or 
portion of the said states."(2)
(1) From Hr Thomson to the Government of India, dated 8th July 1863, repeated in Wynne's History 
of Sistan, op. cit., p. 33 of 231.
(2) Article 7 of the Treaty of Peace between Iran and Britain (1857), op. cit., pp. 8 - 9 .  For 
the fuLL text of this treaty see Appendix III of chapter IV on the partitioning of Khorasan.
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The above provisions of the said treaty made it absolutely 
clear that Iran had the right of self-defence in the face of 
Afghan aggression in Sistan and was determined to repel the 
aggression, and that the military operation of the Iranian 
authorities in these areas of Sistan occupied by the Afghans 
would not amount to crossing any frontier into any other 
country's territory in pursuit of the aggressors in order to 
inflict punishment on them and then withdraw from that 
country's territory. Iran's frequent representations to the 
British Government eventually resulted in the British Foreign 
Secretary, Lord John Russell, writing on the 5th of November 
1863 the important despatch giving Iran permission to assert 
her rights in Sistan by force of arms. Lord Russell's 
despatch to the Iranian Foreign Minister stated:
"J have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of 
your letter on the 20th ultimo, in which you call the 
attention of Her Majesty's Government to the 
apprehended invasion of the territory of Seistan by 
the Afghans, and requesting that an assurance might be 
given to you that Her Majesty' s Government would not 
permit any such invasion of Persian territory.
"I have the honour to acquaint your excellency, 
in reply, that Her Majesty's Government, being 
informed that the title to the territory of Seistan is 
disputed between Persia and Afghanistan, must decline 
to interfere in the matter, and must leave it to both 
parties to make good their possession by force of 
arms."(1)
Though this despatch was in keeping with article 7 th of 
1857 Anglo-Iranian treaty of peace, the Iranians did not take 
it as a reason for immediate action. The Iranian Foreign 
Minister in fact informed Mr Eastwick of the British Legation 
at Tehran that "the Iranian Government had decided upon 
sending Mohammad Kord-Bacheh to Sistan, where he had formally 
been employed, but that the Iranian troops would not enter 
that province unless an aggressive movement were directed
<1) Despatch from Lord RusselL to Mirza Saeed Khan, dated London 5th of November 1863, repeated 
in Wynne's History of Sistan, op. cit., p. 39.
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/1 \
against it by the Afghans".'1 ; This aggressive movement
materialised in October 1865, but in a different form. Ahmad
Khan, Governor of Lash-Jowein of Sis tan, who had been for
years a self-declared subject of Iran and in receipt of
salary from the Government of Iran, was persuaded by the Amir
of Afghanistan, Shir Ali Khan, to join him. Ahmad Khan
married the daughter of Shir Ali and arranged submission to
him not only of himself but also of the dominion under his
governorship. Similar intrigue resulted in Ibrahim Khan,
another chief of Sistan acting similarly and to taking his
(2 )quarter of Sistan over to Shir Ali Khan.^ '
The loss of a vast portion of Sistan in this manner forced
the Iranian Government to resort to military operations in
order to enforce the above-named chiefs' dismissal to recover
the territories transferred by them to the Afghans. This
military operation, the Iranians argued, was in accordance
with article 7 of the Anglo-Iranian peace treaty of 1857 and
was permitted by the British Government in the form of the
British Foreign Secretary's despatch of 5th November 1863 to
the Iranian Foreign Minister. Amir Alam Khan III, the
Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat, was empowered by the Iranian
authorities to advance on Sistan at the head of a cavalry and
infantry regiment with two guns, where he was joined by four
(3}more regiments and four guns from Sistan. v ' Amir Alam 
Khan was put in charge of all forces in Sistan in June 1866 
and was given the governorship of Sistan in addition to his 
own hereditary governorship of Qaenat. Amir Alam Khan's 
first task was to deal with Ahmad Khan the Governor of 
Lash-Jowein, who had sold himself out and the dominion 
entrusted on him to the Amir of Afghanistan. Ahmad Khan and 
others of lesser note were arrested and deported to
(1) Extract of Letter from Mr. Eastwick to the Indian Government, dated Tehran 28th January
1864, repeated in Wynne's History of Sistan, op. cit., p. 41.
(2) From Mashhad Agent to the British Legation at Tehran, dated 28th of October 1865, repeated
in Wynne's History of Sistan, op. cit., p. 43.
(3) From Mr. Alison to Lord CLarendon, dated 10th January 1866, repeated in Wynne’s History of
Sistan, op. cit., p. 43.
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(1)Tehranv } where he remained for some years before his 
return to Sistan. Amir Alam Khan had also attacked Ibrahim 
Khan, another chief of Sistan who had also sold out to the 
Afghans. The Amir of Qaenat and Sistan recovered Jahan Abad, 
Jalal Abad and Fort Nad-e Ali:
"The news from Seistan was that the Ameer of Kain 
had attacked Ibrahim Khan,
"who had been forced to evacuate the forts which 
he had on the left bank of the Helmund River, and had 
retired with his people to the right bank. The 
Persians had likewise crossed the Helmund, and had 
captured the fort of Nad Ali, and they now intended to
attack Sheikhnassoor and other strongholds in Ibrahim
Khan's poss e s s i o n (2)
Ibrahim Khan appealed to the Afghan authorities for
assistance, but his application was turned down. Amir Alam 
Khan put some of his men in charge of Fort Nad-e Ali and 
returned to his headquarter at Nasrat Abad (now Zabol) on the 
western side of the Hirmand River. He received from Nasr 
ad-Din Shah the titles "Heshmat al-Molk" and "Amir Tuman" 
which signified the Shah's pleasure with his success in 
repelling the aggression against Sistan.
Frustrated by the Afghan Chief's lack of enthusiasm to defend 
him, Ibrahim Khan turned to the British for assistance. 
Colonel Phayre, Political Superintendent of Upper Sind, 
reported on the 14th January 1869 to the Government of India 
a strange assessment of the situation in Sistan, aimed at
provoking the old strategic sensitivities of British Indian 
Officers:
"in a strategical sense, and with reference to 
the well known ambition of Persia towards Afghanistan, 
her occupation of Hosseinabad is a flank movement of 
incalculable importance.
(1) From Sir H. Green to the Government of India, dated 13th November 1867 repeated in Wynne's 
History of Sistan, op. cit., p. 46.
(2) Clause 117 of H.L. Wynne's History of Sistan and Lash-Jowain, prepared for the Government of
India, dated July 6, 1870, FO 60.386, p. 46.
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"By it she completely turns Herat, Furrah, and 
Lash-Jowain, neutralizes them, in short, without 
endangering her rear communications.
"Politically speaking, she lays the axe at the 
root of Afghan neutrality and independence, because in 
Seistan she holds a more dominating position than her 
possession of Herat and Furrah would have afforded her.
"The occupation of Kheirabad, about 40 or 50 
miles higher up the Helmund, during the present year, 
will greatly consolidate these well-laid and 
ably-executed plans; and there can be no doubt that 
such will take place, unless some powerful preventive 
be immediately interposed."(1)
GQLDSMID1S ARBITRATION OF THE SISTAN BOUNDARY
The Amir of Afghanistan, Shir Ali Khan, formally asked the
British in 1870 to intervene, on behalf of his Government, in 
(2 1Sistan.v ' The Government of British India contacted the
Iranian Government, offering arbitration between the two
countries in accordance with article 6 of the Paris treaty of 
I 3)1857. v 1 The Iranian Government's agreement to the 
proposal of the British Indian Government was set in the form 
of the following conditions:
"The Persian Government agrees that a Commissioner 
should come to Teheran on part of the British 
Government and proceed from there (to Seistan) in 
company of a Persian Commissioner. They are to inspect 
Persia's possessions in Seistan at the present day, and 
to bring a map of the same conjointly to Teheran, 
which, after having been laid before the Shah, will be 
communicated to the British Government. The British 
Government will then in friendship, and according to 
the first basis entered upon between this department
(1) Political Proceedings for March 1869, No. 196, repeated in Wynne's History of Sistan, op. 
cit., p. 49.
(2) From Colonel F.R. Pollock to the Secretary to the Indian Government, dated Peshawar 17th
June 1870, F0 60/386, p. 206.
(3) From Secretary to the Government of India to Secretary to the Government of Punjab, dated 
Simla 8th September 1870, No. 1613, FO 60/386; p.382.
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and the British Legation, in conformity with Earl 
Russell's letter and the memorandums sent to the 
Legation, amongst which is the one dated the 19th 
April, define the boundaries of the possessions of 
Persia in Seistan, and also of that portion which the 
Persian Government had not yet endeavoured to obtain 
possession of according to its natural sense of
justice; so that, through the good offices of England, 
peace and tranquility may be preserved in future in
our frontier and that of other parties,"(1)
These conditions were received and acknowledged by the
(2 \British Indian authorities.' } The arbitration Commission,
led by Major General (later Sir) Frederick Goldsmid, was
formed 9th August 187 0 on the instruction of the British
(3 \principal Secretary of State for India.' ' Goldsmid was 
joined by Mirza Masum Khan Ansari as the Iranian
Commissioner, and Seyed Nour-Mohammad-Shah Khan Foshenji as 
the Afghan Commissioner.
The Amir of Afghanistan subsequently requested a delay of
approximately one year for the boundary arbitration work to
start in Sistan owing to the disturbances occurring in his
dominion. The arbitration Commission, as stated in the
previous chapter, proceeded with the delimitation of the
Baluchistan boundary between Iran and Britain in the Makran
and Kalat districts. This task was completed in September
1871, and General Goldsmid was re-assigned in May 1871,
before finalising his Baluchistan delimitation of boundary
assignment, to lead the Sistan boundary arbitration 
(4)commission.' ' From the Iranian side, Mirza Masum Khan 
Ansari was also re-assigned as the Iranian Commissioner.
(1) Extract of Mirza Saeed Khan's Memorandum of 24th JuLy 1870, enclosure in Mr ALison's despatch
to the EarL of GranviLLe, No. 38, dated 25th JuLy 1870, F0 60/386, p. 431
(2) TeLegram No. 1963p. from the Viceroy to ALison, dated SimLa the 16th September 1871, F0 60/390,
p. 188, enclosure No. 24.
(3) Goldsmid, F.J. "Eastern Persia", Vol. I, London 1876, p. xiv.
(4) From Indian Government to Goldsmid dated 16th May 1871 No. 905P, F0 60/388, p. 2.
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Mirza Masum Khan and General Goldsmid were re-appointed to 
this task in spite of great difficulties in their 
relationship, developed during the Baluchistan boundary 
delimitation which prevented co-operation between them.
Before any problem occurred between the two commissioners in 
their new assignment, a difficulty emerged resulting from the 
advance of an Afghan force towards Iranian territory in 
Sistan. The British Minister at Tehran, being informed of 
the matter, wrote to the Viceroy of India asking him to 
induce the Afghan ruler to abstain from hostilities.^^ To 
this, the Viceroy replied:
"your telegram of 12th. We have already advised 
Ameer to abstain from hostilities. He has expressed 
intention only to defend his frontier, and has invited 
British arbitration. Only obstacle to solving 
question peacefully is disinclination shown by Persia 
to accept our arbitration on basis which Home 
Government have already approved. If Shah agree to 
proposals made, we will communicate with Ameer at 
once." (2)
The reason for the Iranian Government's reluctance was that 
the British had proposed a few conditions in order to 
increase General Goldsmid's authority in deciding where to go 
in Sistan, what to do, whom to see, and when to return. 
These conditions were eventually accepted by the Shah in 
October 1871 and the British Minister at Tehran communicated 
the acceptance of the arbitration by the Iranians and their 
proposals to the Government of India:
"Recommandee - After a lengthened discussion the 
King has accepted our arbitration in the following 
terms: When the British, Persian, and Afghan
Commissioners are all assembled together in Seistan, 
the Persian and the Afghan Commissioners respectively 
will state and substantiate their claims. If local 
enquiry be necessary, the Commissioners will proceed 
to any point for that purpose, and make a map of any 
districts without let or hindrance. When the British
(1) Telegram from Hr. Alison to the Viceroy of India, dated 12th October 1871, FO 60/390,
enclosure No. 30.
(2) From the Viceroy to Mr ALison, dated SimLa the 15th October 1871, No. 2217P, enclosure 31,
FO 60/390/ p. 6.
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Commissioner considers that there is nothing further 
to he done on the spot, the Commissioners will then 
return to Teheran, where the question will be fully 
discussed with a view to its settlement,. and the 
British Commissioner will also state his arbitral 
opinion.u(l)
By the acceptance of these conditions on the part of Iran and 
British India, General Goldsmid's delegation, became an 
Arbitral Commission with full legal status.
The British Indian authorities, meanwhile, pacified the Amir 
of Afghanistan in his military threat against Sistan and 
assigned Colonel F R Pollock to supervise the Afghan 
Commissioner during the arbitration proceedings. This 
appointment was questioned by the Iranians as will be 
discussed.
Before setting out for Sistan, General Goldsmid was furnished 
by masses of literatures on relevant correspondence and on 
the historical accounts of Sistan disputes ■, including the 
hitherto quoted "History of Sistan and Lash Jowain" prepared 
for the British Indian Government in 75 pages on July 6, 
1870, by Mr H.L. Wynne, the Under Secretary to the Government 
of India. All this literature bluntly favoured Afghanistan's 
claims on Sistan. The above-mentioned document, for 
instance, began with a quotation from Mr Watson's Memorandum 
of the boundaries of Iran, to Mr Alison, dated 15th December 
1864. The extract reads:
"In the time of the Sefaveean Kings, the Province
of Seistan, as well as the whole of Afghanistan,
formed part of the Persian dominions. But Seistan was 
added to the new kingdom of Afghanistan in the year 
1749 by Ahmed Shah, the founder of the Sudozye
dynasty, and therefore it can no more be argued that 
the Province forms an integral portion of Persia than 
that the whole of Afghanistan forms an integral
portion of Persia.
(1) From Hr. ALison to the Viceroy of India, dated Tehran 23rd October 1871, FO 60/390, 
enclosure 35, p.7.
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"Sixty years is the period laid down as that 
after which any dormant claim for territory may not be 
legally revived; and therefore, even supposing that 
the Shahs of the Kajar dynasty had the right to claim 
all the possessions of the Sefaveeans, they have at 
this date, according to the above-mentioned principle, 
forfeited that right in the case of Seistan."(1)
Similar one sided accounts of the history of Sistan continues 
throughout the 75 pages of this document. Of the kind of 
diplomatic correspondence supplied to General Goldsmid, the 
following text is sufficient enough an example of the 
literature that helped the British arbitrator to make up his 
mind even before entering Sistan:
"In a strategic point of view the advance of
Persia along the fertile valley of the Helmund, is a 
far more formidable menace to Afghanistan than her 
advance upon Herat, which the British Government has 
spent so much blood and money to counteract, and which 
was finally checked by the Treaty of Paris of March 
1857. If hostilities between Persia and Afghanistan
were to be permitted, while we do not overlook the 
serious danger that would arise to Afghanistan from the 
machinations of disaffected subjects and refugees who 
would make common cause with Persia, we are fully 
persuaded that the Ameer would strain every nerve to 
recover all that he has lost in Seistan, and might 
probably succeed in driving the Persians from the 
Province. He is fully alive to the danger which 
threatens him from the position which Persia occupies
on the Helmund. From the Cabul Diary for the 18th to
21st March 1870, your Grace will observe that the Ameer 
remarked to our Agent, "troops from Seistan, via 
Helmund, can come to Candahar without any hill or other 
impediments. This fact is well ascertainable by the 
British authorities if they refer to (Afghanistan) 
maps."
"While we admit that the dispute between Persia 
and Afghanistan must be settled according to the rights 
and reasonable expectations of both parties, we are 
strongly of opinion that when facts in support of right 
are at all doubtful, the policy which we have for so 
many years pursued of securing the independence of 
Afghanistan and the Provinces dependent on it against 
the encroachments of Persia, should be allowed full
(1) Extract of section one of "History of Sistan and Lash-Jowain", by H.L. Wynne, dated July 6. 
1870, FO 60/386, ' p. 3 of 214.
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weight in the consideration of the case. Whatever may 
be the result of arbitration in respect to the portion 
of Seistan which Persia has recently occupied, we 
think it would be most undesirable that Persia should 
be allowed to cross the Helmund at any point, and we 
consider it absolutely essential to the security of 
Afghanistan that, from the points where the river 
turns into the territories now in the possession of 
Afghanistan, the Ameer's possession of both banks of 
the river should be maintained. Further than this, so 
far as consistent with the facts that may be elicited 
by the enquiries of the Commissioner, we would desire 
to re~assert and maintain our former policy regarding 
that part of Seistan up to the Helmund on which Persia 
has within the last few years encroached. This policy 
was clearly enunciated in Lord Malmesbury's despatch 
to Colonel Shell, dated October 27th, 1852, when he
announced the distinct determination of Her Majesty's 
Government not to allow "any systematic attempt on the 
part of Persia to effect a change in the state of 
possession in the countries lying between the Persian 
frontier and the British territories in India." It 
was repeated after the war of 1856, when Lord Cowley, 
then engaged in negotiating the treaty of peace, told 
the Persian plenipotentiary that Her Majesty's 
Government were "determined that Persia should not 
disturb the existing state of the tribes on the
eastern frontier." These declarations were clearly 
intended to bar the encroachments of Persia, not only
on territory then undoubtedly belonging to the
Afghans, but also on all territories and tribes to the 
eastward not at the time under Persian dominion, 
including Seistan, part of which is now in the Persian 
occupation, and the whole of which is claimed as an 
integral part of the Persian Province of
Khorassan."M )
Goldsmid's approach to Iran's rights to the sovereignty of 
Sistan, based on information of this kind became suspected by 
Mirza Masum Khan the Iranian Commissioner who had from the 
outset of the proceedings of Baluchistan boundary 
delimitation questioned Goldsmid's true intentions. A fierce 
correspondence started between the two commissioners as soon
(1) Clauses 3 and 5 of despatch from Mr Mayo and others of the Government of India Foreign
Department to the Duke of ArgyLL, dated Simla the 7th July 1870, No. 41 of 1870, FO 60/386, 
pp. 1 - 2 of 211.
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as the arbitration proceeding began in Sistan. The Iranian 
Commissioner, for instance, wrote to the British Commissioner 
on 9th February 1872s
"AFTER becoming acquainted with the contents of 
your letter of 28th Zulkhadeh, X have found it 
necessary to inform you without delay that, with 
regard to the passage in the agreement of the 7th 
Shaban, which sets forth that "if it is necessary to 
inspect any locality, the Commissioners should visit 
any place they may deem expedient, and prepare maps of 
any district without let or hindrance, " its meaning 
is, not that present Persian possessions in Seistan 
should (unnecessarily and in a spirit contrary to the 
tenor of Lord John Russell's despatch) be again 
submitted to enquiry, but that the meaning and wish of 
the Persian Foreign Office and the British Legation 
was and is, that if the Commissioners during their 
stay at any one place should wish for information 
concerning any other place in Seistan that is not 
completely in Persian possession, and upon which the 
Afghan Commissioner may make a claim, and that such 
information is impossible to be obtained at the place 
at which the Commissioners are then staying, then they 
should go to any such place as may be necessary, and 
prepare the necessary maps without let or 
hindrance."(1)
To this, General Goldsmid replied!
"I HAVE read your letter of 28th Zulkhadeh. I 
regret that I cannot change the opinion which I have 
communicated to you in my official letters and also by 
word of mouth during our march hither. With regard to 
other matters, I must wait until the meeting of the 
Commissioners. In my opinion it is not proper to 
raise difficulties before mention is made of their 
existence." (2)
Not satisfied with this reply, Mirza Masum Khan asked General 
Goldsmid of the nature of Colonel Pollock’s role in the 
arbitration commission: "I requested you would inform me in
what capacity and with what intention Colonel Pollock was 
accompanying the Afghan Commissioner? You replied that I had
(1) From the Persian Commissioner, Nasirabad, 9th February = 28th Zulkhadeh, enclosure No. 22 FO
60/392, pp. 26 - 7.
(2) From General Goldsmid, Nasirabad, 9th February = 28 Zulkhadeh, enclosure No. 22, FO 60/392 ,
pp. 26-7
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been long informed by you of Colonel Pollock's coming. As I 
wished to know what his actual employment is, I have again to 
request that you will be kind enough to inform me in what
capacity and with what object Colonel Pollock accompanies the
(1 )Afghan Commissioner?"v •
General Goldsmid's reply to this question was that: "The
above mentioned gentleman will on arrival give me such 
assistance in the work of the mission as I may require from 
him."(^)
General Goldsmid's description of the role of Colonel Pollock 
in the proceedings of the Sistan Boundary Arbitration is 
imperceptible, especially when implying that Colonel 
Pollock's mission was to aid him, whereas he was assigned to 
supervise the Afghan Commissioner. This was clearly defined 
in the Indian Government’s despatch No. 1614 to the 
Government of Punjab to which Colonel Pollock was attached 
which clearly asserts:
"Colonel Pollock should carefully advise the 
Afghan Commissioner as to his proceedings, and,
without assuming a position of partiality, should see 
generally that the views of the Cabul Government, whom 
the Commissioner represents, are fully and fairly 
explained."(3)
Furthermore, the Viceroy of India himself had described 
Colonel Pollock's mission slightly differently. In a letter 
to the Amir of Afghanistan, he stated:
"Your Highness's Commissioner will be accompanied 
by a delegate on my part, and I have selected Colonel 
Pollockf C.S.X., for this purpose.
(1) from the Persian Commissioner, Nasirabad, 9th February = 28th Zulkhadeh, enclosure 23, FO
60/392, p. 27.
(2) From General Goldsmid, Nasirabad, 10th February -» 29th Zulkhadeh, enclosure 25, FO 60/392 ,
p.27 of 73.
(3) Extract of clause 5 of despatch No. 1614 of Aitchison to the Secretary to the Indian
Government of Punjab, dated Simla, 8. 9 1870. F060/392 , p. 383.
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I am desirous that my delegate on his way to 
Seistan should have an opportunity of a conference 
with Your Highness and communicate personally with you 
on various matters connected with the welfare of 
Afghanistan."(1)
Colonel Pollock's duty had also been described in the Indian
Government's Foreign Department despatch of 8th September
1870 as being 'to acquaint Afghan Commissioner with the
opinions and feelings of the court of Cabul; and to explain
to him the views and policy of the Government of India on the
(2 )Seistan question.'' '
Colonel Pollock, accompanied by the Afghan Commissioner and a
large escort, arrived in Sistan in early March 1872. The
Iranian Commissioner protested against the presence of such a
large number of local chiefs from Afghanistan being in the
company of Colonel Pollock and the Afghan Commissioner on the
Iranian soil. In a letter to Goldsmid, Mirza Masum Khan
stated: "in your letter of the 27 th Zulkhadeh you have
written that I should have certainly gained correct
information as to the people accompanying General Pollock and
the Afghan Commissioner during the time that these latter
were encamped at Nasirabad, and that Sardar Ahmad Khan was
the only one worthy of consideration. I have thought it
necessary to ask you the reason of the presence of Sardar
Ahmad Khan and Mardan Khan, and Dust Mohammad Khan and
others, with such a following; and why they accompanied the
Afghan Commissioner into Iranian territory, give me, please,
(3 )speedy information on this matter."v 1
(1) Extract of letter from His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council to His
Highness the Ameer of Cabul, dated Simla the 31st of October 1871, enclosure No. 46, FO 
60/390, p. 193.
(2) Quoted in Mirza Masum Khan's letter to General Goldsmid, dated 9th March 1872, No. 84 of
correspondence related to Sistan Mission, FO 60/392, p. 81.
(3) Extract of Mirza Masum Khan's Letter in C.U. Aitchison, Secretary to the Indian Government
to the Secretary of the Government of Punjab, dated Simla 8th September 1870, No. 1614, FO 
60/386, p. 383.
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Most of these individuals and the armed men were, as a result 
of this protest, returned to Afghanistan and though Colonel 
Pollock was received by Amir Alam Khan III, the Khozeimeh 
Amir of Qaenat and Sistan, with due honour and respect, the 
Amir refused to receive the Afghan Commissioner. In a letter 
to General Goldsmid, Mirza Masum Khan spelled out the 
decision of the Amir of Qaenat and Sistan in this regard, 
stating:
"YOUR Special Assistant, Major Smith, sent me a 
message by your Mir Akhor Ghuffir Beg to the effect 
that General Pollock would come to-morrow to Nasirabad 
and call on me and the Hashmut-ul-Mulk, on the 
understanding that the Ameer and I were to return his 
visit at Bunjar. The Ameer does not agree to this, 
but has requested me to say to you that if the Afghan 
Commissioner has any claims to make he should either 
come to Nasirabad and state them verbally, or that he 
should write them at Bunjar, and that the continued 
presence of so large a number of Afghans in the 
territory possessed by Persia is contrary to the 
agreement between the two Governments, and foreign to 
the duty and authority of the Ameer."(*)
A further complication occurred regarding General Goldsmid’s 
team's flying of the British flag in front of their tents 
which gave rise to unpleasant rumours among local people and 
much headache for the Amir of Qaenat and Sistan. After a 
long argument the Iranian Commissioner found a solution in a 
letter of explanation from General Goldsmid to the Amir who 
could use it in explaining the position to his subjects. 
This letter was sent and the Amir replied:
"AFTER I received your letter I assembled Haji 
Mushtihid(2) and the other Moollahs(3) and
Syuds, (4) and had much conversation with them
concerning your flying a flag in front of your tent,
(1) From Mirza Masum Khan to General Goldsmid, dated 8th March 1872 = 2nd Zulhajeh, No. 83, FO
60/392, p. 43.
(2) Mojtahed » Jurisprudent.
(3) Mulla = Cleric.
(4) Sayyed = descendants of the Prophet of IsLam.
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and with the greatest trouble made them understand 
that the flag was merely a sign of your mission."(1)
The arbitration commission decided to visit not only the 
frontier areas but many places within Iran's undisputed 
possessions. This decision caused more friction between 
General Goldsmid and Mirza Masum Khan who protested against 
Goldsmid's examination of areas in Iranian possession. Mirza 
Masum Khan thus suspended his own mission in Sistan and
returned to Tehran in the vain hope that the Iranian 
authorities would act on his protestation of General 
Goldsmid's proceedings in Sistan.
The arbitration commission visited the Hirmand delta and many 
places in and around the province and interviewed many people 
arriving at the conclusion that the arbitration must take 
into consideration both the ancient and recent rights of the 
two sides, based on examining the actual possessions and
documentary evidence produced by the two Governments.
The Afghan Commissioner handed over to General Goldsmid a
lengthy written statement of documentary evidence. No such 
written statement was provided from the Iranian side, because 
the Iranian Commissioner had departed from Sistan.
Other determining factors taken into consideration were 
testimonials of the local chiefs and khans as to whom their 
loyalty would go to as their sovereign Government.
In order to determine the ancient rights of sovereignty over 
Sistan, the arbitrator concluded that Sistan was:
"... a province on the Eastern Frontier of Persia, 
which had become comprehended in Afghanistan on its 
first conversion into a consolidated monarchy by Ahmad 
Shah Duranif but which, by a common process of intrigue 
and encroachment, had lapsed almost imperceptibly to 
her stronger neighbour on the west.... Persia, on
(1) From Amir Alam Khan Heshmat al-Molk to General Goldsmid, dated 6th March 1872, attached to 
enclosure No. 27 of correspondence of Sistan Mission, FO 60/392, p.80.
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the other hand, laid claim to Sistan by virtue of a 
more ancient sovereignty than that of Ahmad Shah: and 
justified recent conquest and annexation, within its 
limits, as the mere assertion of dormant rights."(1)
If the interests of British India favouring Afghanistan's 
claims were not known it would be incomprehensible as to how 
the arbitrator could ignore more than twelve centuries of 
Iran's sovereignty of Sistan before it was conquered and 
annexed by Ahmad Shah Durrani, and how could he justify this 
short-lived annexation by Ahmad Shah - from 1749 to 1772 - as 
culminating any right of sovereignty to Sistan for 
Afghanistan.
Ahmad Shah Durrani, as has hitherto been explained occupied 
Sistan as well as Herat, Qandehar and Baluchistan when Iran 
was leaderless in the wake of Nader Shah's assassination in 
1747. Moreover, the arbitrator ignored the fact that both 
Herat and Qandehar revived their traditional dependency on 
Iran as autonomous principalities shortly after Ahmad Shah's 
death (see chapter IV on the partitioning of Khorasan and the 
question of Herat), and the chiefs of Sistan and Baluchistan 
declared their allegiance to Iran at the same time. None of 
these developments, which revived Iran's traditional 
relations with the autonomous chiefs of Herat and Qandehar 
and revived Iran's historical sovereignty in Sistan and 
Baluchistan, could be considered as "intrigue and 
encroachment" on the part of Iran. Strangely enough, when 
defining the boundaries in Baluchistan a year earlier, 
General Goldsmid did not consider Afghanistan's rights in 
Baluchistan, in spite of the fact that Baluchistan had also 
been conquered and annexed by Ahmad Shah Durrani in the wake 
of Nader Shah's assassination. When considering these 
historical facts, Amir Alam Khan Khozeimeh's undertaking in 
Sistan and the recovery of lands transferred into the 
Afghanistan dominion by Ahmad Khan and Ibrahim Khan, the two
(1) GoLdsmid, General Sir Frederick, "Eastern Persia", London 1876, p. xiii.
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local chiefs who were intrigued by Amir Shir Ali Khan of 
Afghanistan to join him, could hardly be described as 
"intrigue and encroachment" on the part of Iran. Ahmad Khan 
and Ibrahim Khan who had been subjects of the Iranian 
Government, suddenly decided to become subjects of the Amir 
of Afghanistan. What was wrong was to take with them vast 
areas of the Iranian province of Sistan to be included in 
Afghanistan dominion. Amir Alam Khan entered Sistan, 
punished the two rebel chiefs and recovered Iran's lost 
territories in Sistan. This whole process was in keeping 
with article 7 of the Anglo-Iranian peace treaty of Paris 
(1857) and was permitted by the British Government in the 
form of Lord Russell's (the British Foreign Secretary) 
despatch in this context. This process, therefore, could 
hardly be described as "intrigue", "encroachment", "conquest" 
and "annexation" of another country's possessions.
The arbitrator, nevertheless, decided to examine the 
historical rights of the two countries in Sistan on the 
background of events in the period of one hundred years 
preceding the date of arbitration which conveniently included 
the closing years of Ahmad Shah Durrani's career. The one 
hundred years that the arbitrator chose to be the history of 
Sistan's affiliation to either Iran or Afghanistan 
conveniently excluded two thousand years of sovereign rights 
to Sistan and thus weighing heavily in favour of 
Afghanistan. To fill the gap between Ahmad Shah's death 
(1772) and Dust Mohammad Khan's conquest and annexation of 
Herat and Qandehar (1861 and 1863), the arbitrator decided to 
consider these two principalities as being part of 
Afghanistan, a country which did not exist in that interim 
period of 91 years (between 1772 and 1863), ignoring the fact 
that both principalities had officially renewed their 
traditional dependency on Iran: their rulers governing the
principalities on behalf of the Government of Iran: making
coinage in the name of the Shah of Iran: reading khotbeh in 
the name of the Shah of Iran: paying annual tax to the
Government of Iran: and whenever payment of annual taxes were 
withheld they were punished by being fined or being replaced 
(see chapter IV on the partitioning of Khorasan).
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It is thus inconceivable how Sistan's dependence on either 
Herat or Qandehar in that interim period could culminate in 
"historical rights of sovereignty" for Afghanistan. The 
arbitrator, nevertheless concluded that:
"Sistan was certainly part of Afghanistan when 
Afghanistan was a consolidated kingdom. It was 
afterwards dependent on Herat or Kandehar, according 
to circumstance, or it may be independent of either if 
occasion offered."(1)
By so asserting, the arbitrator was, in effect, claiming that 
it did not matter if, after the rule of Ahmad Shah Durrani, 
his consolidated monarchy disappeared and Herat and Qandehar 
resumed their traditional role as autonomous principalities 
of Iran, and Sistan chiefs became, for most of the period in 
question, subjects of the Iranian Government. He also 
assumed that if the Sistan chiefs adhered, from time to time, 
to the principalities of Herat and Qandehar dependent on 
Iran, would not culminate as a "right of sovereignty" for 
Iran but for Afghanistan, and that recovery of Sistan 
territories taken into Afghan dominion did not amount to 
anything because no fair fighting was involved:
"The manner in which Sistan was occupied by 
Persian troops corresponds with an appeal to arms such 
as contemplated by Lord Russell's letter quoted - 
there was no fair fighting at all. Nor can it be 
admitted that allegiance was obtained by the single 
means of military movements or open procedure of any 
kind".(2)
By so asserting, the arbitrator dismissed the recovery, 
through military means, of territories taken into the Afghan 
dominion by Ahmad Khan and Ibrahim Khan as constituting any 
right of Iran, arguing that it was done at a time when 
Afghanistan was leaderless. Here the arbitrator ignored the 
fact that Amir Shir Ali Khan was the leader of Afghanistan, 
though temporarily lost Kabul to his rebellious son, but was
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit.. Appendix A, p. 403.
(2) Goldsmid, op. cit., pp. 411 - 12.
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in so firm a position in Qandehar that he successfully 
intrigued with Ahmad Khan and Ibrahim Khan, chiefs of Sistan, 
to join him, an act which precipitated Iran's military
operation in Sistan. Furthermore, the arbitrator considered 
Ahmad Shah Durrani's occupation of Sistan, Herat and Qandehar 
(1749) as culminating in sovereign rights for Afghanistan; an 
occupation at a time when Iran was in chaos and was
leaderless as a result of Nader Shah's assassination and 
after Amir Alum Khan I Khozeimeh, leader of Eastern Iran, was 
also murdered by the Kurdish element of his own forces 
(1749); an occupation of Iranian territories which met no 
resistance from the Iranians. Eventually, the arbitrator 
ruled out Iran's historical rights altogether:
"J have given it as my opinion that the Persian
claim to Sistan on the score of ancient right is not
such as to warrant revival after the lapse of a 
hundred years..."(1)
He even rejected testimonies of allegiance to Iran by the 
local chiefs:
"J cannot say that the acts of Ali Khan and Taj 
Muhammad, Sarbandis, have satisfied me that their 
allegiance to Persia was the general desire of the 
inhabitants."(2)
This statement clearly contradicts his earlier assertion of 
"how contented with the present state of affairs, or at least 
insouciant of change, were the general inhabitants^^ He 
went as far as rejecting the actual possessions:
"The garrison in Kaleh-i-Futh, I regret to 
consider as brought there in contravention of the 
terms of the arbitration; therefore the fact of its 
existence can have no value, nor can its discussion be 
appropriate in the present paper."(4)
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 407.
(2) Goldsmid, op cit., p. 407.
(3) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 271.
(4) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 409.
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Chukhansur, taken into the Afghan dominion by Ibrahim Khan 
who was punished by Amir Alam Khan III, was also considered 
as not being in Iranian possession. By contrast, he 
considered Ibrahim Khan's illegal act as sufficient enough 
reason to give Chokhansur to Afghanistan:
"Chakhansur is not in Persian possession, but 
held by Ibrahim Khan on the Afghan side."(l)
He dismissed the recovery of the occupied territories of 
Sistan being in keeping with British Foreign Secretary's 
aforementioned letter allowing Iran to make good its 
possession in Sistan by force of arm:
"J do not think that the English ministerial letter 
quoted alters the position in this respect, "(2)
When it came to the (Iranian) territories to the west of 
Hirmand1 s main branch in the delta region which have been in 
Iran's uninterrupted possession, the arbitrator declared 
Iran's sovereign rights but still with some reservation:
"Sistan Proper is now, under certain 
reservations, to be hereafter noted, in possession of 
Persia, whose Governor is Mir Alam Khan of Kain."(3)
Iran' s rights of sovereignty to the territories to the east 
of the main branch of Hirmand river was dismissed and 
similarly thrown away were such factors as peoples' language 
and religion (similar to those of the people of the rest of 
Iran), the actual possession backed by local testimonies 
which, in the words of General Goldsmid himself, were from 
the "general inhabitants" who were "contented with the 
present state of affairs, or at least insouciant of
/  4  \
change."v }
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 409.
(2) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 409.
(3) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 48.
(4) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 271
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Suspicions existed at the time that General Goldsmid wanted 
to give the whole of Sistan to Afghanistan, but the power and 
influence of Amir Alam Khan III, the Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat 
and Sistan, and his determination in keeping Sistan within 
Iran seems to have convinced Goldsmid that depriving Iran of 
the whole of Sistan would not be advisable. Reporting to the 
Government of India, Goldsmid asserted:
"Ameer of Kain has great power. Persian 
Commissioner plays his game and talks of Lord Russell's 
despatch, arguing that no present possession is to be 
discussed. Writes politely, but acts mischievously and 
in hostile spirit. Meanwhile much information 
obstructed and survey far advanced. I hurry completion 
to be prepared for contingencies."(^)
Based on this information, the Government of India decided 
that Sistan should be partitioned. In a letter to Pollock 
(promoted to the rank of General) adviser to the Afghan 
Commissioner, the Indian Government asked:
"Government gathers from papers received that the 
position is this - Persia holds chief parts of Sistan 
so firmly that arbitral opinion must be in favour of 
Persia, but that a boundary on Helmund from Ameer of 
Kain's bund(2) upwards, might be secured and also a 
line of river onwards to lake. Can you confirm this 
as being the position? If so, would such boundary, 
though not giving all that is desired, satisfy 
sufficiently Afghan interests?... and would Ameer of 
Afghanistan probably convinced that it is the best 
obtainable..."(3)
The arbitrator thus decided to carve up the province into two 
sections: referring to them as "Sistan proper" and "outer
Sistan". He gave Afghanistan the larger part and gave Iran 
the smaller part, defining the main channel of Hirmand River 
on the easternmost part of the delta as the boundary between
(1) Telegram from General Goldsmid through Henjam to Foreign Secretary, Calcutta, dated 12th
April 1872, FO 60/392- *
(2) Referring to Band Sistan dam.
(3) Telegram from the Foreign Secretary of Indian Government to General Pollock, dated 27th
April 1872, No. 1042p, FO 60/392-
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the two (see figure 1). This decision allocated much of 
Iran's actual possession such as Nad-e Ali, Qaleh Fath and 
much of the territories occupied by the Afghans in the 
preceding years, to the Afghan claimants. This approach to 
the boundary arbitration in Sistan was in complete 
contradiction to the circumstances described by himself as 
leading him to believe that documents produced in support of 
Afghan claims and testimonies given in support of Afghan 
claims did not convince him of any sovereign rights for 
Afghanistan in Sistan:
"Whatever force such documents may have, they can 
only apply to particular short-lived conditions and 
circumstances; and I do not consider they can affect 
the validity of Afghan sovereignty over the province 
in respect of the period under review. The allegiance 
of Sistan was of a feudal nature which could not be 
transferred to suit the personal convenience of a 
temporary ruler I"(1)
In trying to divide Sistan politically, the arbitrator found 
it somewhat necessary to introduce a geographical meaning td 
his decision. He, therefore, argued:
"It is not easy to define what, in the present 
day, is meant by the term 'Sistan'. The expression is 
very vague, for ancient limits have long since become 
obsolete, and modern signification practically 
comprehends the Peninsula of the Helmand and Hamun 
only.
"I see no better way to illustrate the case than 
by supposing two territories, - one compact and
concentrated, which I will call 'Sistan Proper;' the
other, detached and irregular, which may be designated 
'Outer Sistan.'
"The first is bounded, on the north and west, by 
the Hamun, which divides it from the Lash Juwain and 
Neh Bandan districts, respectively; on the south 
generally by the Hamun, but immediately by the
Dasht-i-Sangbar and barren tracts south of Sekuha and 
Burj-i-Alam Khan; and on the east by the main branch 
of the Helmand below the band at the mouth of the 
great canal.
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 405.
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"The second is composed of the country on the 
right bank of the Helmand, and extends to a distance 
of about 120 English miles in lengthf or from the 
vicinity of the Charboli and Khuspas River north, to 
Rudbar south. Its breadth is variable, but trifling 
compared to the length, the actual boundaries being 
assumed as the limit of river cultivation on the 
east. To this may be added the Sistan Desert, 
comprising Zirah and the "Shilah."(l)
(For the text of the General Summary 
of Goldsmid's arbitration opinion see Appendix I).
Commenting on General Goldsmid's arbitration awards of
Sistan, Sir Percy Sykes believes that the arbitrator tried to
work out an absolute justice that is to give little
importance to historical evidence and to put more emphasis on
the actual possessions. He asserts: "The arbitrator had to
decide, not so much as to claims - both the Afghans and
Persians having laid the district under tribute at various
(2 jperiods - but as to the actual status quo."' •
Yet, when considering the actual status quo, the arbitrator 
decided to ignore a number of actual possessions of Iran. 
Amir Alam Khan III Khozeimeh's actual possessions at Nad Ali 
and Qaleh Fath and their dependencies on the left bank of 
Hirmand River, for instance, were ignored. Similarly a 
number of actual possession of the Sanjarani and Nahruei 
Baluchi tribes of Iran on the left banks of Hirmand were 
ignored:
"As regards 'Outer S i s t a n t h e  professed 
allegiance of Kamal(^) and Imam Khan(^) the Baluch 
chiefsf residing on the banks of the Helmandf does not 
to my mind constitute a case of absolute possession 
similar to that of 'Sistan Proper;' nor do I find that
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 407-8.
(2) Sykes, Sir Percy, op. cit., 368.
(3) Sanjarani.
(4) Nahruei.
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FIGURE 1
Sistan Boundary According to General Goldsmid
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any arguments bearing upon these particular lands have 
been used by the Persian Government, except that my 
own request for the recovery of a stolen horse, made 
on the right bank of the Helmand to a Persian Yawar,
(1) is cited in favour of Persia's claim."(2)
Major-General Goldsmid's arbitration award not only failed to 
satisfy the local chiefs whose lands were given to a 
Government that they were not subject to, but proved to be 
unpopular with the local inhabitants as well as the injustice 
that the Iranian Government considered to have done to its 
rights in the province. Aware of the unpopularity of this 
award, the arbitrator asserted:
"Briefly, being unable to justify the recent action 
of Persia in Sistan on the score of ancient right to 
that province, I am bound to state my opinion that as 
regards her possession of 'Sistan Proper, ' the fact is 
established; although the action of the authorities 
before described has unquestionably caused me to 
entertain misgivings on the attitude or sentiments of 
the population in certain instances. "(3)
General Goldsmid did not elaborate in his description of 
various aspects of his award that by putting the boundary on 
the main branch of the River Hirmand in the delta region (see 
figure 1), he put 'Sistan Proper' at the mercy of the Afghans 
who could easily deprive the "more fertile half of Sistan" of 
its badly needed water from that river, as it proved to be 
the case in subsequent years.
One individual most unhappy, at the time, with the arbitral 
proceeding, was Mirza Musam Khan Ansari, the Iranian 
Commissioner, who had evidently endeavoured to prevent the 
partitioning of Sistan by creating as much inconvenience for 
the arbitration proceedings as possible. In his book on 
"Eastern Persia" Major General Sir Frederick Goldsmid
(1) Major (MiLitary rank).
(2) GoLdsmid, Sir Frederick, op. cit., p. 409
(3) GoLdsmid, Sir Frederick., op. cit., p. 409.
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complains extensively of Mirza Masum Khan's behaviour towards 
the British arbitration commission. Sir Percy Sykes goes 
further by accusing the Iranian Commissioner of being: "only
anxious to make money, he saw that by fostering this mistaken 
idea he could advance his private interests^1^
It is noteworthy that not only was Mirza Masum Khan not 
accused of such intentions in any other documents that this 
author has examined, but there are indications that the 
Arbitration Commission attempted to buy Amir Alam Khan III 
Heshmat al-Molk's consent by offers of bribes. In a letter 
to his agent in Tehran to be forwarded to the Shah, Amir 
Ali-Akbar Khan Heshmat al-Molk II Khozeimeh, the eldest son 
of Amir Alam Khan and his successor as the Amir of Sistan, 
asserted:
"In the time of my late father, people came from 
the side of England to Sistan, and thought of raising 
their flag. They offered money to my father, the late 
Amir, but he in view of his loyalty never accepted.
The late Shah consequently gave my late father much 
consideration in that connection. The English 
complained bitterly of my late father to the Central 
Government, but it was of no use." (2)
Similarly, Amir Mohammad Esmail Khan Shokat al-Molk, the 
second son of Amir Alam Khan III and his successor as the 
Amir of Qaenat, wrote to the Shah through his own agent in 
Tehran:
"All the inhabitants of Khorasan and Persia are 
witness to this fact that my late father the Amir 
during his life refused 100,000 tumana and as far as 
was possible did not allow the English to set foot in 
Sistan...."(3)
(1) Sykes, op, cit., p. 368
(2) From Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Khozeimeh to his agent in Tehran, dated 26th Zihajeh (26th March
1903), enclosed in despatch No. 56, from A. Hardinge to the Marquis of Lansdowne, dated 30th
April 1903, FO 60/711 .
(3) From Amir Esmail Khan Khozeimeh to his agent, dated 18th Moharram 1321 (17th April 1903),
enclosed in despatch No. 56 above op. cit.
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Sir Percy Sykes did not stop at accusing Mirza Masum Khan of 
trying to make money by confronting the arbitrator in his 
proceedings, but accused Amir Alam Khan III of "ignorance" 
and "jealousy" because of the lack of cooperation that was 
expected of him. General Goldsmid wrote of the view of Amir 
Alam Khan regarding the arbitration proceedings:
"...specially suspicious as to Colonel Pollock's 
presence with the Afghan Commission, which he seemed 
to think intimated a foregone adverse conclusion on 
the part of the British Government".(1)
Sir Percy Sykes concluded differently thati
"The position was one of difficulty, owing to the 
hostility of the local authorities, which was mainly 
the result of ignorance. . . The Amir of Kain, however, 
imagined that the British Commissioner was trying to 
seize as much territory as possible for his Government 
- Afghanistan being always regarded by Persians as a 
province of the Indian Empire."(2)
It could hardly be because of ignorance that the Amir of
Qaenat and Sistan endeavoured to prevent as effectively as
possible the eastern half of his dominion of Sistan being
given to the Afghans. Not only did his efforts fail to
prevent eastern Sistan from being given to Afghanistan, but
many of his personal lands and villages on the left bank of
River Hirmand were also given to the Afghans. The eastern
half of Amir Alam Khan's dominion of Sistan was given to
the Afghans in spite of the fact that the arbitrator himself
confirmed that the possessors of that half of the province
were partly Iranian, partly Afghani "Outer Sistan, on the
other hand, irrespective of the Desert, Shilah and
uninhabited tracts, is in possession of Baluch chiefs who
profess to acknowledge Persian sovereignty, or disclaim
(3 )allegiance to any sovereign power but Afghanistan."' •
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 267 - 8.
(2) Sykes, op. cit., p. 368.
(3) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 408
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General Goldsmid' s own account of the role of Amir Alam Khan 
III, the Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat and Sistan is much more 
realistic than that of Sir Percy Sykes. The following are 
two examples of his observation of the role of this Amir in 
relation to the arbitration proceedings:
(1) "this march up the Helmand could not fail to be
productive of much valuable information. By it we 
learnt how completely successful had been the able 
measures taken by the Amir of Kain to throughly 
Persianise the whole of the province on the west bank 
of the river; how thoroughly the old Baluch chiefs in 
the vicinity, with the exception of Chakhansur and 
Lash Juwain, were inclined to play into his hands, and 
how contented with the present state of affairs, or at 
least insouciant of change, were the general 
inhabitants." (1)
And:
(2) "We arrived at the rendezvous before the Amir, 
who came attended by a large mounted retinue, and with 
the sons of two Baluch chiefs, holding forts on the 
Helmand (which we afterwards visited), who had 
acknowledged allegiance to Persia, and who were this 
day evidently paraded with the purpose of declaring 
their love for Persian rule before the British 
arbitrator. 1 (2 )
General Goldsmid's arbitral award of 19th August 1872 was, 
however, submitted to the two Governments of Iran and 
Afghanistan. This award delimited the Sistan boundary in the 
following manner:
1. From Siah Kuh, near Bandan, which is the beginning of 
the Qaenat district a line to be drawn to the southern 
limit of the Neizar towards Lash-Jowein. Thence the 
line continues to a point named Shahi which is the end 
of Hirmand's main water-bed.
2. From Shahi, the boundary takes a more north-west to
south-east direction to Korki.
(1) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 271.
{2) Goldsmid, op. cit., p. 268 - 9.
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3. From Korki the boundary follows Hirmand River's main 
channel upstream as far as Kuhak.
4. From Kuhak the boundary takes a north-east to south-west 
direction in a straight line across desert as far as 
Kuh-e Malek Siah, the highest peak of which is the 
beginning of Baluchistan and the dividing point of 
Iran-(Pakistan)-Afghanistan boundaries. (see Appendix 
I).
The map prepared by the engineers of the arbitration
commission showed considerable inaccuracy in tracing the
boundary line, especially in areas north-east of Mian Kangi
and south-east of Lash-Jowain. This inaccurate map caused
much dispute later and was used by the Afghans to justify
their encroachments in the Iranian side of the river#
General Goldsmid entered Tehran on the 4th June
1872. The Iranian Commissioner, Mirza Masum Khan had, for
reasons unknown, once again disappeared from the scene after
leaving Sistan in protest against General Goldsmid's arbitral
proceedings. He was replaced in Tehran by Mirza Malkam Khan
m  \
Nazem ad-Doleh as Iranian Commissioner.v }
General Goldsmid, Mirza Malkam Khan and the Afghan
Commissioner met twice in Tehran discussing the terms of the
(2 )award, v 1 The Afghans as well as the Iranians raised a 
number of objections to the specifics of the award. The most 
significant objection raised by the Iranians concerned water 
use of the two sides of the frontier river. In clauses 1, 2 
and 4 of his arbitral award, General Goldsmid had laid down, 
as regards the Hirmand water rights, thats
(1) "She (Persia) should not possess land on the 
right of the Helmand. . . the main bed of the Helmand, 
therefore, below Kohak should be the eastern boundary 
of Persian Sistan.
(1) The Notebook of Sistan Boundary Delimitation (Ketabcheh-e Tahdid-e Sistan), repeated in 
“Farhang-e Iran-Zamin", Tehran 1990, Vol. 28, p. 298
(2) The Notebook of Sistan Boundary Delimitation, op, cit,, 301 - 315.
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(2) "and the line of frontier from Kohak to the
hills, south of the Sistan desert, should be so drawn 
as to include within the Afghan limits all cultivation 
on both banks of the river from the band upwards.....
(4) "It is, moreover, to be well understood that no 
works are to be carried out on either side calculated 
to interfere with the requisite supply of water for 
irrigation on both banks of Helmand."(If
In their appeal against this award, the Iranian Government 
contended, inter alia, that the Sistan of Iran could not live 
without control of the Hirmand up to Rudbar. This was a 
statement of fact which has been attested to by the passage 
of 120 years.
The tripartite meeting of the commissioners in Tehran was 
mostly dominated by questions and answers centred around the 
Iranian Commissioner's reassertion of Iran's claim to the 
whole of Sistan.
As the parties concerned could not agree, the arbitration 
opinion was referred to Lord Granville, British Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, for final adjudication. The 
Foreign Secretary over-ruled all objections raised by Iran 
and Afghanistan and confirmed General Goldsmid's arbitration 
opinion in its entirety on 7th March 1873, which was 
communicated to both Governments of Iran and Afghanistan who 
subsequently ratified it.
The Afghans naturally did not raise any objection to 
Goldsmid's water award, but asked the British Government for 
their interpretation of clause 4 of the above award.
"The Government of India, in referring this 
question to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs (despatch No. 14, dated 15th September
(1) Extract of Goldsmid's Sistan boundary award regarding Hirmand River repeated in Colonel 
McMahon's Hirmand Water Award, from Colonel McMahon to Secretary to the Government of India, 
in the Foreign Department, No. 2407, dated Camp Kohuk, 25th September 1904, FO 60/727,
P. 2.
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1873), after pointing out that the Amir desired to 
construct new, and repair old, canals, leading from 
Helmand, in order to strengthen his frontier and 
establish an Afghan colony at Tarakun, wrote; ’In our 
opinion the clause referred to in the award cannot be 
understood as applying either to existing canals or to 
such old and disused canals as the Afghan Government 
may wish to put in proper repair: nor would it
interfere with the excavation of new canals, provided 
the requisite supply of water for irrigation on the 
Persian side is not diminished. If Her Majesty's 
Government concur in this way, we would suggest that 
an explanation may be given which we can communicate 
to the Amir."(1)
This suggestion was concurred with by the British Foreign 
Secretary in its entirety and the question of the "requisite 
supply of water for irrigation on the Persian side" being a 
matter of interpretation, allowed the Afghans to minimise 
supply of water to the province of Sistan, turning it into a 
parched land in a matter of less than half a century.
Having permitted the Afghans to repair the old canals and 
construct new ones, the Foreign Secretary made his decision 
permanent:
"Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs accepted the above interpretation and the Amir 
was duly informed. The above ruling should, 
therefore, be considered as an integral portion of the 
Goldsmid award."(2)
The way this award was compiled, and the manner in which it 
was accepted by the Iranian Government, was in complete 
contradiction of the condition laid down by the same 
Government when agreeing to the arbitration of Sistan 
boundary. The conditions laid down by the Iranian Government 
for accepting arbitration were:
(1) Ibid.
(2) From McMahon to Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, 25th
September 1904, op. cit., p. 2.
487
"The Persian Government agrees that a 
commissioner should come to Tehran.... they are to 
inspect.... and define the boundaries of the 
possessions of Persia in Sistan, and also of that 
portion which the Persian Government had not yet 
endeavoured to obtain possession of according to its 
natural sense of justice."(1)
In later correspondence to the British Minister at Tehran, 
the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs repeated:
"The Persian Government consents, and is also 
highly pleased, that the British and Persian 
Commissioners are to proceed to Seistan and inspect 
the present possession of the Persian Government, to 
draw up a map of the same, to define the same, and to 
ascertain what portion of Seistan has not yet come 
into Persia's possession, and to state the same to the 
British and Persian Governments. "(2)
Not only did General Goldsmid's award not ascertain the 
portion of Sistan which had not yet "come into Iran's 
possession"; not only did his award not give many of Iran's 
actual possessions on the east of Hirmand delta to her, but 
also, the award made Iran to abdicate all rights of control 
over Hirmand's water distribution which proved in the later 
decades to be detrimental to Sistan and its inhabitants.
GOLDSMID'S AWARD, THE AFTERMATH
General Goldsmid’s arbitration award and delimitation of 
boundary in Sistan did not bring peace to the province. 
Rather, it opened up fresh causes for friction and dispute. 
The most noticeable complication that occurred immediately in 
the wake of ratification of Goldsmid's award was resultant in 
the way the Afghans interpreted various aspects of the
(1) Extract of Mirza Saeed Khan's Memorandum of 24th July 1870, enclosure in Mr Alison's
despatch to the Earl of Granville, No. 38, dated 25th July 1870, F0 60/386/ p. 431.
(2) Extract of Mirza Saeed Khan's Memorandum to Mr Alison, dated Tehran 4th August 1870, F0
60/386, p. 433.
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award. On the northern section of Sistan, for instance, the 
Afghans seized a number of Iranian villages on the pretext 
that the terms laid in the award would have meant so. The 
Iranians complained to the Government of Great Britain. Her 
Majesty's Secretary for India enquired from the Indian 
authorities if it was possible to undo the occupation. The 
Foreign Department of the Indian Government replied that 
Afghanistan authorities' interpretation of the award must be 
supported, because "the Iranian Commissioner had not been 
present at the time when Goldsmid was surveying those areas" 
and because "Amir of Afghanistan would not be pleased if his 
interpretation was over-ruled"s
"We telegraphed on the 20th instant, in reply to 
Your Lordship's despatch, Secret, No,18, dated 17th 
July, that we deprecate any modification whatsoever of 
the Seistan award finally accepted both by Persia and 
Afghanistan, as being likely to bring about very 
serious complications; and that having in view the 
correspondence relative to the acceptance of the award 
by the Ameer of Cabul we could not make to His
Highness any proposal for modification.
2. "General Goldsmid's arbitral award expressly
declares that "north of Seistan the southern limit of 
the Naizar should be the frontier towards
Lash-Jowain. " The language of the award and the map 
which was attached to it leave no doubt as to the 
exclusion of the Naizar from the portion of Seistan 
awarded to Persia. If thereby any Persian villages 
have suffered loss, it is owing entirely to the
proceedings of the Persian Commissioner who left 
Seistan before the investigation was completed.
3. "We are of opinion that if the award be reopened 
in the interest of Persia, we shall be placed in a 
very false position towards the Ameer of Afghanistan, 
who accepted the decision with great reluctance, and 
is not likely to agree to any further concession to 
Persia however apparently i n s i g n i f i c a n t )
Prior to this aggression, Amir Alam Khan III, the Khozeimeh 
Amir of Qaenat and Sistan, was forced to take refuge, on 21st 
December 1872, in his newly built fort of Nasriyeh (or Nasir
(1) From B.H. Ellis and others of the Foreign Department of the Indian Government to the Marquis 
of Salisbury, Secretary for India, No. 56, dated Fort WiLLiams 25th August 1874, FO 60/394y 
p. 209.
489
Abad) . The coalition that forced him to retreat to his 
fortification was led by Ibrahim Khan Sanjarani of 
Chokhansur, who had previously joined the Amir of
Afghanistan, taking with him territories belonging to Iran 
and under Iranian possession, and eight or nine of his
villages on the western side of Hirmand's main branch
remained in Iranian possession according to Goldsmid's
(1)award.1 • Other Baluchi chiefs in that coalition included,
Ahmad Khan of Lash-Jowein, who had also aligned himself with
(2)the Afghans;' * Kamal Khan of Bandan; Imam Khan of Rudbar. 
Malek Abbas Khan Keyani, another significant chief in Sistan, 
sent one of his sons to the Amir and the other to the
rebels. Sharif Khan Nahruei also joined the coalition simply 
because every other Baluchi chief did, albeit he was related 
to Amir Alam Khan by marriage. The rebel chiefs furnished 
500 men:
"On the 1st Mohurrum (about 10th February) a 
force was sent to Seistan with Abbas Khan Sartip, 
Herati, Ataoolla Tymore, and Baba Khan, Hazara, 
consisting of the Regiments of Turshiz and Damghan 
with two guns, 600 horse Tymori and Hazara, and 100 
Shamkhalchis (mounted matchlock-men). By the end of 
Mohurrum the Governor was reduced to the last 
extremity, having been driven out of Huseinabad into 
the "ark" or citadel of Nasriya, leaving a gun in the 
hands of the insurgents. Forty or 50 men had been 
killed during the siege or blockade, and provisions 
had come to an end."(3)
The Amir's position was critical, even his son, Amir 
Ali-Akbar Khan who was put in charge of the governorship of 
Qaenat in the absence of his father, refused to send a relief 
force to his rescue for reasons explained in chapter II on 
the "Khozeimeh Amirdom of Qaenat and Sistan - section on Amir 
Ali-Akbar Khan Khozeimeh". The news of the despatch of 
relief forces from Mashhad softened the chiefs and as the
(1) From Captain the Hon'ble 6.C. Napier, on Special duty in Persia, to C.U. Aitchison,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, No, 18, dated Tehran 1st March
1875, FO 60/394 , p. 1 of 220.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Extract of Captain Napier's report to the Government of India, No. 18, dated Tehran 1st
March 1875, FO 60/394 , . p. 2 of 220.
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relief forces appeared near Sistan, the insurgents began to 
disperse. The action of the said chiefs who collectively 
owned considerable measures of agricultural lands and Neizar 
in Sistan, angered Naser ad-Din Shah Qajar to the extent that 
he ordered for all their lands in Sistan to be transferred 
into Khaleseh (public lands, owned by the crown) and to be 
leased back to whoever wanted to cultivate them.^^ These 
lands were re-distributed among the peasants at the time of 
Reza Shah Pahlavi in the 1930's.
Amir Alam Khan III was replaced in April 1872 by Samsam 
al-Molk (an outsider) as Governor of Sistan. This man was 
recalled in the winter of 187 3-74 and was replaced by another 
outsider, Mohammad Jahan Khan, who did not last long in 
Sistan either and was recalled in December 1874 to be 
replaced by Amir Alam Khan III, this time for life.
During the rule of Samsam al-Molk, the Iranian Government
appointed Haji Shah-Mohammad Khan to demarcate the Sistan
boundary in conjunction with Afghan representatives who had
also arrived at the frontier. These men were dismissed after
a while by the Governor who argued that "the administrative
and revenue arrangements for the partitioning of lands and
(2)demarcation were not completed".' '
The Afghans efforts, in diverting water from Hirmand before 
reaching Sistan Proper, was so effectively felt in the three 
years after General Goldsmid's arbitration award that Captain 
Napier's report on the "(present) situation in Sistan in 
relation to late arbitration" could not overlook it. This 
report indicates:
"The swampy malarious basin, it is argued, has 
come to be the seat of the densest population since 
the destruction of the old cities and of the canals, 
by which the fine lands to the south of the basin and 
on the right bank were rendered unculturable.
(1) Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz, “Bar Sistan va Hirmand Cheh Gozashteh Ast“, Rahavard Quarterly No. 
25, Vol. 1, Spring 1991, Los Angeles, p. 270.
(2) Captain Napier's report, op. cit., p. 3.
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"This, I was informed, would, undoubtedly, be the 
result of an energetic resort to works of irrigation 
on the Afghan side, even if the whole country were 
under one rule; when, therefore, the Persians are 
aware that their people are in the main disaffected, 
as events continue to prove, they have good reason to 
fear a ruinous desertion of their lands.
"It is probable that some stipulation was made 
regarding a division of the water of the Helmund by 
the "arbitrator," but if so, it is never alluded to by 
th Persians. They perhaps feel, as they well may, the 
futility of any such conditions under circumstances 
precluding the possibility of a speedy settlement of 
disputes. The party naturally the stronger and with 
the strongest hold on the country, having entire 
command of the source of water supply, and it being 
practically impossible to refer a dispute for 
settlement to any third party, the weaker party has 
good reasons to fear that its interests will suffer. 
After discussing this question, and looking at it as 
far as possible from all points, the conclusion 
arrived at is that the Persians have certainly much 
reason to fear loss of population and consequently of 
revenue, but that whether they have any reason to 
complain is doubtful."(1)
Finally, reflecting on the public disappointment of the 
Iranians with the arbitration award of General Goldsmid 
regarding the Sistan boundary, Captain Napier states in his 
report:
"Persian Opinions.
"The Persians, and especially those who have 
local knowledge, appear to regard the arbitration as a 
device to rob them of the lands they have acquired and 
have an ancestral claim to, by taking advantage of the 
weakness and ignorance of the Shah and his Ministers, 
and this is in the interest not of the Afghans but of 
the Government that promoted the arbitration. 
Believing this, and seeing also more plainly the 
losses that may ultimately be suffered by the more 
complete occupation of the lands on the Afghan side of 
the Helmund, they are furnished with a motive for 
disregarding the award and delaying as long as 
possible to give effect to it, and are stimulated 
thereto by a hope that some change of fortune may in 
the meantime occur to improve their position. Every
(1) Captain Napier's report, op. cit., p. 5 of 222.
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year that they can delay a settlement of the country 
and the occupation of the Afghan land is a direct gain, 
and also leaves room for changes that must be 
favorable. For, in the opinion of those Persians with 
whom I have conversed on the subject, their position in 
the country is so bad that if the arbitration award be 
strictly adhered to, their share of it will not be 
worth holding, and that matters being thus at the worst 
any change that time may produce must be to their 
advantage. Such opinions fully explain why the people 
are left in the dark regarding the boundary, and are 
led to believe that the matter is still unsettled, and 
that there is room for further changes.
"Opinions of Seistan
"The view taken by the Seistanis is very much the 
Persian view. They show that they believe, though they 
may not say so in so many words, that the arrangement 
was forced on the Persians by us for our own benefit, 
and that in awarding so much of the country to the 
Afghans we were simply gaining our own ends. They talk 
of the Afghan side of the boundary almost invariably as 
"mal i Inglis" (English possession) and of the people 
as "raiyat i Inglis."(1)
SISTAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE RENEWED
The most important friction between Iran and Afghanistan in 
Sistan occurred in 1896 when the main branch of Hirmand River 
changed its course in the delta region, from its most 
eastward old channel to Rud-e Parian, a more westerly branch 
(see figure 1). Though almost all recorded evidence speak of 
this change of course occurring in the said year, it appears 
that this change took place gradually, starting from 1893. 
Reporting this development to the British authorities of 
India in 1900, the British Consul for Sistan states:
"My visit along this eastern border was to see 
for myself the actual course of the Helmand river to 
the Naizar, as I had heard that, owing to the river 
having changed its course about seven years ago, there
(1) Captain Napier's report, op. cit., p. 7.
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existed some ambiguity about the clear definition of 
the border as laid down by Goldsmid."(1)
The border line ambiguity referred to in this report concerns
claims made by the Afghans that since the river had changed
its course, Goldsmid's arbitration award was rendered null
and void, and their boundary followed the river in its new
12 \channel, consequently the Mian Kangi' ' district was no
longer Iran's but belonged to them. British Consul at Sistan
wrote in 1900 that: "the Afghans maintain that the old bed
has become obliterated, and that, with its obliteration, the
Goldsmid award becomes null and void. They claim the new bed
runs along the rud-i-Pariun as far as the new Naizar. The
Persians assert that the old bed can still be traced, and
that, whatever geographical changes may have taken place in
(3 \the locality, the Goldsmid award must still hold good."' '
The Afghan Claim to Mian Kangi would benefit them 
tremendously as the district is a highly fertile land. This 
claim was in clear contradiction of Goldsmid's boundary 
delimitation award. His arbitral opinion of 19th August 
1872, concerning the eastern boarders of Sistan asserts:
"The main bed of the Helmand, therefore, below 
Kohak should be the eastern boundary of Persian 
Sistan."
(see Appendix 1)
The Afghan claim could warrant some validity if the 
arbitration opinion spoke of the "main branch" or "main 
course" of the river being the boundary. The water changed 
its course but the actual river bed which was defined to be
(1) Confidential Diary of Major G. Chenevix-Trench, Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul for Sistan,
No. 6, Period 14th to 25th May 1900, FO/60 463, P. 140.
(2) Kang is an ancient Persian word for ‘island".
(3) Extract of clause 3 of despatch No. 172 from Major Benn, H.B., Majesty's Vice-Consul for
Sistan to Lieutenant J.F. White, ConsuL General for Khorasan, dated 14th JuLy 1902, F0 60/463,
p. 209.
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the boundary, could not have moved from where it was. As the 
changed course of the river rendered lands to the east of the 
new channel (Rud-e Parian) dry, the Iranians began 
constructing canals from Parian to the lands deprived of 
water in Mian Kangi. Writing on this undertaking, the 
British Consul for Sistan noted:
"Here I was much struck by the extraordinary 
quantity of grain being at the time reaped and the 
general richness of the soil. I found that the 
Persians were busy in making new canals from the right 
bank of the Pariun or present bed of the Helmand, to 
water the lands which were now dry, and which were 
formerly watered from the left bank of the Helmand.
The Nahr-i-Surhang and Sartip were two large 
canals in progress, the Nahr-i-Surhang extending right 
up to Takht-i~Shah, the least rightful property of the 
Persians."(1)
Threats of an Afghan aggression west of the old bed of River 
Hirmand, for the occupation of Mian Kangi, was imminent. 
Amir Alam Khan III, the able and powerful Khozeimeh Amir of 
Qaenat and Sistan had died and was succeeded in 1891 by his 
elder son, Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Khozeimeh, as Governor of 
Sistan who had inherited his father's title "Heshmat al-Molk" 
as well as the governorship of Sistan. Amir Heshmat al-Molk 
II, unlike his father, was not a strong leader and this in 
itself was an invitation for Afghan aggression in Sistan.
Aware of this situation, and concerned about the situation in
Afghanistan in the wake of Amir Shir Ali Khan's death in
1901, the Governor General of Khorasan decided to strengthen
Iran's frontier with Afghanistan in Sistan. Information
received by the British Consul of Sistan confirmed that a
force of 4,000 infantry with some guns was being despatched
to Sistan from Tehran because it was necessary, owing to the
death of the Amir of Kabul, to have an adequate force under a
strong man along the Sistan-Afghan boarder. The officer in
(2}charge of the force was said to be the Entekhab-al-Molk.v ’
(1) Extract of Confidential Diary of Major G. Henevix-Trench, op. cit., p. 3 of 141.
(2) Diary No. 25 of Major R.A.E. Benn, Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-ConsuL for Sistan and Kain, 
for period 1st to 15th December 1901, FO 60/463, pp. 1 - 2 of 7.
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The long awaited Afghan aggression in Mian Kangi district
took place in 1902. The local Governor of Chokhansur
(Afghanistan), Faqir-Mohammad Akhund-Zadeh, informed the
British Vice-Consul for Sistan on the 7th of December 1901
that during his previous visit to Herat, he was told that it
had been decided to redemarcate the Sistan boundary, and that
the Afghan Commissioner was on his way to Sistan to be joined
(1)by the Iranian Commissioner.v }
As it turned out, there had been no arrangement of the kind 
that was claimed by the said Akhund-Zadeh to have taken place 
with the Iranians. Less than six months later he sent a 
request to the Deputy Governor of Sistan, Amir Mohammad Reza 
Khan (eldest son of Amir Heshmat al-Molk II) to be allowed to 
visit Nosrat Abad (now Zabol) capital of Iranian Sistan, for 
the purposes of discussing boundary delimitation and that he 
would bring three regiments with him as escort. ' 1 This, 
the Deputy Governor of Sistan refused, and Yamin Nezam who 
had been appointed by Tehran as the Frontier-Keeper of 
Sistan, despatched parts of his troops to the Sistan frontier 
with Afghanistan, where they were joined by the local cavalry
/ 3 \
sent by the Deputy Governor. v ' This was done in 
anticipation of the suspected aggression against Sistan by 
the Afghans which was sensed by the Iranians to be imminent 
in the wake of Akhund-Zadeh1s above-mentioned message to the 
Deputy Governor of Sistan. Faqir-Mohammad Akhund-Zadeh 
crossed the frontier with all his troops on 29th June 1902, 
pitching his camp close to Deh-e Dust Mohammad on the Iranian 
Territory and began a campaign of harassment on the 
inhabitants. He prevented Government officials from 
performing their administrative work on behalf of the Iranian 
Government, and destroyed Iran's Band-e Sistan dam which had
(1) Diary No. 25 of Major Benn, 1st to 15th December 1901, op. cit., p. 2.
(2) Confidential Diary No. 6 of Major R.A.E. Benn, Her Britannic Majesty's Vice Consul for 
Sistan, for Period 16th to 30th June 1902, FO 60/463, , P. 1 of 205.
(3) Ibid.
496
existed long before the Goldsmid arbitration and was 
recognised by the arbitral opinion as being an Iranian 
possession. Previous to this, however, the Afghans had made 
two attempts to provoke the Iranian authorities to take 
action.
During the first week in April it was reported that the 
Akhund-Zadeh had arrested, near Jallalabad in Iranian 
territory, an Iranian subject who was collecting 
grazing-tax. This report seems to have been exaggerated, and 
it would appear that the Akhundzada - claiming the new 
Hirmand bed as his boundary - merely protested against the 
Iranians collecting taxes at Jallalabad.
On 15th April, at a time when there was a great scarcity of 
water in the Hirmund, reports reached the British Consul that 
the Afghans had partially destroyed the Sistan Band at Kuhak, 
so as to allow of a good flow of water reaching a point lower 
down stream, called Chah Gol, where they had made a dam to 
conduct the water into Afghan territory. This dam had the 
effect of temporarily cutting off the Mian Kangi district 
from water, or at any rate of seriously reducing its 
supply.^ ^
The Afghans began constructing two dams" one in a place south
of Malek and the other down stream near Deh-e Dust Mohammad,
thus diverting the whole of the Hirmand water to the Afghan
(2)side and thereby ruining Iranian villages,'1 1 while the 
Iranian officials: the Deputy Governor, the Yamin-e Nezam and 
the Kargozar retired in indecision and while the British 
officials began referring to Mian Kangi as the "disputed 
frontier district", the Russian Consul for Sistan became 
agitated by the situation and began displaying objections to 
the Afghan aggression and Iranian local officials'
(1) Confidential Diary of Sistan, No. 172, for 14th July 1902, FO 60/463, p. 2.
(2) From His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India to His Highness the Amir of
Afghanistan, dated Simla 31st July 1902, FO 60/659.
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inactivity. The confidential dairy of the British Consul for 
Sistan, dated 14th of July 1902 states:
"During M. Molitor's absence on the frontier, the 
Russian Consul had written letters to the Deputy 
Governor and the Yamin-i~Nizam. He asked the former 
for an official explanation of his action in allowing 
an armed force belonging to a foreign power to enter 
Seistan,
The Deputy Governor (as he subsequently 
complained to me) was much annoyed at this "piece of 
interference", and in a short but polite reply told 
the Russian Consul that the matter only concerned the 
Persian Government. The above was afterwards 
corroborated by M. Miller's Mirza who told my Head 
Clerk."(2)
(For more details on Anglo-Russian 
rivalries in Sistan and Qaenat, 
see chapter on Khozeimeh Amirdom's 
Foreign Relations).
The two local authorities of Iran and Afghanistan (Yamin-e 
Nezam and Akhund-Zadeh) eventually agreed to meet and discuss 
the differences. This meeting took place on 10th July 1902 
and was decided, according to the confidential diary of the 
British Consul for Sistan:
"(1) That as the maps in possession of the Persian and 
Afghan representatives do not appear to agree,
and that as no definite decision regarding the 
boundary can, therefore, be arrived at for the 
present, the matter should be referred for orders 
to Tehran and Kabul, respectively.
" (2) That pending the receipt of orders from their
Governments, both parties should retire from the 
frontier.
"The Akhundzada, though he dismissed his troops, 
was at first inclined to remain at Deh Dost Muhammad 
with a small escort, there to await his orders. He is 
now said to have retired to his own residence at
Kila-i-Kang, and the Yamin-i-Nizam and Sardar Purdil 
Khan have now returned with all their troops to
Seistan."(2)
(1) Extract of CLause 12 of Confidential Diary of Sistan, No. 172, for 14th JuLy 1902, FO 
60/463,' ' p.3 of 210.
(2) Ibid, p. 5 of 211.
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Thus, the problem was settled temporarily on the 1st of 
August 1902. The British Charge d'Affairs at Tehran informed 
the Foreign Office that the Iranians had complained to him of 
the occupation of Iranian territory in Sistan by 
Akhund-Zadeh, and requested them to prevent further 
encroachments pending a settlement of the boundary line.^^
Reports to the Indian Government by the Vice-Consul for 
Sistan seems to have moved the Government of India to 
formulate a policy that would make the Iranians refrain from 
military action against the aggressors and to refer the 
dispute to the British Indian authorities for settlement. 
This was mainly owing to the facts stated in the following 
document:
"MY Secret telegram of 17th July.
Benn telegraphed on 7th July that M o l i t o r ( 2) ±s 
said to have demanded reinforcements urgently, and 
that Birjand Governor is sending troops. In later 
telegram, dated 9th, Benn reports that Molitor, who 
returned on 6th informed him that he acts [eel] as 
Customs officer only, that his meeting Miller(&) at 
Governor's house was accidental, and that hostile 
influences, meaning Miller's were at work to 
complicate situation and provoke disturbance. 
Deputy-Governor, who had received another letter from 
Miller, complained of latter's interference to Benn, 
who has information that Miller is in communication 
both with Afghan Governor and Yamini Nizam, and is 
inciting both. Benn is in communication Afghan, has 
induced Seistan Governor to issue orders to avoid 
conflict, and has reminded latter of provisions of 
Article VI of Treaty of 1857. I think that Persian 
Government should also be reminded of their obligation 
under this Article to refer dispute to British 
Government, and, if you agree, I will address Ameer in 
similar sense; meanwhile, I again urge strong protest 
against Russian Consul's intrigue [?] in a matter 
which solely concerns Persian, Afghan and British 
Governments."(4)
(1) From Her Britannic Majesty's Charge de Affairs to Foreign Secretary Simla, No. 25, dated 1st
August 1902, FO 60/463 •
(2) Molitor was an Iranian Customs Officer from the Belgic team led by Monsur Nouz.
(3) Miller was the Russian Consul for Sistan.
(4) Telegram from the Government of India to Lord George HamiLton, Secretary of State for India,
dated JuLy 21, 1902, FO 60/463, p.118.
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The Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, in the meantime, 
complained to the Russian Government of the interference by 
the Russian Consul for Sistan in the Sistan frontier 
dispute. The Russians replied that they could not be 
indifferent in such matters. The Russian Ambassador informed 
the British: "that the Russian Government had learned that an 
Afghan Chief (the Akhund-Zadeh) had collected a considerable 
body of troops and was threatening the Persian frontier in 
the neighbourhood of Nasratabad. The Russian Government
could not regard the prospect of such an incursion with
indifference, and that they hoped that the British Government 
would do their best to prevent a breach of the peace.
The Iranian Foreign Ministry informed the British Legation at
Tehran on 29th July 1902 that Akhund-Zadeh had resumed
encroaching on Iranian territory by taking possession of
12)several other villages and hamlets on Iranian soil.v '
The Viceroy of India, at length, wrote to the new Amir of 
Afghanistan, Amir Habibollah Khan, (who had been invested
with a Knighthood and the title of "Sir" by the British
Government) reminding him that a settlement of the frontier 
dispute with Iran was not the responsibility of his
Government's provincial representatives, but those of the 
British Government of India. The Viceroy pointed out:
"I am not prepared at this moment, and on the 
information in my possession, to advise Your Highness 
precisely how the frontier line should be drawn: this 
is a question which can only be decided after very
careful enquiry on the spot. I would remind Your
Highness, however, that by the arrangement with your 
late father, the control of the foreign relations of 
Afghanistan rests with the British Government, and I 
would accordingly propose that, as in 1872, a British 
officer should be appointed as arbitrator to settle 
the dispute. X regard this measure as imperative in 
the interests of peace and, on hearing that Your
(1) Extract of Letter from the Marquis of Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott, No. 208, dated Foreign
Office, JuLy 27, 1902, FO 60/463 # P. 84.
(2) From Moshir ad-Doleh, Iranian Foreign Minister, to Mr. des Graz of British Legation at 
Tehran, dated July 29, 1902, FO 60/659 -
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Highness approves of this suggestion, I will take 
steps to secure the consent of the Persian Government, 
and will arrange for the deputation of a competent 
officer in the early autumn,"(*)
The Iranian authorities complained again on August 2, 1902,
to the British Minister at Tehran that the Afghans had made
fresh encroachments in Sistan and established customs and
posts and built houses and dwellings on Iranian soil.^^ A
further complaint from the Iranian Foreign Minister, made on
August 14, 19 02, confirmed that the Akhund-Zadeh had returned
after the negotiations with Yamin-e Nezam, but on returning
from the Iranian territories, the Afghans stopped up all
mouths of the water courses and runlets, diverted the water
of the Hirmand, destroyed the dam by which water came to
(3)Sistan, and went off.v ' The substance of this complaint 
was subsequently confirmed to the British Minister at Tehran 
who wrote to the British Foreign Secretary on August 15, 1902 
that: "it was true that he had heard that the Afghans had
according to his information withdrawn but not before having 
achieved the object they had in view by destroying dams in 
Iranian Territory and thus depriving part of Iranian Seistan 
of water. These fresh acts of aggression had been reported 
to him on dates which he made out to be somewhat more recent 
than July 14 and he was receiving constant complaints and 
appeals for redress from the inhabitants of those villages 
which had been entirely deprived of their water supply by the 
Afghans' action in breaking down the dams and diverting the 
stream to their own t e r r i t o r y ^ ^
(1) Extract of Letter from H.E. the Viceroy of India to H.H. Amir Sir HabibolLah Khan of
Afghanistan, dated Simla 31st of JuLy 1902, FO 60/659 *
(2) From Hoshir ad-DoLeh to Hr. des Graz, August 2, 1902, F060/659*
(3) From Hoshir ad-Doleh to Hr. des Graz, August 14, 1902, F060/659*
(4) Extract of Letter from H.B. Majesty's Hinister at Tehran to the Harques of Lansdoune, No.
117, dated August 15, 1902, FO 60/569 , p.2.
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But what the Iranian Foreign Minister did not know was that 
the damage inflicted by the Afghans to the people and lands 
of Sistan was far greater than it was first thought. 
Replying to a despatch by the British Foreign Secretary in 
assessing the damages, the British Legation at Tehran 
informed him:
"Benn reports, in urgent communication received 
by post to-day, copy of which has been telegraphed to 
Government of India, that Persian sowars who were sent 
by Seistan authorities to report on condition of 
Helmand have brought back story that Afghans have 
constructed Bunds at ten or twelve different places in 
Afghan territory, which divert water to irrigate lands 
hitherto uncultivated, and that Akhandzadeh has opened 
deep channel just above Seistan Bund, thus drawing off 
what little water that remains. There is water famine 
in Seistan caused in part by prolonged drought of 
Bund. " (1)
Mr Benn, Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul for Sistan,
subsequently informed the Foreign Secretary of the Indian
Government of a different story, that shortage of water in
Sistan was because of Hirmand being "particularly dry" that 
(2 )year.' ' Finally, the Government of India proposed, in a
letter to the British Foreign Secretary, in late September
1902, that Colonel McMahon should be appointed as the new
arbitrator for Sistan’s ^disputed" frontiers, that he should
start in November, accompanied not only by experts in matters
of boundary delimitation, but also by "two companies of
(3 \infantry and a troop of cavalry".' ;
Replying to the Viceroy of India's letter, the Amir of 
Afghanistan, firstly denied the whole incident and then 
claimed that the dispute was local and insignificant. He 
claimed that what was interfered with was recognised by
(1) From des Graz to the Marques of Lansdowne, No. 52, 28th August 1902, FO 60/569 •
(2) From Major Benn to Foreign Secretary India, 1st Sep. 1902, F0 60/659 *
(3) From Government of India to Lord Hamilton No. 1 dated Sept. 30, 1902 of Persia and Arabia
Confidential F0 60/659
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General Goldsmid's arbitral map which, according to him, was 
a curved line from Kuh-e Siah to the end of the 
Irano-Afghanistan frontier, clearly implying that the 
boundary was from the beginning on the new channel. Having 
said all this, he finally stated:
"As to what Your Excellency writes stating that 
the Persian Government has represented to His Majesty 
the King of England's Government that, besides 
occupying land, which was until recently indisputably 
Persian, my subjects have destroyed the Persian dam 
of Band-i-Seistan near Kuhak, - my dear friend, as 
clearly the complaints of the Persian Government are 
against the officials of Chakhansur, who are subjects
of the God-granted Government of Afghanistan, and are
friends and not subjects of the Government of His
Majesty the King of England, I have written a reply
above to the effect that the Hakim of Chakhansur does 
not interfere with the land which is on the other 
side, to the west of the boundary line, as marked in 
the map of General Goldsmid, although owing to the 
flood and change of course of the stream, it may have 
come to be placed on this side of the Helmand and 
close to the western side of the boundary line."(1)
The British Vice-Consul for Sistan, in the meantime, once 
again corrected his report on the extent of damages caused in 
Sistan by the Afghans. In his despatch of October 15, 1902, 
Major Benn informed the Indian Government:
"My report No. 298, dated 30th September, shows 
clearly how the Shahgul bund and channel are able 
successfully to prevent any of the Helmand water from 
reaching the Miankangi district. I have also pointed 
out that in normal years the Helmand water easily 
passes the Shahgul bund and fills the Pariun river 
bed, which is the main channel of supply for the 
Miankangi district. At the present moment, although 
Nasratabad and its adjacent villages, as also the 
villages along the Rud-i-Seistan, are supplied with 
water, the Miankangi district is absolutely without 
any, owing to the existence of the Shahgul bund and 
channel. It is stated here that what the Afghans are 
striving for is to destroy the Seistan bund at Kohak 
and to construct a more permanent dam at Shahgul. By 
this means they hope that the Helmund water would
<1) Extract of Letter from H.H. Amir Sir Habibollah Khan to H.E. the Viceroy of India, No. 12 
dated 15 October 1902, FO 60/659, P. 75.
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again be permanently diverted into its old bed. The 
only argument the Afghans use in defence of their 
present action is that, with the shifting of the 
Helmand into its new bed, the Miankangi district has 
become their property, and they, therefore, deny the 
Persians' right to cultivate it. These arguments they 
are able to support by a show of force, which is 
certainly superior in quality to anything the 
Seistanis can at present produce."(1)
The Government of India, apparently loosing patience with the 
Afghan Amir's evident lack of concern about the situation in 
Sistan, wrote on October 21, 1902, to the British Government 
stating that Akhund-Zadeh had flatly refused to allow water 
to pass through the Shahgol dam - the Afghans built on the 
Hirmand, diverting all its water to Afghan territory - to 
Mian Kangi and the Iranians threatened reprisals. The 
Iranian Government had stated that they felt the situation to 
be critical and likely to result in the advancement of 
Iranian troops and that the letter promised by the Amir of 
Afghanistan had not been received. They, therefore, asked 
the Foreign Office to address strong remonstrance to the 
Amir.^ ^  ^
A new turn, for the worst, was the undertaking by the Afghans 
to construct a large canal from the Hirmand River at Kushk, 
before the start of Sistan - Afghan boundary, diverting the 
whole of the river into Afghan territory before reaching the 
Iranian boarder. Major Benn, British Vice Consul for Sistan, 
indicated in his confidential diary of 31st October 1902:
''The Afghans, it is said, cherish the hope that 
their large canal from Kushk above the Seistan Bund 
through Khaogah to Jaroki will divert the course of 
the Helmund and deprive Seistan of its water supply. 
But from information now received from a secret agent 
sent to inspect the canal a somewhat different aspect 
has been thrown on the case. It would appear that 
only half the work is now completed and that 20 to 30
(1) Clause 3 of despatch from Major Benn to the Secretary to the Indian Government, No. 339, 
dated 15 Oct. 1902, FO 60/659 •
(2) From the Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton, No. 1, dated 21st October 1902, FO 60/659 *
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days will be required to finish it. Also that owing 
to disputes existing between the Akhundzada of
Chikansur and the Governor of Kilai Fath there is a 
probability of the canal not being finished at 
all. " (2)
This undertaking was also in contradiction with the terms of 
Goldsmid's arbitral opinion which makes it clear that "no 
works are to be carried on either side calculated to 
interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation 
on both banks of the Helmand" (see Appendix I).
Major Benn visited the site of this canal and prepared a
sketch which is reproduced here (see figure II) . He also
reported on October 29, 1902 that the Yamin-e Nezam told him
that the Iranians would not take Akhund-Zadeh's grand canal
too seriously, and that it was more of a psychological
(2 )warfare against the Sistanis.v '
Faquir-Mohammad Akhund-Zadeh continued harassment of Sistan 
even when the British Arbitration Commission, led by Major 
McMahon, was preparing to move to Sistan. He threatened to 
destroy what remained of the Sistan dam and persistently 
claimed Mian Kangi to be his possession. As a result, the 
Viceroy of India wrote to the Amir of Afghanistan on November 
24, 1902 explaining in full detail the situation, his claims 
and Goldsmid1s award, remarking:
"It is not the case therefore, as stated by Your
Highness, that by Colonel Goldsmid's decision the
whole of the river below the Kohak bund and the Kohak 
bund were left to Afghanistan or that Your
Highness'subjects are at liberty to do what they 
please with the water below Kohak. Further, it is
clear from the award of Colonel Goldsmid and from 
correspondence that passed between Atta Muhammad Khanf 
Khakwani, British Agent at Kabul, under instructions
(1) Extract of Confidential Diary No. 14 of Major Benn, British Vice-ConsuL for Sistan, 16th to
31st October 1902, FO 60/463 , p. 2.
(2) From Major Benn to the Government of India, No. 366, dated 29th October 1902, FO 60/659 r
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from the British Government, and Saiyid Nur Muhammad 
Shah, the Sadr Azam, in February 1874, in consequence 
of enquiries made by the latter as to the meaning of 
this portion of the award, that the Persians have the 
same right to make channels on their side of the river 
below Kohak as the Afghans have to make them on 
theirs, and that channels should not be constructed by 
either party which will interfere with the water in 
the old ones. These then are the facts. Your 
Highness and your officials are apparently under a 
misapprehension as to the true position of the 
boundary fixed by Colonel Goldsmid."(*)
Interestingly enough, as the arbitration commission was about 
to leave for Sistan, both Iran and Afghanistan expressed 
unwillingness for the matter to be referred to British 
arbitration, both claiming that with the rise in Hirmand 
water the dispute would settle itself.
When the British Minister at Tehran applied pressure on the
Iranian Prime Minister for the reasons of Iranian reluctance
regarding British arbitration of the Sistan dispute, the
Prime Minister, according to the British Minister at Tehran,
replied that it was because the Russians had suggested to the
Shah that their representative should also be involved in the
arbitration and as the Shah responded favourably to this
demand it would be difficult to go ahead with the proposed
(2 )arbitration without them being involved.v '
Even if this was the case, it would not explain the 
reluctance displayed by the Afghans to British arbitration. 
It appears, however, that the actual reason for both parties' 
reluctance to accept the proposed British arbitration was 
because of their dissatisfaction of General Goldsmid's 
arbitration award of 1872.
(1) From H.E. the Viceroy and Governor GeneraL of India to H.H. Amir Sir HabibolLah Khan
G.C.M.G. of Afghanistan, No. 51. p.o., dated Viceroy's Camp the 24th November 1902, FO 60/659/
p. 100.
(2) From Hardinge of British Legation at Tehran to the Marques of Lansdowne Confidential No. 
180, dated Tehran December 29, 1902, FO 60/659 -
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FIGURE II
Sketch of Afghan Grand Canal, Prepared by Major Benn 
(Enclosure in Mr Benn’s despatch No. 36 6, 
dated Sistan 29th October 1902, to the Government of India
FO 60/659 )
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The new arbitration of Sistan, however, went ahead in 1903 
and concluded its task in 1904, and final arbitral awards 
were made in 1905 (See next chapter).
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APPENDIX I
General Summary and Arbitral Opinion; dated Tehran, 
the 19th August 1872.
Preamble
The Arbitral opinion which I am required to deliver has been
formed after perusal of the several histories of Sistan of
more general note; after examination of much oral and written 
evidence; and after a stay of forty-one days within the
localities under dispute. Naturally the more immediate 
argument with which I have to deal is contained in the
statement authoritatively given in by the Persian Government 
(through the Foreign Office, or Mirza Melkam Khan), and 
Afghan Commissioners. These have been carefully considered 
together with the documentary evidence with which they are 
supported.
I now proceed to summarise my views on the whole Sistan 
question and to carry out the instructions with which I have 
been honoured.
Summary
I Sistan was undoubtedly in ancient times part of Persia,
and it appears to have been so especially under the
Safavian Kings: but under Ahmad Shah it formed part of 
the Durani Empire. Further it had not been recovered to 
Persia until at a very recent date; and that only 
partially, and under circumstances the nature of which 
materially affect the present enquiry.
II Ancient associations, together with the religion, 
language, and perhaps habits of the people of Sistan 
Proper, render the annexation of the tract to Persia by 
no means a strange or unnatural measure. But Persia has 
not valid claim to possess it on abstract right, whether 
the country be taken from Afghanistan, or whether it be 
simply deprived of independence. The period referred to 
for former connection is too remote. A century of 
disconnection cannot fail to be a bar to validity.
III The possession of the Afghans for the second
half-century may have been more nominal than real, and 
more spasmodic than sustained. It may have been 
asserted by raids and invasions, or mere temporary 
tenure: but it has nevertheless a certain number of
facts in support; and these are most material in an 
enquiry of this nature. General principles and theories 
are always important, but they cannot produce facts:
(+) GoLdsraid, Major-General Sir Frederick, "Eastern Persia" Vol. I, London 1876, pp. 410 - 411 - 
412 - 413 = 414.
509
whereas facts have a more practical tendency - for they 
support and establish general principles and theories. 
Neither ancient associations nor national sympathy are 
strong enough to nullify the force of circumstances, and 
circumstances show that Persia has exercised no
interference in the internal administration of Sistan 
from the days of Nadir Shah until a very recent date.
IV Geographically, Sistan is clearly part of Afghanistan, 
and the intrusion of Kain into the province is 
prejudicial to the delineation of a good natural 
frontier.
It has been commonly considered part of Herat and Lash 
Juwain; though its dependence on the Helmand for 
irrigation may cause it to be included by some in the 
general valley of that river. The Neh Bandan Hills 
manifestly separate Sistan from Persia. I cannot but
believe such would have been found to be the status had
an illustrative map accompanied the sixth article of the 
Paris treaty.
V But while, in my opinion, Afghanistan has the advantage 
in claims on the score of an intermediate tenure, 
superseding that of Nadir Shah or the Safavian Kings, it 
cannot be denied that from year to year she has been 
relaxing her hold over Sistan; and this has been evinced 
in a marked manner since the death of the Wazir Yar
Muhammad. It would be absurd to contend that the second 
half-century of Afghan connection with the province has 
been a period of continuous possession. That Sistan has 
now fallen into the hands of independence and the 
personal action of its ruler. It was for a time at 
least out of the hands of Afghanistan. I do not admit 
that the manner in which Sistan was occupied by Persian 
troops corresponds with an appeal to arms such as 
contemplated by Lord Russell's letter quoted - There was 
no fair fighting at all. Nor can it be admitted that 
allegiance was obtained by the single means of military 
movements or open procedure of any kind. On the other 
hand, I cannot see that the Afghans took any measures to 
counteract the proceedings of Persia when treating with 
Ali Khan, Taj Muhammad, or other Sistan chiefs.
VI As the Sistan of the present day is not the separate
principality of the past, and it is essential to a due 
appreciation of claims, that the parts in possession of 
either side should be intelligibly defined, I revert to 
a territorial division which has appeared to me
convenient and approximate. By this arrangement the 
rich tract of country, which, the Hamun on three of its 
sides and the Helmand on the fourth, cause to resemble
an island, is designated 'Sistan Proper,' whereas the
district of Chakhansur and lands of the Helmand above 
the Bank, and Sistan desert, are known as 'Outer Sistan.'
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The first may be considered in absolute possession of 
Persia and has a comparatively large and mixed 
population.
The second is either without population or inhabited 
chiefly by Baluchis some of whom acknowledge Persian, 
Some Afghan sovereignty. The professions of Kamal Khan 
and Imam Khan do not to my mind prove a possession to 
Persia, similar to that of Sistan Proper. Chakhansur on 
the right bank of the Helmand is under the Afghans. But 
the fort of Nad Ali on the same bank has been lately 
taken by the Persians.
VII I have to consider ancient right and present possession, 
and report briefly my opinion on both these head: 1st.
That Sistan was incorporated in the Persia of ancient 
days: but the Afghanistan of Ahmad Shah, which also
comprised Sistan, had not then come into existence; and 
it is impossible to set aside the fact that this kingdom 
did exist, any more than that Ahmad Shah was an 
independent monarch. 2nd. That the possession of 
Sistan obtained in recent days by Persia cannot affect 
the question of right as regards Afghanistan. If 
admitted at all under the circumstances, it can only be 
so subject to certain restrictions, and with reference 
to the particular people brought under control.
Arbitral Opinion
Weighing therefore the merits of the case on either side 
as gather from evidence of many kinds, and with especial 
regard to the great advantages of a clearly defined 
frontier, I submit an opinion that the tract which I 
have called 'Sistan Proper1 should be hereafter included 
by a special boundary line within the limits of Persia, 
to be restored to independence under Persian protection, 
or governed by duly appointed governors. This opinion 
is accompanied by an expression of sincere and earnest 
hope that the Persian rule will prove beneficial to a 
people whose nominal state has been from time 
immemorable one of terror, suspense, and suffering.
But I am thoroughly convinced that, by all rules of 
justice and equity, if Persia be allowed to hold 
possession of a country which has fallen to her control 
under such circumstances as these detailed, her 
possession should be circumscribed to the limits of her 
actual possession in Sistan Proper, as far as consistent 
with geographical and political requirements. She 
should not possess land on the right bank of the 
Helmand.
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If in a question of ancient right and present 
possession, a military occupation of six or seven years 
and the previously action of a local chief be suffered 
to outweigh rights and associations extending more or 
less over a whole country, and ARbitration award the 
most coveted, populous, and richer part of the Sistan 
province, it is manifestly fair that some compensating 
benefit should accrue to the losing side.
It appears therefore beyond doubt indispensable that Nad 
Ali should be evacuated by Persian garrisons, and both 
banks of the Helmand above the Kohak Band be given up to 
Afghanistan. And this arrangement becomes doubly just 
and proper when the character of the inhabitants along 
the banks of the river is compared with that of the 
Sistanis of Sekuha, Deshtak, and Sistan Proper.
The main bed of the Helmand therefore below Kohak should 
be the eastern boundary of Persian Sistan, and the line 
of frontier from Kohak to the hills south of the Sistan 
desert should be so drawn as to include within the 
Afghan limits all cultivation on the banks of the river 
from the Bank upwards.
The Malik Siah Koh on the chain of hills separating the 
Sistan from the Karman desert, appears a fitting point.
North of Sistan the southern limit of the Naizar should 
be the frontier towards Lash Juwain. Persia should not 
cross the Hamun in that direction. A line drawn from 
the Naizar to the "Kuh Siah" (black hill) near Bandan, 
would clearly define her possessions.
It is moreover to be well understood that no works are 
to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere 
with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on the 
banks of the Helmand.
F J GOLDSMID, Major-General,
On Special Mission
C H A P T E R  V I I
EVOLUTION OF SISTAN BOUNDARY =
PART I I :  MCMAHON’S BOUNDARY ARBITRATION 
OF SISTAN 
(1903-1905)
INTRODUCTION
Following General Goldsmid's Sistan boundary arbitration of 
1872, further disputes occurred between Iran and Afghanistan 
on the Sistan section of their mutual boundaries. Recurrence 
of disputes between the two countries was caused by changes 
of course of the River Hirmand in the Sistan delta region 
which began by an unusually large flood in 1884 and was 
completed by another unusually large flood in 1896. While 
both Iran and Afghanistan were unhappy about Goldsmid's 
arbitral award of their mutual boundary of 1872, the new 
alteration in the course of the river came as an addition to 
the old disputes.
In 1896 the Hirmand burst into a new main channel which was 
subsequently named Rud-e Parian. The Afghans claimed that 
the boundary should also follow the changed main course of 
the river, thus leaving the district of Mian Kangi to the 
Afghan side of the frontier. The Iranians rejected this 
claim and maintained that the boundary should remain along 
the old branch of the river "Nad Ali channel" where it was 
defined by General Goldsmid, and that the change of the 
course of the river should not be considered as cause for 
changing the boundary. The Afghans occupied lands to the 
east of the new channel of Parian and to the west of the old 
channel of Nad Ali which are known as Mian Kangi (see Figure 
1). Furthermore, the Afghans constructed new dams and 
canals, diverting much of the water from the Hirmand to their 
territories.
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The Iranians complained to the British Minister at Tehran in
July 1902 against Afghan encroachments in Sistan and
requested the British Government's intervention to prevent
further Afghan encroachments in the Iranian
territories1  ^ The Indian Government undertook to remind
the Iranians not to resort to force in the disputed frontier
and proposed to remind the Iranians "of their obligation
/ 2 \
under this Article' ; to refer the dispute to the British 
(3 \Government".' '
The Viceroy of India wrote to the Amir of Afghanistan asking
him also to refer the dispute to the British Government for 
/ 4 \
arbitration.v ' In another letter in September 1902 to the 
British Foreign Secretary, the Government of India proposed 
that Major Henry McMahon should be appointed as the 
arbitrator of the disputed Sistan f r o n t i e r s , b u t  both 
Iran and Afghanistan expressed to the British their 
unwillingness to refer the frontier dispute to the
arbitration of British officers which was ignored and 
McMahon's arbitration went ahead.
THE RUSSIAN DIMENSION
The Iranians intimated to the British Minister at Tehran that 
the attitude of Russia was the real reason for Iran's desire
(1) From H.8. Majesty’s Charge d'Affairs at Tehran to Foreign Secretary of India, No. 25, dated
1st August 1902, FO 60/463 -
(2) Article VI of 1857 Anglo-Iranian Peace Treaty of Paris.
(3) Telegram from Government of India to Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India,
dated July 21, 1902, FO 60/463, p.118.
(4) From His Excellency the Viceroy of India to His Highness Amir Sir HabiboLLah Khan of 
Afghanistan, dated Simla 31st July 1902, FO 60/659 -
(5) From Government of India to Lord G. Hamilton, No. 1, dated September 30, 1902, of Persia and
Arabia Confidential, F0 60/659 «
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to back out of arbitration. Writing to the Marquess of 
Lansdowne, Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary, the British 
Minister at Tehran informed him that he had been told by the 
Iranian Prime Minister that the Russian Minister had asked 
the Shah to allow a Russian Delegate to accompany the Iranian 
Commissioner and the Shah had not objected to the proposal. 
This the British could not accept and the British
Minister at Tehran told the Iranian Prime Minster what to say 
to the Russians:
"J said that his course was easy. Persian
Government could at most only promise Russia to ask us
if we objected to her, and if we did, as I felt
certain would be the case, inform her of my reply and
of Persia's treaty obligations"(2).
The idea of Russian involvement in Sistan arbitration was 
opposed to by the British, who went as far as threatening the 
Iranians with Afghans interference with the water supply in 
Sistan if the Iranians did not submit to McMahon's 
arbitration without their commissioner being accompanied by a 
Russian representative. In a letter to the Government of 
India, the British Secretary of State for India indicated:
"We do not think that in any form Russian 
intervention can be allowed, and we are of opinion 
that, if in spite of remonstrance addressed by us to 
the Shah, the Persian Commissioner is accompanied by a 
Russian delegate, McMahon should decline to exercise 
his arbitral functions, and should follow Hardinge's 
suggestion, that he should remain on the Afghan side 
of the frontier and advise the Afghans.
By adopting this course he will be able to supply 
all information that is necessary, and the failure of 
the Persian Government to respect its treaty 
obligations will be responsible for any inconvenience 
that may result to Persian cultivators from the 
Afghans interfering with the water supply."(3)
(1) From Lord G. Hamilton to Government of India communicated by India Office, dated December 
31, 1902, FO 60/711 ■
(2) Extract of Telegram No. 83, from Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Tehran 
December 29, 1902, FO 60/711 -
(3) Extract from despatch from Secretary of State (for India) to Viceroy, dated 31st December 
1902, F0 60/711 -
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This development was just another manifestation of fierce 
Anglo-Russian rivalries in Iran, substantially increased by 
the turn of the twentieth century. The Russians viewed 
Sistan as the real key to India and, thus, attached greater 
strategic importance to the position of Sistan vis-a-vis 
India. Their Consul for Sistan Mr Miller, became accordingly 
highly active in the region. An article appearing in the 
Russian paper, 'Novoe Vremya' on January 2nd, 1903, described 
the Russian view in clear terms:
11Seistan, by its geographical position and 
intrinsic nature, deserves, rather than Herat, the 
name of the "key to India", Seistan, that flank 
position on the road to India which it is impossible 
to turn. Were it in our hands the advance to India 
would be made far easier. In English hands, all our 
operations are rendered considerably more difficult. 
Lord Curzon has a keen appreciation of the extreme 
importance of Seistan, and he is therefore striving to 
place it as quickly as possible under British 
influence. The railway from Quetta to Nushki..i .e .. 
towards Seistan, is already under construction. But 
the Indian Viceroy is not satisfied with this somewhat 
slow progress towards the object in view. He wishes 
to accelerate matters.
"What would Lord Curzon say if we despatched a 
mission, with a becoming escort, to Candahar? We have 
as much right to be disquieted by disputes between the 
Afghans and neighbouring tribes on the East of 
Afghanistan, as the English have by such disputes on 
the West of that country."()
The author of this article felt so badly about British 
arbitration in Sistan without Russia being involved that he 
proposed active undertakings to remedy the situation. The 
article states:
"What role will Major McMahon's mission play in 
Seistan? That of the representative of Afghan 
interests, or of a Court of arbitration? In any case 
we cannot sit as indifferent spectators of such a 
mission in Seistan. If the English are protecting
(1) Extract of the translation of an article appeared in the Russian paper “Novoe Vremya", dated
January 2nd 1903, enclosure of despatch No. 3 of British Embassy at St. Petersburg to the 
Marquess of Lansdowne, same date, FO 60/711, p. 4.
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Afghan interests, we must protect those of Persia. If 
the English desire to pose as mediators we ask, who 
requested their mediation? The disinterestedness of 
England in all affairs that concern her interests is 
sufficiently well-known. They will so delimitate the 
Perso-Afghan possessions, in dividing the waters of 
the Helmund between the disputants, that in the end 
the whole of the southern course of the river will be 
in their own hands.
"It may be objected that we have a Consul in 
Seistan and a very active one, to protect our 
interests. To this we can only answer that the 
English also have a Consul in Seistan and that if they 
despatch for the 'peaceful' settlement of a 
misunderstanding a force of three squad companies of 
troopsr it is evident that a Consul cannot be equal to 
such a situation. In the East it is impossible to 
keep up prestige with notes and memoranda and the 
other weapons of diplomatic chanceries, their force 
must be opposed to force, and not in the abstract but 
in grim reality."(1)
The Russian Minister at Tehran, in the meantime, informed the
Iranian Prime Minister on 2nd January 1903 that the Russian
delegate should be involved in the arbitration and Russia
{2)should be party to any settlement in Sistan. v * The Prime
Minister complained, in a conversation with the British
representative, that "no political step could be taken by him
without exposing himself to suspicious inquiries and
interference on the part of either Russia or England, and
that these two great powers, instead of discussing their
rivalries together, always made Persia the victim of their
{31mutual jealousies".' ;
The size and strength of the armed escort accompanying Major 
McMahon was also a major cause of friction. The Kargozar of 
Sistan had informed the Iranian Government that, on the
(1) Extract of translation of article, op. cit., pp. 3 - 4 .
(2) Confidential despatch of Sir Arthur H. Hardinge, British Minister at Tehran, to the Marquess
of Lansdowne, No. 5, section 9, Persia and Arabia, dated January 26, 1903, FO 60/711 •
(3) Ibid., p. 1.
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authority of the Indian press, Major McMahon was bringing
with him to the frontier of Sistan an armed force of 800 men
and artillery. The Iranian Foreign Minister wrote to the
British Minister at Tehran in December 1902 protesting that
McMahon's mission did not necessitate the presence of so
large an armed body or of guns.^1  ^ To this letter, the
British Minister replied that: "Major McMahon's escort
consists of a single company of foot soldier and a troop of
Sowars, which, as he has to move through a wild part of
Afghanistan, can scarcely be deemed an excessive guard for
the protection of an important diplomatic Mission. It is
scarcely conceivable that the presence of a small escort of
about 150 men on their borders, such as has frequently been
sent on previous occasions for the personal security and
dignity of British Missions, can cause disquiet to the
Persian authorities in Seistan; but should this really be the
case, it can, I have little doubt, be arranged that a portion
of the escort should remain in Afghan or British territory,
or, if it has at any point to cross the Persian frontier
either to camp or obtain supplies, that it should not
penetrate more than a very short distance into Persian 
(2 \territory. ’
This explanation seems to have convinced the Iranian Foreign 
Minis ter, but he, in reply to the British Minister at Tehran, 
reasserted Iran's desire for the abandonment of the proposed 
arbitration:
"Your Excellency In your note considers the rise 
of the water as temporary, and you think the removal 
of the differences depends on the appointment of the 
Commissioners. From what has been seen, there is not 
every year a rise and fall in the water, and it seldom 
occurs like last year. In view of this fact, the 
Persian Government does not consider the meeting of 
the Commissioners necessary, and I have no doubt that 
your Excellency will communicate the views of the
(1) From Hoshir ad-Doleh to Sir A. Hardinge, dated 27th December 1902, repeated in Sir A.
Hardinge's letter to Hoshir ad-Doleh, dated 6th January 1903, inclosure 1, in No. 1, FO 
60/711, p. 2.
(2) Extract of Letter from Hardinge to Hoshir ad-Doleh, dated January 6th, 1903, inclosure 1, in 
No. 1, FO 60/711, p. 2.
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Persian authorities to your Government, in order that 
the departure of the Commissioners may be stopped for 
the present.
In spite of thisf should the appointment of the 
Commissioners be insisted uponf it would be better 
that a Russian official should also attend the meeting 
which is to be held for the inquiry into the 
matter."f1)
This note clearly came as a disappointment to the British who
were adamant on going ahead with the boundary arbitration in
Sistan and to keeping the Russians out of it altogether. In
his letter of 7th January 1903 to the Iranian Foreign
Minister, the British Minister at Tehran informed the
Iranians once again that the arbitration had to go ahead
because his Government preferred to adhere to the procedure
prescribed by the treaty of 1857 rather than trust to chance
that the rise of the river might prevent, once and for all, a
(2)recurrence of the difficulties.^ ' He further notified the
Iranian Government that the British Government would not
accede to the proposal of Russia being represented in the
(3)boundary arbitration.v '
The British Government went a stage further by instructing 
Major McMahon to proceed with arbitration work whether the 
Iranians agree or disagree. In a despatch to the Viceroy of 
India, the British Foreign Office asserted:
"I7e are not prepared to abandon idea of 
arbitration or to cancel arrangements for McMahon's 
visit. He should proceed to frontier as originally 
intended and if he finds that owing to attitude of 
Persians he cannot obtain the information necessary 
for forming opinion as arbitrator he should report 
state of affairs with expression of his views for 
consideration of H.M. Govt. He should be careful not 
to recognise any right of intervention on the part of
(1) Extract of letter from Hoshir ad-Doleh to Hardinge, dated 6th January 1903, inclosure 2 in
No. 1, FO 60/711 r pp. 2 - 3.
(2) From Sir A Hardinge to Mushir-ed-Doleh, dated January 7th 1903, inclosure 3 in No, 1, FO
60/711 r P- 3.
(3) Ibid.
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the Russians in case their Consul or anyone else 
assuming to represent their interests should be in the 
neighbourhood."(1)
The Russian Ambassador to London in the meantime, held a 
lengthy discussion with the British Foreign Office
authorities during which he acknowledged Russian satisfaction 
with the assurance given by the British authorities with 
regard to the strength of Colonel McMahon's escort. The 
Russian Ambassador further declared that there was a 
considerable Afghan force concentrated near the Iranian
frontier and that the Russian Government would not agree to 
any change in the boundary line laid down by British
arbitration in 1872:
[His] "Excellency told me that he had been 
instructed to say that the Russian Government * ne 
Saurait se preter a une modification de la ligne de 
frontiere combinee avec 1'Angleterre en 1872. '
"I gathered from his answer to a question which I 
put to him, that the line to which he referred was 
that laid down by General Goldsmid about the time 
referred to.
"J told his Excellency that we too had heard of 
the alleged Afghan concentration, and that the 
Government of India had taken steps to discourage it. 
I could not/ however, see that the matter in any way 
concerned Russia."(2)
The Russians had apparently argued that the matter concerned 
Russia because they had agreements with the British on the 
maintenance of Iran's integrity and independence and that it 
was maintenance of Iran's integrity that concerned Russia in 
this matter. To this argument the Foreign Office authorities 
replied in a note stating:
"J cannot find in our archives any documents which 
can be regarded as giving the Russian Government
(1) Extract from Telegram from Foreign Office to Viceroy of India, dated 13th January 1903, FO 
60/711 •
(2) Extract of despatch from Foreign Office to India Office, repeated to British Minister at 
Tehran, dated February 21, 1903, No. 39, FO 60/711 •
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a right of intervention in the matter of the 
arbitration now proceeding in Seistan as to the claims 
of the Persians and Afghans to the use of the waters 
of the River Helmund.
"The British and Russian Governments have, it is 
true, on more than one occasion agreed to respect the 
integrity of Persia, and there is a despatch from Lord 
Granville to Lord Augustus Loftus of the 10th July, 
1873, in which he records a conversation with Count 
Brunow upon this point.
"It can, however, scarcely be contended that an 
arbitration for the purpose of settling a local 
dispute as to water rights can be regarded as 
affecting the general principle of the integrity of 
Persia, or that such assurances as those given by Lord 
Granville in any way derogate from the right of this 
country to act as Arbitrator in accordance with the 
Treaty of 1857."(1)
The explanations and assurance given to the Russians by the
British authorities in London and by the Iranians at Tehran
appear to have convinced the Russians to let the arbitration
go ahead. The Iranian Prime Minister informed the British
Minister at Tehran in February 1903 that the Russians had
abandoned the idea of Russian participation in the
arbitration proceedings and decided to send an officer of
/ 2\their own, to watch proceedings independently.v '
THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
These developments coincided with heavy rainfall in Sistan 
and the rise of the Hirmand water which, increased tensions 
between the Iranians and Afghans. The confidential diary of 
the British Consul for Sistan for the period 1st to 15th 
December 1902 states that: "heavy rain fell here during the
2nd and 3rd December. The present temporary quarters of the 
Consulate, which we are still occupying, suffered
<1) Ibid.
(2) From Sir. A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Tehran February 9, 1903, No. 9, FO
60/711 -
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considerably and two rooms were rendered uninhabitable. 
In the city many of the domed roofs fell in and three 
Seistanis were killed.
"The Helmund has risen considerably. The Karguzar informed 
me that half the Seistan Bund at Kohak had been carried 
away, and that the Afghan Bund at Shahgul, which has been 
one of the main causes of the recent water difficulty, has 
also been demolished. A bund, constructed by the 
Seistanis just above the Poozah Jang Jah channel, the 
existence of which had not been reported to me, was also 
carried away.
"The Mian Kangi district now has an ample supply of water 
and the villagers are reported to be busily engaged in 
cultivation.
"From Deh Dost Muhammad a report has reached me that the 
Kat Khuda of that place, having made use of a water 
channel which takes off from the west bank of the (old) 
Helmund to irrigate his district, the Akhundzada blocked 
up the mouth of the Channel, which, however, was opened 
again by the Kat Khuda, With the exception of this 
incident the status quo with respect to the Seistan water 
question has not been disturbed.
"It is, however, reported from a reliable source that the 
Akhundzada has completed the long canal he was engaged in 
digging from Kushk above the Seistan Bund to Jaroki. 
Three hundred and fifty labourers are said to have been 
discharged from work on the 4th D e c e m b e r ^ ^
McMahon's arbitration commissione was well established in 
Sistan by June 1903. He was assigned, in the meantime, to 
extend a telegraph line from India to Sistan and thence to
(1) Clauses 3 and 4 of Confidential Diary No. 18 of H.B. Majesty's Consul for Sistan and Kain, 
for period 1st to 15th December 1902, repeated in FO 60/ 711 / p. 127.
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Mashhad. The Russians decided to station their own military
signallers at principal points of the telegraph line between
Sistan and Mashhad. This decision made Colonel McMahon
(1postpone work on extending the line.v '
Meanwhile the collision between the Iranians and Afghans
which, according to Colonel McMahon's despatch of 16th June
1903, needed his immediate attention, was described by him as
not important in itself but could lead to serious 
(2)results.v '
The friction was in fact the continuation of disputes between
the two sides of the previous five years or so. The Afghans
dug a canal in 1902 carrying off all the water of the
Sikh-Sar channel of Hirmand River (Northern continuation of
Nad Ali or old main bed of the river) to cultivate the lands
between Deh-e Yar Mohammad and Deh-e Hassan Kharut (see
figure I). The Iranian Commissioner, Abdul-Hamid Khan
Ghaffari Yamin-e Nezam, contended that the dry channel of
Sikh-Sar northwards into the Neizar, marks the main bed of
the Hirmand laid down as the boundary between Iran and
(3)Afghanistan by Sir Frederick Goldsmid.v *
The Afghan Commissioner, Musa Khan (later replaced by Faqir
Mohammad Akhund-Zadeh) contended that the old main bed of the
river followed the dry channel then known as the Shela-e
Shamshiri, and that therefore all land to the east of that is
(4 )Afghan territory.v '
(1) Telegram No. 1892F, from His ExceLLency the Viceroy to H. Majesty's Secretary of State for
India, dated Simla 3rd July 1903, enclosure No. 44, FO 60/725, p. 20.
(2) From Colonel A. H. McMahon to Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign
Department, No. 45, dated Camp Kohak the 16th June 1903, FO 60/725 , p. 20.
(3) From CoLonel A. H. McMahon to Secretary to the Government of India in Foreign Department,
No. 824, dated Camp Kohak 16th June 1903, enclosure No. 45, FO 60/725 / p. 21.
(4) Ibid.
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McMahon asserts in his report of 16th June 1903 that:
"undoubtedly the main bed of the Helmand in past time did run
in the Shela-i-Shamshiri c h a n n e l . H a v i n g  said this, he
immediately asserts: "there is reason to believe that at the
time of Sir Fred Goldsmid's award the main bed followed the
Sikhsar channel. Deh Dost Muhammad and other important
villages in the tract between the Shela-i-Shamshiri and
Sikhasar channels are all of recent date within the last 25
years or so, and are all Persian. The Afghan villages on the
east of the Sikhsar are also, with the exception of
Kila-i-Kang, of recent date. Among the local people, Persian
and Afghan alike, the Sikhsar appears to have long been
{2)recognised as the boundary line.'lV 1
Colonel McMahon's survey of the lands in dispute made it 
clear to him that if Goldsmid's line was indeed in the 
Sikh-Sar channel, the Afghans were in occupation of Iranian 
cultivable lands between Deh-e Yar Mohammad and the Neizar, 
and if Goldsmid's line continued northwards to follow the 
edge of the Neizar, the Iranians were in occupation of Afghan 
lands in the Neizar beyond its edge. Faced with this 
situation McMahon concluded:
"To follow strictly the Goldsmid line would 
necessitate making the Afghans surrender the lands of 
Deh Hassan Kharot and Ali Jangi, and the Persians the 
lands in the Naizar and at Tappa-i-Kaniz. This would 
cause ill-feeling on both sides and would cause no 
advantage to the Afghans, because the Persian lands 
can be easily irrigated from the west, while the 
Afghans have no means of irrigating them.
It appears reasonable to treat the two sets of 
encroachments as a set-off against each other, and 
draw a line dividing lands at present actually 
occupied by both sides. It will be seen that the 
intermediate order I have issued lays down such a 
line."(3)
(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
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Figure I
Hirmand River - Old and New Channels and Mian Kangi
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To define such a line, McMahon found it admissible to search 
for neighbouring permanent landmarks instead of demarcating 
in a low level tract liable to inundation. He, therefore, 
concluded that the boundary line should follow a line of 
prominent mounds "tappehs" in a series of straight lines from 
Tappeh-e Talaei to the most western of the mounds of Tappeh-e 
Shahrak to the Tappeh-e Kurki and then to the point Salgumi 
just north of Tappeh-e Shahi (see figure I) . The land around 
all these tappehs is sour salt soil of no value.
The above line considered by McMahon differed from that of 
Goldsmid's in areas between Deh-e Yar Mohammad and Takht-e 
Shahi to the disadvantage of Iran. He justified this 
difference in the following manner:
"It will thus be seen that the line I propose to
fix in my award between Deh Yar Muhammad and
Takht-i-Shah differs but only slightly from the line 
defined by Sir Fred. Goldsmid, or, to speak more 
correctly, the line which careful survey of the 
country shows to be a fair and impartial 
interpretation of Sir Fred. Goldsmid* s definition of 
the boundary. Also that the difference as regards 
area is more to Persian than Afghan advantage.
"In this small section only, i.e., from Deh Yar
Muhammad to Takht-i-Shah, a distance of some 13 miles, 
does the line I propose to define in my award differ 
from the line defined by Sir Fred. Goldsmid. It will 
be a line regarding which future doubts cannot well 
arise, and is one which should be acceptable to both 
sides. As regards the people living in its
neighbourhood on both sides, it involves no change of 
existing conditions, and will cause no ill-feeling or 
unpleasantness."(2)
Having declared that his proposed line would be more to the 
advantage of Iran than Afghanistan, McMahon accused Yamin-e 
Nezam, the Iranian Commissioner, of being responsible for the 
anxieties of the Shah and the Iranian Government because of 
reporting to Tehran the incorrect assumption of sinister 
intentions on McMahon's part. To the Iranians McMahon
(1) Clauses 9 and 10 of McMahon's despatch dated 16th June 1903, op. cit., pp. 21 - 2.
(2) Clauses 12 and 13 of McMahon's despatch of 16th June 1903, op. cit., p. 22.
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described his findings and invited evidence to the other 
effect if any:
"I have, therefore, clearly stated above existing 
facts, and have described the line which I mean to lay 
down in my arbitral award, unless I obtain hereafter 
fresh evidence on doubtful points which would 
necessitate reconsideration of such line. J do not 
foresee at this advanced stage of enquiry much 
likelihood of that. It might be well, therefore, if 
any outcry be made at Tehran against this order, to 
put the matter clearly as above stated to the Persian 
Government and dispel not only present baseless 
anxiety on their part, but obtain acceptance of the 
line therein defined and thereby remove what would 
otherwise prove a ground for subsequent appeal against 
my award and consequent delay in the demarcation of 
the line."(*)
As regards the Afghan attitude on this point, Colonel McMahon 
believed that protest would be made from Kabul against 
inclusion of Takht-e Shahi in Iranian territory. However, he 
thought that it would not be a strenuous protest because of 
Takht-e Shahi being an Iranian possession for a long period 
of time.  ^^  ^
Meanwhile, conflict broke out between the Sistani Iranians 
and Afghan subjects in the Neizar which resulted in three 
Afghans being wounded and an Afghan horse being killed. The 
boundary arbitrator, being informed by the Afghans of the 
incident, wrote to the Iranian Commissioner proposing a line 
temporarily separating the antagonists:
"I therefore issued the following order, i.e.,
that, until further orders or until final settlement 
of arbitration work, Persian subjects should not be 
allowed to interfere with water or land on the east 
side of the following line, i.e., the line followed by 
the water channel recently constructed by Afghans from 
a point between Deh Yar Muhammad and Deh Shah Gul to 
where that channel joins the Shela-i-Shamshiri near to 
and leaving Deh Hassan Kharot on the east. Thence it
(1) Extract from cLause 15 of McMahon's despatch of 16th June 1903, op. cit., p. 22.
(2) Extract of clause 15 of McMahon's despatch of 16th June 1903, op. cit., p. 22.
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runs in a straight line, dividing the hamlets off Deh 
Ali Mardan on the west from Deh Ali Jangi on the east 
to Tappa-i-Tilai. Similarly, no Afghan subjects are
to interfere with land or water on the west of that 
line.
"The line is the line separating the lands under 
actual occupation of Persian and Afghan subjects, 
respectively, at the time of my inspection of the 
country.(1)
This proposal was received in Sistan with much suspicion 
which were apparently stirred up by Mr Miller, the Russian 
Consul for Sistan. In his confidential diary, the British 
Consul for Sistan remarks: "with reference to paragraph 6 of
my diary No. 11, I received from Colonel McMahon a summary 
order regarding the land in dispute between the Afghans and 
Seistanis, which he asked me to communicate to the Amir 
Hashmat-ul-Mulk, The latter received the order very 
suspiciously, and informed me that Mr Miller had told him 
that His Excellency the Viceroy had bargained with the Amir 
of Afghanistan that the British were to receive all land 
south of the Helmand from Afghanistan, and to give in 
exchange to Afghanistan a large slice of Seistan land. I 
disabused his mind of this notion by all the arguments at my 
command, but I fear that he does not yet quite believe in our 
good faith. Another matter which makes the Hashmat-ul-Mulk 
suspicious of the English is that the Mustaufi of Meshed 
informed him that they were backing up his enemy, Syed Khan, 
Nahrui. " ^  ^ ^  ^
The British at the same time were harbouring the idea of a 
passport system in the Irano-Afghan borders of Sistan. The 
British Consul for Sistan visited border areas and concluded
(1) Extract from Letter from ColoneL McMahon to Yamin-e Nezam, dated Camp Kohak 14th June 1903,
FO 60/725j pp. 23 - 4.
(2) Sardar Saeed Khan Nahruei was Amir Heshmat al-Molk's brother-in-law (see Appendix ivof
chapter II on the Khozeimeh Amirs),
(3) Clause 2 of Diary No. 12 of Mr. H. Dobbs, H.B. Majesty's Consul for Sistan and Kain, for the
period 16th June to 9th July 1903, FO 60/726 , p. 4.
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that the Iranian and Afghan villagers were so inextricably 
mingled and had such close daily relations with one another, 
that the introduction of a passport system would produce 
great hardship and discontent even if worked with 
consideration.^  ^
The Sistanis, meanwhile, gathered in large number at the
Band-e Sistan to restore it after being damaged by flooding
in the spring of 1903. In his diary of 24th August 19 03,
Colonel McMahon remarks: "There seems to be a difference of
opinion on the subject between the Governor and the Persian
Commissioners. The latter do not want the bund made while
the Mission is here, as they say I may form inconvenient
conclusions from the amount of water the bund sends down the
Rod-i-Seistan. The Governor says, very wisely, that he and
his people are not going to lose a season's water for
12}anything the Mamurs may think. "v }
The Iranians, after some deliberation, accepted Colonel
McMahon's proposed line of boundary at the northern
continuation of Sikh-Sar channel, which was a modification of
Goldsmid's line. Yamin Nezam, the Iranian Commissioner,
who had been implicitly described by Colonel McMahon as being
(3)under the instruction of the Russian Consul,v ' showed 
McMahon confidential telegrams of the Iranian Foreign 
Minister's report on the acceptance of the proposed line. 
The telegram indicated:
"Your reports and map have been received, and 
submitted to proper quarter. The Foreign Office 
Council consider exchange of that land with land shown 
in the map not advantageous to Persian Government; and 
a clear promise should be obtained from Afghans that 
they will never damage present Kuhak Bund, and will 
not give trouble. They should also undertake not to
(1) Confidential Diary No, 14 of Hr. H. Dobbs, His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Seistan and
Kain for period ending the 31st August 1903, FO 60/ 725 , CLause 2.
(2) Extract from the Diary of Colonel A.H. McMahon for period ending the 24th August 1903, FO
60/725/ p. 14.
(3) Ibid.
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erect any bund above Kuhak, or below Rudbar, lest 
water, which irrigates local land, and has been given 
up, should be cut off and leave this land waste. 
Please see carefully and report whether the land which 
will be given up in exchange for land taken by us will 
not harm Persian Government. The Council say that the 
land the Afghans wish to take is fertile, and that the 
other land is waste. Please ascertain these points 
carefully, and report quickly. Ends.(1)
Yamin Nezam assured McMahon that his letter strongly 
advocated McMahon's line, and attributes present indecision 
to Russian interference. He telegraphed the same day stating 
that he had received his telegram and will carry out Tehran's 
instructions. That he had made careful enquiries again, and 
could say that proposed exchange will be advantageous to 
Iranian Government. It is necessary that the boundary should 
be settled first and demarcated; also the lesser question 
could then be taken up. He then suggested that Foreign 
Minister had an interview with British Minister, with a view 
to discussing the matter.
Yamin Nezam's recommendation to the Iranian Government that
"proposed exchange will be advantageous to the Persian
Government" is in clear contradiction of Colonel McMahon's
description of the lands to be exchanged. In his report of
his proposed boundary line of 16th June 1903, McMahon
described the lands occupied by Afghans, and proposed they be
(2 \exchanged as being: "small tract of poor worthless land"'1 '
and described the lands occupied by the Iranians and proposed
to be exchanged as being: "patches of poor cultivation in the 
/ 3 \
Neizar".v 1 Even British officials sensed that Yamin 
Nezam was suspected by the Iranian Government officials of 
being bribed to support the proposed settlement. In his
(1) Extract from Colonel McMahon's telegram No. 422 to Sir Arthur Hardinge, dated Seistan 12th 
September 1903, enclosure 21, FO 60/725, pp. 14 - 15.
(2) Clause 8 of despatch No. 824, from McMahon to the Indian Government, dated Camp Kohak 16th 
June 1903, enclosure No. 45 of FO 60/725, p. 21.
(3) Ibid.
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despatch of 24th October 1903 to the Foreign Office, the 
British Minister at Tehran states that: "the attitude of the
Persian Government on this question is very foolish, and can 
only be explained by the supposition that their inveterate 
suspiciousness of our intentions in Seistan has led them to 
conjecture that Col. McMahon's proposal conceals some trap 
and that the Yamin's support of it is due to his having been 
bribed or talked over."^1^
A mischievous accountant at the Imperial (British) bank 
branch in Sistan gave out information in March 1904 that 
Yamin Nezam had deposited 10,000 qarans with that bank 
which he had received from the boundary arbitration. The 
British Consul for Sistan recorded this incident in his diary 
of 16th to 21st March 1904 as follows:
"19th March. - Mr Emmerson has been obliged to 
suspend Ismail Khan, the Accountant of the Imperial 
Bank. It appears that the Yamin-i-Nizam recently 
deposited some 10,000 krans with the bank, and the 
Accountant for motives of his own has been giving out, 
at any rate the Yamin-i-Nizam stated that the 
information was now public property, not only that the 
Yamin-i-Nizam had put this amount into the bank, but 
that the same was the consideration he had received 
from the British Commissioner for 'services rendered' 
in connection with the recent boundary award!
The Yamin is furious, as the story has reached 
the ears of the Karguzar who, he thinks, is sure to 
make capital out of it against him."(2)
A further proof of falsehood of Yamin Nezam's 
recommendation to the Government of Iran that exchange of 
villages in question was in favour of Iran, came later in a 
letter to the Amir of Afghanistan by the Viceroy of India who 
pointed out: "from the Band-e Kohak to the Naizar the
(1) Extract from despatch of Sir A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Tehran 24th 
October 1903, FO 60/725 , p. 2.
(2) Extract from Confidential Diary No. 7 of Captain A.D. MacPherson H.B. Majesty's Consul for 
Sistan and Kain, for the period 16th to 21st March 1904, FO 60/726/ p. 1.
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frontier follows practically the old bed of the Hirmand or 
Siksar, but runs a little to the west of this in one place to 
include villages now in Afghan possession. These substantial 
advantages to the interests of Your Highness are qualified 
only by a slight concession which Col. McMahon has felt 
called upon to make in the direction of Takht i Siah to the 
Iranians. " ( ^ )
The acceptance by the Iranian Government of this exchange and 
proposed line was confirmed by the British Minister at Tehran 
in a letter to the Foreign Office, dated 24th October 19 03 in 
which the British Government was informed that the Iranian 
Government had made this acceptance conditional upon an 
engagement on the part of the Afghans not to construct any
dam upon the upper Hirmand from Band-e Sistan to
12 \Rudbar. v } In his telegram of 12th September to Sir A. 
Hardinge, Colonel McMahon had rejected outright doing 
anything about preventing the Afghans from constructing bands 
on the Hirmand above Band-e Sistan, arguing that the question 
raised about Afghan bands above Sistan lies outside his 
arbitration tribunal's jurisdiction, and he had strictly 
avoided any reference whatever to it in discussions with the 
Iranians.^  ^
Hardinge did indeed succeed in preventing the Iranian 
Government from continuing these conditions. In a meeting 
with Moshir ad-Doleh, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Hardinge 
was informed that following an interview that Moshir ad-Doleh 
had with the Shah, the Iranian Government had withdrawn this 
condition and only asked that the Afghans should undertake
(1) Extract from tetter from His ExcelLency the Viceroy of India to His Highness the Amir of
Afghanistan, No. 8, dated 22nd November 1903, FO 60/ 711, pp. 2 - 3 .
(2) From A.H. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Tehran 24th October 1903, FO 60/725.-
(3) From Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Tehran 24th Oct. 1903, FO 60/725 .
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not to destroy the existing Band-e Sistan without previous 
agreement with Iran.^1^
To secure the Afghans' agreement to his proposed line, 
Colonel McMahon decided to tell them bluntly but indirectly 
how wrong they were in relying confidently on Goldsmid's 
vague definition of the boundary line. In a despatch to 
Hardinge which was referred to the Foreign Office, McMahon 
noted:
"I sent Khan Bahadur Mir Shams Shah this morning 
to pay a casual visit to the Akhundzada and to take 
the opportunity, if the Akhundzada alluded, as I felt 
sure he would, to boundary matters, to speak somewhat 
gloomily on the subject. I directed him especially to 
find out, if possible, the purport of whatever 
correspondence had passed between the Amir and the 
Akhundzada on this subject. He had a very important 
and useful interview over five hours with the 
Akhundzada and Musa Khan. They, of course, turned the 
conversation at the start off to boundary work, and 
the whole question was thoroughly threshed out once 
more. All the old Afghan arguments were paraded and 
my own answers to them repeated. The Akhundzada 
seemed to have thoroughly understood the ambiguity of 
Sir Fred. Goldsmid's definition of the boundary line 
between Bund-i-Kohak and Koh-i-Malik Siah, and how 
unfavourably to Afghanistan that definition can be 
read. A purpose of this, the Akhundzada admitted,
what I have long suspected, that the Afghans possess 
no copy of the Goldsmid award."(2)
This tactic apparently secured the Afghan Government's 
acceptance of his proposed line. The Iranian Government's 
unconditional acceptance of the particulars of McMahon’s 
boundary line was telegrammed to him by the British Charge 
d'Affairs at Tehran on 1st November 1903. The Shah had, on 
8th October, asked the British through his Foreign Minister 
that he would like McMahon, after the delimited line was 
agreed upon with Yamin-e Nezam north of Hirmand, to mark out
(1) Telegram No. 422 from Colonel McMahon to Sir A. Hardinge, dated 12th September 1903, 
enclosure 21, FO 60/725, p. 15.
(2) From Hardinge to Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Tehran 24th October 1903, FO 60/725 -
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the Irano-Afghanistan frontier between Hirmand and Kuh-e 
Malek Siah so that doors should be closed to a recurrence of 
the controversies.^  ^
Colonel McMahon concluded his boundary arbitration award and
communicated it to the Afghan Commissioner on the 7th
November 1903 and to the Iranian Commissioner on the 17 th
(2)November that year.' ' McMahon's boundary award states:
"Arbitral award given by 
COLONEL A.H.McMahon, C.S.I., C.I.E.,
British Commissioner,
Seistan Arbitration Commissioner.
"The boundary line in Seistan between Afghanistan 
on the east and Persia on the west should run as 
follows, i.e., from the Malik Siah Koh in a straight 
line to the Bund-i-Kohak and thence along the bed of 
the Helmand river to the junction of its two branches, 
the Rod-i-Pariun and Nad Ali channel. From here it 
should follow the bed of the Nad Ali channel into the 
Sikhsar and along the bed of the Sikhasar to the point 
near Deh Yar Muhammad where the Sikhsar has been 
diverted towards the west in the water channel shown 
in the map which joins the Shela-i-Shamshiri near to 
Deh Hassan Kharat. The boundary line should follow 
the left bank of this water channel to the 
Shela-i-Shamshiri leaving Deh Hassan Kharot on the 
east. It should then run in a straight line 
separating the hamlets of Deh Ali Mardan on the west 
from Deh Ali Jangi on the east of Tappa-i-Tilai; 
thence in a straight line to the most western of the 
mounds of Tappa-i-Shaharak; thence in a straight line 
to the most western mound of Tappa-i-Kurki; thence in 
a straight line to Salgumi and thence in a straight 
line to Siah Koh, Bandan."(3)
In separate letters to the Iranian and Afghan Commissioners, 
McMahon gives more details of various aspects of his boundary 
award (see appendix I for McMahon's detailed letter to the 
Afghan Commissioner).
(1) Telegram from A. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 129, dated Tehran 8th October 
1903, FO 60/711 -
(2) From McMahon to Secretary to the Indian Government in the Foreign Department, No. 1258,
dated Camp Kohak, the 14th November 1903, enclosure 66 of FO 60/725, p.41.
(3) McMahon's Boundary Award, F0 60/725, p. 43.
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In spite of being deprived of much of their possessions in 
the areas to the north of Sikh-Sar channel and in the Neizar, 
the Iranian Government accepted McMahon's boundary award, but 
the Afghans complained and argued against it for nearly a 
year. The Amir of Afghanistan declared his acceptance of the 
award and stated his agreement to demarcation of this 
boundary in October 1904.
Meanwhile, the Afghan Commissioner (Faqir Mohammad 
Akhund-Zadeh) became agitated by the state of affairs as the 
Iranians continued cultivating lands to the east of the 
arbitral boundary in their possession hitherto and the 
Afghans could not do much about it because their Government 
had not accepted the award. The following remarks in Colonel 
McMahon's diary of January 1904 give clear indication of this 
situation:
"19 th January, Camp Gul Shah. - Fearful howls
from the Akhundzada, who sallied forth to-day to 
inspect the land near Ganguzar. He saw two Persian 
ploughs working, and returned in high dudgeon, I 
expressed regret that he had not continued his 
researches further west, for, if he had, he would have 
found the boundary line clearly defined by an avenue 
through the jungle. Any ploughing and sowing done by 
Persians east of that line, would, I said, be Afghan 
gain.
I made the Yamin-i-Nizam send for the village 
headmen responsible for this continued flagrant 
encroachment, and he promised to keep them in 
custody. Instead of doing this, however, he let them 
go, and they went to the Akhundzada to try and make 
terms with him. The lands in question can be 
irrigated from the Persian side, but not from the 
Afghan side, and what will happen after final 
demarcation of the boundary line will be that those 
who have now cultivated those lands will merely step 
over the border and become Afghan subjects,
The sooner the Amir accepts the award, and 
demarcation is completed, the better, for both the 
Persian and Afghan Commissioners are working 
themselves into a nervous and depressed state of 
mind. The Akhundzada fears he will share the fate of 
my last Afghan colleague, Sardar Muhammad Umar Khan, 
while the Yamin says everybody is accusing him of 
taking bribes from me for selling Persian territory.
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23rd January, Camp Gul Shah. - The Akhundzada has 
seemed very restless and nervous the last few days, 
and I am firmly convinced he has received 
unsatisfactory news from Kabul. I sent Khan Bahadur 
Mir Shams Shah to see him to-day. He denies the 
receipt of any letter from Amir, and, to-day, is in 
better spirits, owing to a dream which Mulla Samand, 
an aged Pir of his, who is now in the Afghan camp, has 
just had. He dreamt that a letter from the Amir of a 
favourable nature is on the road and will reach us in 
a few days. The Akhundzada places implicit confidence 
in this. In the course of conversation, the 
Akhundzada referred to the bad influence exercised 
over the Amir by his brother, Nasrulla Khan. He does 
much to counteract the Amir's natural leaning towards 
clemency and generosity, and opposes reform and 
progress.«(1)
The Iranian Commissioner, Yamin-e Nezam wrote to Colonel
McMahon on 2nd June 1904 reporting that the Afghans were
showing signs of resisting, by force, the taking of revenue
by the Iranians from the lands near the villages of Ali Jangi
which had been cultivated by them to the east of the arbitral
boundary line. The Iranian Commissioner contended that,
until the Amir of Afghanistan agreed to the boundary line,
and the protocols were signed, the line could not be
considered to effect ownership of disputed lands hitherto in
12)Iranian possession^ 1 To this, McMahon replied on 4th
June 1904 that: the Amir of Afghanistan had recently agreed
to his boundary line; but had raised questions, regarding
demarcation, which were still under discussion. In any case,
he added that he pointed out that his line was now a definite
settlement of the boundary, and must be adhered to. The
Persians, he added, could no more object to Afghans taking
revenue from lands on their side of it, than Afghans could to
the Persians doing the same with regard to Takht-i-Shah,
(3)Tappa-i-Kaniz, or other lands hitherto disputed."' '
(1) Extracts from CoLoneL McMahon's Diary of 23rd January 1904, FO 60/726, p. 55.
(2) From Yamin-e Nezam to CoLoneL McMahon as appeared in McMahon's Diary of 8th June 1904, dated 
2nd June 1904, FO 60/727 •
(3) Extract from McMahon's Diary of 8th June 1904, op. cit..
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In spite of the above claim, there is no trace of any 
document suggesting the acceptance of McMahon's arbitral 
boundary line by the Amir of Afghanistan before 15th October 
1904. He was, most certainly, referring to a letter from the 
Amir of Afghanistan to the Afghan Commissioner in February 
1904 instructing the latter to investigate certain aspects of 
the situation in the frontier areas. In a telegram to the 
Government of India regarding this letter, McMahon stated:
"Afghan Commissioner has received letter from 
Amir, which he has communicated to me in strict 
confidence. Amir makes various enquiries regarding 
substance of my award, chiefly as to previous owner of 
certain villages and tracts along border. Letter does 
not indicate disapprobation of the award, but 
corroborates Afghan Commissioner's forecast that Amir 
would find pretext to delay acceptance for a becoming 
period. Very satisfactory feature of Amir's letter is 
that references in it to Afghan Commissioner's 
previous letters showed latter expressed thorough 
approval of my award. Afghan Commissioner has replied 
to Amir's questions, and the answer thereto are all 
corroborative of favourable nature of my award."(1)
As a result of this treatment of the Iranian farmers' 
cultivation in the lands to the east of McMahon's proposed 
line which were still in their possession, the Iranians lost 
a whole year's revenue from those cultivations.
As the Afghans' doubts about the situation in the areas to 
the north of Sikh-Sar boundary continued, Colonel McMahon 
sent two extracts of his draft final report on the Sistan 
boundary to the Government of India so that they could use 
them in meeting the objections of the Afghans. These two 
extracts clearly demonstrated the rights of the Iranians in 
the Neizar and lands exchanged between the two sides (see 
Appendix IV for text).
Meanwhile, the Amir of Afghanistan wrote to his 
representative in the arbitration commission on 15th October 
1904 giving his consent to the arbitral award and the
(1) TeLegram No. 549 from CoLoneL McMahon to the Foreign Secretary Calcutta, dated the 13th of 
February 1904, FO 60/726 , p. 55.
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commencement of demarcation of McMahon's line. The Amir 
stated:
"Whereas you were deputed on my behalf as 
representatives for the determination of the 
separation of the boundaries of Afghanistan in the 
Naizars of Seistans and my revered friend Colonel 
McMahon was deputed on behalf of the allied Government 
(British) to settle the aforesaid affair, the written 
award of the latter has now reached me through His 
Excellency the Viceroy of India. As far as possible,
I did my best in correspondence with him to maintain 
my rights. As I am now convinced that the Government 
of India have, as far as possible, done justice to 
Afghanistan, and consider that the settlement which 
they have made is in the interests of my State, 
therefore I know this also that in no way have they 
neglected, nor will they neglect, my interests. 
Without doubt, in determining the frontier, and in the 
settlement of the aforesaid tract, they will bear our 
welfare in sight.
"Therefore, in accordance with the written award 
of the aforesaid Colonel, the details of which were 
copied on a separate paper and sent to you, you are 
informed that you are to take action in pillar 
building, so that the work may be finished during this 
season. " (1)
Colonel McMahon proceeded with boundary demarcation 
immediately after confirmation of the Afghans' acceptance of 
his line was received. He informed the Indian Government on 
18th November 1904 that demarcation of the straight line of 
boundary from Kuh-e Malek "Siah to Kuhak was completed by 
that date^^ (see figure II).
Colonel McMahon's boundary award was accompanied by a water
(3 )award which was issued on 25th September 1904. v ' In his 
water award Colonel McMahon determined that Iran and
(1) Extract from the translation of H.H. the Afghan Amir's Farman of 5th Shaban 1322 (15th
October 1904) to Faqir Mohammad Akhund-Zadeh, enclosure No. 19 of FO 60/728 , p. 30.
(2) Telegram No. 838 of McMahon to Foreign Secretary of the Indian Government, dated 18th
November 1904, enclosure No. 14 of F0 60/728, p. 27.
(3) From Col. McMahon to the Government of India, No. 2407, dated the 25th September 1904, FO
60/727, pp. 1 to 20.
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Afghanistan should receive from Hirmand, below Band-e Kamal
f 1)Khan, half the water eactr ' regardless of the requisite 
consumptions of the two sides which have been naturally 
developed throughout the ages and regardless of the fact that 
Iranian Sistan was repeatedly acknowledged as being highly 
fertile and in need of more water compared with the Afghan 
side of Sistan which was acknowledged by General Goldsmid to 
be generally barren. Moreover, McMahon changed this decision 
later in his final award by giving one third of Hirmand water 
to Iran and two thirds of it, from below Band-e Kama Khan, to 
Afghanistan. (For details of McMahon's Sistan Water Award, 
see next chapter).
Colonel McMahon, however, completed his demarcation of the 
Sistan boundary in February 1905^^ and communicated to the
Government of India on 21st February 1905, his report on the
final settlement and demarcation of the boundary between Iran 
and Afghanistan in Sistan.
Clauses 1 to 19 of his report consists of the historical 
background of the dispute and Goldsmid's arbitration. 
Clauses 20 to 4 3 deal with the way he determined the Sistan
boundary (see Appendix II). Furthermore, McMahon had on 1st
February 1905 communicated to the Iranian and Afghan 
Commissioners his report on the demarcation of this boundary 
(see Appendix III).
McMahon's water award came as a great disappointment to the 
Iranian Government (see next chapter), while his boundary 
award dismayed the Sistanis. In a letter, to the editor of 
"Trans-Caspian Review" of Russia appearing on 19th March 
1905, an unnamed Sistani remarked:
t*) From CoLoneL McMahon to the Government of India No. 2407 dated 25th September 1904, FO
60/727 , pp. 1 to 20.
(£.) From McMahon to the Government of India, dated 21st February 1905, FO 60/728 .
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"We beg to request you to have the following 
particulars printed In your esteemed journal, so that 
all the lovers of their native country may know that 
we have complained, and do complain, about the 
question of the Sistan boundary delimitation, by which 
a large and valuable portion of the sacred Persian 
territory has been added to Afghan territory. B u t  it 
is a matter of great regret that the high officials of 
the Government do not listen to our representations 
and complaints.
"Now, it is three years since that this English 
Arbitration Mission have come to Sistan, where they 
have pitched their camp on the banks of the Helmand in 
Persian territory. When they arrived, they said that 
they would finish their work of arbitration, and that, 
please God, they would depart in two or three months. 
But now three years have passed, and yet they say the 
same, i .e., that they would depart in two or three 
months. At present they have replaced their tents by 
building regular houses and apartments. God knows 
when they will go!
"The thing to be wondered at is that this Mission 
was appointed to arbitrate about the waters of the 
Helmand. Gradually they began to say that the limits 
should be duly recognised and fixed. And before the 
poor people were aware of the matter, the British 
Mission suddenly fixed a boundary between Sistan and 
Afghanistan, and built up high and round pillars on 
the line, in such a way that cattle-owners, 
flock-owners and cultivators saw that all their 
pastures and 'Naizars', which specially belonged to 
the cattle-owners of Sistan, and cultivated and other 
lands, were all transferred to Afghanistan. The 
wonder is that the high officials of the Persian 
Government had appointed a Commissioner for the 
frontier to look after it. But when this delimitation 
was effected, where was he, why did he not prevent 
them, or at least report actual facts and all the 
particulars to the high officials of the Government?
"The Mission, from the beginning, up to the 
present, have been saying that no new changes would be 
made, but that the boundary line laid down about 32 
years ago by General Goldsmid, between Persia and 
Afghanistan, would be renewed, as in most places it 
had become obliterated and was not clear.
"[Then the correspondent gives some particulars 
of the boundary laid down by General Goldsmid, and 
states that some of the lands, which by that
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delimitation belonged to Sistan, have now by this 
fresh boundary line passed to Afghanistan.]"(1)
The author of this letter continued by accusing the British 
of planning to take Sistan for themselves. An accusation 
much in the same fashion advocated by the Russians at the 
outset of McMahon's Sistan mission.
These suspicions were encouraged by such extremist
recommendations as that of Major Percy Sykes, Her Britannic 
Majesty's Consul for Kerman, which asserted:
"As regards the Province of Kain, such is, I
understand, not the case, but yet, my Lord, I am
convinced that its possession by Russia would
constitute a permanent menace to the Indian Empire.
The buffer State of Afghanistan is apparently 
doomed to succumb, and as our minimum share of it 
would include the watershed of the Helmand, I would 
submit that we must not leave the flank of Western
Afghanistan unprotected. "(2)
Nearly a century had gone by proving the accusation that 
Russia intended to take possession of Qaenat to be unfounded 
but McMahon's water award was a devastating blow to the 
inhabitants of Sistan as remarked in the Confidential Diary 
of February 1948 of His Britannic Majesty's Consul General 
from Mashhad:
"When at Zabul at the beginning of January H.M. 
Consul General saw the desperate condition of that 
one-time "granary" of East Persia, due to the failure 
(or stopping) of the flow of water from the Helmand 
River in Afghanistan, with the resultant drying up of 
the usually 40 x 20 miles wide "overflow" the Hamun 
Lake. Some water was actually flowing in a few of the 
canals as it had been arranged that water would be
(1) Extract of translation of a Letter from Sistan as appeared in the ‘Trans-Caspian Review*,
dated the 12th Moharram 1323 H. (19th March 1905), enclosure No. 14 of FO 60/728, p. 7.
(2) Extract from Major Percy Molesworth Sykes*s (Later Sir Percy Sykes) despatch to the Marquess 
of Salisbury, dated Kerman June 29, 1900, No. 4, FO 60/621.
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released for 5 weeks, and had been available in Zabul 
town for 3 weeks for the first time for months of 
drought."(^)
(1) Clause 6 of PoliticaL Diary No. 1 of His Britannic Majesty's Consul General for Mashhad, 
dated the 4th of February 1948, FO 371/68724# p. 2.
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Appendix I
Letter from Colonel McMahon, British Commissioner for Sistan 
Boundary Arbitration Commission to Faqir Mohammad 
Akhund-Zadeh, Afghan Commissioner^"1"^
**********
After Compliments. - We have discussed the question of the 
boundary between Afghanistan and Persia in Seistan for many 
months, and the time has now come when I am able to give my 
arbitral award on this question.
In April last, I verbally explained to you the boundary line 
which I said represented a fair and impartial interpretation 
of the award given by General Sir Fred. Goldsmid. I would 
have given my award then, but further surv3y work appeared 
necessary and, moreover, the Persian Commissioner at that 
time declined even to discuss boundary questions. They 
claimed that the words in Sir Fred. Goldsmid's award, i.e., 
"the line of frontier from Kohak to the hill south of the
Seistan desert should be so drawn as to include within the 
Afghan limits all cultivation on both banks of the river from 
th bund upwards" mean that only the few cultivated portions 
of land on the bank of the Helmand remain in Afghanistan and 
that all the rest of the country, including Tarakun, is
Persian territory. They maintained that this had been
already settled, and no boundary question was, therefore, now 
in dispute.
I refused to admit this argument, and the matter has now, as
you will see below, been at last settled.
Before stating my award, it is advisable to refer to certain 
matters which explain my award. You were yourself with Sir 
Fred. Goldsmid's Mission and know the difficulties under 
which he examined and surveyed the country. Major, now
General, Beresford Lovett has himself told me that he was not 
able to go over the country properly, and that his maps was,
therefore, a very rough map of which the accuracy could not
be depended on. As regards Sikhsar and the Maizar, he says 
he did not get nearer to that portion of the country than 
Khakansur. You can realise from this how impossible it was 
for him to make a correct map. Sir Fred. Goldsmid, moreover, 
in his award, takes care to say that this mpa is only 
:illustrative of the country awarded:. I have found from our 
present surveys how very inaccurate that award map is. I 
have followed in my award as much as possible the line shown
(+) From McMahon to Akhund-Zadeh, No. 2 - A.P., dated 7th November 1903, FO 60/725, 
4 1 - 2 - 3 .
pp.
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on that map; but in portions where the maps has been wrong, I 
have had to be guided by Sir Fred. Goldsmid's written 
definition of the boundary line.
Another fact to remember is that Sir Fred. Goldsmid did not 
arrive at any conclusion about the boundary till after he had 
left Seistan. He delivered his award in Teheran several 
months after he left Seistan. The line which he awarded was 
never clearly explained on the round to either the Afghan or 
Persian officials and people of Seistan,. They only received 
a vague idea of the line from their Governments, and the 
people actually living near the line were, therefore, obliged 
to come to some common understanding between themselves as to 
what they thought the right line was. For many years it has 
been fairly well understood among the people along both sides 
of the line that the boundary ran along the Mad Ali channel 
of the Helmand, thence along the continuation of that 
channel, i.e., the Sikhasar, as far as that stream-bed could 
be traced through the Naizar into the Hamun. Cultivation has 
gradually been extended and villages have gradually been made 
by both countries nearer and nearer to this line until they 
reached this line. At the present moment the bed of the 
Sikhsar represents the boundary between land occupied by 
Afghan subjects on the one side and Persian subjects on the 
other, throughout its course, except at two places, i.e., 
near Deh Yar Muhammad where you have recently made a canal 
from the Sikhsar and irrigated a tract of land on the west of 
the Sikhsar, which is coloured red on the map and near 
Ganguzar where the Persians have sown crops to which you have 
objected on the east of the Sikhsar. These lands are 
coloured green on the map.
You have strongly maintained your right to cultivate land on 
the west of the Sikhsar on the ground that the real main bed 
of the Helmand in past times ran in what is now called the 
Shela-i-Shamshirir. Undoubtedly the main bed of the Helmand 
did in past times follow the course of the Shela-i-Shamshiri, 
but this, in my opinion, was before the time of Sir Fred. 
Goldsmid*s Mission. At the time of his award the main bed of 
the Helmand followed the Sikhsar channel.
I come now to Sir Fred. Goldsmid's award. The portions 
relating to the boundary line are as follows: "Persia should
not possess land on the right of the Helmand. The main bed 
of the Helmand, therefore, below Kohak, should be the eastern 
boundary of Persian Seistan, and the line of frontier from 
Kohak to the hills south of the Seistan desert should be so 
drawn as to include within the Afghan limits all cultivation 
on both banks of the river from the bund upwards. The Malik 
Siah Koh, on the chain of hills separating the Seistan from 
the Kerman desert, appears a fitting point. North of 
Seistan, the southern limit of the Naizar, should be the 
frontier towards Lash Juwain. Persia should not cross the 
Ilamun in that direction. A line drawn from the Naizar to 
the Koh Siah Hill near Bandau would clearly define her 
possession".
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Interpreting this award with the aid of Sir Fred. Goldsmid's 
map and, in places where I have found that map inaccurate, 
adapting that award to agree with a correct map of the 
country, I lay down the award of which a copy is attached to 
this letter.
I send you a map in two parts to illustrate this award. This 
map is on a scale of 4 miles = 1 inch. When the boundary 
line has been demarcated with boundary pillars, I will give 
you a more complete map showing the position of each pillar. 
You will see that this boundary line leaves to Afghanistan 
the lands cultivated by the new water channel near Deh Yar 
Muhammad, and it leaves to Persia the lands occupied and 
cultivated for many years past by Persian subjects at 
Takht-i-Shah and Tappa-i-Kaniz.
I feel regret at not being able to concede to the many and 
urgent demands you and also Musa Khan have made for the 
inclusion within the Afghan line of Takhi-i-Shah. Not only 
does the definition of the line awarded by Sir Fred. Goldsmid 
prevent my doing this, but I feel sure that to forcibly take 
away from Persia lands which that country has so long 
occupied and cultivated would undo much of the good which 
will result from a definite settlement of the Seistan 
boundary. It is, moreover, to be remembered that Persia can 
easily irrigate that tract and the Tappa-i-Kaniz land by 
canals from the Rod-i-Pariun, whereas it is impossible ti 
irrigate them by canals from the Afghan side. Sir Fred. 
Goldsmid* s definition of the line is very clear. The 
southern limit of the Naizar shall be the boundary. 
Takht-i-Shah is a small miserable tract of poor land and, 
willing as I would be to include it in Afghan territory to 
meet your many requests if it were in my power to do so, I 
fail to see how the possession of it would be of any value or 
use to Afghanistan. As an Arbitrator, I am obliged to act 
impartially towards both countries concerned, and it has been 
my object to try and arrive at a boundary line fair to both 
and one which would not lead to ill-feeling between the 
people living on either side of it. I feel confident you 
will yourself admit that the line I have now awarded is a 
fair and impartial settlement of all present boundary 
disputes. I have every hope that this award will meet with 
he approval of His Highness the Amir, when he is informed of 
it.
It now remains to properly demarcate this line with boundary 
pillars so as to avoid all disputes in future. I trust that 
no delay will occur in starting that work.
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Appendix II
Colonel Henry McMahon's report to the Government of India on
the final settlement of boundaries between Iran and
(+)Afghanistan in Sistan.v 1
***********
Clauses 1 to 19 of this report concern the history of the 
disputes, and the following clauses deal with McMahon's 
arbitration proceedings and decisions;
20. On the arrival of this Arbitration Mission in Seistan in 
february 1903, further attempts were made to stultify its 
action and defeat its purposes. The Persian Commissioners* 
were informed by their Government that our arbitration 
applied only to water questions. Their instructions were 
thus worded:- "Keep this point in view that the boundaries of 
Seistan and Baluchistan have been already entirely 
delimited. Now in Seistan this Mission is for the removal of 
differences# in respect to Helmund water **** and nothing 
else." (Vide enclosure to my letter No. 503 of 25th February 
1903m to the Government of India.)
21. Although the Persian Commissioner were not then 
authorized to discuss boundary questions, I insisted upon 
obtaining their views on the subject. I even made them 
accompany me along the disputed boundary from Deh Dost 
Muhammad to Takht-i-Shah in March 1903, but they declined to 
accompany me round the northern portion to Siah Koh, when I 
went there in May of that year.
22. The boundaries claimed by the Persian and Afghans 
respectively were as follows. Briefly stated, the Persians 
contended that Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award map was no 
authority, and they even denied ever having seen a copy 
thereof. They claimed that the boundary as defined in his 
award ran as follows:- From the Koh-i-Malik Siah it ran, not 
in a straight line to Band-i-Kuhak, but in such a manner as 
to include in Persian territory the Tarakun tract and all the 
country on the west of the Helmund, leaving only the small 
narrow fringe of present Afghan cultivation on the left bank 
of that river in Afghan territory. From Kuhak it followed 
the Helmund and the Nad Ali Sikhsar channel, and thence 
northwards through the old Maizar to the northern edge of the 
Hamun, and thence in a straight line to Siah Koh.
(1) From CoLoneL A.H. McMahon C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Sistan Arbitration
Commission, to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, encLosure 
17 of FO 60/728 f pp. 1 to 13 (21st February 1905).
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23. The Afghan claims are defined in detail in His Highness 
the Amir's letter of October 15th and December 9th, 1902, to 
the government of India. They represent merely an attempt to 
verbally define the line shown on Goldsmid's award map, which 
is taken as the sole authority on the subject regardless of 
any written award. As a matter of fact I have ascertained 
that the Afghan Government does not possess any copy of Sir 
Frederick Goldsmid's award, as all papers connected with the 
Goldsmid Mission appear to have got lost in the chaos which 
ensued on the death of Amir Sher Ali.
Briefly stated, the Amir claimed a line from Koh-i-Malik Siah 
to Band-i-Kuhak including Ramrud in Afghan territory. (The 
Afghan Commissioner* claimed possession also of Hauzdar and 
Kuntdar.) From Band-i-Kuhak their line followed the Helmund 
and Nad Ali channel to a point about one and a half miles 
from Nad Ali near Burj-i-As and Deh Ido. It was contended 
that this is the point at which, on Sir Frederick Goldsmid's 
map, the boundary line leaves the river and that therefore 
the Afghan boundary should run from here in a straight line 
to Siah Koh.
24. So much for the rival claim. It will be seen that the 
Persians based theirs on their own interpretation of the 
Goldsmid award and professed ignorance of his map, while the 
Afghans had never seen the award and insisted on a strict 
adherence to the map.
25. The first thing to be done by this Mission was to make 
an accurate survey of the country. Even the latest Government 
of India maps were found to be very inaccurate, a fact which 
is easily explained when one realises the very serious 
difficulties which the country offers to accurate survey work 
owing to its dead flatness and general absence of prominent 
points, together with, in some places, dense tamarisk jungle, 
wide stretches of water and high reeds, and in others vast 
expanses of waterless desert. It was only with great effort 
and after a considerable time with our large staff of able 
surveyors that these difficulties were overcome and accurate 
maps on scales of 4 miles and 1 mile = 1 inch were prepared. 
It was hardly surprising, therefore, to find that the country 
as shown by our maps differed largely from that shown in
earlier maps prepared under less favourable circumstances, 
and especially from that shown in the Goldsmid map. It is a 
matter of much greater surprise that the map made under such 
ver unfavourable circumstances by Major Beresford Lovett in 
1872 is so approximately accurate as it is.
26. The next step after completing a new survey of the
country was to determine with its aid the course of the
boundary line as defined in the Goldsmid award. Having
established the fact that the Helmund at the time of that 
award ran along the present Nad Ali and Sikhsar Channels, the 
boundary presented little difficulty up to the point where it 
is said by Sir F. Goldsmid to enter the Maizar.
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Local evidence and the unerring proofs afforded by- 
surveys and levels established the fact that, at the time of 
the Goldsmid Mission, the point where the Helmund entered the 
Naizar is at the edge of the tract of mainland just north of 
Deh Ali Jangi and Ganguzar. The limits of the old Naizar can 
be still distinguished by the dry stumps of reed roots and 
the absence of old# tamarisk jungle which covers the 
mainland. From just west of this point the mainland jutted 
out northwards into the Naizar in a long narrow spit on which
the Deh Buzi and Takht-i-Shah villages are now situated, and
which terminates at a point known as Shalghami. The Afghan 
Commissioner has himself admitted that this spit was dry 
mainland and not Naizar at the time of the Goldsmid Mission. 
Applying Sir F Goldsmid's definition to the actual conditions 
of the country, the boundary line of his award ran along the 
eastern edge of this spit to Shalghami, thus leaving
Takht-i-Shah in Persia.
27. From this point onwards the definition becomes very
difficult of application. As shown by their own accounts of 
their journey to Lash Juwain, the Naizar even at the time of 
the Goldsmid Mission stretched practically across the whole 
of that portion of the Hamun tract between Seistan and the 
mainland of Lash Juwain. There was a larger of Hamun to the 
north-east than now exists since the Helmund has turned 
westwards, but then, as now, the Naizar stretched in places 
from the southern to the northern shore and only in years of 
high flood is there any wide stretch of open water to which 
the name of Hamun as distinct# from Naizar can be applied 
between the Hamun-i-Puza and the Hamun-i-Sabari; the Hamun 
area shown in our recent survey map is the area covered by 
water in years of high flood. Even at the time of the 
Goldsmid Mission it would have been impossible to lay down a 
boundary line from any point on the north bank of the Seistan 
mainland to Siah Koh in strict accordance with Sir F. 
Goldsmid's definition. The principle underlying his 
definition is that the boundary line should not enter the 
mainland north of the Hamun, which belongs to the Lash Juwain 
district of Afghanistan.
A straight line from Shalghami to the nar-i-Ahu peak 
fulfils this conditions.
28. The next difficulty was to determine the identity of the 
Siah Koh (Black hill) near Bandan referred to in the Goldsmid 
award. It was not visited by that Mission and the name was 
taken from people at a distance who probably knew as little 
of the names of the distant hills as their present 
successors. It is obvious, however, that a group of 
conspicuous black hills which stand out prominently near 
Bandan as seen from Seistan and Lah Juwain was the Siah Koh 
meant by Sir F. Goldsmid. The position in his map ascribed 
to this group confirms this.
None of these mountains, however, are locally known as 
Siah Koh. The three mountains composing the above group are
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called Nar Ahu, Mada Ahu, and Sabzak, respectively, of which 
Nar Ahu is the most southern and Sabzak the most northern of 
the group.
That this group was understood by the Persians to be the 
Siah Koh of the Goldsmid award is proved by an old Persian 
map which is in my possession. On it is a note by Mir Alam 
Khan, the then Governor of Seistan, to the effect that "Siah 
Koh is also called Nar Abhi Mada Ahu.".
It only remained to decide which of the three peaks best 
fulfils the Goldsmid definition. To Nar Ahu only of the 
three can a straight line be drawn from Shalghami without 
cutting the mainland north of the Hamun. Nar Ahu must, 
therefore, be taken to be the Siah Koh.
29. Having thus applied the boundary line defined by Sir F. 
Goldsmid to the existing country, it was necessary to next 
ascertain the conditions of actual present occupation and 
possession by Persia and Afghanistan of the country adjoining 
that line, and consider whether any modification of that line 
was necessary to suit present conditions.
It has already been explained in paragraphs 14 and 15 
above how, in the absence of detailed information of the 
Goldsmid award, the people of Persian and Afghan Seistan had 
arrived at a mutual understanding regarding the boundary. 
The line recognized by them only differed from the actual 
line defined in the Goldsmid award from the point where the 
old Helmund entered the Naizar northwards. It thence ran 
along the old dry bed of the Sikhsar through the Naizar
northwards and thence westwards north of the Shalghami to 
Mesh Kushi. From there nobody apparently apparently has ever 
bothered their heads about boundaries. The line was vaguely 
understood to run in a straight line to Tappa-i-Kharan, and 
then westwards. How or where it ran from Tappa-i-Kharan no 
one has ever seemed to know or care. This is hardly
surprising when one considers that the tract in question is 
nothing but Maizar, saline flats, marsh or Hamun until the 
barren waterless slopes of the mountains are reached. The 
desolate, waterless, saline flats studded with old ruins, 
which form the southern portion of the Lash Juwain district, 
moreover, offer no attraction to the people of that district, 
and they have always remained supremely indifferent about
their southern boundary.
30. Both sides seem to have respected their mutually 
recognized boundary until the last few years, when the
encroachments described in paragraph 17 above were made.
The Goldsmid line described in paragraphs 26, 27 and 28 
above represents the boundary of actual present occupation 
except in the following cases
(1) A small tract Included by the Afghan canal west of 
the Sikhsar between Deh Gul Shah and Deh Hassan 
Kharot.
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(2) A small tract of Persian cultivation east of the 
Sikhsar at Ganguzar. In the winter of 1903-1904 
the Persians further encroached in this direction 
by occupying the lands of Deh Ali Jangi.
(3) The Persian cultivation and village at 
Tappa-i-Kaniz. This, it should be noted, is on 
the Persian side of the mutually recognized 
boundary, although east of the Goldsmid line as 
defined in paragraph 26 above.
Further north and west the vague ideas held of the 
boundary line by the Persian Seistanis and the apathy of the 
Lash Juwain people have resulted in the Persian Cattle owners 
grazing their herds and residing for portions of the year 
without let or hindrance as far north as the Farrah Rud, 
while Persian tax collectors have often collected grazing tax 
and taken fees from kafilas without objections being made as 
far north inside the Lash Juwain mainland as Peshawaran and 
Salian.
31. With he above information at my disposal it only 
remained to adapt the line of the Goldsmid award to present 
conditions. I considered that it was of primary importance 
for many reasons to reduce to a minimum any disturbance of 
existing conditions of occupation and possession. The
circumstances of the case did not seem to call for changes, 
and I considered that arbitrary changes, however pleasing 
they might appear at first sight to one or other side, would 
in reality do more harm than good and the ill-feeling stirred 
up thereby would in the end injure both sides.
The explanations given by Sir F. Goldsmid of the
principles underlying his award, as stated in paragraph 12 
above, gave me, I considered, all the necessary authority for 
making the slight modifications required in his line which, 
at the same time, keeping my award within the terms of his 
award as required by the conditions imposed upon me by the 
Persian Government.
From the Koh-i-Malik Siah to the Band-i-Kuhak the only 
satisfactory solution of the boundary question equally fair 
to both sides was a straight line between these points. A 
tract of deserted country has formed the boundary up to now; 
but it is no longer safe to rely upon a boundary so 
indefinitely defined. I therefore decided to award a 
straight line.
From Kuhak to the mouth of the Afghan canal near Deh Gul
Shah the line runs along the Helmund River and Nad Ali and
Sikhsar channels. From that point I decided to award to 
Afghanistan the lands between their new canal and the old 
"Sim" as far as Deh Hassan Kharot, as a fair set off to the 
Persian encroachment at Tappa-i-Kaniz. The Persian 
encroachments at Ganguzar and Deh Ali Jangi could not be 
supported on any grounds, so I decided to restore those lands 
to Afghanistan.
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I would have liked, with he above exception, to retain 
as the boundary of the old bed of the Sikhsar northwards 
which had for so long been recognized as such, but this is 
now only a small dry ditch about 2 feet wide and a few inches 
deep, in places no larger than a shallow furrow. It is very 
difficult to distinguish its course, and a careless ploughman 
might any day obliterate it for ever. To demarcate its 
course meant building pillars for a long distance through 
marsh lands subject to heavy inundation. It therefore 
decided to take advantage of a line of prominent and 
conveniently situated Tapps or mounds called Tappa-i=Tilai, 
Tappa-i-Shahraki, and Tappa-i-Kurki and run the boundary by 
straight lines at long them to Shalghami. This line very 
closely follows the course of the old "Sim."
From Shalghami to Siah Koh I saw no reason to depart 
from a straight line for the boundary, and for reasons stated 
in paragraph 28, the Nar Ahu was fixed upon as the Siah Koh.
32. It will be noticed that this line fails to include, in 
Afghanistan, Takht-i-Shah which the Persian Government in 
1873 and 1974 understood to be outside the Persian boundary. 
I have explained in paragraph 26 how the Persian Government 
were mistaken in this idea. This place lies on the Persian 
side of the line as defined by Sir F. Goldsmid. My reason 
for now referring to this spot again in some detail is 
because regarding no place along the whole Seistan boundary 
has so much misunderstanding and discussion risen. This is 
the more extraordinary, as it is about the most miserable 
spot in Seistan. It consists of a few patches of poor 
culturable land in the midst of sand hills fringed on either 
side by a dismal waste of marsh and salt flats. Importance 
has been attached to this place by the Afghans owing to its 
having been specifically alluded to in correspondence between 
the other Governments concerned in the Seistan Settlement. 
The Afghan Commissioner made strenuous efforts to obtain its 
inclusion in Afghan territory, as he feared the Amir's wrath 
if he failed to do so. It was easy to see that he did not 
himself believe that the Afghans had any real right to it.
To include it in Afghan territory, even if this could 
have been done in accordance with the Goldsmid award, would 
have brought about a most undesirable state of affairs. It 
has always been in Persian possession, it is within a short 
distance of several Persian villages and is irrigable from 
Persian canal, whereas it is cut off for the greater portion 
of the year from the Afghan mainland by marsh and water. 
Whilst this Mission were camped there, the Afghan 
Commissioner could only reach us by travelling several miles 
through Persian territory. The nearest inhabited spot of 
Afghan territory was some 14 miles distant, and he urged me 
to leave the place as it gave him so much trouble to keep in 
touch with me while there! It cannot be Irrigated from any 
Afghan canal system, and would, therefore, be useless to the 
Afghans. It would form an isolated island, so to speak, of 
Afghan territory thrust into inconvenience, trouble, and
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irritation to the Persians. To prove the trouble it would 
cause, I need only quote the Afghan Commissioner's reply to 
my query as to what use Afghanistan would make of this 
worthless spot if they got it "Oh, " said he "we would put an 
Afghan post there and at Tappa-i-Kaniz just to annoy the 
Persians." Further comment appears unnecessary.
33. Enough has been said above to fully explain the line I 
determined to award and the reasons which influenced me in so 
doing. My decision was arrived at by May 1903 and under 
ordinary circumstances I would have delivered forthwith an 
arbitral award accordingly, but the circumstances of the case 
were very far from ordinary, and I considered it wiser for 
the following reasons to defer the delivery of my award and 
take action on other and somewhat unusual lines.
The Persian Government still contended that no boundary 
questions were in dispute and that the scope of my 
arbitration extended only to the settlement of the Seistan 
water questions. To such lengths did they go in this 
direction that they actually demanded from me, through the 
British Legation in Teheran, an explanation as to why I 
visited the Siah Kohl It would appear that the reason of 
this unreasonable attitude was that the Russians had 
frightened them into believing that our arbitration would 
result in a large portion of Persian Seistan being given to 
the Afghans. Until the Persians consented to recognize the 
very obvious fact that boundary questions were in dispute, it 
seems premature to fire off a boundary award, and, moreover, 
I was obliged to look beyond my arbitral award and keep in 
view the fact that the boundary line itself had subsequently 
to be demarcated on the ground. This would not be possible 
until the award was accepted and approved of by both the 
countries concerned.
34. No further progress was made until June 14th, 1903, when 
a very opportune fracas occurred between Afghans and Persians 
over the disputed lands on the frontier near Deh Ali Jungi in 
which some Afghans were wounded. This gave me the desired 
opportunity of advancing matters an important step forward 
and I issued an arbitrary order in the form of an 
intermediate award laying down the boundary line ascribed in 
paragraph 31 above from Deh Gul Shah to Tappa-i-Tilai and 
called upon both Commissioners to prevent their people 
transgressing that line.
As this collision and my action thereon would 
necessarily prevent the Persian Government contending any 
longer that there were no boundary disputes, I thought the 
time had now arrived to communicate full particulars* of the 
whole boundary question to the British Minister at Teheran 
and to define, for the information of the Persian Government, 
the line which I said I proposed, except under certain stated 
contingencies, to lay down in my arbitral award.
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35. It may be asked why i did not deliver the whole of my 
award at this stage. To do so I considered would be playing 
into Russian# hands as they would make the Persian Government 
believe they had been hardly dealt with in my award, no 
matter what its terms really were. An appeal to His 
Majesty's Foreign Secretary of state would doubtless have 
followed and that opened out a vista of interminable 
discussion and delays, and the ultimate confirmation of my 
award with the rejection of the Persian appeal would be 
represented to Persia as a fitting termination to our 
arbitrary and high-handed proceedings. The Russians had very 
favourable ground to work on. They have long ago got the 
Persians to believe that the Goldsmid award was an act of 
most cruel injustice to Persia, who had every right to the 
whole area of classic Seistan even as far up as Rudbar. So 
much national sentiment attaches to both the legendary and 
historical past of Seistan that the Persians always find it 
hard to view Seistan with undistorted perspective and have 
long nursed imaginary grievances regarding the Goldsmid 
settlement.
It seemed wiser, therefore, to try and work matters, if 
possible, so that the Persian Government should be reduced 
to accept my award before it was actually delivered. I could 
not alter it after formally delivering it, whereas the 
peculiar circumstances of the case enabled me, while laying 
all possible stress on the points where my proposed 
interpretation of the Goldsmid award could be shown to be 
favourable to Persia, to also hint very plainly that any 
reconsideration of the question on wider lines, and in the 
light of past injudicious admissions and statements of the 
Persian Government, would result in an interpretation much 
less favourable to Persia, if she did not accept the 
settlement now proposed.
A lengthy correspondence ensued and the Persian 
Government, while no longer able to deny that boundary 
disputes were in question, endeavoured to question the 
justice of my line and to insist on various conditions 
relating to the Seistan water question being included in my 
boundary award, and coupled with boundary questions. To 
describe the new positions taken up and abandoned by the 
Persian Government at this period is unnecessary. Suffice it 
to say that nothing seems to have been left undone by 
Persia's disinterested Russian advisers to complicate simple 
questions.
36. During this stage I received some valuable assistance 
from one of the Persian Commissioners, the Yamin-i-Nizam. I 
had delayed communicating to him the details of my proposed 
award until they were just about to reach Teheran. This gave 
him no time to forward any objections to Teheran in 
consultation with the Russian Consul in Seistan, with whom he 
had hitherto been working conjointly, and to confess, at this 
late stage, his ignorance of my opinions and intentions would 
have exposed him to a rebuke from his Government. He was,
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moreover, agreeably surprised to find that my proposed award 
was much more favourable to Persia than anything I had yet 
given him cause to hope for. He, therefore, took the only 
wise course open to him and strongly recommended by telegram 
and letters the acceptance of my proposals. Under 
instructions from his Government, he continually kept 
pressing upon me the consideration of various water questions 
designed to complicate the boundary settlement.
37. I steadily declined to discuss any water questions until 
the boundary question was settled, and in doing so I was 
obliged to repeat more and more plainly the warning conveyed 
in my previous communication, until on the 24th October 1903, 
I informed the Yamin-i-Nizam, for the information of his 
Government, that matters had then reached a stage when 
nothing remained for me, but to consider the whole boundary 
question on wider lines and award a boundary ins strict 
accordance with the letter of the Goldsmid definition, 
irrespective of all existing conditions of possession or 
occupation. On the 1st November the Persian Government 
agreed to accept my line unconditionally.* This satisfactory 
result having at last been achieved and the hands of the 
Persian Government being thus completely tied in the matter 
of any appeal, I proceeded to formally deliver my award. It 
was delivered to the Afghan Commissioner on the 8th November 
and to the Persian Commission on the 11th November 1903. The 
text of the award as delivered was communicated to the 
Government of India and Teheran in my letter No. 1259 of 14th 
November 1903.
It is necessary to note here that, although the terms of 
my proposed award had long ago been communicated to the 
Persians, the Afghans had until now remained in ignorance of 
them. This was necessary as long as there was any chance of 
my being obliged to modify my award in consequence of the 
contingencies referred to above. I had, moreover, steadily 
endeavoured to minimise any expectations on the part of the 
Afghans of a line unduly favourable to themselves, and any 
misgiving which they protracted period of our discussion with 
the Persian Government had instilled into their minds were 
allowed to remain there.
There result was as intended and hoped for, i.e., that 
when the time came to enlighten them they were very agreeably 
surprised at the line propounded in my award. The Afghan 
Commissioner in forwarding it to His Highness the Amir wrote 
in very favourable terms of it and strongly recommended its 
acceptance.
38. He expressed to me his confidence that the Amir would 
accept it, but said it was not improbably that some delay 
might occur in this as the Persians had created so much delay 
in the matter that the Afghan Government might think it 
unbecoming to their dignity to show undue alacrity in 
expressing their final approval of the boundary settlement.
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This supposition proved correct. No reply was received 
from the Amir until early in April 1904 when he informed the 
Government of India that he accepted my award. He stated, 
however, that demarcation was undesirable. His letter (no. 
52 of 10th March 1904), to which I invited reference, 
expresses approval of the boundary settlement and argues that 
an award on my part more favourable to Afghanistan would have 
played into the Russian hands. It affords interesting 
corroboration of the views expressed in paragraph 35 above. 
This connection in the Amir's mind of Russia with the Seistan 
question, coupled with the annoyance he was then experiencing 
at their hands, in the matter of the demarcated Russo-Afghan 
frontier, led him, as stated in his letter, to desire that 
the Seistan line should not be demarcated.
39. Further representations to Kabul by the government of 
India resulted at last in a letter (No. 57 of 12th August
1904) from His Highness the Amir agreeing to demarcation. 
This did not reach me until 5th September when I informed the 
Afghan Commissioner the Afghan Commissioner of the Amir's 
consent. No authority, however, had reached him from Kabul 
and he was naturally afraid to take action without it. I 
explained that doubtless the Amir considered his 
communication to the Government of India sufficient and I had 
no option but to act upon it as sufficient authority for 
demarcation. In deference to the Afghan Commissioner's 
anxiety I decided to limit our work at first to the 
demarcation of the straight line from Koh-i-Malik Siah to 
Kuhak, and work commenced on the 2 3rd September.
The line from Koh-i-Malik Siah to the Band-i-Seistan, 
running as it does through absolutely waterless desert from 
some ninety miles, presented great difficult. All water, 
both for men and animals and building, had to be brought from 
a distance varying from ten to twenty-five miles, and some 
four hundred camels were continuously employed on this work. 
The heat, wind, dust, haze and mirage interfered greatly with 
the work of alignment and the straight line from Koh-i-Malik 
Siah to Kuhak was not finished until November 18th, 1904.
The building parties, who worked for over one and a half 
months in the waterless desert, suffered considerable 
hardships.
In the meantime the Afghan Commissioner received, on 
30th October, the requisite authority from His Highness the 
Amir to assist in demarcation.* This letter was the first 
intimation the Afghan Commissioner had yet received of the 
Amir's acceptance of my award. There was a complete absence 
of any note of disapproval of the boundary settlement in this 
letter and it cause the Afghan Commissioner the liveliest 
satisfaction.
The details of the demarcation of the boundary line are 
very fully related elsewhere. It is sufficient to say here 
that a low Hamun enabled me to demarcate with boundary 
pillars most of the usually inundated portion of the line
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between Shalghami and the Siah Koh. The last 25 miles from 
the western shore of the Hamun to Siah Koh ran through 
another stretch of absolutely waterless country.
The whole line was successfully demarcated up to the 
Siah Koh by the 29th December 1904. Masonry pillars 
carefully built, many of them of great size and height, have 
been built along the line. Every care has been taken to makr 
clearly with pillars all portions of the line where future 
doubt might arise and to demarcate the whole line in a manner 
that is best waited for durability and permanence.
The arduous duty of building the pillars, a task which 
involved careful and extensive arrangements and considerable 
hardship, was entrusted to Mr. T. R. J. Ward and the thorough 
manner in which the work has been carried out is deserving of 
the highest praise.
It is not to be expected that the plaster covering of 
these pillars will long resist the destructive effects of the 
alternating heat and frost of Seistan, but the loss of the 
outer skin will have no effect on the durability of the 
pillars themselves. I would suggest, however, that His 
Majesty's Consul in Seistan should be instructed to have all 
the pillars visited each year and arrange for the annual 
repair and whitewashing of them all.
40. The preparation and completion of boundary maps and 
statements and other final documents relating to the boundary 
line occupied the whole of January 1905. Further delay in 
their delivery arose through the unavoidable who in
consequence of important work connected with his district was 
unable to rejoin my camp. On the 20th February# 1905 the 
following documents were delivered to both the Persian and 
Afghan Commissioners:-
(1) A covering letter, dated 1st February 1905, 
addressed by me to both Commissioners enumerating 
the documents therewith handed over to them for 
delivery to their respective Governments.
(2) A statement written in Persian on parchment,
defining in all necessary detail the course of the 
boundary line as demarcated and the manner of its
demarcation. This document may be considered as
my final arbitral award on the Seistan boundary 
question.
(3) A map of the whole Seistan boundary, in two sheets 
drawn on tracing cloth, on a scale of one inch = 
four miles.
(4) A map of that portion of the boundary from the 
point of separation of the Rud-i-Pariun and Nad 
Ali branches of the Helmund to Tappa-i-Tilai, in 
one sheet drawn on tracing cloth, on the scale of 
one inch = one mile.
(5) A detailed list of boundary pillars prepared on 
ferrotype showing the position and nature of each
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pillar. This list is written in Persian and comprises
three large sheets of cloth-mounted ferrotype paper.
41. The following documents are herewith forwarded to the 
Government of India:-
(A) A roll containing an exact facsimile in every 
respect (including material and method of 
production) of each of the five documents above, 
as given to the Persian and Afghan Commissioners, 
together with the receipts, in original, signed by 
the Persian and Afghan Commissioners for the 
documents delivered to them. All documents in 
this roll are marked A in red ink.
(B) A roll containing exact copies of the above five 
documents, in ferrotype, together with an exact 
English rendering of No. (5) on cloth-mounted 
ferrotype paper, in three sheets.
(C) An English translation of the covering letter to 
the Persian and Afghan Commissioners, i.e., No.
(1) above.
(D) A list of pillars and detailed particular of each 
in English, typewritten. [N.B.- This list and the 
particulars noted therein includes some details 
which are not shown in the list of pillars, (5) 
above, given to the Persian and Afghan 
Commissioners and which will facilitate the 
identification of any pillar regarding which any 
dispute may hereafter arise.-A.H.M.]
(F) Plans and drawings of all the boundary pillars in 
original.
42. This report has, I fear, attained somewhat large 
proportions, but this has been unavoidable in the case of a 
question which, possession certain intricacies of its own, 
has by reason of unnecessary complications of an unusual 
nature taken two years of tedious labout to unravel and 
settle.
It is gratifying in bringing this review of its history 
and settlement to a close to be able to record the opinions 
entertained of its settlement by the countries concerned. In 
the settlement of all boundary questions, more especially 
where they relate to a country to which sentimental as well 
as material importance attaches, there is always a grave risk 
of the discussion re-opening the old sentimental grievances 
of either side, and of awakening the slumbering ill-feelings 
of the past, and of the eventual settlement leaving both 
sides discontented and with ruffled feelings that take some 
time to calm down. In the present case I am glade to be able 
to report that no such result have accrued. Both sides, as 
represented by those most intimately concerned, i.e., the 
officials and the people of the country itself, appear* 
genuinely satisfied and pleased with their boundary as now 
settled and demarcated. It is a boundary line to which, with 
slight exceptions, they have already been long accustomed.
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The very slight modification which the previous Seistan 
boundary has required and the satisfaction with which the 
present settlement has been locally accepted furnish solid 
evidence of success of Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award on high 
it is based.
43. A copy of this report is being forwarded direct to His 
Britannic Majesty's Minister at Teheran and to His Britannic
Majesty's Consul for Seistan and Kain, together with the
following documents, viz., (B) , (C)f (D) / anci (E ), as
described in paragraph 41 above.
A copy of this report with documents (B), (C) , and (D)
are also being sent direct to Mr. Dane, O.S.I., Kabul 
Mission, for information.
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Appendix III
Colonel Henry McMahon's statements on 
Sistan Boundary demarcation.
ick-k-k-k'k-ic-kiklf
Final Arbitral Statement on the Seistan Boundary by COLONEL 
A.H. McMAHON, C.S.I., C.I.E., British Commissioner, Seistan
Arbitration Commission, dated 1st February 1905.
1. The boundary line between Persia dn Afghanistan in 
Seistan was defined in my arbitral award of November 1903 as 
follows:-
"The boundary line in Seistan between Afghanistan on the 
east and Persia on the west should run as follows, i.e., from 
the Malik Siah Koh in a straight line to the Band-i-Kuhak and 
thence along the bed of the Helmund river to the point of 
separation* of its two branches, the Rud-i-Parian and Nad Ali 
channel. From there it should follow the bed of the Mad Ali 
channel into the Sikhsar and along the bed of Sikhsar to a 
point near Deh Yar Muhammad where the Sikhsar has been 
diverted towards the west in the water channel shown on the 
map which joins the Shela-i-Shamshiri near to Deh Hassan to 
the Shela-i-Shamshiri leaving Deh Hassan Kharot on the east 
it should then run in a straight line separating the hamlets 
of Deh Ali Mardan on the west from Deh Ali Jangi on the east 
to Tappa-i-Tilai; thence in a straight line to the most 
western of the mounds of Tappa-i-Shaharaki; thence in a 
straight line to the most western mound of Tappa-i-Kurki; 
thence in a straight line to Shalghami; and thence in a 
straight line to Siah Koh, Bandan."
2. The above award having been accepted by both 
Governments, I have now demarcated the boundary line by 
boundary pillars in strict accordance with that award. The 
following remarks will clearly explain the boundary line and 
the manner in which that line has been demarcated by pillars.
3. The starting point of the boundary line is marked by a 
boundary pillar on the summit of Malik Siah Koh which was 
constructed by the Afghan-Baluchistan Boundary Commissioner 
in 189 6, and is known as Boundary Pillar No. 186 of that 
Commission.
4. The latitude and longitude of this and all other Seistan 
boundary pillars, the position of each with regard to
(+) From CoLonel A.H. McMahon C.S.I., C.I.E. British Commissioner, Sistan Arbitration
Commission, to the Persian and Afghan Commissioners, dated the 1st February 1905, FO 60/728 
pp. 14 to 24.
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prominent places visible from them, and all necessary 
particulars of their size and construction are fully stated 
in the list of boundary pillars attached to this statement.
The position of each boundary pillar is also clearly 
shown in the two maps attached to this.
5. From the top of Malik Siah Koh to the Band-i-Kuhak (also 
called Band-i-Seistan) the straight line of boundary has been 
marked by 51 pillars. As these are all in exactly one
straight line a further description of each is unnecessary;
and it suffices to say that No. 12 is on the sought bank of 
the Shela, No. 36 on the north bank of the Sana rud, and No. 
51 on the left bank of the Helmund river where the 
Rud-i-Seistan leaves that river at the Band-i-Kuhak. Between 
pillars Nos. 8 and 9 and between Nos. 12 and 13 are 3 and 8 
miles respectively of heavy sand through which it was not 
possible to demarcate the line with pillars.
Besides these 51 pillars there are 16 smaller marks also 
exactly on the straight line. The positions and particulars 
of these are stated in the attached list of pillars. They 
bear the following numbers in that list:- 13!, 14a , 15A, 16A, 
17A, 18A, 18B, 18C, 21A, 23A, 23B, 25A, 25B, 26A, 32A, 43A,
but in order to prevent confusion with boundary pillars they 
have been shown in the map attached to this only as small 
black dots without numbers.
6. From the Band-i-Kuhak demarcation with pillars was 
unnecessary along the course of the Helmund river as far as 
the point of separation of the Rud-i-Pariun and Nad Ali 
branches of that river. To mark this point pillar No. 52 has
been built at a distance of 94 feet from the left, i.e.,
Persian, bank of the Nad Ali channel, and pillar No. 53, has 
been built at a distance of 65 feet from the right or Afghan 
bank of the same channel. The boundary line thence follows 
the Nad Ali channel. The old ruin of Burj-i-As marks the 
right bank of that channel near Nad Ali, and pillar No. 54 
marks the right bank at the point where the Shela-i-Charakh 
leave that channel. From Pillar No. 54 the Nad Ali channel 
is known as the Sikhsar. Pillar No, 55 marks the left bank 
of the Sikhsar at the point where the Deh Dost Muhammad canal 
takes off from it, while pillar No. 56 also marks the left 
bank at the point where the Sikhsar again turns northwards. 
Pillar No. 57 has been built on a prominent mound called 
Tappa-i-Sikhsar.
Further north, pillar No. 58 which has been built at a 
distance of 109 feet from the right bank, and pillar No. 59, 
which is situated 20 feet from the left bank of the Sikhsar 
stream, mark the point where the boundary line leaves the 
Sikhsar as defined in my award. Pillar No. 58 is built 
alongside the site of Deh Yar Muhammad. That village 
mentioned in my award has lately been deserted and no longer 
exists.
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7. Further demarcation of the course of the Helmund river 
and the Nad Ali and the Sikhsar streams is at present 
impossible owing to the nature of the banks, which are liable 
to be inundated. Moreover further demarcation appears 
unnecessary at the present time as the course of the water in 
those streams clearly marks the boundary. Hereafter should 
any of those streams dry up by reason of a change in the 
course of the Helmund, and cease to be water channels, their 
course can easily be ascertained and demarcated, if 
necessary, with the aid of the pillars and places above 
described.
8. From Pillar No, 59 the course of the boundary line is 
demarcated by pillars Nos. 60 and 61 built on the left bank 
of the water channel which joins the Shela-i-Shamshiri near 
Deh Hassan Karot. Pillar No. 62 has been built to mark this 
point on the south bank of the Shela-i-Shamshiri close to Deh 
Hassan Kharot, From here the straight line to Tappa-i-Tilai 
has been marked by pillars Nos. 63,64 and 65, the last named 
being built on the top of Tappa-i-Tilai. It is necessary to 
note here that the villages of Deh Ali Mardan and Deh Ali 
Jangi mentioned in my award as being on either side of this 
line have been deserted since my award was delivered and 
neither of them now exist.
9. To illustrate the boundary line from the point of 
separation of the Rud-i-Pariun and Nad Ali channels to
Tappa-i-Tilai in greater detail than is possible in a map of 
4 mines to 1 inch, a map of 1 mile to 1 inch of that portion 
of the boundary line is attached to this statement.
10. Pillar No. 66 has been built on the top of the most
western of the Sharaki Tapps and the straight line onwards to 
Tappa-i-Kurki is marked by pillars Nos. 67 and 68, the latter 
being situated on the top of the most western of the Kurki 
Tappas. On the straight line between pillar No. 68 and 
Shalghami, which is marked by pillar No. 70, pillar No. 69 
has been built. The land on which pillars Nos. 67 and 69 
have been built is generally under water, but as it happened 
to be dry at the time of demarcation massive masonry pillars 
have been built at those points which it is hoped will last a 
long time.
11. From pillar No. 70 at Shalghami, the straight line of
boundary to Siah Koh has been marked by 19 pillars, Nos. 71
to 90. Of these pillars some are built in Naizar lands 
subject to inundation, and every care has been taken to built 
them strong and massive enough to last a long time. The line 
from pillar No. 70 to pillar No. 76 passes 600 feet south of 
the most southern edge of a prominent Tappa called 
Tappa-i-Kharan, 3,223 feet south of the centre of top of 
southern face of Tappa-i-Shaghalak, and 1,485 feet south of 
the highest point of Tappa-i-Musjidak. Between pillars Nos. 
7 6 and 77 the line crosses the open water of the Hamun and 
demarcation was impossible. Pillar No. 77 is on the west 
shore of the Hamun, and the line thence ascends the barren
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and waterless glaciers and slopes of the Siah Koh. Pillar 
No. 90 is on the summit of Siah Koh, which is also known
locally as the Nar-i-Ahu.
12. Two maps accompany this statement. One, in two sheets
is on a scale of 1 inch = 4 miles and illustrates the whole
boundary from Malik Siah Koh to Siah Koh. The other is a
scale of 1 inch - 1 miles, and illustrates the boundary
between the point of separation of the Rud-i-Pariun and Mad 
Ali channels of the Helmund and Tappa-i-Tilai only.
It should be noticed that the number of names of
villages has been restricted as much as possible in these 
maps. This is due to the fact that most of the villages in 
Seistan frequently change not only their names but also their 
position. Endeavour has been made to show only such villages 
as are likely to be permanent.
These maps should be considered as superseding those 
issued with my award of November 1903.
13. Attached to this statement is a list, already referred
to, of all the boundary pillars, giving all necessary
particulars of their position, size constructions, etc.
14. All measurements such as inches, feet, yards and miles
in this statement and the accompanying list of boundary 
pillars, are English inches, feet, yards and miles.
A.A. McMAHON, Colonel,
British Commissioner, Seistan Arbitration Commission.
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Appendix IV
Extract from the draft of the final report of Colonel McMahon 
on the settlement of the Sistan Boundary, FO 60/727, pp. 1 - 2.
**********
"First, the fact is, in my opinion, conclusively 
proved, not only from local evidence, but from the 
unerring proof afforded by levels and surveys, that, at 
the time of Sir Fred. Goldsmid's Mission, the point 
where the old Helmand channel entered the Naizar was at 
the north edge of the tract of mainland now called Deh 
Ali Jangi and Ganguzar. From here westwards, the 
mainland jutted out northwards into the Naizar in a long 
narrow spit, on which the Deh Buzi and Takht-i-Shah
villages are now situated, and which terminated at a
point which is now known as Shalgumi. The Afghan
Commissioner has himself admitted to me, although such 
evidence is hardly required to prove the fact, that this 
long spit was dry mainland , and not Naizar, at the time 
of the Goldsmid Mission. The strict interpretation of 
Goldsmid's definition obviously brings his boundary line 
along the edge of this spit of mainland to Shalgumi, 
whence his straight line takes off to Siah Koh.
"The Persians have, for some years, cultivated a 
small reclaimed area of old Naizar round Tappa-i-Kaniz, 
where a small Persian village long existed. This 
cultivation, strictly speaking, is an encroachment on
the Naizar as existing in 1872. This tract is irrigated 
by extension of the canal which goes from the 
Rod-i-Pariun to Takht-i-Shah, and I should mention here 
that there is no possibility of irrigating it from any 
other source.
"West of this spit of mainland, there is little 
needing remark. To the western edge of the 
Hamun--i-Saburi the country is Naizar, marsh, and Hamun, 
either entirely or only partially flooded, according to 
the annual volume of the Helmand.
"To those who have followed the above statements 
of the history of the boundary question and of existing 
conditions, it will not, I think, be a difficult matter 
to form a definite opinion as to a boundary line which 
would not only be in accordance with Sir Fred.
Goldsmid's definition as interpreted with the aid of
accurate local survey, but cause the minimum of
disturbance in the existing conditions of present
occupation and possession.
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"I will briefly describe the line which, in my 
opinion, fulfilled these conditions, and which I have 
accordingly laid down in my award.
"From Kohak the boundary runs as before, and 
follows the hitherto recognised line of Nad Ali and Sikh 
Sar channels to Deh Gul Shah. From here, I have taken 
the Afghan encroachment, west of the old Sim, as a set 
off to the Persian encroachment in the Naizar, at 
Tappa-i-Kaniz. Sir Fred. Goldsmid's interpretation of 
his own award, vide paragraph above, applies effectively 
to the case of Tappa-i-Kaniz. The line, as now awarded, 
is marked, therefore, by the Afghan canal to Deh Hassan 
Kharot, and thence a straight line to Tappa-i-Talai, and 
thence in straight lines though Tappas-i-Sharaki and 
Kurki to Shalgumi.
"The Persian encroachment, in the face of Afghan 
protest, at Ganguzar, cannot be supported on any 
grounds, and possession has been given to the Afghans.
"These prominent Tappas have been chosen to mark 
the boundary line, as they are the only conspicuous 
marks in this flat waste. The ground between each is a 
salt marshy land generally under water. It will be 
noticed that the line as demarcated follows as closely 
as possible the old main channel of the Helmand, which 
was for so long mutually recognised as the boundary. It 
is not possible to trust to the faintly marked line of 
depression which has hitherto marked this. A 
ploughshare might any day obliterate forever.
"From Shalgumi, the line runs straight to Siah Koh.
"About no place along the whole of the Seistan 
Boundary has more misunderstanding and discussion arisen 
than about Takht-i-Shah. This is the more extraordinary 
as it is the most miserable spot in Seistan. It 
consists of a few patches of poor culturable land of bad 
salt soil, in the midst of sandhills fringed on either 
side with a dismal waste of marsh and salt lands. It is 
possible that at the time when the Persian Government, 
in 1873-74, thinking erroneously that it was included in 
Afghanistan, made such efforts to obtain possession of 
it, the Naizar in the neighbourhood was of large extent, 
and, as such, afforded better grazing for herds than 
other places. Whatever may have been the case, then, it 
offers no advantages now. With the shrinkage of the 
Naizar, the grazing in that neighbourhood has 
diminished, and now-a-days both Afghans and Persians 
have ample and luxuriant Naizar grazing grounds 
elsewhere.
"Importance has been attached to this place by the 
Afghans, because it has been specifically named in the 
the correspondence between the other Governments
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concerned. The Afghan Commissioner made strenuous 
efforts to get possession of this tract, as he feared 
the Amir's wrath if he failed to do so. It was easy to 
see that he did not, himself, believe that the Afghans 
had any real right to it.
"To include it in Afghan territory, would have 
brought about a most undesirable state of affairs. It 
is cut off, for the greater portion of the year, from 
the Afghan mainland, by marsh and water. When this
Mission was camped there, the Afghan Commissioner could 
only reach me by passing through several miles of 
Persian territory. The nearest inhabited spot in Afghan 
territory was about 14 miles distant, and the Afghan 
Commissioner urged me to leave that locality, as it gave 
him so much trouble to keep in touch with me. It cannot 
be irrigated except from the Persian canal system, and 
would, therefore, be useless to the Afghans. It would 
form an isolated island, so to speak, of Afghan
territory thrust into Persian Seistan, and, as such, 
would not fail to become a source of inconvenience, 
irritation, and trouble to the Persians. To explain
what needless trouble it might cause, I must note the 
Afghan Commissioner's reply to my question as to the use 
Afghanistan would make of this worthless place if they 
got it. "Oh", said he, "we would put an Afghan post 
there, and at Tappa-i-Kaniz, just to annoy the
Persians"! Further comments appears unnecessary. 
* * * * * *  * *
"Note Marginally referred to above.-
Regarding his line from the Helmand northwards, 
Sir Fred. Goldsmid wrote in Minute to His Majesty's 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (pages 80-81 of 
Plowden's Precis of 1879) as follows:-
"it would certainly not be contrary to the spirit 
of arbitration to allow Persia the benefit of any reeds 
or cultivation within the Naizar which fairly belong to 
the places assigned to her as such, as Jalalabad, 
Jehanabad, &c., provided they do not equally belong to 
places north of the Naizar
"The cultivation at Tappa-i-Kaniz at the present 
date comes within this category.
A. H. MCMAHON"t1)
C H A P T E R  V I I I
EASTERN IRANIAN BOUNDARIES =
EVOLUTION OF SISTAN BOUNDARY
SECTION I I I :  HIRMAND WATER DISPUTES (1872 -  19391
G e o g ra p h ic a l  B ackgrounds
Rising in the Baba mountain to the north-west of Kabul, 
Hirmand river flows through Afghanistan for most of its 
course, but before emptying into the Lake Hamun, it forms the 
boundary between Iran and Afghanistan for about 40 to 50 
miles.^
The name of the river is an ancient Persian adjective: a
combination of the word "Hir" meaning "water" in pre-Islamic
Persian, and the common suffix "mand" which implies abounding
in". The combination thus means "the river of abundant
water". Similar descriptive adjectives exist in modern
Persian such as "honarmand" which is a combination of the
word "Honar" meaning "art" and the suffix "mand", describing
(2 )a person of abundant artistic talents.' } The name
"Hirmand" appears in this form in all Persian and Arabic
works of geography and history of the post Islamic era.
(3)Referring to the city of Bost in Afghanistan: Magdasi' J
states that the city and its fortress, surrounded by great 
suburbs, stood one league above the junction of the river
/ 4  \ / 5  \
Khardaruyv ' (modern Argandab) with the Hirmand.v *
(1) Wilber, DonaLd N., editor, “Afghanistan", Human Relations Area File, 1956, p. 24.
(2) Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz "Bar Sistan Va Hirmand Che Gozashteh Ast", Rahavard Persian 
Quarterly, No. 25, Los Angeles, Winter, 1990 - 91, pp. 262 - 271.
(3) Maqdasi is an Arab Geographer of fourth century of Hijra.
(4) Correctly "Khardarya".
(5) Le Strange, G. "The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate", London 1966, p. 345.
567
It is for unknown reasons, however, that the British 
travellers and recorders of the nineteenth century adopted 
the term " Helmand" or "Helmund", a corruption of this name, 
used locally in south-west Afghanistan.
Flowing for about 650 miles in a north-east to south-westerly
direction, Hirmand enters the Iranian border area at Kuhak
(see figures I and III). Its drainage system includes most
of the central and southern half of Afghanistan. The course
of the river, upstream of the delta, is made up of two parts
with quite distinct characteristics: one, mountain; the
other, plain. The mountain basin occupies a great part of
the southern slope of the Afghan massif and feeds a great
number of tributaries, which flow together in two principal
streams: the Hirmand main branch which is also known as
Zamin Davar; and the Arghandab branch which, in turn, unite
near Qal'eh-e Bost, at the edge of the mountain zones.
Describing Hirmand, Tate states: "of these, the Helmand is the
first in rank draining an area of about 100,000 square
miles, and with a discharge in the summer (taken in Sistan)
of 70,000 cubic feet per second in ordinary years. This
river ranks the twelfth in the list of rivers of Asia,
having regard to area drained by it and its tributaries, and
/ 1 \
eleventh with reference to the population it supports."' •
Hirmand carries a great deal more water in its upper sections
and its width at Zamin Davar is about 900 metres in the
Spring and Summer, and about 300 metres in the Winter 
(2)months. v 1 Its width in Sistan is much less than it is in 
Zamin Davar. Hirmand's width reduces at Milak where Rud-e 
Parian takes off to 200 metres with a depth of two to three 
metres.^  ^
(1) Tate, G.P., "Travel on the Borders of Persia and Afghanistan", London 1909, part III, p. 
120, Hr Tate was a member of CoLoneL Sir Henry McMahon's Sistan Arbitration Commission team.
(2) Mokhber, Mohammad Ali, "Marzhay-e Iran", Tehran 1945, p. 101,
(3) Ibid,
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From Qal'eh-Bost which is Arghandab's confluence with
Hirmand, the river crosses the deserts of Rigestan^*^ and 
(2)Dasht-e Margv ' for about 250 miles within definite banks 
with respect to the plain. Before reaching the delta region 
of Sistan, Hirmand changes its direction northwards at Band-e 
Kamal Khan, and in Sistan it subdivides into numerous 
branches which flow into the Hamun-e Hirmand and Hamun-e 
Puzak.
Data available from Colonel McMahon's Arbitration
Commission's measurements of Hirmand water at the turn of
(3)the twentieth centuryv ', at the bifurcation, indicate
annual flows (from October to September of three years - 1902
1905) respectively of 7.7, 5.4 and 3.6 thousand million
cubic metres: minimum monthly flows of 40 - 50 million cubic
metres: and maximum of about 2000 million cubic
I 4)metres.v ; Against these figures, data from observations 
made at Chahar Borjak measuring station - situated in the 
plain section about 45 miles upstream of the delta - in the 
period between October 1946 and September 1950, gathered by 
Hirmand Delta Mission shows that: the flows were 2.2, 4.5, 
6.6 and 6.5 thousand million cubic metres, respectively, 
with minimum monthly flows in the months of September and 
October (exclusive of September 1947, exceptionally low) of 
30 x 10 cubic metres (equal to a capacity of about 11 - 12 
cubic metres per second) and maximum of 1.8 - 2.6 x 10 cubic 
metres in the months of April and May (700 - 1000 cubic
/5\
metres per second).v ;
The above two sets of data show clearly a drop in the average 
amount of water flowing in Hirmand downstream in the first
(1) Meaning the Land of pebbles.
(2) Meaning the plain of death.
(3) Period from October 1902 to September 1905.
(4) As quoted in Italconsult*s "Socio-Economic Development plan for the South-Eastern Region", 
Preliminary Report to PLan Organisation of Iran, Rome, November 1959, p. 52.
(5) Ibid.
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half of the twentieth century during which the Afghans
constructed a number of dams and canals on the Hirmand.
The Afghans signed, in 1945 a series of agreements with 
American firms for the construction of dams and canals on 
the river Hirmand. The most important of the dams built by 
the American construction were Abgardan (diversion) Boghra 
dam at Girishk together with Boghra canal of seventy
kilometres, with a capacity of 2800 cubic feet per second, 
and the Kajaki reservoir dam with a capacity of 1.5 million 
cubic feet, and the Juy-e Now canal which was constructed 
near the Iranian b o r d e r s ( s e e  figure III). Arghandab 
dam constructed on the Arghandab branch of the Hirmand is 
another important dam built at this period. Kajaki is
situated on the Hirmand main branch above Arghandab's
confluence. Recording data concerning this dam, Italconsult 
report of November 1959 indicates:
" 2Vo important barriers have been built on the two 
above- mentioned principal streams: one, on the
Hirmand at Kajakai, consisting of an earth rock dam 
with a volume of 3.3 x 10 cu. m., 98 m. high, 550 m. 
long, with dam lake of 3.5 x 10 cu. m .; the other on 
the Argand Ab, near Qandahar, consisting of an earth 
dam with a volume of 3.6 x 10 cu. m., 48 m. high, 530 
m. long, with a dam lake of 480 x 10 cu. m. The two 
reservoirs enable a total of 380,000 ha. to be 
irrigated. These dams are capable of making 
considerable variations in the water supply of the 
two streams, artificially determining the high or low 
level of the river, the former extremely dangerous, 
given the heavy overall flow from the dams (equal to 
4,000 cu. m,/sec.)"(2)
The utilisation of the accumulated waters, if limited to the 
middle basin of the Hirmand, would have a strong
repercussion on the delta zone, where the amounts to be 
destined for irrigation and, in any case, those flowing into
(1) Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz, "The Eastern Iranian Boundaries", paper presented to the seminar on
the Iranian Boundaries at the GeopoLitics and International Boundaries Research Centre, 
SOAS, December 9, 1991.
(2) Italconsult Report, op. cit., p. 51.
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the Hamun-e Hirmand, would diminish. From this, there would 
be a consequent reduction in the size of the lake, itself a 
major source of irrigation in Sistan, and should the outflow 
of the waters through Shileh Shallaq - a natural canal 
flowing Hamun's surplus waters into God-e Zereh (see figure 
II of previous chapter) - cease, a progressive increase in 
the salinity of the waters. Hence, in preparing a plan for 
the economic rehabilitation of Sistan, it is essential to 
know thoroughly the Afghan irrigation projects, how the 
reservoirs will be utilised, and how it is intended to 
safeguard the interests of the current uses downstream. The 
course of the Hirmand in the delta region begins at Kuhak 
where the river - the direction of which is from south to 
north - subdivides into two main branches; the Sistan river 
which takes off at Kuhak in a south-east to north-westerly 
direction, and Hirmand channel which continues northwards as 
far as Milak, where Rud-e Parian takes off most of the 
waters. This branch, from Kuhak to Milak, is now generally 
known as "Common Parian" or "Parian-e Moshtarak". The rest 
of the waters continue in a northwards direction, generally 
known as Nad-e Ali Channel, the old bed of the river. Its 
continuation towards the Neizar is known as Sikh-Sar Channel 
which is no longer identifiable on the ground. Each of 
these branches subdivides into a number of branches and 
canals in the delta region, potentially enabling Hirmand 
waters to reach all population centres and cultivable lands 
in Sistan (see figures I and III).
Rud-e Sistan constitutes the most important branch of the 
delta region of Hirmand, in as much as it crosses and 
irrigates the most fertile and populous zone of Sistan, both 
the Shibab and Poshtab, and further through the Azar Canal, 
conveys the greater part of the irrigated waters to the third 
zone of Sistan, the Mian Kangi.
The other branch of Hirmand, called the Common Parian 
(Parian-e Moshtarak) - as it forms the boundary between Iran 
and Afghanistan - is subdivided in its turn into various 
branches, of which the most important are the inner Parian
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(Dakheli), the Milak and the Shah Nahr-Holmir, all situated
in Iranian territory. The inner Parian or Rud-e Parian
subdivides, in turn, into numerous branches, among which are
the Shir Del, the Maleki and the Niatak. The first two
carry water to the Mian Kangi region, the third to the
northern Poshtab and to the Mian Kangi ^ (see figure I).
A background study of the changes of course of Hirmand in the
delta region made by M. P. Tandy, British Vice-Consul for
Sistan in 1940, accompanied by a sketch he drew himself,
provides useful information on the formation of the existing
main branches and related deltas. He indicates that it took
some 60 years to silt up the Cilling delta of Rud-e Sistan
which he refers to as "Nurab", and some 40 years to silt up
(2)the Alamdarv ; delta on the Afghan side of the boundary 
line (see figure II). He continues:
"In the past the river has usually given previous 
indication of the coming change by floods along the new 
bed which scour it out. In the next year of high flood 
the new bed is then deep enough to take the main 
discharge. Last year's flood of the Nurab appears to 
have been of this nature, and I have for some weeks 
suspected that a change in the course of the Helmand 
was threatened. I was, however, waiting until it was 
possible to visit Band-i-Seistan before submitting a 
report; this the flood of the 3rd February anticipated.
"I have inspected the Nurab at several points along its 
course up to KalaiKuhna and I have also seen the 
previous main channel of the Helmand (Rud-i-Pariun) at 
Malaki. Of the two the "Nurab" was wider and deeper 
and, if anything, faster. There are, however, two 
other channels running north. I forded the western 
most one and found it only some 3 foot deep and 
sluggish, while the other, (the Siksar on the Afghan 
boundary) was said to be even smaller. I am therefore 
of the opinion that the discharge of the Burab a month 
ago was about equal to that of the old bed of the 
Helmand. This is merely an amateur opinion and not 
founded on any measurements or calculations whatsoever.
"In previous years there has been at Kohak (the point 
of divergence of the Nurab from the Helmand) a dam to 
turn the water from the Helmand into the Nurab for 
irrigation. This used to be built in August of 
tamarisk fascines, and the spring flood used to carry
(1) For more detaiL see ItaLconsuLt's report on Sistan {1959),
(2) Tandy spelled this name as "iLamdar".
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Figure I
Hirmand's subdivisions in Sistan as appeared in 
Italconsult's report of 1959
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it away. Without it the Nurab would have carried no 
water, at least during the winter. Last autumn this 
bend (or at any rate the Irani half of it) was not 
built. The heavy winter discharge of the Nurab has 
therefore found its own way into that river 
un-assisted by any dam.
"A fact which points to the change of bed being at 
present far from complete is that during the floods of 
3rd February the Rud-i-Pariun also flooded very 
severely; but this does not prove that no change in 
the river bed is in progress. In the past such 
changes have taken several years, during which the old 
bed may carry water. I think I am right in saying, 
however, that it is unusual for a river to divide into 
two branches and for both of them to carry an equal 
amount of water for any length of time. That being so 
I consider that the "Nurab" is in process of becoming 
the 'Helmand'.
"The obvious result of this will be considerable 
suffering to the population of Seistan both from 
inundations and from the drying up of the present 
delta. In addition when the change is complete Zabul 
will probably become uninhabitable in its present 
site. Finally canals taking off into Afghanistan from 
the eastern bank of the Helmand and the Siksar channel 
are likely to run dry. This will upset Sir Henry 
McMahon's division of the Helmand waters between 
Afghanistan and Iran, and the parties may have 
difficulty in reaching a settlement by negotiation. I 
have not yet had time to study this last aspect of the 
matter."(*)
Another useful study of the irrigation water distribution in 
the delta regions of Hirmand, through man-made canals, was 
carried out in 1909 by another British Vice-Consul for Sistan 
which is supported by a sketch map of these canals. This 
report is reproduced in Appendix I.
An important feature of Hirmand's behaviour is the great 
variations which exist in the level of its water throughout 
the year. The autumn and winter months are the months of low 
levels whereas the spring and summer months are the months of 
high levels of water.
(1) Paragraphs 2 to 7 of M.P. Tandy's "Note on the Helmand in Sistan", enclosed in Indian 
Government's Foreign Secretary's letter No. 48, dated 11th March 1940, F0 371/29582.
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Figure II
M.P. Tandy's sketch of Hirmand delta channels 
FO 371/29582 , p.258
Oscillations of Helmand 1760 - 1940
rt:
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The data available permit determination of the type of 
snow-water and hydrological regime of the Hirmand, as results 
from the following table from Italconsult's report of 1959 
which gives the amount of the mean monthly capacity atChahar 
Borjak in the period 1946 - 1950, expressed in percentage of 
the mean value of capacity for the entire period (157 cu. 
m./sec.):^
Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
11 16 21 27 76 211
Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep.
390 296 99 29 14 10
The flows are concentrated in the period of snow melting. 
More specifically 75% in the months from March to May, and 
about 90% in the months from February to June.
Greater variation still exists in the volume of water flowing 
downstream into Lake Hamun in different years. Little is 
known of the cycle of years of drought and high flood, thus 
Hirmand remains as one of the most unpredictable rivers of 
the world.
The highest water mark left by the flood which can be traced
around Lake Hamun is five feet above the level in 1903, the
year of McMahon's study of Sistan frontiers. When the lake
established this record the discharge of the Hirmand must
(2)have been not less than 200,000 cubic feet a second.' *
In all probability the year which saw such an expansion of 
the lake area was 1885. This flood prepared the ground for 
the change of Hirmand's course in the delta region from the 
old channel to Rud-e Parian which was completed by another 
high flood in 1895/6.
(1) Italconsult report, op. cit., p.52.
(2) Tate, op. cit., p. 245.
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"Nothing is known of any other 'year of Noah' till 
after a very long interval of time, even then the date 
cannot be fixed more exactly than between 1692 and 
1722 A.D. Rather more than a hundred years later we 
find Captain Edward Conolly recording that in 1883 a 
tremendous flood came down the Helmand and formed a 
new channel for the river in the delta. The year 1866 
was another year of high water and this was followed 
by the last great flood of 1885."(1)
The latest reported flood of major consequence took place in 
April 1991 after many years of low water and droughts, which 
caused extensive damage in Sistan. This flood was the 
outcome of a combination of high levels of snow melting and 
lack of control in Afghanistan, both political and technical, 
owing to the prevailing political situation in that country.
R E E D  BOATS OX T H E  H ELM AND LAGOON
(This picture appeared in Major Percy Sykes' book 
"Ten Thousand Miles in Persia", London 1902, p.375)
(1) Tate, op. cit., p. 246.
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EVOLUTION OF HIRMAND WATER DISPUTES
The question of allocation and method of utilisation of 
Hirmand water in the delta region has always been the most 
important aspect of border disputes between Iran and 
Afghanistan in Sistan« Although the actual location of the 
boundary has long been accepted by both states, disputes 
concerning allocation and other reparian rights has not as 
yet been resolved. This is in spite of several attempts in 
the past 120 years to settle these disputes. The original 
problem was that the Amir of Afghanistan considered the
Hirmand as an internal river of that country, reserving for
Afghanistan the right to utilise its water in whatever way 
she wished. McMahon's Memorandum of 25 September 1904 
asserts that: "the Afghan Government do not admit that there
is any water question in dispute, as their geographical 
position makes them sole owners of the whole Helmand above 
the Band-i-Seistan."^^
By harbouring such considerations, the Afghan Amir, not only
ignored the rights of the people of downstream Hirmand whose
life depended so heavily on the water supplies from that
river, but also ignored international trends towards
recognising status of rivers passing through more than one
country as "international rivers". This trend began with the
Vienna agreement between the states of Prussian and Saxony of
(2 )1815 on navigation rights on the river Elbe,v ' and evolved
through a number of treaties and agreements concluded between
(3 )two or more reparian nations,v 1 embodying, by late 
nineteenth century, the internationally accepted description 
of international rivers which can be summarised as follows:
(1) Paragraph 3 of clause 69 of McMahon's Memorandum of 25th September 1904 on Sistan Water
Question, FO 60/727, P. 11.
(2) Bogg, Whittermore, “International Boundaries, a Study of Boundary Function and Problems", 
New York, Columbia University Press, 1940, p. 117.
(3) See above, and/also: Oppenheim, L.F.L., “International Law & Treaties", ed. Lauterpacht, 
H., 8 th Edition, New York, Longman, 1955.
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(a) crossing the territories of two or more countries,
(b) dividing two or more countries' territories,
(c) being of economic consequence to two or more
(1)nations.v 1
River Hirmand, "crossing Afghan territory into Iranian 
Sistan; separating Afghanistan from Iran in Sistan; and being 
of vital economic consequence to both Iran and Afghanistan", 
is undoubtedly an international river to the downstream 
sections of which neither Iran nor Afghanistan can claim 
exclusive rights. In fact the arbitral award of 1905 and 
subsequent agreements recognise the status of the 
international river for Hirmand downstream, effectively from 
Band-e Kamal Khan in South-west Afghanistan.
GOLDSMID'S HIRMAND WATER AWARD
General Sir Frederick Goldsmid was assigned in 1871/2 by the 
British Government of India to arbitrate in boundary disputes 
between Iran and Afghanistan in Sistan. When in 1872 his 
arbitration commission began its investigation in Sistan, the 
Hirmand river had only one major offshoot, i.e., Rud-e 
Sistan. This river took off from the Hirmand at the Band-e 
Kuhak which is the beginning of Iran-Afghanistan boundary, 
situated at its present site, and thence followed the same 
course westwards as it does at present.
The main branch of Hirmand in Sistan, from the Band-e Kuhak 
northwards, followed its present course to near Shahgol where 
Rud-e Parian took off in the late nineteenth century, at 
least twenty years after Goldsmid’s arbitration. From 
Shahgol, the course of Nad-e Ali and Sikh-Sar to Neizar and 
Hamun were followed. In his arbitral award, General Sir 
Frederick Goldsmid laid down as regards the Hirmand water 
rights that i
(1) See above and other material on international rivers.
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1 (1) She (Persia) should not possess land on the right 
of the Helmand. * * * The main bed of the
Helmand, therefore, below Kohak should be the 
eastern boundary of Persian Seistan,
"(2) and the line of frontier from Kohak to the hills, 
south of the Seistan desert, should be so drawn 
as to include within the Afghan limits all 
cultivation on both banks of the river from the 
band upwards. * * *
"(3) It is, moreover, to be well understood that no 
works are to be carried out on either side 
calculated to interfere with the requisite supply 
of water for irrigation on both banks of the 
Helmand."(1)
Considering that the above was the closest Goldsmid came to 
dealing with water division rights between the two countries, 
it is reasonable to state that he made no water award in his 
arbitration opinion and the above vague terms made little 
impact on the region. Nonetheless, the Afghans appear not to 
be aware of even these vague terms for years thereafter. 
This is clearly stated in a letter to the Amir of Afghanistan 
from the Viceroy of India in 1902. In this letter the 
Viceroy points out: "that the whole of the water of Helmand
which passed the Kohak bund, was, at the end of September, 
when water was urgently required for the Rabi sowings, being 
diverted into the old channel of the Helmand by an Afghan 
Bund at Shahgul and a channel dug by the Afghans just above 
this bund, and that the whole of lower Persian Seistan was 
thereby left without water. The local Persian authorities 
had remonstrated with the Afghan officials who refused to 
allow any water to go down to Persian Seistan. Since then it 
appears that the Persians have been engaged in constructing 
another channel above the Afghan channel in order to 
counteract it, and that the Afghans have now begun a third 
channel above the Persians. Seven hundred men are working on
(1) Memorandum on the Sistan Water Question from CoLoneL H. McMahon to the Indian Government, 
No. 2407, dated Camp Kuhak, the 25th of September 1904, FO 60/727, p. 2.
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the Persian channel; and the position is one that may at any 
moment produce a c o n f l i c t . ^
Water disputes soon erupted and the Iranian Government
complained in October 1883 in a letter to the British
Minister at Tehran that the Afghans had diverted the Hirmand
into their territory by constructing the Band-e Shamshiri,
The matter was dropped as neither the Iranians nor the
British officials seem to have been able to define the
position of this band (dam). Yet, about twenty years later,
McMahon's arbitration team was able to find this band which,
by then, was useless as Hirmand's main branch had changed its
course above that point in 1896. McMahon's Memorandum of
September 1904 states: 1 from careful local enquiries, we have
ascertained that the Band-i Shamshiri referred to was
constructed across the then mouth of the Shela-i Shamshiri,
which then took off from the main river at a point between
Deh Taus and the present village of Deh Lalla. It was
constructed to prevent the Shamshiri drawing off too large a
volume of the river, and to thus feed the Sikhsar and other
Afghan channels. It was first constructed about 1883, and
was maintained until 1895. The changes in the river caused
(2 \by the flood of 1896 rendered it no longer necessary."' }
An unusually high flood in 1885 turned the main course of the
Hirmand from Sikh-Sar to Shileh Lakshakh. This branch was
still the main course by 1894 when Colonel Yate visited the
site in the spring of that year, but the Shileh-e Jahanabad
which, when he crossed, halfway between Milak and Deh-e
(3 \Sayyed, was little smaller than the Lakshakh.v ' Another 
major flood in 1896, however, changed the course of the
(1) Extract from Letter from H.E. The Viceroy and Governor-General of India to H.H. Amir Sir
Habibollah Khan of Afghanistan, No. 51, p.o., dated 24th November 1902, F0 60/659,
p. 99.
(2) Extract from McMahon's Memorandum on Sistan Uater Question, op. cit., p. 3.
(3) Yate, Lieut. Colonel C.E., “Khurasan and Sistan", London 1900, pp. 102 to 105.
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river completely into Rud-e Parian, the northern parts of 
which were the channels of water to Lakshakh and Shileh-e 
Jahanabad. This major change in the course of the river, 
brought the question of the Sistan boundary to the forefront 
of the frontier disputes between the two countries (see 
previous chapter).
COLONEL HENRY MCMAHON'S SISTAN ARBITRATION AND 
WATER AWARD
By the turn of the twentieth century the Afghans opened up an 
old canal from the Hirmand, at a point about five miles above 
the Band-e Sistan, to feed the important Jaraki canal which 
was then known as Nahr-e Sultani. The Iranians, in 
retaliation, dug a new canal called the Nobar-e Puzeh 
"Jangjah", to outflank the Shahgol Band and turn the river 
into Rud-e Parian (see figure III). The Afghans, in 
retaliation, threatened to band the river above this canal. 
The dispute, therefore, intensified and British intervention 
was sought, but an unusually early winter flood in 1902 
settled water differences naturally but temporarily. Both 
Iran and Afghanistan withdrew their request for British 
intervention and expressed disinterest in the British offer 
of boundary and water arbitration (see previous chapter). 
The arbitration works of Colonel McMahon, nevertheless, went 
ahead and by June 1903, a survey of the water and land in 
Sistan began. The measurements made by McMahon's mission of 
the volume of the Hirmand during 1903 and 1904 produced the 
following results:
"The following statement of the ten day averages of 
the Hirmand volume, in a normal year, will show how 
this figure is arrived at:-
Period Average of daily discharges
at Band-e Kamal Khan.
September 21st to 30th .. .. .. 2,162 cusecs.
October 1st to 10th .. .. .. 2,360 "
11th to 20th .........  2,502
21st to 31st .. .. .. 2,442
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November 1st to 10th ............2,612
11th to 20th ............2,966
21st to 30th .........  3,481
December 1st to 10th .........  3,161
11th to 20th .........  3,062
" 21st to 31st .........  3,252
January 1st to 10th  3,450
11th to 20th .........  4,420
" 21st to 31st .........  4,280
February 1st to 10th .........  5,110
11th to 20th .........  5,525
21st to 28th .........  5,800
March 1st to 10th   6,750
11th to 20th ......... *12,100
Total: 75,435
Average 4,191 or roughly
4,200."
During the above period, the average volume taken off by the 
Afghan canals between Band-e Kamal Khan and Kuhak, including 
the Nahr-e-Sultani, is about 294 cusecs, as follows
By the Mirabad** canal . . .. 27 cusecs.
" " Dak-e-dila " . . . .  36 "
" " Qaleh-e-Fath " . . . .  44 "
" " Deh Dust Mohammad Canal 27 "
" " Mirak canal .. .. 27
" " Khwabgah canal . . . . 27 1
" " Sultani   106 "
Total: 294
The water which passes down the river below Band-e Kamal Khan 
at this season is thus appropriated:-
This sudden rise may cause comment in a statement of 
normal volumes, but it must be remembered that a heavy 
rise always takes place from, or about, the middle of 
March.
These canals though shown in this list, actually take 
off above Band-e-Kamal Khan at Qaleh-e-Mir, but the 
lands they irrigate are below Band-e-Kamal Khan."(l)
(1) Paragraphs 48, 49 and 50 of McMahon's Memorandum on the Sistan Water Question of 25th
September 1904, op. cit., p. 7.
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(1) To the Afghans
By canals above Band-e-Sistan 7/100 ths
as above
" on the Nad Ali channel 7/100 ths
Totals 14/100 ths
(2) To the Iranians
By the Rud-e-Sistan 48/100 ths
" canals from the Rud-e-Parian 8/100 ths
" " " " Nad Ali channel 7/100 ths
Total: 63/100 ths
(3) Flows through the Rud-e-Parian 23/100 ths
into Hamun
Having arrived at these figures, McMahon stated that: from
Band-e Kamal Khan downwards to the Band-e Sistan, the Afghans 
take off only /100th of the whole river above the
Band-e-Sistan, and an equal amount below it, whereas the
g 3
Persians at, or below, the Band-e Sistan take off /100th
of the whole volume of the Hirmand which passes Band-e Kamal
Khan; and that the Persians are only able to utilise
o
/100th of the water which goes down the Parian, the
remainder flowing on into the Hamun.
As regards the Hirmand from Band— e Kamal Khan upwards to
Rudbar, McMahon found that there are the following Afghan
canals (not included in the above calculations) whose
volumes, during the spring crop season, are recorded below:-
Rudbar Canal   25 cusecs.
Chahar Burjak canal   30 "
Band-e-Kamal Khan, old canal .. 16 "
Band-e-Kamal Khan, new canal .. 12 "
Total: 83
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"The Rudbar canal actually takes off at Pulalak; the Chahar 
Burjak canal at Puza Mashi; and the two Band-e-Kamal Khan 
canals opposite Chahar Burjak. It is important to note that 
the Chahar Burjak and the Band-e-Kamal Khan old canals are 
both capable of very large future extension, which would 
irrigate lands below Qaleh-e-Fath and in Tarakun, 
respectively. The Afghans are not likely to be able, by 
themselves, to effect anything like the full amount of 
possible extension? but, even with their present methods, 
they could draw off a very appreciable portion of the volume 
of the Hirmand at the time of low river, thereby largely 
affecting the volume available below Band-e-Kamal Khan.
"If we consider the whole amount of water taken by Persians 
and Afghans respectively, in the spring crop season, from 
Rudbar downwards, we find that the volume of the Hirmand 
(calculated at the head of the Rudbar canal at Pulalak) is 
appropriated as follows
By Afghans . . . . ^/lOOths
" Persians.. .. .. 62/l00ths
" Flows unused into the Hamun 22/l00ths"^^
Asserting that "although the Persians use this large
proportion of the volume of the Hirmand, it must not be
supposed for a moment that they really require so much water
for their cultivation. A large portion is wasted owing to
(2 )their careless system of irrigation",v } McMahon ignored 
the fact that the cultivable lands in Iranian Sistan were a 
great deal more than those of the Afghan side. He, thus, 
gave no consideration for the future needs of water in 
Sistan. McMahon also ignored the fact that waters finding 
their way to the Lake Hamun were not wasted because Hamun 
itself was an important source of irrigation and a major
(1) Paragraph 51 of McMahon's Memorandum on the Sistan Water Question, op. cit., p. 8 .
(2) Extract from paragraph 52 of McMahon's Memorandum on the Sistan Water Question, op. cit., p.
8.
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source of other economic interests in Sistan, and its surplus 
waters flow into God-e Zereh which is inside Afghan borders. 
Taking into account deserts and sandhills on the Afghan side 
of Sistan McMahon asserted that Afghanistan's cultivable 
lands in Sistan exceed those of Iran’s in the proportion of 4 
to 3. He illustrated that:
"In Afghan Seistan - 
Tarakun tract 
Elsewhere
Total:
In Persian Seistan - 
Hauzdar tract 
Elsewhere
Total:
Having recorded the above figures, McMahon himself found them
unrealistic and claimed that cultivable lands in Sistan are
proportionally equal between Iran and Afghanistan; "when the
proportionately larger area of uncommandable dasht and
sandhills in Afghan territory is taken into consideration, we
find that the total culturable areas in Afghan and Persian
(2}Seistan may be treated as approximately equal."v '
It was on the basis of this kind of consideration of
proportionality of cultivable lands that McMahon first
resolved to divide Hirmand water equally between Iran and
Afghanistan in spite of remarking that the Iranian lands, at
least in the case of the Hozdar region of Sistan were
/ 3  \
superior lands richly cultivated in the past,' 1 which
would naturally require more water. Nonetheless, McMahon
decided that:
<1) Extract from paragraph 61 of McMahon's Memorandum of September 1904, on Sistan Water
Question, op. cit., p. 9.
(2) Ibid.
2,697 square miles 
1,510
4,207
.. 1,139 
.. 1,728
7,073
m m t l (l)
(3) Ibid.
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Figure III
Major Bands and Channels of the Hirmand in Sistan 
(Based on Major Benn's Sketch of the Hirmand at Delta Region)
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"....the following rough division of water would very 
fairly meet all possible future requirements:-
l/3rd of the Helmand to Afghan territory on the
right bank below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.
l/3rd " " Persian " " left " "
Band-i-Seistan.
l/3rd " " the Tarakun and Bauzdar tracts in
the proportion of half to each.
This arrangement would thus give one half of the whole 
Helmand to Persia and the other half to
Afghanistan."(1)
This decision would undoubtedly restrict Iran's rights to the 
water of the Hirmand as McMahon himself recognised it. 
Describing the situation in his memorandum on water question, 
McMahon states: "even an Afghan, however, must acknowledge,
when it is brought home to him, as it should be, that any 
settlement which restricts Persian right to water to certain 
limits is in the present case a distinct gain to Afghanistan 
who has hitherto taken off only 16/100ths of the whole river 
from Rudbar downwards, while the Persians have taken 
62/lOQths. Any deferred settlement of the question might 
have to recognise the Persian right to what custom may have
entitled them to, and not, as in the present case, to their
( 2 \requisite supply of water only.”v '
When it came to the actual water award, McMahon further
restricted Iran's rights to Hirmand water. He prepared the
draft of his water award in four different forms (draft A, B,
C and D) of which the Viceroy of India agreed to draft B, the
(3)only version with the most devastating prospect for Iran.v f
(1) Extract from McMahon's Memorandum on Sistan Water Question, op. cit., p. 14.
(2) Paragraph 82 of McMahon's Memorandum on Water Question, op. cit.
(3) Telegram No. 4883 from H.E. the Viceroy, CaLcutta, to H. Majesty's Secretary of State for
India, London, dated the 29th December 1904, FQ 60/ 728 , p. 34.
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Clauses 2 and 3 of the "award" of draft B of McMahon's Water 
Award, favoured by the Viceroy of India, defined Iran's need 
of Hirmand water in Sistan as being one-third of the whole 
volume of Hirmand water and thus allocated to Iran only 
one-third of the water which was in effect to restrict Iran's 
share of the water from 62 percent of the river's volume to 
33 percent. This incomprehensible water allocation to
Iranian Sistan, which is admittedly the more fertile part of
the province and naturally in need of more than half of the 
Hirmand water, was in clear contradiction of Goldsmid's
award, in spite of McMahon's repeated statement of
undertaking that his arbitration would not exceed the
framework of that of Goldsmid's. The Afghans do not seem to 
have made any protest against McMahon's water award. Yet, 
they seem to have protested against clause 3 of draft A of 
his water award which was included under clause 6 of draft
B. This clause gave both Iran and Afghanistan the right to 
reconstruct their bands at Kuhak and Shahgol respectively.
To this protest. McMahon replied: Amir (of Afghanistan)
would be wise to accept paragraph 3 of my draft award A, as 
Afghans some day may badly want to take advantage of it.^^
The Viceroy of India, having agreed to draft B of McMahon's 
Sistan Water Award, desired some modifications of a trivial 
nature in the contents and composition of the sentences. 
These modifications were outlined to be: "I agree to draft B, 
with the modifications now proposed, subject only to the
substitution of 'shall' for 'should' in both places in clause 
5 of award.
These modifications were implemented (see Appendix II), and 
McMahon's water award was delivered to the Iranian and Afghan
(1) Extract of telegram No. 836 from Colonel McMahon to the Indian Government's Foreign 
Secretary, dated 15th November 1904, FO 60/728 f p. 27.
(2) From H.E. the Viceroy, CaLcutta, to H. Majesty's Secretary of State for India, telegram No. 
4883, dated 29th December 1904, FO 60/728 - P. 34.
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commissioners on 10th April 1 9 0 5 . This water award was 
immediately protested to by the Iranians. In his telegram of 
12 th April 1905 to the Foreign Secretary of the Indian 
Government, Colonel McMahon gave a summary of his interview 
with the Iranian Commissioner, stating:
"Persian Commission, at long inteirview yesterday, 
expounded following opinions regarding my water award,
"(1) Preliminary remarks, paragraph 7, He felt sure 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affair's ruling had not 
been communicated to Persian Government, I expressed 
ignorance, but said I knew that it had been 
communicated to Afghanistan by the Government of India,
"(2) Paragraph 9(c), and clauses 2 and 3 of award. 
Why was Persia given only one-third of the river, and 
Afghanistan two-thirds? On what figures is this 
calculation based, and why is water not divided in 
accordance with respective areas of land on both 
sides? I said that obligation to allow of one-third 
of water at the point river reached Kohak did not 
leave two-thirds of river to Afghanistan; that this 
arrangement gave Persia assurance of continuance of 
requisite supply; that the share of water given to 
Persia is sufficient to irrigate much more than 
present Persian cultivation, and even as much as half 
of the entire irrigable area of Persian Seistan 
commanded from and below Kohak annually; that area of 
culturable land in Afghan Seistan is somewhat in 
excess of corresponding area in Persian Seistan,
”(3) Clause 5, He thought that, as carrying out of my 
award required presence of an expert, Persian 
Government would raise no objection,
"(4) Clause 6. He expressed thorough approval, but 
asked why I had not laid down that the bund below 
Kohak should be built jointly by both sides, I said I 
had carefully avoided all details which, though 
practicable now, might hereafter prove inconvenient to 
either side,
"(5) Clause 7. He said this will give offence to 
Persian Government, and is opposed to spirit of 
Article 6 of Treaty of Paris, Why had I not imposed 
similar restriction on alienation of Afghan Seistan? 
I said that any idea of restricting Persia was far 
from my intention, and that further reflection would 
show this clause to be in the true interests of
(D From H.E. the Viceroy to H. Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, dated 18th April 1905, 
FO 60/728 , p. 5.
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Persia. It was necessary for me to emphasise the fact 
that my arbitration was solely between Persia and 
Afghanistan, and my award, therefore, would not
necessarily hereafter apply to any one else. That the 
geographical position of Afghanistan gave her superior 
rights In water, which made a similar restriction In 
her case uncalled for.
"(6) Persia contended Persian right to water for
irrigation of Ramrud tract, and said that Persia could 
arrange with Afghanistan for canal through Afghan 
territory for that purpose. Why had I ignored this 
right? I explained I was as he knew, restricted by 
the terms of the Goldsmid award, and was, therefore, 
unable to consider the question of Persian right to 
conduct water through Afghan territory.
"Interview was very friendly, and I was agreeably 
surprised at the few objections raised against my 
award, and at the manner in which these were
propounded. I am confident, however, that, although
Persian Government may accept the one-third allotment 
of water for land commandable at and below Kohak, they 
will strongly raise point 6 above, and will doubtless 
talk much about point 5."(1)
The Afghans, in contrast, were pleased with McMahon's water 
award. In another telegram to the Indian Government, McMahon 
gave a summary of his interview with the Afghan Commissioner, 
stating:
"Afghan Commissioner, at inteirview yesterday, 
expressed following opinions on the water award:-
"(1) Preliminary remarks, paragraph 9(c). He asked 
why division of water was calculated at a place within 
Afghan territory. I explained impossibility of giving 
Persia what she has just right to demand, i.e., 
assurance of continuance of requisite supply of water, 
without calculating her share at the actual point 
where water is capable of division and diversion; that 
that point is at present near Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, but 
if new canals are constructed above that place to 
water land below that place, then the point of 
division will move higher up the river accordingly. I 
showed how this applies to clauses 1 to 4, inclusive, 
of award, and how Afghanistan must always arrange to
(1) Extract of telegram No. 947 from CoLoneL McMahon to Foreign Secretary of India, dated 12th 
ApriL 1905, enclosure No. 6 , FO 60/728, p.3.
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let sufficient water pass the point of division to 
enable at least one whole third of river reaching and 
being available for Persian use at Kohak. He said he 
understood this; and, as far as he was personally 
concerned, admitted justice of this contention.
"(2) Clause 5. He expressed approval of this.
"(3) Clause 6. While admitting in confidence that 
both portions of this clause were necessary, he was 
obliged to protest against first portion on the ground 
of the Amir's orders conveyed in latter's letter of 
15th October 1904 (vide No. 19 of Seistan Series, part 
V). I said I would make a note of it, but felt 
confident that Amir would himself at once recognise 
advisability and necessity of this clause.
"(4) Clause 7. He express complete approval.
"(5) Clause 8. He admitted danger of river taking new 
course at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan or near Kila-i-Fath, and 
recognised absolute necessity for greatest care in 
enlargement of old or opening of new canals. I was 
glad to find he thoroughly recognised danger involved 
if Afghanistan tried new irrigation experiments at 
first named place, and, in fact, he admitted that, 
though works required for diverting water there could 
easily be constructed by Afghanistan, yet the danger 
involved thereby is beyond their power to cope with.
"(6) He asked whether Persia was entitled to more than 
the one-third now allotted to her for future 
irrigation of Ramrud tract. I replied that my 
arbitration had been restricted by the terms of 
Goldsmid's award, which nowhere provided for right of 
one party to cut along canals through territory of the 
other party; that my award (vide clause 2) provided 
requisite supply of water for irrigation of Persian 
Seistan commandable from and below Kohak only; that I 
presumed if irrigation of Ramrud tract by Persia 
hereafter became practicable, supply of water for it 
would then, and then only, form question for 
settlement.
"The Afghan Commissioner's reception of whole award 
was most favourable, and he admitted that his protests 
1 and 3 above were pro forma. He begged that the 
Government of India, in communicating award to Amir, 
would, in order to protect him, lay stress on 
necessity for those two clauses."(1)
(1) Extract of teLegram No. 949 from Colonel McMahon to Foreign Secretary of India, dated the 
13th ApriL 1905, enclosure No. 7, FO 60/728 > p.4.
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The Iranian Commissioner had put two other questions of less 
significance to Colonel McMahon. The British Commissioner 
replying to these questions expressed his surprise both by 
the small number of objections raised by Yamin-e Nezam and 
with the friendly and agreeable manner in which they were 
propounded.^ ^
Amir Masum Khan Khozeimeh 
Deputy-Governor of Sistan at the time 
of McMahon's Water Award, 
seated and flanked by 
his cousin
(1) Persian Commissioner's views, from Col. McMahon to the Government of India, No. 3004, dated
15th April 1905, No. 16 of FO 60/728, p. 15.
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The Kargozar of Sistan and Deputy-Governor, Amir Masum Khan 
Khozeimeh despatched telegrams to Tehran accusing Yamin-e 
Nezam of being in collusion with the British 
Commissioner.^^ However, it seems that the authorities in 
Tehran had similarly received Colonel McMahon's water award 
without much objections at the time.
Writing to the Marquess of Lansdowne in May 1905, the British 
Minister at Tehran stated:
"The full text of the award, with the Yeanin's 
observations on it, has now reached the Persian 
Government and the Mushir-ed-Dowleh has informed me 
that it has been submitted to the Shah. I asked him 
if he did not think it very just and satisfactory to 
Persia, and it appeared to me, from the rather guarded 
terms in which he expressed himself, that the only 
point which had so far occasioned any heart’-searching 
to the Persian Government was the clause about the 
Persians being entitled to only a third of the water, 
as to which he said he would talk with me again after 
receiving the Shah's commands. In the meantime His 
Majesty' s departure for Europe has for the time 
stopped further discussion of the subject.
"The Heshmet-ul-Mulk, in the course of a recent visit 
which he paid me, referred to the Seistan water
question. He knew nothing, of course, about the
award, but he said that what the Persians feared was 
the construction by the Afghans of a canal from a 
point near Bander-i-Kamal Khan through the now desert 
Tarakun tract. It is probable that the omission of 
any reference to this contingency in the award, 
especially when its terms were known to the Russians, 
may give rise to some criticism here. On the whole, 
however, the decision seems so far to have been 
received at Tehran less unfavourably than the
Yemin-i-Nizam had told Colonel McMahon to
expect."(2)
(1) Diary No. 1 of Captain A.D. HacPherson, H.B. Majesty's Consul for Sistan and Kain, for the 
period 1st to 7th January 1905, FO 248/847.
(2) Extract of despatch No. 103 from Sir A. Hardinge, British Minister at Tehran, to the 
Marquess of Lansdowne, dated Tehran May 15th 1905 FO 60/728 , Persia Confidential
(June 5) Section 5.
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THE AFTERMATH OF MCMAHON'S WATER AWARD
As the summer months of 1905 drew closer, and Hirmand water 
began to become scarce in Sistan, the Iranians opened two new 
canals from the main stream of Hirmand (Parian-e Moshtarak)
nearly opposite of Nad-e Ali where both sides were deprived,
by McMahon's water award, of cutting off from the river. 
Since his water award had not been acceded to by the two 
sides, McMahon could not do much to reverse this
development. Assistant to the British Consul for Sistan 
remarks in his despatch of 12th July 1905:
"About the 27th June, Persians opened two canals from the 
main stream of the Helmand nearly opposite Nad Ali. Owing to 
the failure of our newswriter, this was not reported till 1st 
July. Afghans crossed frontier and closed canals on the 
first. Failing to obtain trustworthy information, I sent 
Muhammad Ashraff to make enquiries. He reported on the 6th 
that the Yamin had had interview with Afghan officials who 
have permitted him to keep one canal open for ten days from 
2nd, but that both Brigadier Ghulam Ahmed, Acting Governor, 
Chokhansur, and Ayub Khan, Governor of Kila Fath, were 
ignorant of the terms of McMahon's award, copies of which had 
been taken to Kabul by the Akhundzada. Meanwhile, I had 
heard that the Yamin was boasting of having worsted the 
Afghans and declared that he would keep canals open as long 
as necessary. I inspected canals on the 7th; the one now 
running irrigates 14 pagaos and probably detrimentally 
affects Afghan irrigation. The opening is new, but it 
eventually joins old canal mouth which has become silted up. 
Ayub Khan had returned to Kila Fath, but the Brigadier 
received me most cordially on the eighth. He informed me 
that he had permitted one of the canals to remain open for 
ten days, as he had been appealed to as a fellow Mussulman, 
but that, on the expiration of that period, he would, if 
necessary, use force to close it. He is of a mild 
disposition and would prefer pacific measures, but the
agitation of the Akhundzada's faction, which is behaving 
hostilely to him, may compel him to make a show of force in
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order to escape hostile reports to Kabul. As award not yet 
accepted by the Amir, I considered it inadvisable to show him 
the text, but advised him that, as matter was still sub 
judice, he should not violate frontier again. I am also 
sending warnings to Akhundzada's faction that any provocatory 
action on their part will only injure their chief. On the 
9th, I had interview with Yamin who was elated at his 
success, and boasted if Afghans cross frontier again he would 
close 30 canals on the Afghan side that have been dug since 
Goldsmid’s award. He said that he had told Afghans he would 
pardon them this time, but would insist on punishment if the 
offence were repeated. He denied agreement as to ten days, 
and maintained that he had right to dig these canals, as they 
irrigate land unirrigated by old canal, and Afghans had also 
dug canals since Goldsmid's Award, which was not yet 
superseded by McMahon's Award. He declared intention of 
keeping new canals open as long as necessary. I warned him 
of serious consequences that might ensue from the violation 
of conditions clearly laid down in both Awards.
The Afghans did not uphold the agreement with Yamin-e Nezam.
Brigadier Gholam Ahmed, named above, received a strongly
worded letter from the Governor of Herat and as a
consequence, opened two new canals in retaliations Neshan-e
Divan and Nad-e Ali. ^  Furthermore, the Afghans crossed
the frontier and closed the two canals constructed by the
Iranians. The local dispute was about to turn so ugly
that British Consulate officials at Sistan intervened and
(4}prevented an almost certain clash between the parties.' 1
(1) Extract of telegram No. 98c from Lieut. T.H. Keyes to Captain A.D. HacPherson, H.B. 
Majesty's ConsuL for Sistan and Kain, dated 10th July 1905, FO 60/729 , p. 10.
(2) Telegram No. 112c from Lieut. Keyes to Captain MacPherson, dated 29th July 1905, FO 60/729,
p. 13.
(3) Report from Lieut. T.H. Keyes to Captain A.D. HacPherson, H.B. Majesty's Consul for Sistan,
No. 105c, dated 21st July 1905, FO 60/729, pp. 13 to 16.
(4) Ibid.
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The Sistanis once again wrote a letter to the editor of 
"Trans-Caspian Review" Russian newspaper spelling out the 
grievances of the ordinary people of Sistan on the effect of 
McMahon's boundary and water awards. The letter stated:
"Translation of a letter in the Persian supplement of 
the 'Zakaspiski Obozrenie', dated the 1st May 1905.
(To the Editor of the newspaper 'Mawaray-e Bahr-i-Khizar')
"X have read your paper No, 15 of the 12th Mohurram. 
This that you had given publication to a detailed 
account penned by us poor people of the literal facts 
and a full statement regarding the ceding of a large 
area of the lands of Holy Persia, which f by the 
arbitration and award of the British Commission, in 
presence of the Persian Commissioner, was given to 
Afghanistan, On reading this we were exceedingly 
thankful to you.
"God be praised, we are not ashamed before our 
consciences, for we have beaten and are beating the 
drum of these facts to different tunes and to the sound 
of despair in every direction from which we might
expect hope, in order to see what may be wrought by the
courage of the men of our day. By the will of God the 
real opinion of this stricken people has reached the 
ears of the authorities of the Government, and they 
will have consideration for the boundaries of an 
excellent nation and the rights of a powerful 
Government may God strengthen their pillars and impart 
vigour to their helpers which is the first important 
care and duty binding on a Muhammadan people; and they 
will bring all the lands which have slipped out of our 
hands back to Persia as before or according to the 
words which are in common use to-day (What business is 
it of mine? What business is it of yours?
MahshallahJ Inshallah!) they will be satisfied and
will leave things as they are.
"In short, I state here, for the information of your 
readers, the conclusions from the previous
communication: this that after the English had excited 
the Afghans saying that now the Russian Empire is
engaged something may be gained, and it would be 
advisable for them to pick a quarrel with the Persian 
Government, and at that time they will settle all
necessary things. The result was the coming of a 
British Commission to Persia and the appointment of an 
officer of the Persian Government from Tehran as
Sarhaddar and Persian Commissioner.
"These officers, i.e., the British Commissioner and the 
Persian Commissioner, obviously had no thorough 
knowledge of the lands of Seistan, and the surroundings.
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"It is indeed worthy of attention that from the very 
beginning of the arbitration up to the present none of 
the officers asked any questions at all of a single one 
of the grey-beards, katkhudas, or revenue officers of 
Seistan as to which side such or such land has belonged 
during the past thirty years, and to whom has the 
revenue been paid. That which was done by the British 
Commissioner should not have been done without 
obtaining information, but information was obtained 
from the Afghans as to which tracts could by any 
under-hand means be taken from Persia in this 
arbitration, and what was the profit from each tract.
"The lands belonging to Persia which have been given to 
the Afghans are stated here one after the other for the 
information of our readers the land from which revenues 
have been recovered by revenue officers from 30 years 
ago to the present time, to all of which they have a 
separate claim.
"On the northern boundary of Seistan -
"Three-fourths of the hills known as Nar Ahu and Madah 
Ahu, which are called Siah Koh, although the Siah Koh 
cited by Goldsmid lies now at a distance of two 
farsakhs or more to the north-east of Nar-Ahu.
"Koh-i-Tabarkan, Koh-i-Zarkan, Koh-i-Sabzak,
Chah-i-Reg, Chah-i-Hejna, Chah-i-Rustam,
Shaud-i-Shirin, Shorah Gaz, Dasht-i-Gauri,
Dasht-i-Chah-i-Shor, Kalak, Koh-i-Darazu, Nal-i-Ab, 
Koh-i-Chakab, Ajkimak, Naizar Masjadak, Dahan-i-Nahaq, 
Chashma-i-Kah, Shugalak, Kulha-i-Khan, Tapa-i-Kharan, 
Naizar Maesh Kushi, Machatak, Naizar Gaz Kushtar, 
Paiju, Tapa-i-Arawana, Shalgami, Reg-i-Saruni, and 
Laf-i-Takht-i-Shah.
"Of the division known as Mian Kangi, the cultivated
lands that have been given away, together with the 
produce of their people, are:-
"From Deh Muhammad Khan 8 pagaos [pagao is a plot of 
land producing six (?) kharwars, Tabrizi]; inhabited 
but uncultivated land 13 pagaos; deserted land 40
pagaos.
"From Band-i-Kohak to Malik Siah Koh, one-third of the 
lands of Mashi, all the lands of Tarakhun, and
one-fifth of the lands of Kundar and Hauzdar. This
tract from Band-i-Kohak to Malik Siah Koh has an area 
of about a hundred square farsakhs.
"The area of the first-mentioned tracts has been left 
for calculation. We hope that the authorities of the 
Government will give minute consideration and complete 
attention to this important place Seistan, which is 
called the 'Gate of Tehran' by the Seistanis and will
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not let this large area go, nor will consent to the 
obvious loss to the Government and the homeless state 
of its poverty-stricken subjects will be forced to 
emigrate.
"As for the Naizar, which used to be a place for the 
flock-owners of Seistan, the better part of their share 
has fallen to Afghanistan. The flock-owners used to 
live in the northern and western parts of it during the 
winter and when water was scarce, while in the spring 
when water is ample they used to move gradually towards 
the north and east.
MNow the tracts where, during the time of abundance of 
water, the flock-owners used to live have gone 
altogether, and the poor peasants are in a state of 
destitution owing to their grazing grounds having 
become Afghan territory, and from this that the land 
that once formed part of Persia has now gone."(l)
Colonel McMahon concluded his mission by the 1st of July
1905, on which date he sent his final report to the
Government of India and received from the Government of India
(2 \a congratulatory letter dated 15th July 1905v ' whereas
Sistan's people continued voicing their disappointment with
the outcome of his arbitration. Another letter from Sistan
appeared in the influential Persian Habl al-Matin in late
July 1905, which pointed out aspects of the awards most
/ 3  \
injurious to the Iranian Sistan.v 1 Similarly, the Russian 
Legation at Tehran sent a report to the Iranian Crown Prince 
highlighting points most damaging to Iran's interests in 
S i s t a n . T h e  Russian Legation wrote another note to the 
Iranian Crown Prince claiming that the Iranian Commissioner, 
Yamin-e Nezam had sacrificed Iran's interest to Colonel
(1) Extract of translation of a letter from Sistan appearing in the Persian supplement of the
“Zakasfiski Obozrenie“, dated 1st May 1905, FO 60/ 729, pp. 11 - 12.
(2) From the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to Colonel A.H.
McMahon, No. 2575F, dated Simla the 15th of July 1905, FO 60/729 .
(3) Letter from Sistan appearing in Habl al-Matin of 24th July 1905, enclosure No. 20 of FO
60/729 , p. 17 of 298.
(4) Copy of a report sent by the Russian Legation at Tehran to H.I.H. the Vali-ahd, dated July
20th 1905, F0 60/729 , p. 48.
599
McMahon, and demanded his dismissal. ( The Crown Prince 
Mohammad Ali Mirza (Mohammad Ali Shah as from 1907) 
apparently agreed to send a commission to Sistan to enquire 
into the truth of the charges of corruption against Yamin-e 
Nezam.^ ^  ^
In a letter addressed to the Viceroy of India in September
1905, the Amir of Afghanistan gave his Government's general
(3 \consent to McMahon's water award.v 1 The Iranians, to the
contrary, were very disturbed by the terms of the award.
Ehtesham al-Vozara, a competent engineer, was sent in early
September of that year to Sistan to enquire into complaints
made by inhabitants of the province against McMahon's water
(4 \and frontier awards. v ' By this time, it became clear to
the British diplomatic mission in Tehran that the Iranian
Government had decided to reject Colonel McMahon's water
award, and to lodge a formal appeal against it with the
(5 \British Government.v * The people of Iran also became very 
agitated by the results of McMahon's arbitration. Letters of 
protests from Sistan and Tehran began to appear in various 
newspapers within and outside Iran. The Times of London 
featured a long report on McMahon1s arbitration proceeding 
with the following statements as its introduction:
"PERSIA, RUSSIA, AND GREAT BRITAIN.
(From A Correspondent.)
St. Petersburg, Sept. 23.
"Telegrams dated from Teheran are almost daily 
published here by the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency 
and transmitted to the English and foreign Press 
containing false or exaggerated statements calculated 
to promote ill-feeling towards England.
(1) Despatch from British Legation at Tehran to the Marquess of Lansdowne Mo. 182. Secret, dated 
August 21, 1905, FO 60/ 729, p. 43.
(2) Telegram No. 147, from Sir Arthur Hardinge, British Minister at Tehran, to Foreign Secretary
of the Indian Government, dated 22nd August 1905, FO 60/729 , P. 26 of 218.
(3) From H.H. the Amir of Afghanistan to H.E. the Viceroy of India, No. 73, dated 17th September
1905, FO 60/729f p. 34 of 225.
(4) TeLegram from E. Grant-Duff His Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affairs at Tehran to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs London, No. 162, dated 14th September 1905, FO 60/729,
No. 33 of p. 225.
(5) Letter from British Minister at Tehran to the Moshir ad-Doleh, the Iranian Foreign Minister,
dated Meshed 9th September 1905, FO 60/729, p. 206.
600
"Thus, among other things, it is claimed that the 
Seistan Boundary Commission despoiled Persia for the 
benefit of Afghanistan; that many important 
concessions have been obtained by England from the new 
Prime Minister and long accounts are given of the 
British Minister1s journeys in north-eastern Persia as 
if they concealed some political designs. Each and 
all of these statements are grossly exaggerated. The 
British Boundary Commission did apportion a slice of 
what was formerly considered Persian territory to 
Afghanistan; but it awarded to Persia a still larger 
section of what was formerly Afghan soil. There is 
some dissatisfaction in Teheran regarding the share 
awarded to Persia of the water of the Helmund."(*)
The report went on, claiming that:
"Then followed the question of the distribution 
of the Helmund water, which did not depend upon 
demarcation, but on existing rights and practice. 
This was decided last May, and has, it is understood, 
now been accepted by both the Amir and the Shah".(2)
Not only was the Times of London wrong in stating that the
water award had been decided on existing rights and
practices, and not only was it wrong in stating that the
award had been decided in May (1905), but this author has not
come across any evidence, among Persian and English documents
suggesting Iran’s acceptance of McMahon's water award. The
people of Sistan, however, were reported to have demolished
and burnt the Lakshakh band of the Afghans on the 29th of 
/ 3  i
October 1905.v ' The Iranian Commissioner, Yamin-e Nazam, 
began on his own behalf communicating with the Afghans for a 
more satisfactory arrangement, while the Government of Iran
( A\
seems to have requested a fresh arbitration.' ; Public 
anger in Sistan led to wide spread reactions. The local 
officials of Sistan attacked and burnt down the Sistan
(1) The Times, Friday September 29, 1905, FO 60/729# p. 20.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Confidential Diary of H.B. Majesty's ConsuL for Sistan, dated the 15th November 1905, FO
248/847# p. 6 of 315.
(4) From Hardinge to the Foreign Office, dated Brighton, November 21st 1905, FO 60/729,
p. 268.
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Arbitration Commission's building at Kuhak.^1  ^ Other 
people of Sistan widened the canals and strengthened the 
bands on Hirmand, taking more water from the river. The 
Viceroy of India reported the complaints of the Afghans of 
these undertakings by the Iranian subjects stating:
"P._____Seistan. Please refer to my telegram of
the 2 7th ultimo, regarding Water Award. A telegram, 
dated the 30th November, has now been received from 
His Majesty's Consul to the effect that Afghans are 
complaining that more water is being taken by the 
Persians than they have ever taken before. Macpherson 
states that Afghan complaint is fully justified, as 
the Persians are receiving 1,400 cubic feet per 
second, while the Afghans are only getting 100, and no 
water was passing down the Sikhsar channel. Two dams 
were recently constructed by Afghans, one across 
Helmund at Shahgul, and the other at the mouth of 
Lakshak canal; effect of latter was to reduce by about 
one half the Lakshak supply. Gangs of Persians were 
collecting in anticipation of orders for removal of 
dam being issued by Yamin. Macpherson fears that 
there will be serious trouble unless the Persians 
allow a larger amount of water to flow down the 
Helmund at Bund-i-Kohak; he is, however, trying to 
arrange to induce the Afghan Governor to settle matter 
amicably, should dispute arise."(2)
DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS: AMIR SHOKAT AL-MOLK'S MISSION
Disputes between the Iranians and Afghans on the distribution 
of the Hirmand water in Sistan continued for years. Not only 
was not McMahon's decision on Hirmand water distribution 
observed by local population but his recommendation of 
appointment of a permanent British water engineer for the 
supervision of water distribution was not followed by any one.
In his confidential diary of December 1929, the British 
Consul for Sistan indicates that: "there had been one or two
minor affrays between Afghans and Persians in the Mian Kangi
(1) From India Office to Foreign Office, dated 23rd November 1905, FO 60/729 f p. 280.
(2) From the Viceroy of India, dated 8th December 1905 F0 60/729# p. 341.
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district of Sistan as a result of disputes in connection with
the distribution of the Hirmand water. A few casualties on
(1 ^both sides resulted."v '
By this time, Reza Shah Pahlavi had established a strong 
central authority in Iran backed by a modern central military 
force. As his power consolidated in Iran and his 
Government's influence began to expand among neighbouring 
countries, he began fresh attempts to settle the Sistan water 
dispute through direct negotiations with the Afghans. The 
first attempt to enter negotiations with the Afghans took 
place in 1930. The two governments, according to Mohammad 
Ali Monsef's book on Shokat al-Molk, had agreed to send their 
missions to Sistan where negotiations could be conducted on 
the site of the disputed frontiers. Iran's mission was led 
by Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II, the 
Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat and Sistan who had by then assumed 
the surname "Alam". His appointment was obviously prompted 
by his vast knowledge of the problem and his deep interest in 
the matter. Other members of the Iranian delegation included 
Colonel Mokri representing the army, Badi az-Zaman Khan 
Mesbah and Esmail Shirazi representing the Ministry of 
Finance, Rafi al-Molk Rasteh representing the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and Mohammad Ali Monsef was secretary to the 
mission. The Afghan mission was led by Abd al-Ahad Khan 
speaker of Afghan Majlis, Mohammad Anvar Khan, Governor of 
Chokhansur, Gholam Yahya Khan, Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Motasam Khan and Mohammad Esmail Khan.^^ The two 
delegations met at Deh-e Mohammad in Sistan and continued 
their discussions for two months: "when the Afghan mission
referred to the arbitrations of Goldsmid and McMahon, the 
Amir said: we are not prepared to base our talks on foreign 
arbitrations which had never been officially endorsed. 
Moreover, those arbitrations were not for settlement of
(1) Paragraph 97 of Confidential Diary of H.B. Majesty's Consul for Sistan for 15 Nov. to 31
Dec. 1929, FO 371/14526 $ p. 3 of 211.
(2) Monsef, Mohammad Ali, “Amir Shokat al-Molk Alam1*, Tehran 1975, pp. 184 - 189.
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differences, but to create cause for disputes between the two 
brothers in religion. Thus, it is not to the interest of 
either side to negotiate on those arbitrations."^^
The Amir, therefore, succeeded in opening up fresh
possibilities in the Iran-Afghanistan negotiations on Hirmand
water distribution by casting out Goldsmid and McMahon water
awards. Direct negotiations thus began on a new footing
which was to rule out previous arrangements and to start
afresh. It was to negotiate everything in accordance with
accepted international and true local needs. The Shokat
al-Molk, therefore, demanded that the Hirmand water should be
divided between Iran and Afghanistan on equal bases, each
side receiving half of the water flowing from Band-e Kamal
Khan downstream. The Afghans, at length, agreed to the
division of water in two equal volumes from Nahr-e Shahi
which is situated below the Kamal Khan band. This offer was
not acceptable to the Amir as there was not much water left
in the river below Band-e Shahi to be divided by the two
sides and the Amir was clearly hoping for more water for 
(2)Sistan. v ' The Amir, in reply, made the following 
statement:
"J have explicitly stated that I cannot accept any 
other arrangement (other than dividing the whole water 
from Kamal Khan band into two equal halves) . If you 
wish, I will inform my government of your suggestion, 
and if my government accepted it, I personally will 
refrain from adhering to it and will resign from this 
mission, because your suggestion is injurious to the 
Government (of Iran) and to the people of Sistan.... I 
do not want to be cursed and blamed like Yamin-e 
Nezam's mission has been. whenever I myself see the 
(border) pillars, I curse them, because unlike 
internationally accepted method of putting boundary 
line in the middle of the rivers or on top of 
mountains, here natural boundary has been 
disregarded."(3)
(1) Monsef, op. cit., p. 187, quoting notes of the first round of talks.
(2) Monsef, op. cit., p. 188.
(3) Monsef quoting notes of the third round of taLks, op. cit., p. 188.
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FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Amir Shokat al-Molk's abortive attempt for settlement of 
disputes was followed by an upsurge of conflicts. The 
Foreign and Diplomatic Department of the Indian Government 
reported in November 1931 to the Foreign Office in London, 
outlining an eruption of fresh disputes between Iranian and 
Afghan subjects on Hirmand water utilisation. The report 
indicated that: "Afghans have been clearing bed of the old
Shahi canal above Sistan band, which if used would deprive 
Sistan of water.... Local Sardar and followers, roughly 
1,000 men, have proceeded to the frontier to negotiate. It 
is believed that they have instructions to fight if it is 
necessary...."  ^^
The British Consul telegraphed shortly afterwards that:
"Tribal levies returning. Matter is being taken up by
(2)respective Governments."v '
The British, meanwhile, assigned a delegate led by Brigadier
C.H. Haswell to carry out preliminary studies of the Hirmand 
water and possibilities of constructing bridges and dams on 
the river inside Afghan territory. The timing and purpose of 
this assignment were so controversial with regard to the 
existing sensitivities that the delegate was ordered to 
observe strict confidentiality of their mission. The British 
Minister at Kabul writing to the Indian Government stated:
"My memorandum no. 622. Telegraphic orders stated to 
have issued December 8th to Afghan Visa Officer Quetta 
to Grant Haswell's party visas. Prime Minister now 
prefers that they should stay at consulate Kandahar 
and is anxious that no mention of visit should be made 
in press. All telegraphic correspondence on subject 
should please not be in clear. Consul informed. 
Visit by party to Helmand not desired."(3)
(1) Telegram No. 2799S. from Government of India to the Foreign Office London, dated 17th
November 1931, FO 371/15550, p.8 .
(2) Telegram XX No. 84, from British Consul at Zabol to British Minister at Tehran, dated 1st
December 1931, FO 371/15550;. p. 10.
(3) Telegram No. 812 from H.B. Majesty's Minister at Kabul, to Foreign Department, New Delhi,
dated 10th December 1931, FO 371/16275, . p. 29.
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Receiving this telegram, the Indian Government issued 
instructions to the authorities of British Baluchistan
stating:
"Kabul telegram of 10th December no. 812
2. Please instruct Haswell accordingly. He should 
be particularly warned not to attempt visit to Helmand 
and to warn all members of his party to avoid doing 
anything which might give publicity to their movements 
or arouse Afghan suspicion.
3. Presume you can arrange to keep local
correspondent from mentioning this affair I"(1)
This mission, however, went ahead in maximum secrecy albeit 
its task did not include any interference with the volume of
Hirmand water flowing into Sistan. In a report to the
British Minister at Kabul, Brigadier Haswell stated that they 
were asked to investigate the following:-
(1) Subsoil water flow on the area between Kandahar and the 
hills to the North.
(2) Sites and designs for bridges on the Argandab river on 
the Herat Road and Hazarastan Road.
(3) Site and design for a bridge over the Argastan river 
near Takhter Hul.
(4) Repairs necessary to improve the road to Chaman for the
/ 2 \
benefit of the Fruit Trade Lorries.v 1
The Afghans began, as from 1920, to get the Americans to 
Kabul.(3 ^ The Daily Telegraph of London reported in 
January 1935 that the Americans had decided to send a 
Minister to Afghanistan.^^ While surprised by this
(1) TeLegram No. 3118-S, from Foreign Department, New Delhi, to Baluchistan, Quetta, dated 12th
December 1931, FO 371/16275, p. 30.
<2) Extract of detaiLed report from Brigadier Haswell to British Minister at Kabul, dated
Quetta, January 5th 1932, FO 371/16275, p. 32.
(3) Minute paper of British Foreign Office, No. P.2.325/35, FO 371/19421, pp. 1 and 2
of 104.
(4) Daily Telegraph, Cutting date 16th January 1935, FO 371/19421 / p. 106.
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decision, the British concluded that the decision was 
connected to oil explorations in Afghanistan.^^
American interests in Afghanistan proved, in due course, not 
to be connected with oil exploration in that country. 
American interest in Afghanistan was proved to have been 
motivated by geostrategic considerations of wanting to return 
Afghanistan to the Western sphere of influence. This 
interest manifested itself in economic cooperations, 
including the construction of dams and canals on the river 
Hirmand.
THE 1939 HIRMAND WATER AGREEMENT
After her third war with the British, Afghanistan considered
(2 )closer ties with her historical neighbour Iran.' }
In 1920 the Government of Afghanistan sent Sardar Abd al-Aziz
Khan as its representative to Iran. He succeeded in signing
an agreement of friendship with Iran in June 29th,
(3)1921.' ' Diplomatic relations were established between the
two Governments that year, and another agreement of
friendship was signed on 31st October 1927, article six of 
which provided for the direct diplomatic settlement of
disputes between the two countries in accordance with the 
terms laid down in the attached protocol. This protocol
stated:
"Taking into consideration Article six of treaty of 
friendship between the governments of Iran and 
Afghanistan, the two contracting parties have agreed
to the method of appealing for arbitration that, in 
the event of differences occurring between the two 
contracting parties, if settlement was not achieved 
through political means, each side will select an 
important personality of their country with full
(1) Minute paper of British Foreign Office, op. cit,, p. 2.
(2) Ghobar, Mir Mohammad, ‘Afghanistan Dar Masir-e Tarikh", KabuL 1987, pp. 787-8.
(3) Ibid.
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authority, and if agreement was not achieved by them, 
they will jointly select an important personality from 
a third country and the opinion of the third party 
arbitrator will be final and binding. Dated sixth of 
Azar of 1306 (31 October 1927)."(1)
It was on the strength of this protocol that Turkish General 
Fakhr ad-Din Altay was selected to arbitrate between the two 
countries in 1935 on the disputed districts of Musa-Abad and 
Yazdan (see chapter V on the boundaries of Khorasan and 
Baluchistan).
With the strengthening military positions in Baluchistan and
Sistan in the mid-1930's the attention of the Iranian
Government, once again, was drawn to Sistan and the question
of the Hirmand water. An incident occurred in Sistan between
(2}the subjects of Iran and Afghanistan in 1938.'- ' This 
incident brought the urgency of a settlement to the Hirmand 
water disputes to the forefront of Reza Shah's Government's 
foreign policy priorities. Mohammad Nader Shah's friendly 
attitude towards Iran at this time made it possible for an 
amicable settlement to the disputes. The protocol attached 
to the treaty of friendship of 1927 also prepared the grounds 
for negotiations between the two countries. Mr. Baqer Kazemi 
Iran's Ambassador to Afghanistan, was instructed to enter 
negotiations with the Government of Afghanistan. 
Negotiations between Kazemi and the Afghan Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Ali Mohammad Khan, resulted in the conclusion of a new 
treaty between the two countries which was signed on 26th 
January 1939.
Article 1 of this treaty recognised that "the Governments of 
Iran and Afghanistan agree to divide in equal shares all 
waters of the Hirmand river which flows to Band-e Kamal Khan 
(30 miles inside Afghan territory) between Iran and 
Afghanistan"; and
(1) Translated by the author from original Persian text of the protocol sent to the author by 
Document Centre of the Institute of PoliticaL and International Studies of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Islamic RepubLic of Iran, on 17.05.1369 (8th August 1990).
(2) See Ghobar, op. cit., for details.
608
Article II of this treaty provided that "in order not to use
more water than what is taken now between Deh-e Chahar Borjak
and Band-e Kamal khan, the Government of Afghanistan engages
not to construct any other stream in the said distance and
(1 ^even not to repair any of the existing ones"' ' - (See
Appendix III for full Persian text and English translation of 
this treaty).
An important obstacle in the way of reaching this agreement 
was the deep rooted mistrust between the two people of each 
other's intentions. To remove this obstacle, the two 
signatories to this agreement issued a joint communique on 
the same day stating:
"Considering friendly relations and brotherhood that 
fortunately exist between the Imperial Government of 
Iran and the Royal Government of Afghanistan, at this 
time that the treaty of dividing Hirmand water is 
being signed by the competent representatives of the 
two sides, in order not to leave any cause for anxiety 
and suspicion between the inhabitants of Sistan and 
Chokhansur and between their respective governorates, 
and in order to enable the inhabitants of the two 
sides to trust each other's mutual friendship and 
cooperation, the following communique is signed and 
attached to the treaty of Hirmand water division of 
today's date: First; the Imperial Government of Iran
announces that its sole consideration regarding this 
treaty is cultivation and irrigation of Sistan so that 
the cultivators would not be in much difficulty in 
this respect, and that it has no intention in 
obtaining instrument and excuse for interfering in 
Afghanistan's internal affairs, but desires the 
everlasting progress and prosperity of Afghanistan.
"Secondly; the Royal Government of Afghanistan 
announces that it has no intention whatsoever, in 
administering pressure for preventing water to reach 
Sistan, and to this end, will not permit undertaking 
which will result in reduction in the Iranian share of 
water at Band-e Kamal Khan (engagement stated in the
(1) Articles I and II of the treaty of Hirmand Division, signed between the Imperial Government
of Iran and the Royal Government of Afghanistan, on sixth of Bahman of 1317 (26th January 
1939), Text in Persian, from the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic 
RepubLic of Iran, sent to this author by the Document Centre of the Institute of Political 
and International Studies, on 8th August 1990, Ref. 94.
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Article I of the treaty) which would damage 
cultivation and irrigation in Sistan*"(1)
(for original text see Appendix IV)
This agreement, though a significant improvement on McMahon's 
water award, from the Iranian point of view, also failed to
put an end to Hirmand water disputes between Iran and
Afghanistan, mainly because Reza Shah was deposed and exiled
by British and Soviet forces who occupied Iran in 1941. The
feebled Governments which replaced Reza Shah's authority in 
Iran were too weak to engage in settlement of disputes in 
their foreign policy.
Commenting on the impact of the 1939 treaty, a French
translation of which was forwarded to the British Foreign
(2 \Office by the British Legation at Tehran,' ' a Foreign 
Office official made the following notes:
"I seem to remember, while I was in Tehran (1931 
- 1934), that the question arose in some form or
another of a new division of the water being 
necessary. No Award can last forever in this case, 
because the Helmand keeps changing its course.
In the present case, the Band-i-Kamal Khan lies 
about 30 miles inside Afghan territory, and I presume 
that the Deh Doust Mohammad which is mentioned is the 
one shown on the large-scale maps (India and adjacent 
countries 1/1,000,000 No,30) as about 20 miles north 
of the Band-i-Sistan, i.e. the point where the Helmand 
reaches the Perso-Afghan frontier. The Band-i-Sistan 
(or Band-i-Kuhak) has hitherto, I believe, been the 
principal irrigation barrage for Sistan."(3)
(1) Translation (by the author) of the Communique of 26th January 1939, signed by Baqer Kazemi
and ALi Mohammad Khan, Original Persian text sent to this author by the Document Centre of
Institute of Political and International Studies of IRI, dated 8th August 1990, Ref. 94.
(2) From British Legation at Tehran to Viscount Halifax London, dated 13th April 1939, FO
371/23264 r p.184.
(3) Comments from an unnamed officiaL of Foreign Office on the French text of Hirmand Water
Division Treaty of 1939 between Iran and Afghanistan, dated 2nd May 1939, FO 371/23264 ■
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Notwithstanding the fact that the 1939 Hirmand Water Division 
Treaty was much in line with the accepted international 
standards concerning international rivers, it has failed in 
effect not because of geographical reasons but because of 
political sensitivities. The Hirmand has not changed its 
course in the delta region since 1939, but the prevailing 
atmosphere of distrust and lack of goodwill has prevented 
genuine efforts for solving the disputes.
AN ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HIRMAND 
WATER DISPUTES SINCE THE 1939 AGREEMENT
The 1939 Hirmand water agreement between Iran and Afghanistan
was not enforced because the Afghans declined to ratify it,
arguing that the Iranian Government should undertake, in a
separate official communique ratified by the Iranian Majlis,
to make no objection to Afghanistan's complete freedom of
interference in the Hirmand water above Band-e Kamal 
11 ^Khan.v ' An additional argument for disregarding the 
agreement was that its attached communique was not ratified 
by the Iranian Majlis. The agreement was not, therefore,
officially exchanged between the two Governments and eight 
years of negotiations did not succeed in revitalising the 
agreement.
Reza Shah Pahlavi was deposed and sent into exile in 1941 as 
a result of an Anglo-Soviet effort. His power and influence
in Iran was replaced by a succession of weak Governments who
lacked the ability and initiative of bringing about a 
solution to the worsening situation regarding Sistan's water 
problem. The Afghans, on the other hand, concluded a series 
of agreements with the Americans, in 1945 whereby the 
Americans were granted concessions to build dams and canals
(1) Afghanistan's proposals as attached to the Letter of 11.10.1319 (1st February 1941) from 
Deputy Foreign Minister to the Prime Minister, Iranian Documents of the Office of Prime 
Minister, Series No. 102010.
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on various locations alongside Hirmand and its tributaries 
within Afghanistan with harmful consequences for Sistan. The 
Political Diary of the British Consul General of Mashhad 
records a long spell of drought in Sistan in the summer of 
1947. It remarks: "from Zabul a report has been received
that no water from the Helmand has reached the town for a 
month and that outlying villages have been without it for 
some three months. The drought-stricken population will not 
believe that failure of last winter' s snow is the reason and 
have expressed their intention of crossing into Afghanistan 
and forcibly releasing the water on which they depend and 
which they are convinced the Afghans are illegally stealing 
or diverting by their new American engineered irrigation
schemes in the neighbourhood of Girishk."^1^
Flow of Hirmand water into Sistan, in the meantime had
diminished, in some instances completely stopped. A report 
from Zabol in the summer of 1947 to the Iranian Government 
indicated that Hirmand water had completely dried up in that 
year:
"1- Following my previous reports, the number of the 
people taking part in the sitting strike increased 
today, and all of them cry about the lack of water and 
constantly ask me for an answer to their telegrams of 
complaints sent to His Excellency the Prime Minister
and some of the Ministries and to the media and
communication centres. If therefore, beg to draw your 
attention to this matter n(2)
Within eight years, between 1949 and 1957, the Abgardan 
Boghra dam was constructed at Girishk, the Boghra Canal was 
built in 70 kilometres with a capacity of 2800 cubic feet per 
second, the Kajaki reservoir dam was constructed with a 
capacity of 1.5 million cubic feet, the Arghandab dam was 
constructed on the Arghandab branch of the river Hirmand.
(1) Extract from Secret Political Diary of British Consulate General Meshed, No. 8 of 1947,
dated 5th August 1947, FO 371/62024 •
(2) Extract of telegram from Afshar Naderi in Sistan to the Iranian Government, dated 07.06.1326 
(29th August 1947), Iranian Documents of the Office of Prime Minister series No. 102010.
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Also the Hoghian Kamaraq, Akhtechi, Gohargan, Juy-e No, Archi 
Sarvi and a number of other canals were constructed with 
disastrous consequences for Sistan.
In a report to his Government, the Iranian Ambassador to 
Kabul described his own personal assessment of the inspection 
of the Boghra canal in the following words:
"Following the telegraph No. 244, I returned to Kabul 
last night and accompanied by Mohandes Tashakori, 
inspected the Boghra canal from Kereshk (Girishk) 
which is its beginning, to Nad-e Ali in 65 
kilometres. This canal is completed and now in use. 
The depth of water all along this canal is two and a 
half metres; the water flowing in the canal at present 
is one thousand cubic feet, or in other word, 300cubic 
metres per second. The water of Hirmand at this time 
of the year which is at its most, is between 15 to 20 
thousand square feet. The breadth of the canal is 30 
metres at the upstream, and reduces to a minimum of 12 
metres at the downstream...."(2)
Another local official in Zabol reporting to Amir Asadollah 
Alam, Governor General of the province of Sistan and 
Baluchistan, in 1945 states:
"According to information received from inside 
Afghanistan a canal known as Boghra Canal has been 
constructed near Ghandahar in 1314 - 1315 (1935 -
1936) towards Hirmand river (towards Zabol). Our 
investigations indicate that during the past 8 to 9 
years this canal was constructed in 18 kilometres with 
a breadth of 35 metres and with a depth of 5 metres.
"The number of people working on it until now, except 
for the three months of the winters, have been 6 to 7 
thousand, but this year the number of the workers has 
increased, and it is estimated to be completed within
(1) Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirouz, "The Eastern Iranian Boundaries'*, paper presented to the Seminar on
the Iranian Boundaries, at the Geopolitic and International Boundaries Research Centre, 
SOAS, University of London, on December 9th 1991. Information contained in this section were 
compiLed from various Afghan sources.
(2) Extract of teLegram No. 252 from the Iranian Ambassador to Kabul to his Government, no
visible date, Iranian Documents, op. cit.
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the next five years with disastrous consequences for 
Sistan...."(*)
Construction of Kajaki reservoir and the Boghra diversion dam 
in 1947 - '49 caused great uproar in Iran, especially amongst 
local people and dignitaries of Sistan and Baluchistan.
Interviewed by this author on Wednesday 10th April 1992, Amir 
Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam stated:
"Construction of Boghra dam in Afghanistan caused much 
anxieties among local people in Sistan and increased 
fear of complete halt in the flow of Hirmand water 
into the delta region. Floods of letters and 
telegrams from Sistan and Baluchistan did little to 
move the Iranian Government to act in that regard. My 
cousin and brother-in-law Amir Asadollah Khan Alam 
whose concern and enthusiasm regarding affairs of 
Sistan and Qaenat cannot be doubted, was 
Governor-General of Baluchistan and Sistan at the 
time. He instructed units of the Air Force at Zahedan 
(Baluchistan and Sistan) to carry out surveillance 
flights over the site of the dam studying 
possibilities of destroying the dam by aerial 
bombardments. Young Amir Asadollah Khan was about to 
act on his own initiative that Mohammad Reza Shah 
advised him to control his temper and allow for 
peaceful means to settle the problem. He followed 
young Shah's advice but the promised settlement never 
materialised."
Other sources attribute this impetuous act to General 
Razmara, the powerful Prime Minister at the time, but it does 
not seem logical that a mature politician as prudent as 
Razmara would follow his impulse in this manner, whereas Amir 
Asadollah Khan Alam was at the time a young man 
enthusiastically inclined regarding local affairs.
As Afghanistan continuously failed to reply to Iran's 
suggestions for the settlement of the problem, the Iranian 
Government, instructed their permanent representative at the 
United Nations in 1947 to refer the case to the UN Security
(1) Extract of telegram of 05.03.1324 (26 May 1945) from Hussein Sarani to Amir Asadollah Alam, 
Iranian Documents of the Office of Prime Minister, series No. 102010.
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Council. Before Iranian representation was made to the 
Council, the Americans intervened and their Ambassador to 
Tehran, George Allen, was instructed to persuade the Iranians 
to continue negotiations with the Afghans in Washington. The 
Government of Iran agreed to this course of endeavour and all 
parties (Iran, Afghanistan and the United States) decided to 
allow an impartial commission to study the amount of Hirmand 
water, the size of the cultivable lands on both sides of the 
border river and the water needs of each side, before serious 
negotiations took place. As a result of this decision, a 
commission was formed of three international water experts 
from three impartial countries. The three were:
1- Mr. F.F. Dominguez, a water expert and university
professor from Chile;
2- Mr. Robert L. Lowry, a water expert from the United
States; and
3- Mr. Christopher E. Webb, a water expert from Canada.
Having completed their investigation in Afghanistan, the 
commission continued investigation of the relevant water and 
agricultural situations in the Sistan of Iran in 1948. Amir 
Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam, Iran’s Deputy Minister of 
Agriculture at the time, who was in charge of hosting and 
guiding the commission inside Iranian territories, told this 
author on Wednesday 10th April 1991 that the commission 
inspected relevant districts on either side of the river and 
recommended that Iranian Sistan should receive, at least, 22 
cubic metres per second of the Hirmand water.
Although this amount per second of Hirmand water was, in
practice, less than the amount determined by Colonel McMahon
(2 1in 1905 of the Hirmand water for Sistan,v ' the Afghans
declined to accept it. The Government of Iran eventually 
succeeded in obtaining Afghanistan's consent to a new round
(1) Iranian Documents of the Office of Prime Minister, series No. 102010.
(2) Iranian Documents of the Office of Prime Minister, series No. 102010.
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of negotiations on the question of Sistan water on the basis 
of recommendations of the impartial commission.
The two Governments decided on conducting their own
negotiations in Washington. The Iranian delegation was led
by Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam and included Mr.
Qodratollah Tashakori and Mr. Soleiman-pour who were water
engineers, Mr Abd al-Ahad Dara, Mr. Mohammad Sarvari and Dr.
(1)Mohammad Hassan Ganji^ } a highly respected Iranian 
geographer who was also secretary to the mission.
In Washington, the delegation was joined by Dr. Ali Amini,
Iranian Ambassador to the United States, as the chief 
(2 \negotiator.v '
The Afghan delegation was led by Mr. Ludin , that country's 
Ambassador to the United States and included Abd al-Majid 
Khan Zabuli, Dr. Tabibi and Mr Reza who was a water engineer.
In a summary of the confidential notes of the mission, sent 
to this author, Professor Mohammad Hassan Ganji indicates 
that: "the first official session began in the afternoon of
9th April 1959. Heads of the two delegations exchanged their 
written statements which contained the main points of their 
claims.... The two sides exchanged their notes of response to 
the claims of the opposite side on the 11th April.... thence 
meetings took place twice a week in the embassies of the two 
countries alternately. As discussions proceeded the Afghans 
continued reiterating their one-sided answers to the 
questions put to them. This practice prevented progress of 
negotiations.... The Afghans remained intransigent throughout 
emphasising that Iran's rights of Hirmand water were limited 
to the minimum 22 cubic metres per second quota as defined by 
the impartial commission. In reply, Iranian water engineers 
demanded 52 cubic metres per second which was needed for
(1) Later Professor of Geography at the University of Tehran, now retired {Professor Emeritus).
(2) Later Prime Minister.
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agricultural irrigation in Sistan.... As negotiations 
continued to no avail, Dr. Ali Amini stated in a meeting of 
the latter days that he had solved the problem of oil in Iran 
and was then ready to accept on his own responsibility an 
offer from the Afghans of 30 cubic metres or even 26 cubic 
metres per second instead of the 52 cubic metres quota 
needed. But the Afghans stated that they had no authority to 
anything more than the 22 cubic meter per second 
quota...."^1)
These negotiations came to an abrupt end as the Afghan 
delegation wanted to return to Kabul. Professor Ganji 
indicates that:
"On 5th June 1956 Dr. Amini informed Iranian
delegation that the Afghan representative had informed 
him that the talks should be brought to an end within 
one week, allowing him to see to his other duties. 
The Iranian delegation, as a consequence summarised 
its view in a note which was handed to the Afghan 
delegation. This note was as follows:
(1) Iran has, in accordance with historical
tradition, the rights of using Hirmand water and 
will continue preserving these rights.
(2) The Washington negotiations will not be
considered as terminated, but the two sides agree 
to:
(a) Afghanistan will continue allowing supply of 
water needed for the existing agricultural lands 
of Sistan (149,000 acres) for 5 years, and Iran 
will, in the meantime, undertake to improve 
irrigation networks to eradicate wastage.
(b) Afghanistan undertakes to supply water for 
the future agricultural needs of Sistan.
(c) The two sides will form joint commissions 
for further studies of the problem and compiling 
relevant documents.
(d) After the 5 year period is terminated, the 
present commission will resume its sessions or a 
new commission will take over."(2)
(1) A summary of the notes of negotiation of Iranian delegation in Washington with the Afghan 
delegation on Hirmand water division, prepared and sent to this author by Professor Mohammad 
Hassan Ganji, dated 9th March 1991, translated into English by Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh.
(2) Ibid.
617
On 19th and 20th of March 1959 direct negotiations were 
resumed between an Iranian delegation at Kabul and the Afghan 
Prime Minister Sardar Davood Khan. The Iranians put forward 
a series of proposals to the Afghans during these
negotiations, none of which was accepted. The Governments of
Iran and Afghanistan eventually signed in Kabul, on March 13, 
1973, a new agreement with two protocols regarding the water 
division of the Hirmand river. Unfortunately the text and 
related information were not disclosed at the time and the 
agreement did not enter into effect because of the Afghan
Coup d'etat of that year which prevented ratification of the 
agreement by the Afghan parliament. The Iranians also
disowned the agreement unofficially, firstly, because of 
widespread protest against it within the country and; 
secondly because of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 which 
resulted in the cancellation of many agreements with other 
countries signed by the previous regime. Mr Forughi, Iran's 
Ambassador to Afghanistan (late 1960's and early 1970's) 
who was involved in the preparation of grounds for this
agreement, prepared for the use in this work, a report on the 
basis of his personal notes, of the proceedings leading to 
the signing of the 1973 agreement. The following is a
summary of his report: "late in Shahrivar (mid-September) of
1345 (1966), six months after arriving in Kabul I informed
Iranian Foreign Ministry in a report the following:
1- One of the principal reasons of differences among the
countries of Asia and Africa is the legacy of the 
colonial policies of European countries of the 19th
century.... I include the Hirmand dispute in this 
category....
2- I discussed General Goldsmid's arbitration and his
invention of outer Sistan and Sistan proper, and 
introduced it as the principal bone of dispute 
concerning Hirmand.
3- Then I discussed (with the Afghans) the mission of Sir 
Henry McMahon.
(1) Mr Mahmud Forughi was appointed Deputy Foreign Minister in 1978. He took residence in the 
United States in the wake of the 1979 revolution and died there in January 1992.
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4- Then I considered the Commission of Hirmand Delta (the 
Impartial Commission) of 1950. According to a table 
(produced by this Commission) Iran's average annual 
share of Hirmand water was determined as being 22 cubic 
meter per second. It is noteworthy that the Iranian 
Government did not agree with the outcome of these two 
missions (McMahon and the impartial commission).
5- His Majesty the Shah of Afghanistan for the reasons of 
courtesy to His Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah added another 
four cubic metres per second to the figure (recommended 
by the impartial commission of 1950) bringing up the 
total to 26 cubic metres per second, but the division of 
water was to be based on the formula of the same table.
6- Another 2 cubic metres per second was possible to be 
added to this in that year (1966), bringing the total to 
28 cubic metres per second.
7- All damages caused to Iran in the past years were the 
results of ignorance of the (Iranian) authorities of the 
time, I hope with no ill intentions.
8- A careful study of Sistan's military and economic 
importance of today is needed. If the situation remains 
as it is now, what will happen? How could the water be 
stored and how could Iran's share be increased? What 
policies could the Iranian Government adopt regarding 
rivers flowing from Iran into other countries?
9- With development plans progressing in Chokhansur of 
Afghanistan, how much the Hirmand water will be affected?
10- Having completed these studies, we have to proceed with 
solutions (to the problems). Should we accept the 28 
cubic metres quota and then increase our share of the 
water by implementing joint projects for storing Hirmand 
waters, or should we do nothing at present and proceed 
with international arbitration, bearing in mind that 
whenever we did, we sustained losses. Or should we 
follow imaginations of those who still hold out that the 
entire Sistan (divided between Iran and Afghanistan) and 
the countries of Herat, Samarqand, Bokhara, Caucaus 
and... are parts of Iran?
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11- Time is passing to the disadvantage of Iran. Political 
situation in Afghanistan is uncertain and centre of 
decision making becomes more problematic every day.
12- If settlement of the differences is aimed at, it should 
be noted that an agreement is not the end of the problem 
but it will be the beginning of extensive activities.
13- I suggest that a qualified commission be appointed to 
see to these matters."
Negotiations with the Prime Minister of Afghanistan in the 
month of Aban (October-November) of that year resulted in his 
agreement to the proposed investment on joint projects to be 
implemented in the Afghan territory. High officials of Iran 
instructed Mr. Forughi in the following month to proceed with 
the aim of settling the differences on the basis of
acceptance by Iran of the 28 cubic metres quota with joint 
projects and investments for increasing Iran's share of the 
water in mind. Afghanistan, in the meantime, was going 
through a domestic political change. As freedom expanded in 
the country, achievement of unanimity of views on the
question of Hirmand water disputes with Iran became more 
difficult. Apparently there were groups of people in Iran 
who were, as Mr. Forughi puts it, "influenced by their 
fanaticism, and advocated hostility to any settlement with 
Afghanistan, propagating that any such settlement would add 
up to nothing less than treason". He writes:
"The question which was initially technical, became 
political and legal. Regrettably informations in Iran 
on the Hirmand issue were little more than none. I 
wonder how many people had seen that river, Sistan and 
Chokhansur.... However, talking to His Majesty the 
King and the Prime Minister of Afghanistan after a 
while, I was told that considering prevailing 
(political) situation, acceptance of 26 cubic metres 
quota was difficult let alone accepting 28 cubic 
metres per second. But, since we have already
accepted the principle of 26 cubic metres per second, 
we will agree to it in any circumstance. We also 
promise, with our honour, that we will agree to the 
joint projects after settlement of the differences, 
because it is to the benefit of Afghanistan as well."
As each month passed by it became clear that time was against 
Iran and the Afghan authorities began to lose their power and
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influence in that country. In his notes, Mr. Forughi points 
out:
"Late Hoveida, the then Prime Minister (of Iran) 
arrived in Kabul on the 6th of Aban (28th of October) 
of 1347 (1968) for a state visit. Negotiations on
Hirmand issue were high on the agenda. The night 
before his return to Iran, the Afghan Government 
cabinet assembled in the Chehel-Sotun Palace (Late 
Hoveida's residence) and we Iranians assembled in 
another room. Talks continued for some hours past 
midnight. There were much comings and goings between 
the two rooms, but no agreement was achieved and the 
Prime Minister returned to Iran with his entourage the 
following day (9th Aban) (31st October)."
The year 1971 was the year of great drought in the Hirmand 
delta region. People in Iran and Afghanistan sustained great 
loss and large groups of Afghans immigrated and settled in 
Kerman, Baluchistan, Khorasan and Gorgan regions of Iran. 
The Afghan Government endeavoured at the outset of the 
drought not to ask for foreign help but to no avail. They 
sought assistance and the Red Lion and Sun Society of Iran 
did all it could. After six years of remaining in 
Afghanistan, Mr. Forughi requested termination of his mission 
to that country. The application was approved and he 
returned to Tehran on the 18th November 1971. After all 
those negotiations and comings and goings between Tehran and 
Kabul, the Hirmand dispute remained unsettled. Mr Forughi 
was sent back to Kabul by order of the Shah less than a year 
later. He indicates in his confidential notes:
"I was. sent to Kabul at the head of a delegation for 
a temporary mission in Shahrivar of 1351 
(August-September 1972). I resumed negotiations 
there. The basis of negotiations was the same quota
of 26 cubic metres per second. But according to a
table prepared by the Ministry of Water and Power of 
Iran, additional quota of water would be purchased 
annually in a separate agreement to be signed with the 
Afghans.
"Agreements between the United States and Canada, 
between the United States and Mexico and agreements
between some states of the United States on the rivers
flowing from one country to another and the ways of 
purchasing water were studied.... The final draft on
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the measurements of the water was prepared. I have 
already explained the rest of the matter to you.(1)
"In the final letter I wrote to the Foreign Ministry 
on the 29th Shahrivar 1351 (20th September 1972)
pointing out that I had stated in the final meeting in 
Kabul that by reaching agreement and when documents 
went through legal process the activities and 
cooperation between the two countries will just 
start. Then I noted that if we were to sign this 
agreement on the belief that the differences are 
finally settled, we are better not to do so. But if 
the aim is to settle the differences on the basis of 
this agreement so that we could begin all efforts and 
cooperation between the two countries, the sooner we 
sign the agreement the better. It is obvious that the 
preparation of future projects will rest with the 
honourable Government, but as a reminder I would add 
that such cooperations must include a wide range of 
projects: from joint projects for reservation of water 
and regularisation of distribution system, to economic 
and cultural cooperations, each to be prosecuted 
diligently and with patience, stamina and goodwill."
Here Mahmud Forughi expresses regret for not being in 
possession of the final draft of the agreement to send to 
this author. Before coming to the final draft, 
representatives of the two countries prepared and modified 
eleven drafts during their six years of negotiations. On the 
joint projects and investments, he points out that the 
experts of the two countries had concluded:
"....that the Musa Qal'eh branch of Hirmand was the 
most suitable site for the construction of the 
intended dam. In an amateurish sketch that I have 
attached, the approximate positions of the rivers 
joining Hirmand are shown and I hope it will be of 
some use in your research project."(2/
In an earlier correspondence, Mr. Forughi wrote to this 
author:
(1) Here Mr. Forughi refers to the contents of an earlier letter to this author which will be 
quoted in subsequence to this text.
(2) Report in 7 pages in Persian, sent to this author by Late Mahmud Forughi, prepared on the 
basis of his personal notes, dated 7th of Shahrivar 1369 (29th August 1990).
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Chahar Borjak
Rough sketch of Hirmand and its tributaries, prepared by Mr. 
Mahmud Forughi in aiding his report on Hirmand negotiations 
of late 1960' s and early 1970 sent to this author on 29th 
August 1990. Names in English added by the author.
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"After a few months His Majesty instructed me to go 
back to Kabul accompanied by a delegation to resume 
efforts aimed at settlement of Hirmand problem. 
Negotiations were resumed there and eventually we 
agreed that after signing the new agreement it should 
be first ratified by the Afghan Parliament and signed 
by the King, then the treaty of purchasing water 
should be signed and the whole package to be presented 
to the Iranian Houses of Majlis and Senate for 
ratification, to be signed finally by the Shah.
"The remaining task still to be sorted out was the 
method of measuring Hirmand water. Since this was a
technical matter and I was not qualified to make any 
decision on the subject, I returned to Tehran and 
reported the development (to the Shah). A few days 
later Mr. Amir Abbas Hoveida, the then Prime Minister 
informed me that Mr. (Safi) Asfia, Deputy Prime 
Minister was to go to Kabul accompanied by a 
delegation. I apologised for not being able to do so, 
but promised to furnish Mr. Asfia with every detail of 
the previous proceedings. I did so, but learnt later 
that treaties were signed and ratified by the Iranian 
Parliament with no news of water purchasing 
agreements." (1)
The treaty of 197 3 was not ratified in Afghanistan because of 
the coup d 'etat which occurred in that country three months 
after signing the treaty.
When it was put before the Parliament in Iran in 1973 for 
ratification, much opposition to it was voiced both within 
the Parliament and outside it. A vociferous opponent of this 
treaty was Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam, then a member of 
the Senate, who told this author in an interview on Wednesday 
10th April 1991:
"My opposition was motivated by two aspects of the 
treaty: firstly, the treaty on the whole denied Iran 
of her ancient rights to half of the Hirmand water 
reaching Iranian borders, and: secondly, it recognised 
all dams, bands and canals that the Afghans had 
constructed above and below Band-e Kamal Khan contrary 
to the terms of 1939 treaty and contrary to the 
previous arbitral opinions concerning the same."
(1) Extract from a letter from Mr Mahmud Forughi to this author, dated 10th Khordad 1369 (31st 
May 1990.
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A few years later the Iranian monarchy was overthrown by the 
Islamic revolution of February 1979. A few months later, 
Afghanistan was occupied by the forces of the the Soviet 
Union and civil war continued until April 1992 when the 
Soviet installed regime of Dr. Najibollah was toppled by the 
Afghan Mojahedin forces. The new "Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan" has not, as yet, consolidated its position in 
that country and there is no prospect, at present, of an 
early resumption of dialogue between Iran and Afghanistan on 
the Hirmand water disputes.
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Appendix I
Report by British Vice-Consul (1909) on canals
(+ \in Hirmand delat.' 1
Sir, I have the honour to submit for your information 
the following notes made by me recently, while on tour 
in the Mian Kangi district, on the Afghan and Persian 
canals and - water-channels between the "Band-i-Shah 
Gul" and Deh Dost Mohammed (vide Colonel McMahon's map - 
scale 1" to 1 mile illustrating his boundary award)
AFGHAN
2. On crossing the "Band-i-Shah Gul" (the old
"Band-i-Pariun no longer exists) I noticed that 
the water did not appear to be flowing freely 
down the head of the Ju-i-Afghan. This has been 
considerably blocked by sand which is blown off 
the Reg-i-Pariun by the prevailing north wind. 
On proceeding about half a mile further down the 
Ju I found that a fresh cut had been made from
the Helmund which meets the old Ju at a point
about half way between the take out from the
Helmund and its point of junction with the
Nad-i-Ali channel. A good volume of water 
appeared to be flowing down this cut and I was 
informed that it had been made in 1908 by the 
Afghans and Persians together and without 
friction.
SHAM-U-DINS
WATER CHANNEL
3. From this point I retraced my steps and crossed 
the Reg-i-Pariun to boundary pillar No. 53. A 
dry water channel (vide sketch map attached) was 
found to run from the head of the Ju-i Afghan 
parallel to the right bank of the Helmund to a 
point in the Reg-i-Pariun where it turned off to 
the N.E. in the direction of Milak. This water 
channel showed no signs of having held water and 
is now out of repair. On making enquiries I was 
informed that it had been constructed in 1907 by 
Sham-u-Din Khan, nephew of Khan Jehan Khan, with 
a view to irrigating the country round Milak 
(which has suffered from lack of water since the 
change in the course of the Helmund) . The 
Afghans, however, very naturally refused to allow 
the water to be taken from this point fearing 
that a large proportion of the water of the
(+) From H.B. Majesty's Vice-Consul, Sistan and Kain, to Major R.L. Kennion I.A., His Britannic 
Majesty's Consul for Sistan and Kain, dated Seistan; the 30: January 1909, FO 248/971,
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Ju-i-Afghan, already scarcely sufficient for its 
purpose, would be diverted from the Nad-i-Ali 
channel. The actual objection they raised was to 
the effect that the new water channel traversed 
their territory and could not therefore be made 
without their permission. This is certainly 
correct but in any case it appeared to me 
improbable that the channel would have worked 
satisfactorily since the sand which has already 
partially blocked the Ju-i-Afghan would have had 
an even worse effect here.
As far as I could ascertain Shams-u-Din Khan did 
not attempt to despite the right of the Afghans 
to refuse water for this channel and it therefore 
remained unused.
4. No water now flows down the old bed of the
Helmund between boundary pillars nos. 53 and 52. 
The bed is therefore dry up to the point where it 
is met by the Ju-i-Afghan.
WATER CHANNELS
TAKEN FROM THE NAD I-ALI
5. From this point I followed the Nad-i-Ali channel
and the Sikhsar to Deh Dos Mahommed. On the left
bank I noticed that two water channels, in close 
proximity to one another feed Milak (in place of 
one shown on map) . One of these was recently 
made owing to the unsatisfactory flow of water 
down the old channel and I was informed that they 
reunite lower down. Neither appear to take off 
any very considerable volume of water.
About half a mile below Milak a water channel, 
with a good flow of water, has been recently made 
by Shams-u-Din Khan. This, I was informed, 
unites with the canal somewhat lower down (marked 
Jehanabad water channel No. 2 on the sketch map) 
and it is to one of these canals that Shams-u-Din 
referred to when speaking to H.B.M's Consul at
their exchange of visits last month. He then
stated that disputes had arisen regarding one of 
these (almost certainly No. 1 which was the last 
to be dry) and that the Afghans had closed it. 
At the time of my visit water was flowing freely 
down the channel and I could see no signs of its 
having been recently closed.
On the right bank I noticed that one of the 
Afghan water channels leading in the direction of 
Nad-i-Ali was closed but this may be temporary. 
None of these appeared to carry off much water
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LAKSHAK
AND DEH DOST
MAHOMMAD CANAL
6. On proceeding some two miles further down the
left bank through dense tamarisk undergrowth, X 
found that the Lakshak and Deh Dost Mahommed
the spot known as "Janjal" (vide marginal note 
Sheet No. 2 (b) map of Persian Seistan showing 
irrigation canals). These two canals take out 
together. The draw is very considerable and the 
canal itself very much larger and deeper than any 
other above it.
AFGHAN
CUT
7. A few hundred yards further down and at the point
where the Nad-i-Ali channel bends to the N. (vide 
sketch), I found that a new cut had been made by 
the Afghans which is connected apparently with 
the Shela-i-Charkh and which, at the time of my 
visit, carried off all the remaining water of the 
Nad-i-Ali channel. From this point and onwards 
as far as boundary pillar 56 I found no water in 
either the Nad-i-Ali or Sikhsar channels except
for a short distance where the united waters of
the Lakshak and Deh Dos Mahommed canals rejoin
the old bed before separating at a point known as 
"Janjal" (vide sketch).
From boundary pillar 56 and down to the head of 
the Rud-i-Gashta I found water was flowing in the 
Sikhsar channel: this was brought in from the
Afghan side (right bank) a few hundred yards to 
the north of boundary pillar No. 56 but from such 
enquiries as I had any opportunity of making, it 
was recognised that the water belonged to the
Afghans. The water followed the old Sikhsar 
channel to the spot where the Rud-i-Gashta takes 
out from it and thence onwards it was, at the 
time of my visit, dry. Opposite Deh Rasul Khan a 
cut had been made and was actually being repaired 
and cleaned by a man from Bahlol on the Afghan 
side when I passed by. This cut passes through a 
corner of Persian territory and rejoins the 
Sikhsar about half a mile further down.
I spoke to some cultivators from the Afghan side 
who met me here: they told me that the water was 
carried through the cut and on by the old Sikhsar 
channel to irrigate the country round Bahlol. At 
the time of my visit, the channel of the Sikhsar 
showed evident signs of having held water 
recently.
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JEHANABAD
CANALS
8. On my return from Deh Dost Mahommed I visited
Jehanabad and Khadung. A few days later I also 
visited Gazbar.
I found that Jehanabad and the country 
surrounding it obtained water not only from the 
Lakhs ak and the two Jahanabad canals but also 
from an old canal recently cleaned out and 
repaired which takes off some three miles below 
the "Band-i-Shah Gul.
TENDENCY OF 
WATER TO TURN 
TOWARDS KHADUNG
9. A greater proportion of the water of the Pariun
than in previous years appears to be flowing via 
Khadung and Gazbar (in this connection see 
covering letter to Water Award from the British 
Commissioner to the Afghan Commissioner dated 
16.04.06) and whereas last year the country round 
Sheikh Wasi was inundated before that round 
Gazbar, this year the reverse is the case.
10. To sum up:-
The Nad-i-Ali channel has been strengthened by a 
new cut taking out above the "Band-i-Shah Gul, 
dug by Afghans and Persians without friction.
(ii) Water channels are taken out on both 
sides of the Nad-i-Ali channel down to the 
point marked A on the sketch. At this point 
the Lakhsak and Deh Dost Mahommed canals take 
out together and thence onwards no water is 
taken by the Seistanis.
(iii) At B is the new Afghan cut and from 
such information as I could gather it was 
understood that under present conditions the
residue of the water which did not pass down 
the Lakhsak canal belonged to the Afghans 
whether conducted by the Sikhdar channel or 
not.
The Nad-i-Ali and Bahlol districts appear to 
depend entirely on this canal and it seems 
very probable that any disputes which may 
arise under the present state of affairs will 
hinge on points marked A and B on the 
sketch. Both of the canals had a strong flow 
of water at the time of my visit but I am 
inclined to think the Lakhsak has the 
advantage of being higher up the Nad-i-Ali 
channel, and should the Persians increase the 
number of their water channels, which are 
already in excess of those dug by the
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Afghans, above the Lakhsak, it is possible 
that, in a low year, sufficient water will 
not pass for the new Afghan cut.
(iv) The water of the Pariun below the 
"Band-i-Shah Gul" appears to show an even 
stronger tendency than formerly to turn to 
the west by Khadung.
(v) I heard of no disputes of any importance 
between Afghans and Persians. Undoubtedly 
the Nad-i-Ali channel is much silted up but 
the fact that a settlement such as that 
indicated at A and B has been arrived at 
between the parties tends to show that no 
serious friction exists at present.
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Appendix II
McMahon's Water Awards Final Draft
■ic-kieick
Colonel McMahon's draft Award "B", as revised with reference 
to the telegram from His Majesty's secretary of State for 
Indiaf dated the 19th December 1904 and the telegram to His 
Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated the 29th 
December 1904.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
1. General Sir Frederick Goldsmid, as Arbitrator 
between Persia and Afghanistan, was called upon to settle the 
question of rights to land and water of Persia and 
Afghanistan in Seistan. He delivered an arbitral award on 
both points in 1872, which was confirmed by His Majesty's 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and accepted by the 
Persian and Afghan Governments in 1873.
2. At the time of the above award, the Helmand River 
had one main distributary channel in Seistan, i.e., the 
Rud-i-Seistan, at the mouth of which, in order to divert 
sufficient water into this rud, was a tamarisk band known as 
the Band-i-Kohak or the Band-i-Seistan. The Helmand River 
from thence, onwards flowed in one channel past Nad Ali, and 
along what is now known as the Sikhsar, into the Naizand and 
Hamun. In 1896, a large flood caused the river to burst out 
for itself a new main channel, which left the old one near 
Shahgul, and is now known as the Rud-i-Pariun.
3. Various disputes regarding water between Persian 
and Afghan Seistan, which were caused by changes in the 
course of canals and in the course of the main river, have 
arisen since 1872. My enquiries show that these have, until 
recently, always been mutually and amicably settled by the 
responsible officials concerned on both sides, i.e., the 
Governors of Seistan and Chakansur. These officials, who 
thoroughly understood each other's water requirements, have 
always shown great tact and skill in settling water disputes 
to the mutual satisfaction of both countries.
4. Unfortunately of recent years, whatever may have 
been the cause, and whether this was due to the change in the 
course of the main stream, or to more strained relations, the
(+) Colonel McMahon's draft Award “B" in finaL text, No. 29 of FO60/728 , pp. 34 - 6.
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amicable settlement of water difficulties has been found to 
be no longer possible. A series of small, and in themselves 
unimportant, water questions arose between 1900 and 1902, 
which, by reason of estranged relations caused 
misunderstanding and increased ill feeling, until matters 
were brought to a crisis by further disputes arising from 
abnormal deficiency of water in the Helmand in 1902. This 
led to the present reference to the arbitration of the 
British Government.
5. The condition under which the present arbitration 
has been agreed to by the Governments of Persia and 
Afghanistan, is that the award should be in accordance with 
the terms of Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award.
6. In framing my award I am, therefore, restricted by 
the above condition.
7. Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award on the water 
question was as followss-
" It is to be clearly understood that no works are to be 
carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the 
requisite supply of irrigation on both banks of the 
Helmand". Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, in his capacity as the final confirming authority of 
that award, after consulting General Goldsmid, further laid 
down in 1873 that the above clause should not be understood 
to apply either to existing canals or to old or disused 
canals that it may be desired to put in proper repair, nor 
would it interfere with the excavation of new canals, 
provided that the requisite supply on both banks is not 
diminished.
8. The above award is so definite that it is 
unnecessary to make any attempt to define it further, except 
on one particular point. This award provides that Persia has 
a right to a requisite supply of water for irrigation. In 
order to prevent future misunderstanding, it only remains to 
define what amount of water fairly represents a requisite 
supply for Persian requirements.
9. From the careful and exhaustive measurements, 
observations, and enquiries made by this Mission in Seistan, 
the following facts have been clearly established:-
(a) Seistan suffers more from excess than deficiency 
of water. Far more loss is caused by damage done to land and 
crops, year after year, by floods, than is caused by want of 
water for irrigation.
(b) In only very few exceptional abnormal years of low 
river has any question of sufficiency of water arisen in 
Seistan, and then Afghan Seistan has suffered equally with 
Persian Seistan. Moreover, questions as to the sufficiency 
of water only prove serious when the spring crop cultivation 
is concerned when the river is at its lowest, i.e., between 
the autumn and spring equinoxes, yet it has been ascertained
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that only in 3 out of the past 35 years has there been any
serious deficiency of water in Seistan during that season.
It is necessary, therefore, first to consider water
requirements during the season of spring crops. Any 
settlement based on the requirements of that season will meet 
the case of the remainder of the year also.
(c) After carefully calculating the normal volume of 
the Helmund River during the period between the autumn
equinox and the spring equinox, it has been clearly 
ascertained that one-third of the water which now reaches 
Seistan at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan would amply suffice for the 
proper irrigation of all existing cultivation in Persian 
Seistan, and also allow of a large future extension of that 
cultivation. This would also leave a requisite supply for 
all Afghan requirements.
10. I therefore give the following award:-
Award.
1. No irrigation works are to be carried out on
either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply 
of water for irrigation on both banks of the river, but both 
sides have the right, within their own territories, to 
maintain existing canals, to open out old or disused canals, 
and to make new canals from the Helmand River, provided that 
the supply of water requisite for irrigation on both sides is 
not diminished.
2. The amount of water requisite for irrigation of
Persian lands irrigable from and below the Band-i-Kohak is 
one-third of the whole volume of the Helmand River which 
enters Seistan.
3. Persia is, therefore, entitled to one-third of the
whole Helmand River calculated at the point where water is 
first taken off from it to irrigate lands on either bank 
situated at or below Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.
4. Any irrigation works constructed by Afghanistan to 
divert water into Seistan lands, as above defined, must allow 
of at least one-third of the volume of the whole river being 
available for Persian use at Band-i-Kohak.
5. To enable both sides to satisfy themselves that
this award is being complied with, and at the same time to 
avoid the necessity of fresh references to (the) Government 
of India and (the) expense of special Missions, a British 
officer of Irrigation experience shall be permanently 
attached to (the) consulate at Seistan. He will be empowered 
to give an opinion, when required by either party, on any 
case of doubt or dispute over water questions that may 
arise. He will, when necessary, take steps to bring the real
facts of any case to the notice of the Government concerned. 
He will be able also to call the attention of either party to 
any important indications of threatening danger to their
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water-supply arising from natural causes of their own 
irrigation works. To enable this officer properly to fulfil
the functions of this office, free access shall be given to
him by either side, to the Helmand River and its branches and 
the heads of the canals leading therefrom.
6. The maintenance of the Band-i-Kohak is of great 
importance to the welfare of Persian Seistan. It is possible 
that the deepening of the river bed at and below the site of 
the present band may necessitate moving the band a short
distance further up the river. Afghanistan should allow
Persia to move this band, if necessary, and grant Persia the 
right to excavate the short canal required from such new band 
through Afghan territory to the Rud-i-Seistan. Similarly, 
should it become necessary for Afghanistan to move the 
present Shahgul band across the Rud-i-Pariun somewhat lower 
down that stream, Persia should (as has been done before) 
allow Afghanistan right of way for a canal through Persian 
territory from that band to the Nad Ali channel.
7. It will be noted that the rights to the Helmand 
water, which her geographical position naturally gives to 
Afghanistan as owner of the upper Helmand, have been 
restricted to the extent stated above in favour of Persia in 
accordance with Sir Frederick Goldsmid's award. It follows, 
therefore, that Persia has no right to alienate to any other 
Power the water rights thus acquired without the consent of 
Afghanistan.
8. I cannot close this award without a word of 
warning to both countries concerned. The past history of the 
Helmand River in Seistan shows that it has always been 
subject to sudden and important changes in its course which 
have, from time to time, diverted the whole river into a new 
channel, and rendered useless all the then existing canal 
systems. Such changes are liable to occur in the future, and 
great care should, therefore, be exercised in the opening out 
of new canals, or the enlargement of old canals leading from 
the Helmand. Unless this is done with proper precaution, it 
may cause the river to divert itself entirely at such points, 
and cause great loss to both countries. This danger applies 
equally to Afghanistan and Persia.
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Treaty of Hirmand Water Distribution, original text of which 
signed between Iran and Afghanistan on 26th January 1939.
Sent to this author by Document Centre of Institute of
Political and International Studies of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 8th
August 1990, Ref. 94 - /?*''
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TRANSLATION
Treaty on the division of Hirmand Water between the Imperial 
Government of Iran and the Royal Government of 
Afghanistan^"1"^
Whereas the Imperial Government of Iran and the Royal 
Government of Afghanistan were equally interested in the 
conclusion of a just treaty concerning division of the 
Hirmand water between the two countries, and in signing a 
special treaty for this purpose, they have selected their 
competent representatives of the following description:
On behalf of the Imperial Government of Iran 
His Excellency Baqer Kazemi, the Ambassador..
On behalf of the Royal Government of Afghanistan
His Excellency Ali Mohammad Khan Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Royal Government,
And the Said representatives, after exchanging letters of 
credential which established their respective competence,
agreed on the following articles:
Article I - The Governments of Iran and Afghanistan agree
to divide in equal shares all waters of 
Hirmand river which flow to the Band-e Kamal 
Khan between Iran and Afghanistan.
Article II - In order not to use more water than what is
taken now between Deh-e Chahar Borjak and 
Band-e Kamal Khan, the Government of 
Afghanistan engages not to construct any other 
stream in the said distance and even not to 
repair the existing ones.
Article III - Officials and water distributers of the two 
sides will jointly measure the volume of water 
reaching Band-e Kamal Khan in the autumn of 
every year. They will also measure the volume 
of water taken by the two sides through canals 
branching out from the Hirmand between Band-e 
Kamal Khan and Sikh-Sar, adding them to the 
table of each side's share in a way that (in 
the end) they will amount to equal shares. 
Tables of shares, names of streams and volume 
of waters flowing through the streams of each 
side will be communicated to the other side 
after being determined. They will also 
communicate to each other whatever change is
(+) Translated into English by Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, 27th March 1992.
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Article IV
Article V
Article VI
needed to be made in the said tables that is 
requiring to decrease amount in one part and 
increase same amount in another.
Tools and instruments needed for the
measurement of the water of the rivers and 
streams of the two sides will be purchased by 
the technical employees of Iran and
Afghanistan to be paid for by the two 
governments in equal shares. These tools and 
instruments will be installed in appropriate 
sites below Band-e Kamal Khan, and if needed, 
they will regulate the river course from
Band-e Kuhak to Sikh-Sar.
In order to allow just division and regulation 
of the waters of Hirmand river to take effect 
as is aimed by this treaty, technical 
employees of the two sides will construct 
permanent watersheds (water divider) in places 
they deem fit on their respective sides, and 
the expense of each construction will be met 
by the two contracting sides after agreeing on 
the project and in proportion of the volume of 
water being used by each from it.
Until permanent dams and bands are 
constructed, bands made of Gaz wood (Tamarisk) 
will continue to be built in traditional 
manner and if the two parties needed gaz wood 
from each other for this purpose, will pay 
each other accordingly.
Article VII - Whereas the mouth of the streams taking off 
directly from the Hirmand river after Band-e 
Kamal Khan and flowing in the lands of the two 
countries, is of earth, and in order to 
prevent decrease and increase in the shares of 
each of the two sides, the two governments 
undertake gradually but correctly to construct 
the said parts with brick and chalk within 
four years from the date of signing this 
treaty on their own expense.
Article VIII - The two contracting Governments engage not to 
take any step or act in any way, between 
Band-e Kamal Khan and Deh-e Dust Mohammad Khan 
and Sikh-Sar which is the last dividing point, 
that would diminish or cause decrease in the 
share of the other party from the water.
Article IX - The Governments of Iran and Afghanistan 
mutually agree to allow technical employees 
and water distributers assigned to implement 
above measures and also other employees 
assigned to construct, regulate and clear the 
bands and streams between Band-e Kuhak and 
Sikh-Sar which necessitate entering the 
territory of the other side, to travel unarmed 
and with permission to each others territory.
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Notes - Instruments, tools and other objects that the
said employees and officials may need for 
implementation of the above measures or for 
living after crossing the borders will be 
exempted from custom duties.
Article X In the event of Hirmand river changing its
course above Band-e Kamal Khan into a new 
channel, the terms of Article I will apply to 
another spot, which will take the place of 
Bande Kamal Khan within the limits of 
Chokhansur, with the agreement of the two 
governments. If the river was to change its 
course below Band-e Kamal Khan into a new 
channel or if the existing channel deepened to 
the extent that irrigation of Sistan lands 
became impossible, the two governments agree 
to consider a separate arrangement to the 
satisfaction of both sides, allowing for the 
same amount of water determined in Article I 
to be used for irrigation of lands in Sistan.
Article XI - Any differences occurring in the application 
of these regulations the solution of which is 
beyond the ability and/or competence of the 
water distributers and other officials named 
above, will be referred to the Governor and 
Director of Finance of Sistan on behalf of the 
Iranian Government and the Governor and 
Director of Finance of Chokhansur on behalf of 
the Afghanistan Government or their 
representatives to be solved and the judgement 
arrived at unanimously by this group will be 
decisive. If the cause of differences was not 
so settled, it will be referred to the 
political centres of the two countries, within 
two months from the date of its occurrence, to 
be solved speedily and decisively.
Article XII - The two contracting parties undertake, 
whenever subjects of one of them disturbed the 
method of utilisation of water below Band-e 
Kamal Khan as defined in this treaty or 
violated regulations laid down here, to take 
immediate action on their own soil to make 
good the damage and to bring the guilty 
individuals to legal prosecution.
Article XIII - Within two months from the date of signing the 
treaty, the two contracting parties will 
inform border officials and inhabitants of the 
vicinity of the river in their own territories 
of the terms of arrangements for the 
utilisations of Hirmand water and their shares 
from Band-e Kamal Khan.
Article XIV - Each one of the two contracting parties will 
appoint an official for the purposes of 
reference and observation of implementation of 
this treaty soon after signing this treaty and 
will introduce him to the other party in 
writing.
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Article XV - This treaty will be ratified by the competent 
authorities of the two governments within 
three months of the date of being signed and 
the ratified instrument will be exchanged in 
Kabul.
Article XVI - This treaty will come into force after the 
exchange of the instruments of ratification.
This treaty is written in two copies in Persian and both 
copies will be valid. In witness whereof the competent 
representatives of the two sides have signed and sealed this 
treaty. Dated Kabul the sixth of Bahman (Dalv) of 1317 (26th 
of January 1939). Signed the Ambassador of the Imperial 
Government of Iran, Baqer Kazemi. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Royal Government of Afghanistan, Ali Mohammad,
Appendix IV
Original Persian text of joint communique signed and sealed 
on 26th of January 1939 by Baqer Kazemi/ Ambassador of the 
Imperial Government of Iran in Kabul, and Ali Mohammad Khan 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Royal Government of 
Afghanistan.
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Colonel Sir T. Hangerford Holdich, a prominent administrator
of the British Indian Government at the end of the nineteenth
century and Lord George Curzon of Kedleston,^) Viceroy of
India at the time, were in favour of the so-called "natural
boundaries". This is not to be confused with the French
concept of "frontieres naturelles" which considers frontier
(2)as being a line in space to be secured and maintained.' J
Both Curzon and Holdich made an immense impact on the
formation of the Eastern Iranian boundaries. Holdich
actually delimited, in 1895, the northern section of the
British-Iranian boundaries of Baluchistan. Writing in 1916
on his delimitation of the said boundaries, Holdich stated
that no more perfect boundary could be devised than that of
(3 )the mountains and rivers combined.' }
Curzon and Holdich's views of "natural boundaries" were 
subsequently discredited for having disregarded the human 
dimension of boundary organisation as they did in the case of 
Khorasan, Sistan and Baluchistan where indigenous populations 
were divided between neighbouring countries.
Representing the eastward limits of jurisdiction of the state 
of Iran, the Eastern Iranian boundaries are the spatial 
manifestation of political push against one another, in the 
nineteenth century, of Iran and British India.
<1) See Holdich, Colonel T. Hangerford, ‘Political Frontiers and Boundary-Making", Macmillan,
London 1916, and Curzon, of Kedleston, Lord George, "Frontiers*, "The Romanes Lecture, 
University of Oxford 1907", Oxford University Press 1908.
(2) See Gottmann, Jean, "Evolution of the Concept of Territory", Social Science Information, 
Paris 1975, Vol. 14, Nos. 3/4.
(3) Holdich, CoLonel T. Hangerford, “PoLiticaL Frontiers and Boundary Making", London 1916.
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Commenting on the southern section of these boundaries, from 
a British Indian point of view, Colonel Holdich, describes
this "push" from the Iranian side, in the following words:
"....the Persians practically settled the question of 
Kohuk hy military occupation, and they had gone on 
pushing their claims and their raids further and 
further east until a definite limit to their
aggressions became a political necessity."(1)
The Eastern Iranian boundaries, meanwhile, indirectly 
represented geographical frontiers of political rivalries 
between Britain and Russia in the nineteenth century, the 
latter perceived by the former at the time as being in
alliance with Iran against her interests in India. However
unrealistic this perception may appear now, it was most
serious at the time and British India had every reason to 
have anxieties over the strategic sensitivities of the 
position of Iran and her dependencies of Afghanistan between 
the two super powers of the time. The laxity and lack of 
political initiative which were the mark of the Qajar regime 
in Iran, and their frequently signed but meaningless treaties 
with France and Russia (Britain's main rivals in global 
imperialism) did little to lessen the anxieties of British 
India. This whole situation could not lead to any other 
result but territorial contentions in the Eastern Iranian 
borderlands where British India desperately sought to create 
a zone of safety (a buffer zone) between herself and Russia. 
This development led to what was known then as the "Great 
Game" of geopolitics between Britain and Russia, to which 
Iran (Persia) was also a party as far as delimitation of her 
eastern frontiers was concerned. Iran was suspected by the 
British of collusion with Russia against British possessions 
in india and against British India's peripheral strategic 
sensitivities. These suspicions, though based on logical 
assumptions, did not have actual foundations. Time itself 
has proved that Iran was too weak and her leaders too 
ignorant of geopolitical games of the time to involve herself 
in acts of conspiracy with one neighbouring giant against the
(1) HoLdich, ColoneL Sir T. Hangerford, “The Indian BorderLands 1880 - 1900*, London 1901, p. 
317.
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other. Nonetheless, her weakness was indeed a matter of 
concern to the British. When it came to territorial disputes 
and boundary delimitation, these handicaps of Iran 
demonstrated themselves in an unmistakable manner. The 
Eastern Iranian boundaries were, as a consequence, designed 
to suit India's strategic needs and nothing else. Holdich 
asserts s
"A consulate had been formed at Kirman (the most
important town in eastern Persia south of Mashad) and 
the establishment of this political link between 
Tehran and India had been attended with the happiest 
results* It is to the political influence thus
acquired, as well as to the possession of sound
geographical knowledge, that the rapid success of the 
efforts of Government to settle once for all the 
vexations of border disputes with Persia must be
ascribed."(1)
Compared with the general weakness of the central Government 
in Iran, and the weak ties between it and the dependencies 
far and wide, the frontier-keeping states of the peripheries 
of Iran proper, played a major role, not only in safeguarding 
the frontiers but also in the actual survival of the country 
as a whole. In fact, it was their power and their influence 
that has brought Iran safely out of many periods of political 
chaos and disarray throughout her history.
Fully equipped with the philosophy and tradition of Iranian 
Political leadership, examined in the general introduction to 
this work on "the evolution of state and boundaries in Iran", 
the homogenous regions and amirdoms in Iran constantly 
strengthened their positions, awaiting to take over the 
leadership of the country whenever weakness and decay in the 
political centre triggered the process of disintegration of 
the central power and dispersion of peripheral dependencies.
This was the case of Nader Shah's accession, and when he was 
assassinated in June 1747, with the consequent chaos in the 
country, many leaders of regions and amirdoms, who had been 
loyal to him, opted for leadership of Iran, one of whom was 
Amir Alam Khan I, the Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat who almost
(1) Holdich, op. cit., p. 317.
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succeeded in establishing the Khozeimeh dynasty of Iranian 
leadership. He was murdered in 1749 before fulfilling this 
ambition, whereas his rivals divided Nader Shah's realm into 
two countries: Ahmad Khan Abdali (Dorrani) created
Afghanistan and Mohammad Hassan Khan and his son Agha 
Mohammad Khan established the Qajar dynasty in the rest of 
Iran, which was replaced, at the depth of its decadence in 
1924, by the Pahlavis who, in turn, were replaced by the 
Islamic Republic in 1979. This politically upward movement 
of Iran's peripheral political units has had two prominent 
features; firstly it encouraged rivalries among them which 
eventually shaped most of the internal political structure of 
the country. This internal political structure and 
administrative divisions - as can be seen even at the present 
time - are less geographically oriented than they are 
regionally and ethnically inclined, in some cases still 
representing the domains of the old socio-political regions, 
i.e., vassal kingdoms and amirdoms: the second feature was
the relative absence of regionalism of a separatist nature 
among the peripheral autonomies of the frontier-keeping 
states of Iran proper. In most cases they adhered loyally to
the force that had succeeded in taking over the leadership of
the country. The Amirdom of the Khozeimeh, particularly 
examined in this work, was probably the best example in this 
regard. Writing on the uprising of Khorasan Gendarmerie in 
1921, led by Colonel Mohammad Taghi Pessian, and the efforts 
of Amir Mohammad Ebrahim Khan Shokat al-Molk II, the then 
Khozeimeh Amir of Qaenat and Sistan in mediating between the 
Government and the Colonel, an author who seems to be
familiar with the role of the Khozeimehs in southern
Khorasan, describes Shokat al-Molk's loyalty to the Central 
Government of Iran in the following words:
"Obeying the orders of the centre meant to him as 
guarantee of continuation of the simple living 
standards of the people and of the survival of his own 
rule. Whether Qajar was in power in the centre or 
Pahlavi, made no difference to him. He was loyal to 
the centre."(1J
(1) Bahar, Dr. Mehrdad, "Dar Bareh-e Qeyam-e Jandarmeri-e Khorasan = On the Uprising of Khorasan 
Gendarmerie", Tehran 1990, p. 21 introduction.
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In a telegram to Colonel Pessian, Amir Shokat al-Molk himself 
states:
"..••What can I do? I consider myself as the obedient 
servant of the Government, and therefore, cannot 
disobey the orders of the Government. ..."(*)
The one and only reason that has guaranteed survival of the 
Khozeimeh Amirdom throughout the ages and kept it in favour 
with various dynasties coming and going in Iran was this 
undivided loyalty to the Central Government of Iran, 
regardless of the origin of the dynasty in power in the 
centre. In other words, it made no difference to their 
loyalty to the centre-whether the centre was in the hands of 
the Abbasid Arabs or the Mongolian Holaku Khan: the Safavid 
Seyyeds or the Afshar Sunnis: the Qajari Turkmans or
Mazandarani Pahlavis - they were loyal to the centre.
The frontier-keeping states and amirdoms of Iran, however, 
played an undisputedly significant role in safeguarding 
Iran's unity and integrity and in determining the present 
shape of the international boundaries of the country. The 
significance of their role is particularly more noticeable in 
the Eastern Iranian frontiers.
In the Eastern Iranian borderlands, many such amirdoms and 
families can be singled out. Historically, the more notable 
families of Taherids of Khorasan and Saffarids of Sistan 
waged many wars on the non-Iranian forces in the west, 
particularly against the Caliphate of Baghdad, not only to 
secure their own region's freedom, but also for the 
independence of Iran as a whole, preferably under their own 
rule,
In more recent centuries, such families as the Keyanis, 
Khozeimehs, Hazaras, Barakzais, Abdalis, Kalalis, Teymuris, 
Surbandis, Shahrakis, Nahrueis, Sheibanis, Sanjaranis and so 
on, have each played a role of some significance in shaping 
the history and the boundaries of Eastern Iran. Among these
(1) Bahar, op. cit., p. 65, telegram from Birjand to Mashhad, dated 9 Sonboleh 1300 (31st August 
1921).
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families, none has influenced political geography of the 
Eastern Iranian borderlands as significantly as did the 
Khozeimehs. Their Amirdom, probably the best example of the 
frontier-keeping states in post-Islamic Iran, has been 
involved in regional and tribal rivalries with those of the 
surrounding areas for at least three centuries, beginning 
from the time of the later Safavid Shahs until early 
twentieth century. Their territorial and political rivalries 
with the tribes and Amirs of Western Afghanistan, in 
particular, have been a dominant factor in determining the 
present boundaries between Iran and Afghanistan in the Qaenat 
and Sistan regions.
At least in three sections of the Eastern Iranian boundaries, 
the impact of the role of Khozeimeh Amirs directly influenced 
boundary delimitation in favour of Iran:
1. In Sistan, the role that was cast by Amir Alam Khan
III Heshmat Al-Molk, made the British arbitrator take
his power and influence in that region into account.
The arbitrator wrote to his Government, advising them
of the "great power of the Ameer of Kain" and his
(1)refusal of "discussing present possessions".' '
Based on this information, the Government of British
India informed the British officer accompanying the
Afghan Commissioner that "Persia holds chief part of
Sistan so firmly that arbitral opinion must be in
(2 \favour of Persia...."' } The arbitration
commission, as a result of Amir Alam Khan's display 
of power and influence resolved that Sistan should be 
partitioned and divided between Iran and Afghanistan, 
instead of being handed over to the Afghans in its 
entirety.
The boundary in this section was drawn in a delta 
shape to include the western half of Sistan in 
Iranian territory.
(1) From General GoLdsmid to Foreign Secretary CaLcutta, dated 12th April 1872, FO 60/392 •
(2) From Foreign Secretary Calcutta to General Pollock, dated 27th April 1872, No. 1Q42P, FO 
60/392 *
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2 - The Baluchistan boundary arbitration of 1895 included
the district of Mirjaveh (an obvious Iranian
possession) in the Kalat territory. The decision was
protested to by the Iranians, but to no avail. The
Anglo-Russian rivalries in Sistan, on the other hand,
intensified to a degree that the British felt their
prestige in the region would be "gravely 
(1)injured"' ' if the Russians succeeded in securing 
Amir Ali Akbar Khan Khozeimeh's dismissal from the 
governorship of Sistan. The Russians were conspiring 
with the Government in Tehran to dismiss the Amir for 
having protected British lives and property in a 
disturbance which was initiated by Russian agents 
against the British diplomatic mission in Sistan in 
July 1903. The British found it necessary to 
compromise this situation with the Iranians in return 
for boundary adjustments in Baluchistan. They agreed 
in March 1905 to recognise Mirjaveh district, 
connecting the northern section of Baluchistan 
boundaries to the southern sections of Sistan 
boundaries in a stretch of 300 miles, as an Iranian 
possession in return for "concessions in Sistan", 
namely, retaining Amir Ali-Akbar Khan Khozeimeh in 
power as the hereditory Governor of the province.
3 - When the southern section of the Khorasan boundaries
with Afghanistan was being determined by the Turkish 
arbitration in 1935, the land and water holdings of 
Amir Masum Khan Hesam Ad-Doleh and his son Amir 
Hussein Khan Khozeime Alam and his brother Amir 
Mohammad Reza Khan Khozeimeh in Yazdan district were 
too strongly in evidence to be disregarded by the 
arbitrator. The boundary line in Yazdan vicinity 
was, consequently, drawn in a delta shape to include 
that district within Iranian territories.
Apart from these, the Khozeimeh family's deep concern of the
developments in the borderlands of Qaenat and Sistan,
(1) From H. Dobbs, H.B. Majesty's ConsuL for Sistan to the Indian Government, dated 7th July 
1903.
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stemming from their immediate political and economic 
interests in those borderlands, together with their knowledge 
of the region and its borders, were considered as an asset by 
the central Governments of Iran who assigned, on many 
occasions, members of the family to negotiate with the 
Afghans for border settlement. Amir Shokat al-Molk's mission 
of 1930 and Amir Hussein Khan Khozeime Alain's mission of 1956 
in Washington were of more noticeable missions of this kind, 
whereas when Mohammad Reza Shah decided in 1969 to have
direct dialogue with the leaders of Afghanistan, he deputed 
his powerful Court Minister, Amir Assadollah Alam to carry
out, on his behalf, confidential negotiations with the king
and Prime Minister of Afghanistan.^1^
These instances of Khozeimeh Amirs' power and influence 
directly affecting the evolution of the Eastern Iranian 
boundaries, in addition to the wider impact of their role in 
shaping the political geography of Eastern Iranian 
borderlands, are manifestations of the impact of the
peripheral autonomies on the safeguarding of the territorial 
integrity of Iran. The concerns of the Khozeimeh family with 
farming and irrigation gave them the local knowledge and 
economic incentive to fight for a maximalist portion of both 
territory and above all water supply in the south east 
region. Insofar as these local family interests coincided 
closely with national policies, Iran benefited from the 
activities of its regional elite. When local advice, inter 
alia from the Khozeimehs, was ignored by the Iranian central 
authorities, national interests were also badly served as is 
illustrated by the continuing border problems faced in Sistan 
Basin and adjacent territories. Whereas these peripheral 
autonomies performed successfully their role of defending the 
country's territorial integrity within their immediate 
jurisdictions, the weakness of the Central Government of Iran 
resulted in a reverse consequence.
(1) Alam, AsadoLLah "The Shah and I*, Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969 - 1977, ed. 
ALinaghi Alikhani, London I.B. Tauris 1991, Diary of Sunday 16th March 1969, p. 41.
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The arbitration awards of the Sistan boundaries of 1872 and 
1905, and the Khorasan boundaries of 1891 and 1935 and the 
delimitation agreements of Baluchistan boundaries of 1871 and 
1896, have resulted in the loss of much of the territories 
traditionally belonging to Iran, in some cases in actual 
Iranian possession for a considerable length of time. This 
was due to two factors: first, the strategic considerations
of the British Indian Government which were wholly based on 
the want of pushing their own frontiers with Iran in
Baluchistan and those of their protectorate of Afghanistan in 
Khorasan and Sistan as far west as it was possible. This 
strategy was mainly motivated by a strong conviction that the 
Russians had firm plans to threaten India via Iran and that 
the Iranians, having occupied India in the times of Nader
Shah (1732 - 1747), would always remain a source of threat to 
the security of India or her weakness would encourage the
Russians to use her territory as the road to India: second, 
and more importantly, it was because of the weakness,
incompetence, ignorance and lack of responsibility which were 
the trademark of the Qajar rule in Iran, particularly that of 
Naser ad-Din Shah.
The decline of Iran's power began with the treaties of
Golestan (1813) and Turkmanchai (1828) which resulted in the 
secession of a number of Iran's northern provinces to the
Russians as well as in the expansion of foreign influence in 
the country and among the ruling class. This political
decline together with the ignorance and incompetence of the 
administrations and the irresponsible manner in which the
Shah and his ministers conducted the affairs of the state 
resulted in the loss of territories all around Iran.
Naser ad-Din Shah himself, for instance, presented the
Hashtadan Plain to the Afghans out of his "feelings of 
friendship towards the British Government", an unbelievable 
act of ignorance, stemming from lack of responsibility that 
gave the Russians and the French the impression that Iranian 
territories were up for grabs. Iran lost territories to the 
British protectorate of Kalat in much the same way. The
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Shah's Government made their acceptance of the boundary 
delimitation proposal of the British Indian authorities in 
187 0 conditional on the commissioners of the two sides only 
surveying and drawing up their maps of the frontier areas, 
but the actual delimitation would take place through 
negotiations in Tehran. In practice, they did not even care 
to see their own commissioner's map and not only had they not 
asked the opinion of their commissioner, but also limited 
their so-called negotiations to one meeting between their 
Foreign Minister and the British Minister at Tehran during 
which the British commissioner's boundary proposals and map 
were accepted as the final settlement of Baluchistan 
frontiers, save for the Shah's own demand for Kuhak to be 
given to Iran. Having, thus recognised Khan of Kalat's 
status as a protectorate of British India and having 
abandoned Iran's historical rights in Kalat and East Makran, 
the Iranian Foreign Minister demanded in 1876 that as Kalat’s 
status was changing (an internal affair of British India), 
the abandoned Iranian rights to that "province" should be 
revived. These meaningless demands were withdrawn as soon as 
a strong reply was given by the British Government:
"At Lord Salisbury's suggestion, the Persian 
Government was given to understand that the policy of 
Her Majesty's Government in regard to Kalat was not 
liable to be affected by the assertion of any 
reversionary or contingent claims of Persia to the 
territories now ruled by the Khan. It was held that 
the Shah's formal acceptance of Mr Alison's letter of 
1st September 1871, submitting General Goldsmid's 
boundary decision, was a final abandonment of Persian 
claims, of whatever value these might be, based on the 
short-lived and long-dead empire of Nadir Shah."(l)
Not only did this strongly worded response silence the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry, but also took away from them the 
natural courage of trying to put the history of the argument 
right: that Nader Shah's "short-lived empire" was not the
beginning and end of Iran in South-West Asia; that it was 
just another revival of Iran; that it was only the revival of 
the Safavid Empire within its borders of nearly three
(1) Extract of Confidential Memorandum of Boundary between Persia and North-west Baluchistan,
dated 19th September 1893, p. 8, FO 60/627 ■
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centuries, after a short ten year period of confusion caused 
by the Afghan rebels in Iran.
The extent of ignorance of the Iranian authorities in matters 
of such magnitude as maintaining the country's territorial 
integrity did not escape the attention of rival powers. The 
British Minister at Tehran for instance, reported to his 
Government:
"At the outset of this negotiation the Persian 
Government advanced some very extravagant claims; but 
happily the Persian Foreign Office is exceedingly 
ignorant both of the course of former correspondence 
and of the situation on the frontier. Its claims were 
consequently based on assertion which were not 
difficult to disprove."(*)
Now that all this is history and Iran is contented within its 
present boundaries, if the Iranians were to look back and 
seek reasons for the loss of valuable territories to the 
neighbouring countries, they should not look further than the 
incompetence and ignorance of those who ruled their country 
at the time of boundary delimitation.
A strong factor that can affect Eastern Iranian boundaries in 
the future, is the fact that these boundaries, in many cases, 
partition districts of the same characteristics with people 
of the same ethnicities. This situation is more pronounced 
in Sistan where Hirmand waters are vital to the existence of 
the population on both sides. Hence, and since these 
boundaries are not firmly established in many parts, they 
could constitute a continued source of friction between Iran 
and her two eastern neighbours. In fact, Hirmand water 
disputes have never ceased keeping Iran and Afghanistan apart.
Disputes over the use of water from Hirmand river continued 
between the Iranians and the Afghans as from 1929, mainly 
because the latter had been trying to draw more water from 
the river than the two-thirds which was awarded to them by 
the McMahon arbitration of 1903.
(1) CLause 3 of letter from Durand, H.B. Majesty's Minister at Tehran to the Marquis of
Salisbury, No. 5, dated Tehran January 20th 1896, FO 60/627 ■
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It was reported in 1931 that the Afghans began clearing the
bed of the old Shahi canal, above Band Sistan, which, if
used, would deprive Sistan of w a t e r . T h e  dispute
continued until 1935, when the Altay arbitration work was
completed and pressure exerted by the Government of Reza Shah
resulted in the signing of a new treaty whereby, the boundary
line was put in the middle of the river and the water divided
12 )equally between the two countries.' ' Article I of the 
treaty reads:
"The two powers will divide the water of the Hirmand, 
throughout the year, in equal portions. from the Band 
Kamal Khan."(3)
This agreement, though a significant improvement, from the 
Iranian point of view, failed to put an end to the border 
disputes. The Afghans, with the help of the Americans, 
constructed a number of dams and canals, diverting more than 
half of the water of the Hirmand before reaching Iranian
borders, and thus, depriving a highly fertile and populous
region of its badly needed water.
The dispute continued in the Hirmand delta, and even the
(4)
Sadabad pact' ' of 1937 - giving implicit recognition to
the existing boundary arrangements in the region - did not
put an end to the differences. The Afghans' continued
diversion of water from the Hirmand before it reaches the 
Band Kamal Khan, further aggravates Sistan’s deprivation of 
the Hirmand river and is leading to a large scale 
geographical disaster.
Sistan, frequently referred to in the historical documents, 
as the "bread basket" of Khorasan, owed much of its economic 
life to the free flow of Hirmand waters and Lake Hamun. This
<1) Deciphered telegram from the Government of India to the Secretary of State, dated 16th
November 1931, FO 371/15550.
(2) From British Legation, Tehran, to Foreign Office, dated 14th November 1935, No. 6213, FO 
371/19408.
(3) Translation from the French text as appeared in the JournaL de Tehran, FO 371/23264. The
original text of the treaty as exists in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is in 
Persian language but without reference number.
(4) Both Iran and Afghanistan, together with Turkey and Iraq were signatory to this treaty.
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highly fertile province is now gradually turning into a 
parched land.
Lake Hamun, described by G.P. Tate at the turn of the 
twentieth century as being something like 150,000 square 
miles, has gradually diminished and with it is going
almost the whole of the Neizar and its related economic life 
with disastrous environmental consequences for both Sistan of 
Iran and Nimrouz of Afghanistan. Hamun, the only fresh water 
lake in Asia, not only is the main source of irrigation in 
Sistan, other than Hirmand, but also provides many 
water-associated economic activities such as fishing, hunting 
in the Neizar, ferrying goods and passengers across the lake, 
has a pivotal role in the living of the Sistan population. 
With the diminished body of the lake and the Neizar, all 
these economic activities are diminishing, while the damage 
to the agricultural life of the province have forced many of 
the local population to migrate from Sistan.
In her long efforts to settle this problem, Iran rarely faced 
Afghanistan herself. Iran had to deal with the British in 
Afghanistan in the beginning, whose role was, to some extent, 
replaced by that of the Americans who constructed many dams 
and diversion canals on the Hirmand during the first half of 
the twentieth century. As from the beginning of the second 
half of the twentieth century, Afghanistan gradually went 
under the influence of the Soviet Union until it was occupied 
by the Soviets in 1980. Two gaps appeared between the 
durations of foreign domination in Afghanistan:
1 - The first gap appeared in the 1920's and 1930 's,
between the end of British domination and the 
beginning of American influence. This duration of 
lack of foreign domination in Afghanistan coincided 
with the growing power and influence of Iran under 
Reza Shah Pahlavi whose Government succeeded in 
concluding the 1939 agreement with Afghanistan,
(1) Tate, G.P., “The Frontier of Baloochistan = Travel on the Borders of Persia and
Afghanistan", London 1909, p. 237.
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whereby Hirmand waters were divided equally between 
the two countries from below Band-e Kamal Khan.
2 - The second gap appeared in the 1960's and early
1970's when Afghanistan was relatively free from 
political domination of foreign powers. Although 
Soviet influence was on the increase in this period, 
Soviet agents were not, as yet, in control of Afghan 
foreign relations. This period coincided with Iran's 
growing power and influence in the region. Yet, 
Iran's approach to her border problems with 
Afghanistan appears strangely weak and almost 
incomprehensible. Notwithstanding the fact that by 
the conclusion of the 1939 treaty with Afghanistan, 
half of Hirmand's waters, from Band-e Kamal Khan 
downwards, belonged to Iran, Tehran's representatives 
argued for 52 cubic metres per second of Hirmand's 
water in the 1959 Washington negotiations. Later on 
Iran dropped her demands from this figure and Prime 
Minister Hoveida accompanied by his Minister of Plan 
and Budget, Safi Asfia, signed, in 1973, a new 
agreement with the Afghan Government whereby Iran was 
given 22 c.m. per second (1) of Hirmand water as her 
share, with an additional 4 c.m. per second as purchase.
This abortive agreement, could seriously jeopardise Sistan's 
life if ratified and implemented. In search for justifiable 
reasons for the manner in which Iran's border interests were 
handled by the Government of the time, this author 
interviewed Dr Ali Naghi Alikhani, a prominent member of 
Iran's Government in the 1960's and early 1970's, on Saturday 
4th April 1992. Dr Alikhani gave the following
assertion on the general policies of Iran towards Afghanistan:
"In view of the fact that Soviet influence was on the 
increase in Afghanistan, the Iranian Government began 
to be increasingly agitated by the prospect of Soviet 
domination of that country which could bring that 
power as close to the Strait of Hormuz, frequently 
referred to by the Shah as the 'jugular vein of Iran 
and the W e s t a s  300 miles. To avoid such
(1) FakhariF Gholam—rera, Ekhtelaf—© Dolatein—e Iran va Afghanistan dar Hored—© Rud**e Hirmand” m Dispute between 
Iran and Afghanistan in the issae of Hirmand River, Tehran 1993, p.74.
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eventualities, Tehran committed herself to a policy of 
encouraging Afghanistan to move away from the Soviet 
influence and to join the Western camp under the 
Iranian influence. Hence, not only did Iran give 
Afghanistan financial and economic assistance and 
granted her such concessions as road links to the 
Persian Gulf through Iranian territories, hut also 
moderated her demands in border disputes with that 
country...."
This view is supported by a number of assertions by Amir 
Assadollah Alam, the Court Minister of Mohammad Reza Shah, in 
his confidential diary. These assertions are as follows;
Sunday, 16th July 1969;
"HIM is particularly concerned by the situation in 
Afghanistan and thinks that before long there may be a 
leftist coup, mounted under the cover of religion, as 
in the Sudan. The Afghans regularly send their 
students and even their servicemen to study in 
Russia, They have also allowed in the Chinese to 
oversee major development programmes. The Afghan 
regime, if not the country, becomes shakier day by 
day. All of which is of tremendous significance from 
our point of view...."(1)
Thursday, 5th February 1970;
"We ought to extend (to Afghanistan) transit
facilities and make various other concessions,
including an offer of favourable terms for the sale of 
oil.... if only to reduce their dependence on China 
and the Soviets...."(2)
This assertion is in keeping with Iran's regional role in the 
1970's and if accepted as the main reason behind moderating 
her rights in the border river to the level of 1973 abortive 
agreement, Tehran must have hoped to replace that agreement 
with a more realistic one at a future date.
(1) Alam, Asadollah, “The Shah and I" Confidential Diary of Iran's RoyaL Court, 1969 - 1977, ed. 
by ALinaghi Alikhani, London I.B. Tauris 1991, p. 79.
(2) Alam, op. cit., p. 128.
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Whatever the reason for Iran's shortcomings in Hirmand water 
disputes, the consequences for Sistan has been and will 
continue to be disastrous unless the issue is treated 
amicably and justly by both parties with the following
recommendations to be considered as prerequisites for such a 
settlement:
1 Complete depolitisation of the Hirmand issue both in
Afghanistan and in Sistan. Hirmand has never been a 
national issue in Iran since McMahon's water and 
boundary awards of 1905.
2 Both nations of Iran and Afghanistan to become fully and
consciously aware of the fact that Hirmand river, below 
the confluence of Arghandab, particularly below Band-e 
Kamal Khan, is not the exclusive right of either one of 
them, and that each of Sistan and Nimrouz provinces of 
Iran and Afghanistan respectively has its rights to the
river in accordance with its geographical situation and
its water needs.
3 Carrying out thorough surveys of agricultural lands and 
irrigation possibilities in Sistan and Nimrouz provinces 
and determining the scale of the annual water needs of 
each.
4 Distributing the Hirmand waters to Sistan and Nimrouz 
provinces in accordance with the determined annual water 
needs of each.
5 Undertaking joint ventures for investment on 
construction of regulatory and reservoir dams in 
suitable places below the confluence of Arghandab.
6 Embankment and regulation of the course of branches and 
channels on both sides to prevent wastage.
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7 Embankment of Lake Hamun and rehabilitation of the Shila 
Shallaq.
8 Establishing at Kuhak on the Parian-e Moshtarak a
permanent dam with sluice gates to regulate subdivisions 
of waters between Iran and Afghanistan in that section.
9 Implementation of a rational canalisation to ensure an 
equitable distribution of the irriguous waters, 
eliminating wastage and unlawful uses of the waters.
10 Construction of reservoir dams wherever possible to
conserve flood waters in the two provinces of Sistan and 
Nimrouz, which will be of noticeable consequence to the 
irrigation needs of the region.
The Iran-Afghanistan disputes on the Hirmand water rights, 
however, have played a major role in the two countries' 
relationships, preventing cooperation between the two, and 
will continue to do so unless these disputes are settled
justly. Considering the positive impacts of the changed
global geopolitical structure in the wake of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, and with the changed 
political structure in both Iran and Afghanistan, any hopes 
of a just settlement of this issue is not too unrealistic.
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